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 Abstract 
BETWEEN FAITH AND SCIENCE: GREGORY OF RIMINI ON THEOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN HIS FOURTEENTH-CENTURY CONTEXT 
 
By Jeffrey C. Witt 
Directed by Jean-Luc Solère 
 
The professional theologian attempts to distinguish herself by claiming some kind of 
“epistemic advance” over the person of mere belief. This claim to knowledge—and the 
relation of this knowledge to the other sciences—can therefore be subject to 
philosophical analysis. What is the subject matter of this discipline? What is the method 
by which it secures its results? And how does its practitioner “know” when she has 
passed beyond mere belief? 
The theologians of the high and late Middle Ages faced a unique historical 
challenge. At this time, “theology” first emerged as a distinct academic discipline, and 
the theological doctors were perpetually engaged in a debate about the exact nature of 
theology. On the one hand, they were eager to assert that theology made a real epistemic 
contribution that should be respected by the other sciences. On the other hand, these same 
theologians struggled with the fact that their discipline did not neatly meet the conditions 
of epistēmē or scientia laid down by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics.  
The main historical focus of this study is Gregory of Rimini, an Augustinian 
hermit, who flourished in the mid-fourteenth century. But I aim to consider Rimini’s 
thought as embedded within its fourteenth-century context. Within the writings of Rimini 
 and his interlocutors, the main conceptual focus of this study is on the debates about how 
the components of a science (subject, object, premises, etc.) are employed in a 
theological discourse. I also consider whether and how the results of this discipline 
should be counted as a genuine science. 
The first part of the study is concerned with some preliminary debates. Here I 
look at how theology distinguishes itself from metaphysics and why a separate discipline 
called theology is needed. These questions fall under the categories of the subject matter 
and purpose of theology. They involve extensive definitions and clarifications about the 
meaning of the “subject” of any science, what constitutes a true “practice,” and how 
“knowledge” does or does not extend to “practices.” On the question of the subject of 
theology, Gregory of Rimini can be seen as closely following the intellectual father of his 
Order, Giles of Rome. Rimini, like Giles, sees theology as an intellectual discipline that 
does not extend to all that is knowable about God, but only to God as viewed from a 
specific vantage point. On the purpose of a theological discipline, Rimini follows the 
tradition of his order in emphasizing love as the primary goal of the theological endeavor, 
but shows some independence from Giles in asserting that this knowledge should be 
considered “practical knowledge” rather than “affective knowledge.” In emphasizing 
theology’s role as directive of the proper love of God, Rimini opposes the position of his 
main interlocutor, Peter Aureoli, who uniquely suggests that theology should be 
understood as primarily directive of a separate act of faith and only indirectly directive of 
an act of love. 
 The second part of the study turns to the question of method and the epistemic 
status of the results claimed within the theological discipline.  Part two looks first at the 
ideas of theological method and its scientific status in the work of Giles of Rome. It then 
considers the development of his ideas in two Augustinians writing at the turn of the 
fourteenth-century: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio. The study then turns to 
an alternative view of theological method advanced by Peter Aureoli and the reception of 
his position first by William of Ockham and then Gregory of Rimini. Having articulated 
Rimini’s disagreements with Aureoli and Ockham and having considered his own 
positive position, the final chapter turns to identify precisely the kind of “knowledge,” 
scientific or otherwise, that Rimini’s methodology produces. 
Part II is the heart of the dissertation. The general thesis is that two distinct 
traditions emerge. One tradition, associated primarily with Peter Aureoli, looks to provide 
a kind of justification for theology among the other sciences. It focuses on finding 
reasons that would strengthen and support, albeit not demonstrate, the claims of faith, 
reasons that would hold sway even with those outside the religious community. For 
some, like Peter Aureoli, this meant trying to find supportive probable reasons that would 
bolster and direct the claims of faith. But for others, like Francis of Marchia, this meant 
finding a way to declare that theology was a true science, which can provide “evidence” 
for the claims of faith. Distinctive of this trend is the sharp divide between the habit of 
faith (which belongs to every believer) and the habit of theology (which uniquely belongs 
to the professionally trained theologian).  
 The second tradition, which I label the Aegidian tradition, and of which I argue 
Rimini should be counted as a member, describes the theologian as more internally 
focused—focused on the deduction and clarification of the consequences of belief. On 
this view, the distinctive mark of the theologian is his or her ability to make explicit what 
the simple believer only believes implicitly. This position closely assimilates faith and 
theology, claiming that theology never proceeds beyond faith nor finds alternative points 
of justification for its claims. This conception of theology is less concerned with 
legitimization and justification in the eyes of the other sciences. Rather, its primary aim 
lies in the ability to establish and prove the consequences of what the members of the 
religious community implicitly claim to believe. Thus, the unique ability (and claim to 
knowledge) possessed by the professional is the power of “self-description.” 
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Introduction 
 | 1 
Between Faith and Science: this title pinpoints the unique philosophical and 
conceptual tension that this dissertation will examine historically. Before turning to the 
historical details and the reason for our historical choice, we need to say something about 
the larger problem. 
I. A Gentle Conceptual Introduction 
Once upon a time Aristotle asked a basic, and now perennial, philosophical 
question: “What does it mean to really know something?” He, like philosophers before 
and after, recognized that we often hold a belief about something that turns out to be true. 
However, he was suspicious about whether holding a true belief really captured what we 
mean when we say “we know” something? 
 For example, I might assert that I believe the weather will be sunny tomorrow. If 
it turns out to be sunny, then this occurrence proves that I previously held something to 
be true that was in fact true. But does this mean that “I knew” that the weather would be 
sunny? In a similar, but more complicated example, I might say that “I know” the sun 
will rise tomorrow because during every previous day of my life the sun arose; therefore, 
it feels inconceivable that the sun will not rise again. But even though it feels 
inconceivable, do I really “know” tomorrow’s sunrise will occur? Can I be sure of it? 
How sure can I be? 
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 For Aristotle possessing a true belief was not enough to count as true knowledge. 
It was too unsteady, too much like successful guessing. Despite my belief that it will be 
sunny tomorrow, it could still turn out to be rainy, and despite the plausible belief that the 
sun will rise tomorrow, my past experience does not guarantee that it will do so 
tomorrow. This lack of certainty suggests that the only things I possess are beliefs that 
are likely to be true. But “knowing” connotes a higher degree of certainty, wherein I not 
only hold a true belief but also recognize that this belief must be true, and that it cannot 
be otherwise. 
But herein lies the problem: how do I know when I really “know” something and 
when I merely believe that something will be true? Lots of philosophers have worked out 
lots of solutions to this problem. But Aristotle formulated one the most serious and 
influential answers. One particular distinguishing piece of criteria he pointed to (which 
we will examine in more detail later)1 was the fact that the person who truly knows, 
“knows the cause of the thing.” That is, the knower does not merely believe that 
something is the case, but she knows why it is this way. This difference between the 
person who believes that the sun will rise based on past experience and the astronomer 
who believes the same thing is that the astronomer knows why the sun rises each day. The 
person who believes based on past experience does not know the real cause because the 
fact that the sun rose yesterday is not the cause of its rising today. 
If we are attentive, we may notice that something is unsatisfactory in this 
definition of “what it means to know.” “To know” has been used to define “to know,” 
 
1 See chapter 5, p. 236. 
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and it appears that we have been led in a circle. To know something is to know its cause 
and to know the cause is to know the cause of the cause. 
 Aristotle solves this circular problem by adding a further criterion: for “true and 
certain knowledge” the cause must be accessed through evident first principles.2 First 
principles are certain propositions that are not known through knowing something else. 
Rather, their truth is simply evident from the proposition itself. The truth of such 
propositions has no other cause that makes them true or known. The principle of non-
contradiction is a classic example. I know that something cannot “be” and “not be” at the 
same time. However in this case I cannot explain why. I do not “know” this principle 
because I know the cause of this principle. On the contrary, its truth is intrinsic to the 
proposition itself and just obvious; it is on the strength of this “obviousness” that it can 
function as the cause of other truths as well. In short, the circle comes to a stop at these 
evident first principles. The mind cannot ask why any further. The distinguishing mark, 
then, of the “person who knows” is that she can trace back her certainty about some truth 
to an equally certain and self-evident first principle. 
II. The Challenge of Revealed Religion 
 Aristotle’s system leaves us with a binary between opinion (true or false) and 
knowledge (inclusive of nous, epistēmē, and sophia or, in Latin, intellectus, scientia, and 
sapientia).3 But his system is challenged by those who are unwilling to accept this binary 
 
2 See chapter 5, n. 26. 
3 Aristotle’s conception of knowledge is actually broken down in three types essentially connected to the 
above discussion of principles and conclusion. For the “knowledge” of principles that have no higher cause, 
Aristotle provides the label nous, which is translated in Latin as intellectus. “To know” a conclusion that 
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as the final word and who consequently want to acknowledge sources of certainty that do 
not meet the criteria Aristotle laid down. This challenge is voiced with particular urgency 
by advocates of revealed religions. Religion that places special emphasis on “revealed” 
(rather than “acquired”) sources of data pose special problems for this binary. The datum 
is neither obviously true (in the manner of a first principle) nor is it deduced and derived 
from what is immediately known to be true (in the manner of a scientific conclusion). 
This data set is given and received from a trusted authority.4 However, the religious 
mindset also wants to claim that this data set is “known” with the same certainty and 
trustworthiness as the data that are known from first and evident principles. In other 
words, what the religious text reveals is supposed to give us something more than 
opinion. But it also lacks the evidence and “obviousness” that Aristotle associates with 
true knowledge.  
 The solution of revealed religion is to reject Aristotle’s binary and posit a third 
epistemic category between opinion and knowledge called faith. Faith is distinguished 
from “science” or “scientific knowledge” because it lacks “evidence,” but faith is 
 
necessarily follows from first principles is to have epistēmē or in Latin scientia. The third category is 
sophia or sapientia, which is slightly harder to appreciate. For Aristotle it connotes a kind of 
comprehensive knowledge of principles and conclusions. It’s somewhat harder to appreciate because it is 
not always clear how this is distinguished from scientia, which would also seem to demand a knowledge of 
principles and conclusions. In the opening chapters of book I of the Metaphysics, Aristotle hints that sophia 
might be distinguished as a comprehensive knowledge of the highest and most noble things. 
4 In his famous work Is theology a Science?, M.D. Chenu comments on the importance of authority in 
religious knowledge by quoting Paul Ricoeur. The excerpted quote reads: “Authority in theology is not just 
an accidental addition: it is something fundamental to the revelation and to the truth which the believer 
finds it in. The facts of revelation can change my personal life, and at the same time they are the foundation 
of a new form of communal life. In this sense they have authority over my life and our life. The word of 
God is authority in its application both to my own life and to us all. Authority is something fundamental in 
the sphere of religion…” (Paul Ricoeur, Histoire et Vérité (Paris 1955, pp. 160-161, qtd in Chenu, Is 
Theology a Science, 32.). 
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distinguished from “opinion” because it shares the same level of certainty and 
trustworthiness that “scientific knowledge” enjoys.5 
 With this new development arises a new problem, which is the specific inquiry of 
this study. Endemic to most revealed religions is a division between two types of people. 
On the one hand there is the devout but unlearned and simple believer (often illustrated 
by reference to an illiterate old woman or vetula). On the other hand stands the teacher, 
the rabbi, or the theologian. Consider the way Augustine describes this division in his 
first sermon on the Gospel of John:  
This John, you see, my dearest brothers and sisters, was one of those 
mountains of which it is written: May the mountains receive peace for 
your people and the hills justice (Ps 71:3). Mountains are lofty souls; hills 
are ordinary souls. But then the mountains receive peace so that the hills 
might receive justice. What is the justice which the hills receive? Faith, for 
the just person lives by faith (Rom 1:17; Hab 2:4). Lesser souls, however, 
would not receive faith unless greater souls—called mountains—were 
enlightened by Wisdom herself, so that they might pass on to ordinary 
souls what these ordinary souls can grasp, and thus live from faith as hills 
because the mountains receive peace.6 
In this passage Augustine first describes this distinction poetically. What separates the 
teacher from the simple believer is that the “mountains” possess “peace” but the “hills” 
receive only “justice.” But he quickly interprets this distinction in more familiar terms. 
Those, who have “justice” live by “faith” and those who merely have “faith” are 
 
5 E.g. see chapter 7, n. 40. That faith demands this middle position is visible even in a thinker like Paul 
Tillich, whose notion of faith is in many ways far removed from that of scholastic definitions. Nevertheless, 
on this point he shows some similarities: “The most ordinary misinterpretation of faith is to consider it an 
act of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence. Something more or less probable or improbable is 
affirmed in spite of the insufficiency of its theoretical substantiation. The situation is very usual in daily 
life. If this is meant, one is speaking of belief rather than of faith” (Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 31). 
Whatever the differences between Tillich and the traditional scholastic view, both views are adamant that 
“faith” or “religious belief” must be distinguished from mere opinion, where a person gives assent on the 
basis of probable but not compelling reasons. 
6 Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, 40. 
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identified by the fact that what they “know” or “hold to be true and certain” they receive 
from the “mountains.” In contrast, the extra-ordinary people are set apart because their 
possession of “peace” is interpreted as the possession of a “wisdom” that the merely 
faithful do not have. In this distinction, Augustine has appealed to an epistemic category, 
as if to say these mountains “know” what the “faithful” only believe.  
At this point several questions come to mind. What does it mean to be wise as the 
Apostle John is wise? Do these wise people “know” in an Aristotelian sense what the 
faithful believe? Is “wisdom” a replacement for faith? Is faith only for the masses, but not 
for the exceptional? If so, then the triad of opinion-faith-knowledge still works fairly 
well. While most people believe on the authority of others, the “mountains” pass beyond 
faith by reaching out to clear and evident principles, and in so doing they acquire (rather 
than receive) “knowledge” for themselves. 
This is one viable interpretation of how we should understand religious revelation 
and the quest for understanding.7 Revelation is given for those who do not have the time, 
 
7 This is something Augustine himself can often seem to suggest. He repeatedly remarks about the ability 
the philosophers to see the truth, while they are unable to reach the “homeland” because of their pride. See 
for example his second sermon on the Gosple of John where he says: “Certain philosophers in this world 
have sought the creator through the creature – because he can indeed be found through the creature . . . 
They saw where the were to go, but, being ungrateful to the one who set what they saw before them, they 
wanted to take all the credit for the sight themselves (Ibid., Homily 2, 57–58.).  
 But one can also see this in select modern interpretations of the 9th century Jewish Philosopher, 
Saadia Gaon. Julius Guttman writes:  “According to him, the Jewish religion revealed by God, is radically 
different from all other religions which are merely the work of men and thus falsely claim divine origin. 
However, the content of this truly divine revelation is identical in Saadia’s eyes with the content of reason. 
Negatively, this means that there is no contradiction between the two spheres; positively, it signifies that 
reason is capable of reaching through its own powers the content of divine truth. This holds equally for the 
theoretical as well as the moral contents of revelation. Both fundamental metaphysical truth and the moral 
demands of revelation are evident to our unaided reason” (Philosophies of Judaism, 62–63). And later 
Guttman refers to this as the pedagogic value of revelation: “This view raises the almost inevitable 
question: What is the purpose of revelation of truths, if reason can apprehend them through its own 
powers? In reply, Saadia propounded the idea of the pedagogic value of revelation” (Ibid., 62). In a more 
recent work Raphael Jospe (2009) expresses a similar sentiment about Saadia’s view of revelation: “What 
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desire, or mental capacity to reach what is, in principle, naturally knowable. But for those 
with a sufficiently philosophical spirit and the luxury of time and talent, these truths can 
be pursued, rather than just accepted. They are known in an evident and natural way. 
Thus, Aristotle’s description of metaphysics as theology in book VI of the Metaphysics is 
representative and exhaustive of “theological knowledge,” and we can conclude that any 
category of theological knowledge distinct from metaphysics is unnecessary.8 
There are, however, many places that Augustine complicates such an easy and 
harmonious picture. In an important passage from De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, which we will 
encounter again and again in the following pages, he comments on another biblical 
distinction between those with the gift of knowledge (scientia) and those with the gift of 
wisdom (sapientia), both of which are distinguished from faith. Here the notion of 
“science” is added to that of “wisdom,” and we are left to wonder whether the 
“mountains” exchange faith for this “science” as well.  Furthermore, recalling to mind the 
exceptional status of the “mountain,” he focuses on the fact that “many of the faithful are 
not strong in this science,” but only certain people possess this science where faith is 
defended against the impious, and the pious are assisted in their belief.9 The ability “to 
 
is known in revelation is thus rational, and in principle is identical to the truth arrived at by rational 
investigation. The difference is not in content, but in the method of arriving at the truth. Revelation permits 
immediate knowledge of truth we could arrive at rationally only after a lengthy process of investigation” 
(Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 59).  
8 Cf., Metaphysics, VI, c. 1, 1026a18-1026a20. “There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, 
mathematics, natural science, et theology.”  
 In the “Conclusion” we will see that Gregory of Rimini’s contemporary, John Buridan, will go to 
great lengths to distinguish this Aristotelian version of theology from the “theology” practiced in the 
theology facutly. See Conclusion, p. 368, n. 4. 
9 Augustine, De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, “Very many of the faithful do not excel in such knowledge, though 
they excel very much in the faith itself. It is one thing to know only what a man should believe in order to 
gain the happy life which is nothing if it is not eternal; quite another to know how the godly are to be 
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defend” is one of the key identifying marks of those who have reached this epistemic 
level, but what it means “to defend” and what a person must “know” in order to be able 
to defend will be one of the central questions that this study follows in the late scholastic 
debates. 
Critical here as well is the sense in which the “science” relates to “faith.” Does the 
person with this science no longer need faith because he understands what the faithful 
only believe? It is possible to read Augustine this way. But it is also possible to 
emphasize the supportive and derivative role that “science” occupies in this passage; in 
this case, it is as if faith is the central and pinnacle achievement, and “science” is 
important only to the degree that it helps others and even the practitioner to acquire and 
hold on to faith. In this sense, the “knower” never surpasses faith nor ceases to rely on it. 
The “science” Augustine speaks of represents a kind of “theological knowledge” that 
cannot be easily absorbed into Aristotle’s theologico-metaphysics. But it also claims an 
identity distinct from mere faith. Thus, we have reached a nebulous place between faith 
and science, the exact nature of which is not easily described.  
For the scholastic thinkers of the Middle Ages, this difficult task of description 
was not one that could be avoided. The re-introduction of Aristotle bequeathed to these 
thinkers the unique historical responsibility of defining the faculties and departments that 
would forever shape the modern academy. Articulating whether and how theology should 
be recognized as a genuine epistemological achievement, worthy of teaching, study, and 
 
assisted in this and how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the apostle seems 
to call by the proper name of knowledge (scientia)” (trans. Hill, 371). 
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dedicated intellectual labor was not just a speculative exercise, but a practical necessity 
for those who wanted to find a place for this unique activity in the university.  
III. A Perennial Problem and a Historical Peak 
Given this unique historical responsibility and the “non-secular age” in which 
scholasticism worked, I suggest that the question of the identity of theological knowledge 
reached a frenetic peak in this period. To be sure, this is a perennial problem endemic to 
all revealed religions that have philosophical aspirations (captured in the mantra “faith 
seeking understanding”). It is a question that continues to take center stage in the 
contemporary dialog between theology and philosophy, Christian philosophy and secular 
philosophy, theology and prologomena to theology.10 But the deep seeds of this remote 
discussion have a history that began in the Middle Ages. This historical debt is easily 
seen when, despite the fact that has much has changed, Barth continues to consider in his 
 
10 One might think of Heidegger’s essay “Phenomenology and Theology” who in his own way discusses 
the perennial tension we are interested in. Consider for example the opening lines of the essay: “The 
popular understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy is fond of opposing faith and 
knowledge, revelation and reason. Philosophy is that interpretation of the world and of life that is removed 
from revelation and free from faith. Theology, on the other hand, is the expression of a credal 
understanding of the world and life – in our case a Christian understanding. Taken as such, philosophy and 
theology give expression to a tension and struggle between two world views. . . . We, however, see the 
problem of the relationship differently from the very start. It is for us rather a question about the 
relationship of two sciences” (“Phenomenology and Theology,” 40). 
 Karl Barth’s own warning about the ease with which theology can become philosophy is also 
apropos: He writes “and certainly the introduction of critical reflection which distinguishes dogmatics from 
proclamation does not mean that a higher norm of knowledge is substituted for the norm of proclamation. 
Naturally there is the constant threat here that some philosophy will rush in and then raise the claim in 
concreto that it represents this higher source of knowledge. For whence can this critically reflective thought 
find its style and norm except in human reason and therefore in concreto in philosophy? Here, then, we 
always need the insight that critically reflective thought, even though it be that of human reason, and no 
matter what philosopical tints it has, must still be set in relation to the theme of the Church’s proclamation, 
and its education must be governed, not by its human origin and nature, but by its divine object.” Barth 
then goes on to cite the famous dictum of Anselm “credo ut intelligam” in order to emphasize that this 
phrase “does not imply transition from faith to another genus” (Barth, Church Dogmatics I.1, sect. 3, 2, 
(Bromily, p. 81). 
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own prologue to the Church Dogmatics whether theology is a science?11 The concern 
remains: what is the labor of theology actually achieving in epistemic terms, and how 
should these results be regarded by other disciplines that make both complimentary and 
contradictory epistemic claims? 
 This historical debt invites us to investigate the roots of a now 700-year-old 
conversation in a serious way. However a serious investigation must really be a collection 
of serious investigations because the conversation is too diverse and too complex to be 
captured from one single vantage point.12 The present study adds to this collection of 
serious investigations by looking at one thread of this historical discussion that for 
several reasons has not be fully investigated or exhausted. 
IV. Gregory of Rimini 
 The thread in question is the interconnected series of question about the nature of 
“theological knowledge” found in and informing the work of Gregory of Rimini, a 
theologian and philosopher working in the mid-fourteenth century. More specifically, this 
means tracking and assessing the historical conversation that eventually informs the quite 
influential position taken by Gregory of Rimini on the nature of knowledge between faith 
and science. But why consider Gregory of Rimini in particular? To answer this question 
we need to know something of his biography. 
 
11 See all of Church Dogmatics I.1 sect. 1, 1 “The Church, Theology, Science,” but consider for example: 
“Theology as a science, in distinction from theology of the simple testimony of faith and life and the 
theology of the service of God, is a measure taken by the Church in relation to the vulnerability and 
responsibility of its utterance” (Bromily, p. 2) (emphasis mine). 
12 For starters one might consider: Chenu, Is Theology a Science?; Chenu, Theologie Au Douzieme Siecle; 
Sweeney, “Aquinas’ Notion of Science”; Trottmann, Théologie et Noétique au XIIIe siècle. 
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While the end of Rimini’s life and his death in 1358 is rather well established by 
historians, uncertainty continues to linger regarding his earliest years. It is customary now 
to cite his birth year as around 1300. However, according to one tradition traceable back 
to at least 1703, Gregory was 80 years old when he died.13 Given the firm and undisputed 
date of his death in 1358, this would put his birth year at 1278. As Leo Davis relates, this 
tradition goes further to assert that Rimini was studying and teaching at Paris from 1303 
to 1308.14 The almost perfect alignment with the Parisian tenure of John Duns Scotus and 
the absence of any other corroborating evidence make these dates highly suspicious. 
More than likely these dates are the product of some scholar’s wishful thinking, who 
hoped to emphasize and contrast Rimini’s later association with the moderni with an 
early training in the via antiqua of Scotus.15 
In contrast to the speculation of tradition, we do have some hard evidence, which, 
while failing to give us a precise birth date, does provide us with a more convincing 
account of Rimini’s early education and eventual elevation to the rank of magister. In the 
Chartularium of the University of Paris prepared by Denifle, a letter is included from 
Pope Clement VI. It is addressed to the Chancellor of the Church of Paris (often referred 
to as the Chancellor of the University because of his power of granting licenses)16 and 
 
13 For an overview of this story and its sources see Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of 
Gregory of Rimini,” 49. 
14 Ibid., 49. 
15 Davis writes: “This chronology of Gregory’s early life would situate his formative years at the University 
of Paris in the milieu of the via antiqua of Soctus. Only in his mature years would he have been exposed to 
the teaching of Ockham who was Sententiarius at Oxford from 1317-1319” (Ibid., 49). 
16 Cf. Lewry, “Corporate Life in the University of Paris, 1249-1418, and the Ending of Schism.” 
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asks for the promotion of Rimini to the rank of “Master of Theology.”17 From this letter 
we learn that Rimini became a Master of Theology in 1345. But it also provides us with 
three further pieces of information. First it tells us of Rimini’s inaugural arrival at Paris, 
22 years prior to his promotion, meaning Rimini first came to Paris in 1323.18  Second, it 
tells us that after six years – presumably 1329 – he left Paris and began to lecture 
throughout Italy: namely, at Bologna, Padua, and Perugia.19 Davis points us to a 
document from Bologna that confirms Rimini’s stay there until 1337.20 And Rimini must 
have gone to Padua and Perugia thereafter. Schabel adds an important hypothesis about 
this time for Rimini’s intellectual development. He says: “Almost certainly while in Italy, 
Rimini came into contact with theological works of Oxford Scholars from the 1320’s and 
1330’s.”21 Here, he means, first and foremost, William of Ockham, but presumably this 
list includes Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, and Richard FitzRalph among others. This 
 
17 Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 2:557, n. 1097. “Clemens VI ad 
cancellarium ecclesiae Paris., alias ejus vicesgerentem, ut Gregorio de Arimino, Ordinis fratrum 
Eremitarum sancti Augustini, in sacra pagina baccalareo Parisiensi, qui, jam sunt xxii anni elapsi, in studio 
laboravit, sex videlicet annos continuos Parisiis, ac postmodum inde ad natale solum rediens Bononiae, 
Paduae et Perusii cathedram tenuit principalem, et jam sunt anni quatuor, quod ad legendas Sententias rediit 
Parisios, quarum lecturam ibidem commendabiliter consummavit, consideratione Gocii tituli Sanctae 
Priscae presbyteri cardinalis pro eodem Gregorio supplicantis, si ipsum per magistrorum studii Paris. in 
dicta scientia testimonium ad hoc sufficientem esse repercrit, infra unius mensis spatium magistralem 
cathedram et honorem ac docendi licentiam concedat in scientia memorata, ipsumque ad omnes gratias ab 
olim illis concessas ibidem, qui consueverunt hactenus in rigorosis expeditionibus magistrari, prout moris 
est, admittat. Datum Avinione ij id. Januarii, anno tertio, ‘viri sacrae religionis’.” / “Clement VI, to the 
chancellor of the Church of Paris, otherwise his deputy, in order that Gregory of Rimini, of the order of 
hermits of St. Augustine, Parisian bachelor in Sacred Pages, who for now 22 years, has labored in study, for 
six years he continued at Pars, after that, returning to the place of his birth, he held the principle seat at 
Bolognia, Padua, and Perugia. And now it has been four years since returning to Paris to read the 
Sentences…” 
18 “…jam sunt xxii anni elapsi in studio laboravit…” (CUP II:557, n. 1097). 
19 “…sex videlicet annos continuos Parisiis, ac postmodum inde ad natale solum rediens Bononiae, Paduae 
et Perusii cathedram tenuit principalem…” (CUP II:557, n. 1097); Cf. Schabel, Theology at Paris, 264. 
20 Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of Gregory of Rimini,” 50. Davis cites, Schüler, 
Prädestination, Sünde Und Freiheit Bei Gregor Von Rimini, 14. And Schüler in turn cites: Lett. 28, Dalle 
schede Garampi ex autographo in Archivio Eremitarum S. Augustini de Ariminense, printed by A. 
Battaglini, Anthichi e Moderni Librai, 49. 
21 Schabel, Theology at Paris, 264. 
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encounter must be noted because, as we will see, understanding the extent of English 
influence on Rimini has been one of the dominant preoccupations of modern studies of 
Rimini. Third, the letter from Pope Clement VI suggests that Rimini returned to Paris 
four years prior to his promotion or 1341.22 At this point some disagreement persists 
about whether Rimini gave his lectures in the academic year of 1342-1343 or 1343-1344.  
Evidence of Clement’s letter suggests that Rimini arrived in 1341. The regulations for 
Augustinian hermits stipulate that a student should spend one year as Sententiarus 
dispositus ad legendum.23 And it follows that Gregory would have spent the academic 
year of 1341-1342, preparing his lectures, before becoming bacculareus actu legens in 
1342-1343 and then spent 1343-1344 as bacculareus formatus while he waited for the 
letter of promotion that would come from Pope Clement VI in the first month of 1345. 
This chronology is complicated by the fact that in several of the manuscripts of Gregory’s 
commentary — “perhaps 50,” says Damasus Trapp — the date line reads: “Gregorii qui 
legit Parisius A. D. 1344” giving the impression that Gregory gave his lectures in the 
academic year of 1343-1344.24 
Trapp has an explication for this, which preserves the fairly straightforward 
chronology. He writes:  
The all too common date line ‘AD 1344’ should always be read as: ‘. . . 
Gregorii qui legit Parisius ·AD 1344·’ . . . Arabic numbers according to 
good MSS of the time were to be set off by dots or periods (·1344·). If we 
 
22 “…et jam sunt anni quatuor, quod ad legendas Sententias rediit Parisios…” (CUP II:557, n. 1097) 
23 Ypma, “Le Mare Magnum,” 275–321 passim. For some direct references to dispositus ad legendum cf. 
300, 313; for  bacculareus actu legens cf. 285, 300, 303, 306, 307, 309, 310; for bacculareus formatus cf. 
285, 294, 300, 309, 310, 315. 
24 Trapp, “Gregory of Rimini Manuscripts. Editions and Additions,” 426. cf. Davis, “Man, Intellect and 
Will in the Writings of Gregory of Rimini,” 52. 
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thus set them off (·1344·) – as many MSS do – the meaning of that so very 
common date line need not be absolutely that Gregory ‘legit anno 1344’ 
but may as well be that Gregory who was a Parisian Doctor was already in 
a clean MS-edition, with clean Tabulae even, at such an early date as 1344 
while many other Parisian Doctors never got a clean Paris edition.” 
Without mentioning Trapp’s proposed solution, Chris Schabel more recently offered a 
different suggestion. Referring to the “four years” mentioned in Pope Clement’s letter, 
from which we derive our certainty that Rimini arrived at Paris in 1341 and not 1342, 
Schabel writes: “but perhaps the “four years” refers to the date of his order’s General 
Chapter of Montpellier, 1341, which may have been the occasion when Gregory was 
assigned to return to Paris.”25 From this suggestion, he goes further to identify this as the 
“prevailing” view—namely that Rimini arrived to prepare for his lectures in 1342 and 
gave his lectures in 1343-1344. However, he acknowledges that a degree of uncertainty 
still remains.  
After his promotion to the rank of Magister in 1345, Rimini’s life is fairly well 
documented. In 1351 Rimini was named Regent Master of the Augustinians at Basle.26 
At this time, Rimini made significant revisions to his lectures. In 1356 he was promoted 
to vicar general of his order, and in 1357 he became prior general succeeding Thomas of 
Strasbourg. Rimini’s stint as prior general was, of course, short as he died in the 
following year.27 
 This biographical picture is an important place to begin since it points us toward 
the unique place that Rimini occupies in the mid-fourteenth century. Schabel correctly 
 
25 Schabel, “Gregory of Rimini.” 
26 Cf. Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of Gregory of Rimini,” 53. 
27 See, among other places, Delucca 2003, who reports that he died in November of 1358)  (“Gregorio da 
Rimini: Cenni biografici e documentari,” 55). See also Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of 
Gregory of Rimini,” 53–54.  
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points out, “Rimini was the first Parisian theologian to make extensive use of a number of 
Oxford works from the 1320’s and 1330’s.”28 William Courtenay confirms that Rimini 
does indeed occupy a unique moment in the history of fourteenth-century thought, when, 
remarking about the new edition of Rimini’s text, he says: “[it is a] key work for 
understanding the reception of Ockham at Paris and the development of nominalism as 
well as Augustinianism on the Continent.”29 And later Schabel says: “What is certain is 
that Rimini marks the merging of the Oxford and Parisian traditions, and, therefore, 
opens a new era in Parisian theology.”30 It is the quality and character of this “newness” 
that interests us in this study. In what way is his thought new? From what does it depart? 
We are especially drawn to this question of newness because it has remained such a 
stubborn question for so long. The remarks of Courtenay surely provide us with an initial 
orientation with respect to these questions:  the character of “newness” has to do with the 
emergence of something recognizable as “Ockhamist” or “Nominalist.”31  
While acknowledging that Rimini opens a “new era,” Schabel also contends that 
the numerous citations of Oxford sources in Rimini’s work “has tended to obscure his 
debt to the Parisian context.”32 Thus, the past with which this newness must contend is 
the established Parisian and Augustinian traditions. And in many ways Rimini is as 
important for being a kind of culmination of the Augustinian-Parisian tradition as he is 
for any departure. (This, at least, is one of the things this study would contend.) 
 
28 Schabel, Theology at Paris, 264. 
29 Courtenay, “Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited,” 159. 
30 Schabel, Theology at Paris, 265.   
31 We will, however, question these labels momentarily. 
32 Schabel, Theology at Paris, 264. 
Introduction | 16 
                                                
In his groundbreaking, but now dated history of the Middle Ages, Etienne Gilson 
acknowledges the influence of Ockham, but then goes on to remark on the extraordinary 
position Augustine occupied in Rimini’s consciousness. He writes:  
[Rimini’s] work therefore raises the curious problem of possible 
collusions between nominalism and a certain Augustinianism. There may 
have been secret communications between them (Durand, the ficta of 
Ockham). At any rate, it is worthy of note that Gregory should have been 
able to confirm by so many quotations from Augustine some theses one 
would otherwise feel tempted to explain by the spreading influence of 
Ockham.33 
And in his 1981 dissertation, Leo Davis points out that the question so well phrased by 
Gilson continues to linger. He writes:  
Although we have learned a great deal about Gregory of Rimini in the last 
few years, one of the basic problems posed by Gilson remains 
unanswered: ‘Whether he is an Ockhamist hiding behind Augustine, or an 
Augustinian making the best of certain Ockhamist conclusions, we know 
him too little to decide’.”34 
Gilson, Davis, Courtenay, and Schabel are only four witnesses out of many who 
simultaneously recognize Rimini as a critical figure of the fourteenth century. Yet they 
have been perplexed about how to account for him. This is not for a lack of trying; 
several studies (though few in English)35 have attempted to get at the heart of Rimini’s 
thought and to unmask him as either an Augustinian or Ockhamist.  At the present, no 
recognizable consensus has emerged, and this fact suggests that it may be time for a new 
approach.  
 
33 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 502. 
34 Davis, “Man, Intellect and Will in the Writings of Gregory of Rimini,” 17; Cf. Gilson, History of 
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 502. 
35 We must acknowledge the English monograph by Gordon Leff (Gregory of Rimini). But this monograph 
has been routinely criticized, see: Foster, “Review of Leff’s Gregory of Rimini” and Trapp, “New 
Approaches to Gregory of Rimini.” 
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V. Exchanging a “School” for a “Toolbox” 
The above quotation from Gilson, cited by Davis, is noteworthy because it 
contains a latent assumption that has plagued modern studies of Rimini for some time. 
While attempting to understand this transitional figure, Gilson assumes a kind of 
antagonism between a conception of Augustinianism and the new “nominalist” doctrine 
or school of Ockham. Thus, we must assume that there is something duplicitous about 
Gregory of Rimini. He must either be a disciple of Ockham and member of a 
“nominalist” school who, despite being a wolf, is still cloaking himself in the sheep’s 
clothing of Augustine in order to save face amongst his co-religionists. Or he really is an 
Augustinian who remains true to the tradition of his order while trying to salvage what he 
can from Ockham. Gilson is right that “we know him too little.” But, in getting to know 
him, this dissertation wonders if we have been given a false choice. 
Underlying the false choice that Gilson give us is the assumption that there was a 
distinct and identifiable philosophical system called “nominalism” in the fourteenth 
century and that this system defined a clear “school of nominalism” composed of 
adherents to the fundamental tenets of the “nominalist system.”36 The traditional 
narrative espoused by Gileson assumes that, as a system, its adherents are all committed 
to the same ideological positions in philosophy, theology, and politics: positions built on 
 
36 Courtenay singles out this assumption about a “nominalist system” and “school of nominalism” as one of 
the dominant characteristics of the old master narrative (or “traditional interpretation”) of the Middle Ages 
formed in the early 20th century and still influencing contemporary view of the Middle Ages. He writes: 
“…The description, however, purported to be an accurate picture of the full implications of the nominalist 
system that was developed in the early fourteenth century and continued as a major intellectual force into 
the sixteenth century. Nominalism was not, in the traditional interpretation, simply a system of thought. It 
was a school that had its own peculiar historical development…” (Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late 
Medieval Religion,” 29–30). 
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a common philosophical foundation. Courtenay describes the key characteristics of this 
so-called school in the following way:  
The picture of nominalism had been fashioned over several centuries and 
was a composite based more on the late medieval nominalists than upon 
their twelfth-century counterparts. A particular body of ideas, all 
interrelated and mutually reinforced, contributed to the definition of 
nominalism. These recurrent ideas or themes that together compose the 
traditional view of nominalism are: (1) atomism, particularism, or 
individualism; (2) excessive stress on the omnipotence of god; (3) 
voluntarism; (4) skepticism; and (5) fideism. These themes reappeared in 
different ways and in different groupings as various areas of nominalist 
thought were explained.”37 
Particularly relevant to our concern with the nature of theological knowledge and the 
relationship between faith and reason is the supposed impact that nominalism had on 
metaphysics and natural theology. It was supposed that nominalism’s concern with direct 
sensory experience and its distrust in the certainty of the principle of causality led to the 
diminishment of metaphysical speculation. This, in turn, led to an increasing contraction 
of natural theology and this “brought about a separation of faith and reason that could 
only be bridged by fideism, a blind trust in the authority of the church.”38 This, as we 
said, is a picture painted by the early work of modern scholarship.  
With respect to Rimini, whom the narrative certainly counted among the members 
of the nominalist school, it suggests that the character of Rimini’s thought—especially on 
the nature of theology, its method, and the use of probable and demonstrative 
arguments—can be predicted according to the characteristics of this school. Further, it 
 
37 Ibid., 27. See also note 4 on page 27, as Courtenay gives a rather substantial list of early 20th century 
writers that stand as witnesses to this “traditional narrative.” 
38 Ibid., 29. 
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suggests that the positions he takes are a direct result of his reading of Ockham, 
Wodeham, and other close English disciples of Ockham. 
The last 50-plus years of scholarship have made this old narrative untenable, 
despite the fact the it continues hold sway in the larger academy.39 As early as 1974 
Courtenay wrote boldly and confidently: “It is already becoming apparent that the term 
‘nominalism’, as a description of the thought of Ockham, Buridan, Rimini, D’Ailly, Biel, 
and other late medieval thinkers, is no longer as appropriate as it once seemed.”40 
Courtenay surveys several convincing reasons. But one especially strong strike against 
this label is the fact the term itself is an anachronism.  
To quote Courtenay: “It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that none of 
Ockham’s contemporaries ever called him a nominalist . . . By 1270 these labels had 
ceased to be used and were only reintroduced in the fifteenth century (possible associated 
with the revival of Albertism and Thomism) to describe a position in logic or, more 
accurately, a way of teaching logic.”41  
This anachronism is particularly stark and well-documented in application to 
Gregory of Rimini.  The label of “nominalist” was applied to Rimini relatively early in 
the history of historiography. Franz Ehrle, in his work Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters 
von Candia (1925) cites approvingly a title given to Rimini by a sixteenth-century 
 
39 What Courtenay wrote in 1974 does not seem to me (someone first introduced to medieval philosophy at 
the turn of the 21st century) to be too far off today: “The changing evaluation of nominalism and late 
medieval thought that has been taking place since about 1930 has not made the impact it deserves.…” 
(Ibid., 32). The continued relevance of this quotation also seems confirmed by the fact that Courtenay has 
continually felt the need to write papers like this 1974 piece. Consider for example his 2007 Aquinas 
lecture: Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought. 
40 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 51-52. 
41 Ibid., 52. 
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historian, Johannes Thurmayr of Abensbert (Aventinus).42 Aventinus names Rimini as 
the antesignanus nominalistarum, that is, “standard bearer” or “leader of the 
nominalists.” Ehrle’s repetition of this designation set a modern precedent of 
understanding Rimini as a nominalist and a mere vehicle of transmission of English 
thought to the Paris in the second half of the fourteenty century. In his article 
“Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century” (1956), Trapp raised severe questions 
about the value of these labels to understand the associations and divisions of the 
fourteenth century.43 In fact, he claimed that the sixteenth-century designation by 
Aventinus may actually have things completely backward. With respect to Rimini, he 
relates the story of an exchange of letters in 1346-1348 between Pope Clement VI (the 
same pope that urged the promotion of Rimini in 1345) and Peter Ceffons concerning 
issues surrounding the condemnations of errors in 1347. The Pope’s letter to Peter 
described his concern with the excessive subtilitas of certain radical thinkers (named by 
Trapp as Autrecourt, Mirecourt, Ulcredus, and Aston).44 The Pope’s concern was about 
the neglect of the Bible and the Church Fathers by these thinkers. Peter Ceffons 
 
42 Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, 163, n. 1. Cf. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 
Fourteenth Century,” 183, n. 43.  
43 Regarding the anachronism embedded in this label Trapp explains that the polemic of Antiqui and 
Moderni was initially a dispute about cognitio universalis and its manner of achievement. But this dispute 
quickly came to signify and encompass more than a simple disagreement about the finer points of 
psychology and any particular philosophy of the mind. The earliest history of this contentious debate was 
eventually written in the 15th century by the victors, which happened to be the Antiqui. He writes: “Once 
the contention had started it reached a high degree of bitterness like all controversies in which both parties 
happen to be right. The Antiqui won the victory and wrote the history of this quarrel, but the ‘victory of 
truth’ alas is not always the ‘victory of truth’” (Ibid., 186.). And elsewhere he writes: “In the course of time 
the bill of indictment against the 14th century was changed and lengthened as many points as there are 
letters in the world nominalism but having to do as little with the original indictment as the 10 letters of the 
world nominalism have with the issue of nominalism” (168). 
44 Ibid., 187. 
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repeatedly interprets this as a condemnation against subtilitas, which, in his view, were 
vital for the advancement of the goals of France.45  
The importance of all this for our picture of Rimini is that, as Trapp states, within 
the context of this controversy, Peter Ceffons showed enduring and visceral animosity 
toward those who opposed him. At one point in expressing his displeasure, he names 
Gregory in connection with those “heresy hunters” bringing accusations against John of 
Mirecourt. Here the broad label of “nominalism” fails us and obstructs a genuine 
understanding of what was happening in the fourteenth century. Trapp summarizes: 
This is a surprising development. He who for centuries has been called the 
antesignanus nominalistarum, the standard bearer of the nominalists, may 
eventually be the standard bearer of the anti-nominalists, the promoter of 
those condemnations which fell upon the Modernists among the Moderns. 
The legend of Gregory will have to be reexamined with these new facts 
and on the basis of the Gregorian texts, now available to every 
medievalist.46 
Beyond the anachronistic nature of the label, a second strike against the idea of a 
fourteenth-century “nominalist school” is the inability to identify true adherents. 
Courtenay traces the recognition of this problem to the earlier attempts to revise the 
traditional narrative. The early attempts at revision looked closer at the fourteenth 
century, and, upon finding a number of anomalies, attempted to correct the narrative by 
one of two strategies.  Some remained committed to the original description of 
“nominalism” as a comprehensive school and began reducing the number of members of 
 
45 Trapp writes: “That subtilitas was the main issue of the condemnations is said again and again by Peter 
Ceffons…Whereas the Pope affirms that neglect of Bible and Fathers produces disputations which are of 
no practical value in civilian life or in the military camp (we are in the midst of the 100-Years War) 
Ceffons stresses the importance of subtilitas and sciences and literature for the knighthood of France and its 
glory and opulence” (Ibid., 187–188). 
46 Ibid., 188. 
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the school as more and more anomalies were found.47 But as Courtenay points out, as 
more and more research is done and fewer and fewer people fit the pre-defined doctrines 
of this school, it becomes possible that there may be a major medieval school “in which 
we cannot place any important late medieval thinker.”48 The other strategy was to be 
willing to “take the term ‘nominalism’ as a neutral term that simply describes the thought 
of William of Ockham and his followers.…”49 While this strategy identifies a reference 
point to which we can consistently refer for the meaning of the label “nominalism,” it 
also becomes so flexible and changeable that it “runs the risk of being redefined with 
every new study.”50 
With these continuing obstacles, Courtenay points us to new perspectives. In 
particular he points to the conservative restrain of E. A. Moody and his article “Buridan a 
Dilemma of Nominalism.” This article offers us some helpful ways to think about the 
common features recognized by the traditional narrative as “nominalism,” while 
completely rejecting the idea of “nominalism” as a fourteenth-century “school” or 
systematic world-view. And Moody identifies the central meaning of Buridan’s 
“nominalism” by saying:  
The only entities signified or consignified by a term are individual or 
singular things; connotation is construed extensionally, not intensionally. 
 
47 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 32. “There are those, first of all, who have 
accepted the traditional view or definition of nominalism and, upon discovering that a theologian 
traditionally regarded as a nominalist (for example, Ockham or Gregory of Rimini) does not maintain that 
system or the particular aspect of it under consideration, have removed that theologian from the ranks of 
the nominalists.” 
48 Ibid., 34. 
49 Ibid., 33. “...Upon discovering that Ockham and other ‘nominalists’ did not maintain the positions once 
attributed to them, they proceeded to redefine the term ‘nominalism’ along the lines of a more accurate 
description of the thought of Ockham or Biel.” 
50 Ibid., 34. 
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This is indeed the thesis of nominalism, as a thesis of the philosophy of 
language; that all cognitively significant statements can be analyzed, or 
paraphrased, in a purely extensional language whose sole domain of 
reference is the domain of concrete singulars.51 
Courtenay summarizes: Moody sees the phenomenon known as nominalism as 
“essentially the application of logical analysis to philosophical and theological problems 
in such a way that they became problems about ‘the meaning and reference of terms and 
the truth conditions of sentences’.”52 Courtenay’s own conclusion is something similar. 
He acknowledges a kind of unity between figures traditionally recognized as nominalist, 
but he thinks the idea of “school” or systematic world-view should be abandoned. 
“Ockhamism,” he says, “seems to be the least undesirable term.” And, nominalism, he 
says, “[it] should perhaps be left to the realm of logic, where it was subscribed to by 
many moderni who otherwise have little in common.”53 The notion of having “little else 
in common” is what I want to emphasize here, as it acknowledges similarities, while 
completely destroying the idea of a school where students partake of a common and 
predictable world-view. 
The ultimate payoff of the kind of view taken by Moody and Courtenay is the 
further recognition that the label “Nominalism” or “Ockhamism” — even when rightly 
applied to a thinker’s logical-semantic methodology — is not a good predictor of the 
larger positions and commitments that a given thinker will take. This fact by itself can 
make sense of much of the confusion that dominates fourteenth-century research. In 
looking for schools and allegiances, the assumption is that those adopting “Ockhamist” 
 
51 Moody, “Buridan and a Dilemma of Nominalism,” 582. 
52 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 53. Cf. Moody, “Buridan and a Dilemma of 
Nominalism,” 577. 
53 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 53. 
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logico-semantical methodology must also be united in their positions about the nature of 
metaphysics, the interaction between faith and reason, and subject matter and purpose of 
theology. A large part of this dissertation focuses on showing that this is not the case. 
While Gregory adopts many “tools” that could be labeled “nominalist” or “Ockhamist,” 
these commitments do not demand that Rimini’s views on theological knowledge are a 
direct consequence of these other commitments. 
In summary, the assumption we reject is that the constellation of doctrines 
associated with late-medieval nominalism really do function as a foundation upon which 
all theological, ethical, and philosophical edifices will be erected. To accept this 
assumption is to get the impressions that every thinker begins from only one 
commitment, to nominalism or its opposing counterpart, and then spends the rest of her 
time merely deducing the consequences that follow. This view ignores the fact that a 
given thinker may have a number of principled positions and that not every position or 
commitment can be seen as a consequence of one core philosophical commitment (or in 
this case it is bettter to say: one core logical-methodological commitment).   
The assumption that nominalism can function as a foundation in this way has led 
to all sorts of problems and anomalies for fourteenth-century research – similar to the 
way wandering planets were a source of perennial frustration for the Ptolemaic system. 
We can hear this frustration in Courtenay’s plea for us to treat thinkers of the fourteenth 
century as individual thinkers rather than as members of distinct identifiable 
philosophical schools. He writes: 
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Perhaps the most significant feature of present research for future work is 
the growing realization of the independence of fourteenth-century thinkers 
and the difficulty of speaking about school traditions, even of Ockhamists 
and nominalists, between 1320 and 1400. The same constellation of ideas 
and values, perceptions and approaches, can only rarely be found in any 
two masters. Fourteenth-century logicians, natural philosophers, and 
theologians must be looked at individually, not as members of schools of 
thought. This means that for the moment at least, the nominalism of the 
fourteenth century, if we are to really understand it, must be studied 
nominalistically.54  
The disconnect between certain “Ockhamist” positions held in common and the 
diverse (often conflicting) positive philosophical and theological positions held by these 
same thinkers should cause us to rethink the traditional model of viewing nominalism as 
the sole foundation upon which a body of doctrines is erected. The diversity of opinions 
among thinkers we once thought were united in a single school now functions as a set of 
disturbing anomalies, similar in kind to those which prompted Copernicus to opt for 
radical paradigm shift. It is possible that fourteenth-century scholarship needs its own 
paradigm shift. 
To stretch the analogy further, we can ask: what if, with Moody, we ceased to see 
fourteenth-century “Ockhamism” or “nominalism” as a comprehensive world-view, but 
rather as a distinct set of tools? Then it might become possible to see diverse groups of 
people sharing the same toolbox, while setting unique foundations, following opposed 
visions, and constructing wildly diverse buildings. Likewise, it is possible to imagine 
thinkers who are working with radically different sets of tools, who are nevertheless 
trying to shape similar foundations and similar buildings. Undoubtedly the kinds of tools 
 
54 Courtenay, “Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited,” 164. 
 This dissertation does not set aside the notion of “schools” or “traditions” completely. Rather, it 
primarily sets aside the idea of a fourteenth-century nominalist school, and believes this adjustment allows 
us to see new alignment and allegiances that were previously obscured. 
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one uses may often shape the kinds of buildings that are possible. Different tools open up 
different possibilities. Nevertheless, the vision underlying two thinkers’ attempts to build 
may be a shared vision, despite the fact that they are working with different toolboxes. 
We continually run the risk of overlooking this shared by vision by focusing on the 
doctrines of nominalism and realism as mutually exclusive foundations, which remove, 
from the outset, the possibility of shared visions and inspiration. In the case of Gregory of 
Rimini, this dissertation is particular interested in understanding the sources of Rimini’s 
overall understanding and vision of theological knowledge. Understanding “Ockhamism” 
as a toolbox means that even though Rimini is drawing from a similar tool box to the one 
Ockham and Wodeham used, he could still be pursuing a vision of theological knowledge 
significantly different form the vision of Ockham. 
In the rest of this dissertation I first follow Courtenay’s injunction of treating 
fourteenth-century thinkers “nominalistically,” by paying attention to the positive 
position of Gregory of Rimini on the subject of theological knowledge – its subject 
matter, its purpose, its method, and its epistemic status. Here I resist the temptation to 
constantly trace this position back to a nominalist foundation. Instead, my first and 
primary goal is to identify the distinct vision of theological knowledge that Rimini 
articulates. I assess the character of this vision and determine to what degree this vision 
mirrors that of his earlier co-religionists and to what extent it lies in harmony with the 
position of theological knowledge taken by Ockham and other influential Franciscans. As 
a secondary and derivative goal, I call attention to when and how Rimini uses a distinct 
set of tools to defend and articulate this vision against others. Some of the tools he uses 
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will be clearly “Ockhamist” in character. But we will also notice some distinctively 
“Ockhamist” tools that Rimini consciously sets aside and some that appear to be simply 
inconsequential and not well suited for the matter at hand. 
Such an approach helps open avenues of connection that were previously 
closed.55 Instead of frequently attempting to point out how Rimini follows Ockham and 
 
55 Below is a summary of Trapp’s attempt to re-describe the landscape of the fourteenth century without the 
traditional label of “nominalism” or a “nominalist school.” At one point Trapp states this goal plainly: “In 
the fore-going sketch I have tried to master the confusion of the 14th century with a terminology which 
purposely disregards the traditional cliché of ‘nominalism’” (“Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth 
Century,” 152). He writes: “I would like to call the 13th century the great century of speculation, the 14th 
century of criticism, a criticism moving along two lines, the historico-critical and the logico-critical” (p. 
147). Trapp envisions that we will get a better handle on the complexities and dynamics of the 14th century 
if we think of its development and disputes a long these two different lines. Some thinkers represent a 
historico-critical approach to the achievements of the previous century, while others exercise their penchant 
for criticism in logic. Trapp’s thesis is apropos to our discussion of Rimini because he believes Rimini falls 
into the line of historico-criticism and further believes the identification of this outlook to be an effective 
way to understand many of Rimini’s motivations and alignment with the other names that populate the 
fourteenth century. He states:  
 “As far as the Augustinian theologians of the 14th century are concerned they are to be classified 
as representatives of the historico-critical attitude. All quote Augustine and early scholastics very carefully, 
contemporary scholastics at least according to the level of the scholarship of their day. The Augustinians 
share their love for St. Augustine with many outsiders on the continent and in England. Significantly none 
of the Augustinians can be called an extremist of the logico-critical attitude” (p. 150-151). 
 In Trapp’s narrative of the Augustinian historico-critical attitude includes Rimini as a 
representative example of this historico-critical school.  Rimini is a good example of attention to faithful 
quotation habits and rigor in the interpretation of Church Fathers. From this perspective the critical shift 
often associated with Rimini from the Aegidian-Augustiniansim to the Schola Augustinian Moderna is 
rather obscured. Such a distinction was in many ways based about the labels of nominalism and moderni 
that Trapp has thrown into suspicion.  
 Nevertheless, it still seems permissible to ask if Trapp’s perspective is sufficient. After all, we 
must recognize that the Augustinian thinkers in question still took positive positions. Yes, there is good 
evidence that they were quite concerned with the accuracy of citation and with faithful interpretations of 
the Church Fathers. However, their respective commentaries undoubtedly wanted to put their historico-
critical approach in service of something. They were not just archivist or bibliophiles. Their historical 
knowledge was put in service of their profession as theologians. And as such they had things to say. 
Trapp’s thesis, therefore, is of definite help in understanding a certain attitude shared among select 
fourteenth-century thinkers, but it still tells us very little about their theological and philosophical positions. 
Taking these positions as our starting point, it is conceivable that we could draw very different lines of 
unity between fourteenthy-century thinkers. For example: certain intellectuals might share methodological 
predilections, while being opposed on a given issue of doctrine. Likewise, two thinkers with very different 
methodological goals may have many doctrinal commonalities. If we may broach a contemporary example: 
many thinkers within the field of analytic philosophy may share much in common with those trained in a 
continental department. At the same time many people within the same continental training may often find 
themselves ideologically opposed. In short there is nothing to prevent agreement and disagreement from 
existing among the very same thinkers. The only way to really understand fourteenth-century thinkers from 
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how his positions are an expression of an Ockhamist foundation, we are freed to show 
how often Rimini differs from Ockham, even as he employs many Ockhamist ideas and 
tools. On the old model of of nominalism as a foundational world-view, such 
simultaneous agreement and disagreement would have been incredibly perplexing. But, 
by envisioning Ockhamist ideas as tools employed by Rimini in service of his own 
vision, the perplexity vanishes. In a similar manner, such an approach allows us to note 
commonalities and shared visions between thinkers using quite distinct sets of tools. 
Most notably, we will be freed to note common visions between Giles of Rome and 
Gregory of Rimini, which were previously obscured by scholarship’s penchant to 
separate the two along realist and nominalist lines. This is not to say that Giles and 
Gregory will never disagree. Their vision of the theological project may differ. Likewise, 
the tools they use will undoubtedly have an effect on how they view and describe things, 
even if they do in fact claim a common vision. However, as this dissertation shows, it can 
no longer be taken for granted that, since the Augustinian Giles of Rome is pre-Ockham 
and Rimini adopts many of the core positions of Ockham, in all matters Rimini must be a 
friend of Ockham and a foe of Giles. As we will see, with respect to theology and the 
nature of theological knowledge, it may very well be the other way around.  
VI. A Glimpse inside an Ockahmist Toolbox 
If, then, it is prudent to set aside the label of “nominalism” as a distinctive school, 
we still need to identify, as a working hypothesis, what is distinctive about the tools one 
 
the perspective of doctrine and ideology is to consider the positions they take and the convictions shared 
with or opposed by others. 
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finds in an Ockhamist tool box, particularly as they inform or relate to Rimini’s 
discussion of theology and the precise nature of theological knowledge. We expect to see 
Rimini employing these logical, semantic, and ontological tools in a manner that 
distinguishes him from his Augustinian predecessors. However, to reiterate, what is at 
issue in this dissertation is whether these tools force him to move in opposing directions 
on other issues or whether these tools are flexible enough to be used in the constructions 
of disparate and competing world views.  
[1] Perhaps the primary and most infamous feature of an Ockhamist tool box is 
Ockham’s rejection of universal extra-mental entities. In the prologue of Rimini this is 
not a tool that appears particularly important for his discussion of theological knowledge 
and methodology. Thus, for us, it will remain a background concern.  
[2] Another feature, which must clearly be separated from the position of 
universals, is a commitment to intuitive knowledge as direct trustworthy access to things. 
This must be separated from the position on universals since both Scotus and Ockham 
acknowledge the possibility of intuitive knowledge, but are opposed when it comes to the 
issue of real universals. This tool and its accompanying trust in experience prove to be 
quite important for a discussion of science, the trustworthiness of knowledge, and the 
reasons for assent. In later chapters,56 we will look at the extent to which Rimini shares 
this commitment to intuitive knowledge and “indubitable experience” and its importance 
for both scientific and theological knowledge.  
 
56 Consider for instance, “Interlude,” p. 308, n. 38. 
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[3] A critical Ockhamist tool and general shift in scholastic jargon lies in the 
definitional uses of “the object” and “subject” of a science. In chapters two and three we 
will have an opportunity to explore Rimini’s clear debt to Ockham. But once again, we 
will be be attentive to how Rimini uses these technical definitions to shape his position 
on the explicit subject matter of the theological discipline.  
[4] A fourth distinctively Ockhamist position, not shared by those who came 
before him, is his position that distinct sciences are really just aggregates of scientific 
habits. The uniqueness of this position will become clear when we consider how Ockham 
and Rimini’s views together diverge from past positions.57 Where this becomes 
especially relevant in Rimini’s prologue is where he deals with the practical and 
speculative nature of knowledge generally and theological conclusions specifically. As 
always we will be attentive to how his vision of theological knowledge determines his 
use of these labels and in turn how his understanding of practical and speculative partial 
habits shapes his views of the kind of knowledge theological conclusions produce.  
[5] A fifth distinctive feature of Ockham’s thought shared by his pupil Adam 
Wodeham is a sharp distinction between apprehensive and judicative habits. In this case, 
it is not that thinkers before Ockham have refused to commit themselves to such a view, 
but rather that in Ockham’s prologue this is a distinctive and well used position. Further, 
it is a position frequently invoked by Adam Wodeham. In chapters six and seven, 
however, we will see that this is a tool Rimini refuses to pick up and use.58 A large 
burden of these chapters will, therefore, focus on what is at stake and what is motivating 
 
57 See chapter 2, p. 119 and chapter 3, p. 190. 
58 See esp. c. 7, p. 318. 
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Rimini’s divergence from these two forerunners, with whom he holds many other tools in 
common.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, we will let these features stand as five 
distinctive characteristics of something that Rimini could recognize as “Ockhamism.” 
Moreover, these are aspects of Ockham’s thought that Rimini in some way engages or at 
least touches upon in his prologue. One part of our task in this dissertation is to observe 
the manner of this agreement and engagement. A second is to discern how he uses these 
tools to provide a philosophical analysis of specifically theological knowledge, wherein 
he will sometimes agree with Ockham’s own analysis, but will more often go his own 
way.  
VII. Thesis of this Study 
Taking seriously William Courtenay’s suggestion to study the fourteenth century 
“nominalistically,” this study first and foremost makes a claim about what Gregory of 
Rimini believes theological knowledge is, who can have it, and how it is acquired.  
However, as we have seen, such a presentation of Gregory of Rimini’s positive doctrine 
cannot be without consequences for scholarship’s larger attempts to form a narrative 
about the character of Augustianism in the fourteenth century, the influence of Ockham 
on Rimini, and the character of scholasticism in the fourteenth century as a whole. 
Therefore, we consider these larger questions as peripheral satellites to our main thesis. 
Consequently, our official thesis consists of two distinct points of emphasis. The first 
pertains to what is distinctive about Rimini’s view about theology and theological 
Introduction | 32 
                                                
knowledge. The second pertains to the nature of Rimini’s debt to his Augustinian heritage 
and his use (or non-use) of Ockhamist tools. 
 To articulate both of these points of emphasis, some background clarification is 
necessary. In a contemporary work Types of Christian Theology, Hans Frei makes a 
fundamental division between two approaches to theology.59 On the one hand, theology 
can be thought of as a “generally accessible subject matter, broadly based, both as a 
technical concept and as a wider cultural one.”60 The ramification of this generally 
accessible field of study singled out by Frei is that “theology and philosophy are bound to 
be closely if perhaps oddly related.”61 Philosophy may be involved in the discourse in 
diverse ways, but what is especially important to Frei is that on this view “the rules of 
correct thought are invariant and all-fields-encompassing. In the light of its foundational 
 
59 For Frei (and for us) these two types represent and exhaustive binary of the possible ways to approach 
the subject. All subsequent controversies and disagreements are about sub-divisions within these two main 
types.  
 In her review of contemporary academic theology, Katherine Tanner describes this kind of binary 
at work in the dominant competing schools of the 20th century (viz. the “Yale” and “Chicago” schools). She 
writes: “Around the time that Modern Theology came into existence in the early 1980s, the main worries of 
theologians in the United States were methodological in character: Could religious thought and language be 
intellectually justified? Did religious thought and language conform to common standards of meaning, 
intelligibility and truth? Or was it possible to argue—with an ironic display of academic rigor informed by 
the latest philosophy, literary theory, and social science—that they need not have to? Methodological 
preoccupations distinguished the main schools of thought in academic theology (the one associated with 
Yale, where I was a doctoral student, and the other with the University of Chicago, where I now teach), and 
established their complementary strengths and weakness. For example, compromise of Christian witness by 
conformity to the world’s standards was thought to be the danger of Chicago’s penchant for critical 
correlation and revisionism, following in the footsteps of Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, and Tillich; stubborn 
insistence on the irreducible particularity of Christian commitment at the possible cost of cultural 
irrelevance was thought to be the danger of Yale’s alignment with Karl Barth” (Tanner, “Shifts in Theology 
over the last quarter century,” 39–40). 
60 Frei, Types of Christian theology, 19–20. 
61 Ibid., 20. 
Introduction | 33 
                                                
status, philosophy arbitrates what may at anytime and anywhere count as meaningful 
language, genuine thought, and real knowledge.”62   
We can get a better sense of what is distinctive about this conception of theology, 
by noting its contrast. On the other side, there is another conception of theology which 
does not claim a space within the hierarchy of other disciplines. Frei describes this as 
follows:  
In the previous case [the first type mentioned above], the phrase Christian 
theology was used to give an instance of a general kind of undertaking—
namely, a Christian instance. But now theology becomes an aspect of self-
description of Christianity as a religion, rather than an instance of a 
general class. It is an inquiry into the internal logic of the Christian 
community’s language—the rules, largely implicit rather than explicit, that 
are exhibited in its use in worship and Christian life, as well as in the 
confessions of Christina belief. Theology, in other words, is the grammar 
of the religion, understood as a faith and as an ordered community life.63 
The first emphasis of the overarching thesis of this dissertation is that Gregory of Rimini 
champions a conception of Christian theology that has lot more in common with the latter 
conception of theology described by Frei than with the former. He sees theology as a 
discourse “internal”64  to a specific community of believers, and, as such, it can only be 
recognized as a kind of “knowledge” within that community. The second emphasis—and 
perhaps more controversial aspect of this thesis—is that Rimini’s proclivity toward a 
conception of theological knowledge as something particular to the practice of a religious 
community, which has little interest in defending its place amongst the other sciences, 
represents a continuation of the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition he inherits; at the same 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 It is important to highlight the language of “internal logic” here as this will be descriptor that we will 
emphasize often, and even see Courtenay employ in our conclusion. See Conclusion, p. 380, n. 33. 
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time it is a departure first from the Parisian thinker Peter Aurioli, but also from William 
of Ockham, who despite much disagreement with Aureoli, follows him in some important 
ways. I suggest that this may be controversial because it seems to fly in the face of many 
common narratives about William of Ockham as a thinker who condemns most forms of 
natural theology and introduces a radical skepticism about what we can adequately know 
about God.65 Nevertheless, as we progress, this dissertation shows, especially in chapter 
six, that on the subject of theological method, Ockham does not significantly depart from 
the dominant paradigm proposed by Petrus Aureoli. Further the conception of theology 
advocated by Peter Aureoli, despite abandoning theology’s claim to be a genuine science, 
never abandons the attempt to defend the place of theological investigation within the 
context of a universal courtroom, where philosophy—as Frei suggests—remains an 
independent arbiter. Rimini’s fierce reaction to Aureoli’s conception of theological 
method, and by extension to Ockham, retains a great deal in common with the view of 
theology or Sacra Doctrina advocated by Giles of Rome, as well as the Augustinians 
who come after Giles. This remains true, despite the fact that Rimini elsewhere employs 
many Ockhamist tools to defend and explain his overall position. 
 In the following chapters this general thesis is advanced in specific ways. Chapter 
one describes the position of Giles of Rome on the subject matter and purpose of 
 
65 This is common attitude and one we can see in Richard Lee’s fairly predictable assesment of Ockham: 
“one finds no natural theology in Ockham. Rather theology is a habit of faith and, as such, must remain 
with the God of faith” (Lee, Science, the singular, and the question of theology, 94). In calling theology a 
habit of faith, Lee means to point out that Ockham has detached theology from its proper moorings in the 
wider world of intelligibility. However, we will see that in calling theology a habit of faith, Lee is simply 
off the mark, since Ockham says explicitly that theology is only an apprehensive habit that can be 
performed equally well by the believer and the unbeliever (see c. 6, p. 275 and following). But besides the 
error in the above quote, the general tenor of this book is that Ockham’s focus on the singular leads to an 
approach to science and theology where knowledge “penetrates [the world] violently” (p. 105) and where 
“the world…becomes open to human destruction” (p. 105). 
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theological knowledge. This is our first introduction to what this dissertation calls the 
Aegidio-Augustinian tradition.66 Chapter two, building on Giles’s treatment of the 
subject of theology, emphasizes Rimini’s qualified adoption of the Ockhamist 
terminology regarding what the “subject” and “object” of a science is over and against 
the language of Duns Scotus. But with this new terminology, Rimini explicitly defends a 
famous Aegidian doctrine about the contracted field of theological research and study. 
The emphasis, in short, is on the absence of Christian theology’s universal cognitive 
aspirations, namely to know all that is knowable. It is not a discipline that attempts any 
kind of comprehensive knowledge—neither for the pilgrim or the Blessed—but seeks 
only to clarify and articulate what is apropos to the religious purposes God intends. 
Additionally, this chapter draws our attention forward by pointing out that, while 
Rimini’s conception of theological knowledge has a distinct subject matter, the “subject” 
alone is not enough to distinguish “theological knowledge.” Thus we see that the manner 
in which that subject is known (or method) is an equally important part of distinguishing 
this kind of knowing from the other disciplines, especially theological-metaphysics. 
Before turning to Rimini’s consideration of method, chapter three addresses the 
“end” or “purpose” of theology. This chapter focuses especially on Peter Aureoli’s subtle, 
but significant revision of what it means for theology to be “practical.” It then looks to 
Rimini’s reaction to that position. Here we see clear use of Ockhamist tools as Rimini 
defines what it means for a habit to be practical and the role of speculative propositions in 
 
66 It is important to note that the notion of “Augustinianism” in the Middle Ages is almost as convoluted 
and unhelpful as the label “nominalism.” This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1, see p. 45, n. 13. 
We will single out an Aegidio-Augustianism to narrow our focus to a particular reading of Augustine 
offered by Giles of Rome and those who aim to perpetuate his thought. This may turn out to be something 
less than a school, but still a recognizeable tradition. 
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such habits. Using these tools, Rimini develops a unique position that, in clear opposition 
to Aureoli, shares some similarities with Scotus and Ockham, but also shares some clear 
parallels with the Aegidian-tradition. 
Chapter four marks the end of what I consider preliminary considerations 
(constituting the entirety of part I) and is the beginning of a turn (part II) toward a 
detailed consideration of the how theology is taught and acquired, whether or not it can 
be distinguished from faith, and whether it acquires a scientific status. Chapter four 
considers Giles’s brief remarks about how theology is taught, and it highlights one 
important assumption: that theology and faith are not to be distinguished as separate 
habits, wherein theology comes to replace faith.67 In chapter five, we follow two early 
Augustinians, Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio, who in different ways 
attempt to be faithful to the Aegidian tradition. Their challenge is to continue to insist on 
theology’s dependence on faith while dealing with Augustine statement in De Trinitate 
XIV, c. 1 which seems to demand that faith and “this science” are very distinct.68 The 
importance of these two thinkers is that they provide a witness to a clear Aegidio-
Augustinian spirit that extends beyond Giles. 
Chapter six begins the decisive moment of the study. Here we consider Rimini’s 
own description of theological method. As mentioned above, this is where we are 
introduced to the distinctive method of theology that is put forward by Peter Aureoli, 
which Ockham approves of with only slight modification. Despite the common opinion 
that Ockham is a skeptic about the strength of natural reason with regard to theological 
 
67 See the brief discussion of this concern above, p. 6. 
68 Again, see the discussion of this quotation above, p. 6. 
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truths, we learn that he shares with Peter Aureoli the opinion that theology is 
“declarative.” This means that theology appeals to resources external to religion and faith 
and attempts to use these natural resources to support and strengthen the veracity and 
plausibility of the claims of faith. In Rimini’s fierce objection to this methodology, we 
not only see a clear break with Aureoli, but also a confraternity with the positions 
advanced by Augustinus of Ancona and Propser of Reggio. The break with Aureoli and 
Ockham primarily rests on Rimini’s Aegidian-inspired refusal to admit any division 
between the habit of faith and the habit of theology. We will see him repeatedly defend 
the notion that the theologian never goes outside the habit of faith, nor attempts to justify 
the claims of faith to those outside of the believing community. Accordingly, Rimini’s 
view of theology and theological knowledge closely approximates the second type of 
theology described by Frei, which sees itself as a kind of self-description of an already 
formed and believing community.  
Between the sixth and seventh chapters, a short interlude acknowledges other 
like-minded Augustinian reactions to Peter Aureoli, notably in Gerard of Siena and 
Thomas of Strasbourg. This section also gives us an opportunity to make some 
clarifications about the principles of theology. We notice Rimini’s emphasis on the 
“explicit contents” of Scripture over the “articles of the creed” and speculate about 
whether this is a significant innovation within the Aegidian tradition and why Rimini 
makes this subtle change. 
The final chapter, which focuses on Rimini’s explicit statements about why 
theology is not a science, further strengthens the points established in the previous 
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chapter. Perhaps most importantly, it reiterates that simply because Aureoli, Ockham, and 
Rimini all deny that theology is a science does not mean that they share similar visions as 
to what theology is or how a theologian should use reason in the service of faith. This 
chapter also provides us with clarification about what Rimini means by “acquired faith,” 
and why, for those within the believing community, this can count as a kind of 
“compelling knowledge.” For those outside the community, this achievement is not 
recognizable as a genuine knowledge about reality or actuality, but only about logic and 
possibility.69 In clarifying the notion of “acquired faith,” Rimini strengthens our 
identification of his conception of theology as a purely internal practice that makes no 
attempt to justify the claims of the community to those who have not been initiated. 
In concluding, we speculate about the importance of Rimini’s position for our 
understanding of the larger narrative of the fourteenth century within the history of 
philosophy. Especially important is how Rimini’s view, combined with that of Jean 
Burdian in the arts faculty helps to institutionalize a particular kind of relationship 
between the theology and arts faculties—a relationship that came under severe criticism 
at the end of the century with the rise of late-Albertism, the via antiqua, and the 
wegesstreit of the fifteenth century.  
 
69 That fact that this kind of faith is in a way compulsory should cause us to take notice. For a theologian 
like Paul Tillich, and perhaps most of us, compulsion and faith seem mutually exclusive. In the Dynamics 
of Faith Tillich writes: But faith is uncertain in so far as the infinite to which it is related is received by a 
finite being. This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be removed, it must be accepted. And the element 
in faith which accepts this is courage” (p. 16). Therefore, Rimini’s description of how acquired faith can be 
faith and yet also be compulsory is crucial tenet of his position. 
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Before pursuing the main line of this dissertation, namely Gregory of Rimini’s 
position on the kind of knowing that takes place between faith and science, it is worth our 
time to look at a few preliminaries. The preliminaries I have mind are Rimini’s 
consideration of the subject matter and purpose of theological knowledge. More 
specifically, I will show that, on these topics, Rimini’s position fits well within a 
recognizable Aegidio-Augustinian tradition. 
The commitment of both Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini on these matters 
sets the tone for how they conceive of the natural or supernatural character of a 
theologian’s work and achievement. This is the discussion where Giles of Rome declares 
the range or scope of theological knowledge: a discussion which is subsequently treated 
by many other authors including Gregory of Rimini. The question asks whether theology 
is a comprehensive knowledge, exhaustive of its subject matter, or whether it is content to 
know only a select group of knowable things. Further, in the concern over the “end” of 
theology, Giles will consider how the theologian is oriented toward this data set? Does it 
seek to know for its own sake or for some other reason? In this second question we can 
see that the scope or range is itself built on (or at least intimately connected with) the 
purpose of theological knowledge. Is this knowledge an end in itself or useful and 
desirable only for a specific purpose? The answers to these questions have an important, 
albeit indirect, impact on how one conceives of the appropriate sources of theological 
knowledge and the standards by which it should be measured and evaluated. I offer, then, 
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a general thesis, which we can expect to become visible in the intermediate section that 
follows.  
On these topics, Rimini shows his most explicit commitment to an Aegidian 
position. When it comes to the subject and scope of a theological inquiry, he is adamant 
that God is considered in a restricted way and that this discipline is limited to a very 
specific and specialized data set that excludes every bit of knowledge that does not 
contribute to the practical end of rightly loving God. Inasmuch as we can see Rimini 
holding a position like this, we can see a visible rift emerge between an Aegidian 
tradition and a Franciscan position primarily crafted by John Duns Scotus, but visible in a 
lesser degree in the thought of Aureoli and Ockham. 
The rift can be described in the follow way. Undoubtedly, for every thinker of the 
Middle Ages there was a significant difference between our knowledge of God and God’s 
knowledge of himself. The trouble or disagreement lies in the characterization of that 
difference. For Aquinas, but even more prominantly, for Scotus and the Franciscans who 
follow him, the primary limitation lies in the lack evidence resulting from our inability to 
achieve a clear and intuitive vision of God. Because of the distance between our earthly 
selves and the presence of God, our knowledge of God is limited. For Scotus, a great gulf 
exists between heaven and earth, clearly separating what our earthly theology actually 
knows about God from what is truly knowable. 
For Giles and Rimini, it is not so much that this limitation does not exist. It is 
simply that this is not the primary reason for the limited nature of theological knowledge. 
Instead of emphasizing the lack of evidence and presence, the emphasis is laid on our 
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lack of capacity. This conviction and difference will appear most starkly in Rimini’s 
assertion (following Giles) that even the theological knowledge of the Blessed (those in 
the presence of God) is contracted and limited only to what this specialized discipline 
finds useful to its ends. Thus for Giles and Rimini, the line is drawn, not between heaven 
and earth, but between the finite and the infinite.  
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I. Introduction:  Giles of Rome, Frater Noster 
Without a doubt, “the first and most important medieval teacher” of the 
Augustinian Order is Giles of Rome. This, at least, is the opinion of Adolar Zumkeller, 
one of the premier historians of the Augustinian Order.1 There are good reasons to see 
Giles as setting a decisive tone and direction for the order as whole. Zumkellar notes 
there is considerable evidence to show that this young order of friars (founded in 1256) 
was concerned about creating a unity of thought.2 The existence and quality of the corpus 
of Giles of Rome was a big asset to this order’s attempt to create the desired unity. Giles 
was the first Parisian master of the order and it was fortunate that they gave this honor to 
a man of exceptional talents, whom fellow co-religionists could respect. Giles made such 
an early impression that the general chapter at Florence decreed in 1287:  
Because the teaching of our venerable Master Brother Giles is an 
enlightenment to the whole world, we order and command it to be 
observed inviolably, that all the lectos and students of our Order accept 
and give their assent to the opinions delivered, the positions taken, and the 
commentaries written by our aforesaid master in the past and future, and 
be sedulous in the defense of that teaching with all possible solicitude, so 
that in their own illumination they are able to illumine others.3 
In 1290, the Order’s Constitutions renewed this sentiment, stating that it was the job of 
the prior general “to order as well that all the masters and students should hold in full the 
 
1 Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 11. 
2 Ibid. “They also show evidence of the energetic effort to prepare the way for a united school of thought.” 
3Analecta Augustiniana IV (1911-1912), 203; cited and translated by Zumkeller, 12. 
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opinions and positions of our venerable Brother Giles, and teach entirely in accordance 
with his writings.”4 This statute remained in effect throughout the entire Middle Ages 
and was theoretically obligatory for prior generals through the fourteenth century, of 
whom Gregory of Rimini was one. 
 Undoubtedly, Giles of Rome cast his shadow into the fourteenth century. But how 
intense was this shadow and how long was it cast? For many scholars of the twentieth 
century, Giles’s influence is distinct enough to recognize a unique kind of 
Augustinianism that emerges after him. As far back as 1884, Karl Werner identified a 
schola Augustiniana beginning with Giles and remaining intact into the 1340’s.5 But here 
is where Rimini’s place in the order becomes particularly important. The relative unity 
that is actually recognizable in the first half of the fourteenth century is often said to stop 
 
4 Constitutions fratrum heremitarum ordinis sancti Augustini (Venice, 1508), f. 36r; cited and translated by 
Zumkeller, 12. 
5 Cf. Werner, Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters, v. III, esp. pp. 13–15. Consider the review of 
Werner give by Erik Saak: “In 1883 Karl Werner published the first monographic treatment of late 
medieval Augustinianism. Werner traced the origins of fourteenth-century Augustinianism. Werner traced 
the origins of fourteenth-century Augustinianism to the thirteenth-century reaction against Aristotelianism. 
He argued forcefully for an Order-specific Augustinianism: the Augustinian School is defined by the 
doctrines of Giles of Rome, according to which Augustinian theologians were required to teach, as 
formulated by the General Chapter of Florence in 1287. Werner dedicated the first part of the work to 
explicating Giles’ position on the major theological topics: epistemology, ontology and metaphysics, 
cosmology and anthropology, the doctrine of God, Christology, soteriology, the sacraments, and ethics. 
When he came to Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358), Werner saw a major rift in the Augustinian School. 
Whereas Giles viewed theology as affective knowledge, Gregory having been strongly influenced by the 
works of the Franciscan theologian and philosopher William of Ockham (d. 1347), sought to combat the 
uncertainty of the speculative nature of Giles’ theology by turning theology in scientific, practical 
knowledge. Only by purifying the Order’s theology of speculative Aristoteliansim could a true 
Augustiniansim come into being” (Saak, High way to heaven, 684).  
 See also Trapp who discusses a similar division: “Thomas of Strassburg marks the turning point in 
Augustinian Modern theology. I call him the ‘last Augustinian of Aegidius’ and Gregory the ‘first 
Augustinian of Augustine’. The two terms are not mutually exclusive. Aegidianism is old-fashioned 
Augustinianism coupled with the cognitio universalis, the Gregorian Augustinianism is ‘Modern’, is better 
acquainted with all the books of Augustine non only with his major works, and goes hand in hand with 
cognitio rei particularis. / Aegidius remained the venerated figure of the Augustinian School before and 
after Gregory, but after Gregory especially more corrective reservations were made in regard to Aegidius. 
What is new in Gregory is the fact that he is the best Augustine Scholar of the Middle Ages from the milieu 
which created the Milleloquium” (Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” 181).  
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with Thomas of Strasbourg, while a new Augustinian school (a schola Augustiniana 
moderna) begins with Rimini.6  
 We can find this characterization readily available in contemporary accounts of 
the fourteenth century. McGrath, for example, writes:  
The school of thought which developed during the fourteenth century, 
based upon the writing of Giles of Rome, was known as the schola 
Aegidiana, suggesting that Giles was regarded as a theological authority 
by those who followed in his footsteps within the Order.7 
And later he against states: 
It is . . . clear that a school of thought developed within the Order which 
remained faithful to [Giles’s] teaching. This fidelity is particularly clear in 
relation to his teaching on original righteousness.8 
In McGrath’s account we can see the penchant to understand this order and its unity from 
a narrow vantage point: on the issue of justification. He offers support for this unity by 
appealing to justification explicitly: “This fidelity is particularly clear in relation to this 
 
6 This division is visible in many sources, but the view is summarized by Denis Janz in his essay “Towards 
a Definition of Late-Medieval Augustinianism.” 
  Janz writes: “A third approach to the problem, already evident in the early works of Zumkeller, 
has been to use the term “late medieval Augustinianism” simply to designate the theology of members of 
the Augustinian Order. In this way scholars can hold in abeyance the question of the degree of faithfulness 
to the teaching of Augustine himself, and direct their efforts exclusively to understanding the theology of 
those who were in the Augustinian Order. Among scholars who follow this approach, Adolar Zumkeller 
and Damasus Trapp are clearly the most important. In his book-length essay of 1956 Trapp takes 
“Augustinianism” to designate the theology of members of the Augustinian Order. Augustinian theology 
thus understood falls into two distinct periods. The first period extends from Giles of Rome (d.1316) to 
Thomas of Strassbourg (d.1357), during which theologians of the Order were heavily influenced by 
Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome (this is known as the schola Aegidiana). The second period followed 
Gregory of Rimini (d.1358), and is characterized by a heavier dependence on Augustine himself, even 
though Giles of Rome remained the official teacher of the Order until 1926 (this is known as the schola 
moderna Augustiniana)” (Janz, “Towards a Definition of Late Medieval Augustinianism,” 121). 
7 McGrath, Iustitia Dei: a history of the Christian doctrine of justification, 177. And McGrath, writing in 
1998 gets this from Karl Werner, Der Augustinismus in der Scholastik des spaiter Mittelalters (Wien, 
1883), 234 and Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters,” 1964 
8 Ibid. 
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teaching on original righteousness.”9 Then he cites three Italian studies dealing with 
justification and the Augustinian Order.10 He later writes concerning the Augustinian 
character of this school: “The strongly Augustinian cast of the schola Aegidiana may be 
particularly well seen in the emphasis placed upon the priority of caritas and gratia in 
man’s justification.”11 Here, McGrath cites a study by Zumkellar in support.12 But if 
there is wider unity, extending to other doctrines and questions besides justification, we 
will not know it until we expand our sphere of interest.  
It is in light of the important place that Giles occupies in the collective conscience 
of the Augustinian Order that we look to him first to see what he thought the subject 
matter and purpose of theology was. This reference point will provide us with a measure 
by which we can recognize a certain class of Augustinianism when it comes to the 
question of what theology is. Most importantly, it gives us a version of Augustinianism 
by which we can measure whether and to what extent Rimini might represent a rupture 
and the beginning of a schola Augustiniana moderna. There are, in the end, several 
“Augustinianisms” that we can identify from different vantage points throughout the 
Middle Ages, and we must clarify what version of Augustinianism Giles represents.13 By 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 A.V. La Valle, La giustizia di Adamo e il peccato originale secondo Egidio Romano (Palermo, 1939); G. 
Diaz, De peccati originalis essentia in schola Augustiniana praetridentina (El Escorial, 1961); idem, “la 
escuela agustiniana pretridetina y el problemo de la concupiscencia’, La Ciudad de Dios 174 (1961), 309-
356) 
11 McGrath, Iustitia Dei: a history of the Christian doctrine of justification, 178. 
12 Zumkeller, ‘Augustinerschule des Mittelalters’, 193-195 
13 For a quick survey, see Janz, “Towards a definition of late medieval Augustinanism,” who identifies four 
different waves of definitions used in the 20th century. Notably, he identifies the fourth wave – like 
McGrath, built around the doctrine of justification – as the most suitable definition (p. 126). We, however, 
want to look for unity and an Augustinian influence on a different and less explored topic. Still, Janz draws 
a conclusion regarding the relationship between his preferred definition of Augustinianism and late-
medieval nominalism similar to the kind “tool-box” approach we outined in the introduction. He writes: 
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zeroing in on a particular topic treated by Giles, we will have given ourselves a firm 
standard by which we can say Rimini continues or ruptures a very particular conception 
of Augustinianism: namely, an Aegidio-Augustinianism. 
Giles presents his most sustained and holistic treatment of theology in the 
traditional place for a scholastic theologian: the prologue to his commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard. But he also retained a life-long interest in the subject and 
left a series of questions pertaining to the nature of theology, and thus we find 
considerable relevant material in his Quodlibetal questions and minor treatises. His 
prologue is immediately distinctive because of its faithfulness to an early custom in the 
tradition of Sentences commentaries. As is visible in the commentary of Bonaventure,14 it 
was customary to ask, what are the four causes of theology? What is its material, formal, 
efficient, and final cause? Giles structures his prologue in the same way. This fact itself is 
notable since this kind of organization becomes increasingly rare as the fourteenth 
century proceeds. Giles begins his prologue with the question of the material cause of 
theology: that is, what is the primary subject matter of theology? He then considers the 
formal and efficient cause, and ends by considering the final cause. In the present chapter 
we concern ourselves only with the first and last question since, taken together, they 
 
“Thus, for example, Gregory of Rimini should be regarded as “Augustinian” even though he may have 
adopted nominalistic metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions” (p. 126).  
 For important alternative approach to Late-Medieval Augstiniansim developed after Janz’s survey 
see: Steve Marraone, The Light of They Coutenance, 2001.  
14 Cf. Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, prooemium (Quaracchi I:1-6); See also 
the work of A. J. Minnis for lengthy discussions of the medieval prologue genre; Minnis, “The Influence of 
Academic Prologues on the Prologues and Literary Attitudes of Late-Medieval English Writers”; Minnis, 
Medieval Theory of Authorship. 
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show themselves to be intimately related.15 We will come back to the remaining two 
questions in part II when we turn our explicit consideration of how the results of this 
discipline can be called “knowledge” and what exactly it means to know theologically.  
II. A Universal Wisdom? 
To begin, then, let us draw momentarily consider a rather banal statement by 
Alfred Freddoso about the understood goal and purpose of theology for late medieval 
theologians.  As the driving question of his essay, Freddoso writes: “But the question I 
mean to raise here is a more basic one, Did [sic] the Catholic medieval thinkers see 
themselves in any philosophically interesting sense as the successors of classical 
philosophical inquirers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics?”16 He then turns 
to what seems to him an obvious and indisputable answer to this question, if three 
conditions can be granted. The first condition is the one that interests us here. The first 
assumption is:  
The Socratic conviction that the aim of an intellectually and morally 
integrated philosophical life is the attainment of wisdom—that is, the 
attainment of a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of the first 
principles that provides definitive answers to ultimate questions about the 
origins, nature and destiny of the universe and about the good for human 
beings and the ways to attain it.17  
Believing Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham to sufficiently 
represent the Medieval Catholic tradition as a whole, he states his purported answer to the 
 
15 Peter Nash has recognized the same interdependence and writes: “We will not be concerned with all that 
he has to say on the four causes of theology, but will concentrate on the material cause, the subject of 
theology, though as will appear later, the final cause greatly conditions his delimitation of the subject” 
(“Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 63). 
16 Freddoso, “Ockham on Faith and Reason,” 327. 
17 Ibid. 
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question. “If the term “successor” is taken in a suitably broad sense, then the answer to 
our question is unequivocally affirmative.”18 Freddoso’s picture is not unique; in fact, it 
is a common narrative used to help us understand this unique period of philosophy and 
intellectual enterprise. 
The claim of this chapter is this: while the picture Freddoso presents is common, 
Giles of Rome stands as a witness to the fact that this is not the only picture that can be 
drawn. The case to be made here is that Giles of Rome’s account of theology does not 
correspond well to description Freddosso has given. Giles does not think that the goal of 
theology is to have a “comprehensive and systematic elaboration of first principles.” Nor 
does he think that theology’s primary objective is to provide “definitive answers to 
ultimate questions about the origins, nature, and destiny of the universe.” Undoubtedly, 
theology for Giles deals with systematic deduction, elaboration, and argumentation. 
However, we find him at the same time repeatedly resisting the holistic and 
comprehensive aim that is such a central part of the classical ideal. We find him almost 
counseling us to abandon such a project altogether and informing us that the ultimate aim 
of a theological science involves the perpetual incompleteness of the scientific ideal. Of 
course, this will leave Giles with some problems and difficulties of his own. In many 
ways, theology will now appear insufficient, incomplete, and second-rate. Likewise, if 
theology is reduced to something less than a complete and comprehensive scientific 
discipline and is doomed to remain incomplete, we might wonder: why begin at all? 
 
18 Ibid. 
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Where does the value of a theological enterprise lie if it does not quench our thirst for 
comprehensive knowledge?  
After laying out the outlines of his position, we will turn to Giles’s answer to 
these lingering difficulties. Both the position of Giles and his answers to these questions 
form a provocative counter-tradition to what Fredosso identifies as the Medieval Catholic 
Tradition. While this counter-tradition may often fly under the radar of modern interest, 
Giles’s thought was not quickly forgotten. His ideas were the starting points from which 
future generations of Augustinian Friars began their theological education.    
III. Giles’s Basic Position on the Nature of a Science 
It is impossible to understand what Giles identifies as the real subject matter of 
theology (and more importantly why) without first spending some time discovering just 
what he thinks a science is. More specifically, we need to be very precise about the 
constitutive parts of a science that he singles out.  
The nature of a science is discussed in several places. His early prologue is 
undoubtedly an important resource to which we will return. But he lays out the 
foundational components of a science most clearly in the second question of his third 
Quodlibet.19 The question does not ask about the nature of a science per se, but rather 
speaks directly to our immediate interest in the subject of theology. It asks “whether God 
 
19 Scholars date this Quodlibetal question to either Easter of 1287 or 1288 (Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and 
the Subject of Theology,” 72n1). It is a nice place to begin, not only because of its clarity, but because it 
receives a direct critical response from Henry of Ghent in his 12th quodlibet (Christmas 1288) (Ibid). 
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is the subject in Sacra Pagina under a special ratio.”20 However, in the body of the 
question, Giles shows his awareness that his understanding of the constitutive parts of a 
science must be laid out plainly if we are going to follow his conclusions. After surveying 
arguments for and against his position, he stops to identify and clarify the three elements 
that must be a part of any science.21  
The first component he identifies is perhaps the most obvious. It is the “thing” 
(res), which is the principal consideration. What is presented here in the Quodlibetal 
question is a truncated version of a larger discussion in the opening question of Giles’s 
prologue: namely, what does it mean to be the subject of any science? The primary 
dilemma of this question comes from the admission that in any given discipline there are 
many “things” that are considered; thus the question is asked: “whether it is the same 
thing to be the subject of a science and to be of consideration in a science.”22 Giles’s 
response is an emphatic no,23 and in the course of his response he develops a distinction 
between that “thing” which is the subject of a science (which is referenced in Quodlibet 
3, q. 2) and those “things” which are merely considered in a science.  
 While he offers five reasons why the subject of science cannot be simply 
whatever is considered in the science, we can sum them up generally. His main complaint 
is: if the subject is merely anything considered in the science, then sciences lose their 
 
20 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 127. “Utrum Deus sub speciali ratione sit subjectum in 
Sacra pagina.” 
21 He explicitly indicates that he hopes such attention to these three parts of any science will help make the 
truth of the matter more evident: “Advertendum tamen, ut melius pateat veritas quaestionis quaesitae; quod 
in qualibet scientia tria consideranda sint” (Ibid., III, q. 2, 129). 
22 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, f. 1vb. “Primo, utrum idem sit aliquod 
esse subiectum scientiae et esse de consideratione?” 
23 Ibid., I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, f. 2ra. “Verum, quia non omne quod est de consideratione scientiae est 
subiectum, ut patebit. Igitur esse subiectum in scientia, et esse de consideratione scientiae non sunt idem 
penitus, sed differunt sicut universale et particulare.” 
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identity and the division of the sciences becomes hopelessly confused. Many “things” are 
considered in many different ways. But without a clear primary subject, we will have no 
way to distinguish the unique ways that a given set of “things” are considered within a 
particular discipline. At one point Giles claims that the division of the science will 
become superfluous because there would be few ways of identifying what is unique about 
a given science with respect to any other science that may consider the same “things.”24 
 In light of this negative claim, the question then becomes which “thing” among 
the many “things” considered ought to be counted as the subject of the science? He goes 
on to explain that a “thing” can be considered in any given science in four different ways, 
not all of which permit the “thing” in question to be called a subject. First it can be 
considered according to three parameters: [1] per se, [2] first and principally, [3] in every 
mode.25 Not everything considered in a given science is considered in all three of these 
 
24 Ibid., “Primum autem est unitas: quia secundum Philosophum in primo Posteriorum, scientia una est 
quae est unius generis, subiectum, partes, et passiones considerans. Secundum est distinctio: nam scientiae 
distinguuntur secundum diversitatem suorum subiectorum, nam per idem habet aliquod esse et unum esse 
et indistinctionem a se et distinctionem ab aliis. Si igitur scientia ex subiecto suo habet esse unum habet et 
esse distinctum. Tertium est dignitas, nam una scientia est dignior alias, quia de digniori subiecto; ut patet 
per Philosophum in principio De Anima. Quartum est ordo; quia quando subiectum est sub subiecto, et sunt 
ibi aliae conditiones annexae, scientiae est sub scientia, sicut videmus quod perspectiva est sub geometria, 
quia linea visualis est sub linea simpliciter sive sub magnitudine continua, quae in geometria dicitur esse 
subiectum. Quintum est necessitas; quia subiectum unius non est subiectum alterius, et aliquod declaratur 
in una quod non declaratur in alia. Si autem idem esset esse de consideratione scientiae et esse subiectum in 
scientia, cum unum et idem possit esse de consideratione plurium sciarum, ut patet per Philosophum primo 
Posteriorum et per Commentatorem 12 Metaphysicae, unum et idem esset subiectum plurium scientiarum.” 
25 Here we need to make a correction to Peter Nash’s description of the four ways a thing can be 
considered. Nash elides Giles’s mention of “four ways” with what appears to be a list of what I call 
‘parameters’: viz. per se, primo, principaliter, and per omnem modum (p. 63) But a close reading shows us 
that “primo et principaliter” ought to be taken together, so that we really have three parameters. The “four 
ways” of considering come from [1] having all of these parameters; [2] having two of these parameters; [3] 
having one of these parameters; [4] and having none of these parameters. One could imagine it would be 
possible to increase this list if there was not an intrinsic hierarchy to these parameters. That is, it is not the 
case that all three of these parameters can be employed separately, rather for Giles only ‘per se’ can be 
known by itself without the “thing” being also known “in a primary way (primo)” or “in every mode”; 
likewise, one can know something “per se” and “in a primary way” without knowing it in “every mode.” 
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ways. The second way of considering something is to consider it [1] per se and [2] in a 
primary way, but not [3] in every mode. A third and even more restricted way of 
considering something is to consider it simply [1] per se, but neither [2] in a primary way, 
nor [3] in every mode. This appears to follow from the fact that not knowing something 
in a primary way excludes the possibility of knowing that same “thing” in every mode. 
Finally, the fourth way a knower can consider a “thing” is without any of these 
parameters; this would be to consider something accidentally rather than per se. Giles 
suggests that “to laugh” can be considered “accidentally” in metaphysics.26 Here, 
laughter does not belong to metaphysics as a sub-category of being, but is imported into 
the science, only “through another” (per aliud), namely, on account of something else 
which does belong to the science of metaphysics in a per se way.  
 Of these four ways, we are looking for that manner of consideration (and the 
“thing” which can be considered in this manner) which gives unity and order to the entire 
body of “things” included in the discipline. Of these four ways, it is the first way that 
 
But finally, to know it in “every mode” assumes or necessitates that it is also known “per se” and “in a 
primary way.”  
 Here is what Giles writes: “Notandum quod quattuor modis aliquod consideratur in scientia: primo 
aliquod consideratur in scientia per se et primo et principaliter et per omnem modum; secundo per se et 
primo, non tamen per omnem modum; tertio per se, sed non primo; quarto et ultimo nec per se nec primo, 
sed per accidens, et per aliud secundum quod ridere possumus in metaphysica.” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, 
f. 2rb). 
 Compare this to what Nash says: “Giles posits that the subject properly speaking of a science is 
whatever is considered per se, primarily, principally, and in every mode in which the things under 
consideration may be found. Thus in metaphysics only being is considered in these four ways, for it is the 
primary and principal aspect under which all the problems are resolved” (Nash, “Giles of Rome and the 
Subject of Theology,” 63).  
 It is true that metaphysics treats “things” in all these ways, but it does not do this under four 
parameters or conditions, but under three. A thing can be known within metaphysics in four ways 
depending on whether all, two, one, or none of these parameters accompany the “thing” under 
consideration. 
26 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, I, prol., pars. 1, q. 1, f. 2rb. “…sed per accidens, et per aliud 
secundum quod ridere possumus in metaphysica.” 
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provides this kind of unity and order. Taking the science of metaphysics as his example, 
Giles says that “being” is the true subject of this science, even though metaphysics has 
lots to say about “substance” and “accidents” (i.e. diverse types of beings.). Substance 
cannot be the subject in the strictest possible sense because a consideration restricted to 
substance would not consider the “things” of the science in every mode, even though 
substance would be considered per se and in a primary way. (Nota bene: for Aristotle, 
substance is a primary kind of being in comparison with all the other ways something can 
be said “to exist”). Most notably, it would ignore or exclude accidents, which are also a 
“thing” considered in this science, but are not primary.  
 However, according to Giles, substance can be considered to be the subject of this 
science “in a certain way”27 or speaking loosely. Substance, unlike accident, is 
considered in a primary way. As primary, substance is the sense of “being” through 
which all other senses of “being” must make reference.28 
 
27 Ibid., I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, f. 2rb. “Quod autem secundo consideratur, licet non sit simpliciter est 
subiectum in ea, est aliquo modo potest dici subjectum.” 
28 Depending on your reading of Aristotle, this might need further nuance, as Aristotle makes important 
distinctions between sensible and non-sensible substances; for Aristotle non-sensible substances are clearly 
primary to sensible substance, just as substances are a primary kind of being with reference to accident. 
Therefore non-sensible substance should be seen as a primary kind of being with reference to sensible 
substances. Cf. Metaphysics, II, c. 1 where Aristotle says:  “Now we do not know a truth without its cause; 
and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to 
the other things (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that 
that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be 
always most true (for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they 
themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in 
respect of truth” (994a1-994a19, trans. Ross, p. 712-713).  
 Cf. Metaphysics, VII, c. 2, where Aristotle says: “Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire 
which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what things are substances, and 
whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and 
whether there is a separable substance (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from 
sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance” (1028b33-1029a6, trans. Ross, p. 
784). 
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 I place an emphasis on the two ways something can be called a “subject,” both 
absolutely and “in some way,” because a tension runs through Giles’s attempt to identify 
God as the subject of theology. He clearly wants to identify God as the subject of 
theology, but he also emphatically denies that God is considered “in every mode.” We 
will see if and how he attempts to work this out in the next section.29 But for now, with 
this basic sense of the “subject” (both in the “strict” and “loose” senses) in place, we need 
to move on to Giles’s description of the second and third components of a science. 
 The second component, mentioned in Quodlibet III, q. 2, is the ratio. A clear 
explanation of a ratio and its function can be found in an example given by Scotus, which 
we will review again in the next chapter.30 Scotus takes as an example the subject of 
human being and notes four rationes under which it can be considered:  “quidditatively” 
(e.g. humanity), “under a common concept” (e.g. substance), “under an accident” (e.g. 
gentle), or “in comparison with something else” (e.g. as the most noble of animals).31 
The example from Scotus is helpful because it prevents us from understanding the ratio 
of a science as a kind of specifying difference. The ratio does not divide up a more 
general category into several parts, wherein “being” becomes the only real subject of any 
science and every other science is merely a study of being under a certain ratio. Instead, 
Scotus helps us see that ratio indicates the vantage point from which a “thing” is going to 
be considered. Since all things are a “being” in some way, any reality can be considered 
from the vantage point (ratio) of “being,” and this, according to Scotus, would be to 
 
29 See below section “Aegidio-Augustinian Theology and Metaphysics,” p. 84. 
30 See below, p. 104. 
31 For the exact quotation see below p. 104, n. 20. 
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consider something through the perspective of a common concept.  Likewise, something 
could be considered only from the perspective of its relation to something else, as human 
being might be considered only in comparison to other animals. However, this 
understanding of ratio makes it clear that everything can be considered in a 
comprehensive way when it is considered under the ratio of its essence, “whatness,” or 
quiddity. By comprehensive, it is meant that the consideration extends to every property 
proper to the nature in question and not merely those properties or attributes that fall 
under a more restricted ratio. To consider something under its “quidditative” ratio is to 
be unrestricted in one’s investigation relative to the subject matter at hand. It is to 
consider to the totality of attributes and properties proper to the nature in question.  
 To consider something under its quidditative ratio is proper to the nature and 
spirit of a speculative science.32 Here is a type of investigation which seeks completion 
and totality. It seeks to know for its own sake and is therefore not limited by some other 
concern, as is the case in a practical science or productive art. In the latter two cases, one 
does not pursue knowledge for its own sake, but for the sake of some activity or the 
production of some artifact. Not every property or attribute of a given subject is relevant 
to this practical interest, and thus a practical discipline would rarely consider its object 
under its “quidditative” ratio, but rather under some common concept like “good” or 
 
32 Consider one of Aristotle’s descriptions of theoretical knowledge: “It is right also that philosophy should 
be called knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical 
knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study what is eternal 
but what stands in some relation at some time)” (Metaphysics, II, c. 1, 994a1ff, trans. Ross, p. 712). 
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“desirable,” etc.33 For a practical science, what is knowable is limited by the end for 
which that knowledge was pursued.  
To hint at what is to come, a major concern for Scotus is whether or not a 
“reality” or “thing” that is not considered quidditatively can really function as the 
ordering subject of a science according to the conditions Giles laid down. To construct 
Giles’s reply we must keep in mind the two senses—the strict and loose sense—in which 
some “thing” can be called the subject. In the strictest sense, the reality must be 
“considered in every way,” and this would seem to demand a “quidditative” ratio. But in 
the second looser sense, a “thing” can be called and function as a subject even if it is not 
“considered in every way.” Thus, substance can “in some way” be the subject of 
metaphysics, even though to consider “being” qua substance rather than qua being would 
be to exclude certain types of “being” from consideration. This is a strategy we will see 
Giles employ as he tries to maintain both that God is the subject of theology and that 
theology does not treat God in a comprehensive way.34  
 
33 We must say “rarely” because Scotus takes a unique position. He is convinced that theology is practical, 
but insists that theology must consider God under a “quidditative ratio” God qua God, we will examine 
why in c. 3, p. 146.  
34 As an aside, I think Nash’s presentation of how God is and isn’t the subject of metaphysics is either 
wrong or ambiguously presented. Nash tends to treat the “ratio” as a specifying difference, distinguishing 
the study of God from the study of Being. In this case, a restricted ratio creates distinguishes theology from 
metaphysics. But, to my ears, this sounds like saying, if “human beings” were not considered under a 
restricted ratio, then this would really be a study of being qua being. The study of human being would then 
be the study of “being” restricted under the ratio of “human being.” But this is contrary to the illuminating 
example provided by Scotus, where to study human being qua human is to study human beings under a 
non-restricted ratio, but to studying human beings qua being is to study them under a common concept and 
to restrict one’s interest in human being to their status as “beings.”  
 Nash ambiguous reads as follows: “Unlike metaphysics which, if and when it treats of God, does 
so sub modo communi, i.e. inasmuch as he is being and the cause of all things, theology considers God sub 
speciali modo; otherwise it would not differ from metaphysics [this is the claim that causes the most 
concern]. God, therefore, under a special aspect is what theology principally considers and is its subject” 
(Nash, 65). 
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The third and final element of any given science is the presence of an actualizing 
light. This element is important for our understanding of how theological knowledge of 
the earthly pilgrim and the Blessed differ. But it is also a key component for our later 
interest in how the theologian knows and whether this knowledge is a distinct habit from 
the habit of faith. Both issues will be discussed below.35 
Regarding this necessary light, Giles writes that the light is that “through which 
(per quod)” the principle subject matter is considered.36 In the case of natural philosophy, 
the light required to make material and sensible objects knowable by an immaterial 
intellect is the light of natural reason. It may, at first, appear needless to add this third 
component, since on the surface this amounts to saying that a science requires that it be 
known by a knower. Without a knower no actual science would exist, but only potential 
sciences. Giles’s emphasis here comes from the fact that he believes the natural light of 
reason is not the only way we can become knowers of truth. In other words, abstraction 
from sensible realities is not the only way someone can arrive at truth. In addition to our 
natural light, Giles recognizes the light of faith, the light of Glory, and God’s own light.37 
 
 As we proceed further, I want to combat the idea that God is considered under a restricted ratio in 
theology because otherwise theology would become metaphysics. On the contary, to consider God 
quidditatively or under a non-restricted ratio would be to consider God comprehensively in every mode, 
not merely as one being among many types.  
35 For example consider the disucssion in this chapter on p. 69, “On the Nature of Beatitude” as well as the 
discussion of beatitude in chapter 2, p. 131, “VI. Rimini on the Primary Subject of Theology and the Extent 
of Theological Knowledge.” For the language of lights and the beginning of the discussion of the difference 
between faith and theology see below “Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium and the Response of Peter 
Aureoli,” p. 249. 
36 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 129a. “Ut in scientia naturali res principaliter 
considerata est corpus mobile; ratio, sub qua consideratur, est in eo quod mobile; lumen per quod 
consideratur, est lumen rationis nobis naturaliter inditum; per quod lumen fit consideratio in omnibus 
scientiis humanitus inventis.”  
37 Cf. Ibid., III, q. 2, 129–130. 
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 But just what it means to know in the light of faith and for that matter in the light 
of glory is an open question. How these two lights differ from the natural light and how 
they differ from each other is a controversial question. But we can make some progress 
toward an answer, at least negatively, by turning to Giles’s consideration of the distinct 
ratio under which theology knows God and considering whether that ratio changes or 
alters when one transitions from the light of faith to the light of glory.  
IV. God Under a Restricted Ratio 
For He keeps all being in His own embrace, like a sea of essence infinite and unseen. 
 – John the Damascene, De Fidei Orth. I, c. 9 
Giles’s answer begins with a commitment to the first and fundamental meaning of 
the name God. “By the name God,” he says, “we should understand an infinite sea of 
substance (pelagus substantiae infinitum)”38 The phrase pelagus infinitum is not an 
invention of Giles, nor of his teacher Aquinas, who also employs the phrase.39 It is a 
description given by the Church Father John the Damascene. The phrase and definition of 
the first and most proper name of God is important because it dictates the rest of Giles’s 
argument. By understanding the term “God” as an infinite ocean, Giles sees the idea of 
God and infinity as irrevocably connected and he identifies three explicit reasons why 
God inasmuch as he is God or God under a quidditative ratio (Deus in eo quod Deus sive 
Deus sub absoluta ratione) cannot be the subject of theology.  
 
38 Ibid., III, q. 2, 128. “Nomine Dei intelligitur quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum; ut innuit 
Damascenus lib. 1, cap. 20.” 
39 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.13, a. 11, resp.  
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These three arguments really represent two types. The first type is an argument 
built upon ability and what is epistemically possible. The second two arguments are built 
on a prior commitment about the purpose of theological knowledge and why we pursue 
it. In these latter two arguments we will see the unmistakable stamp of an Aegidian 
reading of Augustine. That is, these two arguments involve a direct appeal to an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of Augustine. They are therefore a witness to us of what Giles 
believes to be the intention of Augustine. All of these arguments will become classics 
within the ensuing scholastic discussion. 
The first of the three arguments does not appeal to Augustine. But this is because 
Giles believes the reasoning is fairly straightforward. The argument insists: if God, as an 
infinite ocean, is the subject of theology, then a science of that subject will be infinite as 
well.40 All that is required for this proof is two basic assumptions. The first (established 
in Giles’s previous discussion of what it means to be a subject)41 is that a science 
receives its species and distinctive character from its object, and the second is that it is 
impossible for a created finite being to have an infinite science. While straightforward, 
we can already see that the assumptions of this argument carry with them at least one 
important implication. Because of the assumed absurdity of any finite creature having an 
infinite science, the argument requires that not even the Blessed—who though truly 
blessed, remain creatures, and therefore finite—consider God as he is, but only in a 
restricted and qualified way. The further implication follows that the transition from 
 
40 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 128. “Nam si Deus qui dicitur pelagus infinitum, esset 
subjectum in hac scientia: tunc ista scientia esset infinita, et tenderet in Deum modo infinitio, nam  ab 
infinito, in eo quod infinitum, non potest scientia trahere speciem, nisi sit scientia infinita.” 
41 See above, p. 50. 
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knowing in the light of faith to the light of glory does not radically alter the subject 
matter or the extent of what is classified as theological knowledge. This is a consequence 
many theologians to come will struggle with, but one Giles will whole-heartedly defend. 
From this first argument, built around the capacity of a finite intellect, we pass to 
those arguments wherein we are introduced to Giles’s understanding of the purpose of 
theology. The second argument rests on the consequence that if God, as an infinite ocean, 
was the subject of theology, then this science would be able to consider everything. But 
unlike in the first argument, this one looks past the impossibility of the consequence, and 
suggests that even if this were possible, it would be a betrayal of what theology and 
theological knowledge is. The vision of theological knowledge betrayed by this 
consequence is derived from Augustine and the passage from De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, 
used over and over again by scholastic theologians trying to reconcile Augustine’s 
discussion of science with its Aristotelian counterpart.42 For this argument, Giles focuses 
on the first half of the passage. His paraphrase reads: “By no means is everything, which 
is able to be known by man in human matters (where there is much of vanity and harmful 
curiosity), attributed to this science.”43 The concern about excluding vain and harmful 
knowledge from theology is what Giles takes to be the central Augustinian point. In the 
third argument, we will see why Giles thinks Augustine takes this position. But, as this 
passage will come up again, we should spend a moment considering what Augustine 
 
42 For the previous discussion of this quotation see above p. 7, n. 9. 
43 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 128. “quod est contra Augustinum 14, de Trinitate cap. 
I, dicente, non utique quicquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis (ubi plurimum vanitatis, noxiae 
curiositatis est) huic scientiae tribuit.” 
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means by “this science” and whether or how “theology” as Giles means it corresponds to 
this meaning. The familiar citation taken from De Trinitate 14, c. 1, reads as follows:  
Now in their discussions of wisdom they defined it as follows: Wisdom is 
the knowledge of things human and divine.44 That is why in the previous 
book I expressly said that awareness of each kind of things, namely human 
and divine, could be called both wisdom and knowledge. But in terms of 
the distinction made by the apostle, To one is given a word of wisdom, to 
another a word of knowledge (1 Cor 12:8), this definition can be split up, 
in such a way that knowledge of things divine is properly called wisdom, 
and of things human is properly given the name of knowledge. I discussed 
this knowledge in the thirteenth volume, where I did not of course ascribe 
to it any and every thing a man can know about things human, because 
this includes a great deal of superfluous frivolity and pernicious 
curiosity.45 
The pronoun “their” in the opening sentence is Augustine’s reference to pagan 
philosophers and to their understanding of wisdom: “wisdom,” they say, “is a knowledge 
of things human and divine.” But Augustine, at the opening of Book XIV, is in the 
middle of unpacking this belief and redefining this Greek idea of wisdom. As the 
quotation tells us, Augustine thinks the definition can be split into two—wisdom proper 
(sapientia) and knowledge (scientia). He spent the previous book (Book XIII) describing 
knowledge (scientia) as knowledge of human things, and in Book XIV means to turn to 
wisdom, which is described as a knowledge of things divine.46 But here at the beginning 
of book XIV he is careful to point out that, while knowledge of human affairs (scientia) 
can be useful, it should be pursued only in a insofar as it is necessary to support wisdom 
proper. General wisdom (inclusive of Augustine’s subdivision of knowledge and wisdom 
 
44 This is a common Stoic definition of wisdom, quoted by Cicero, for example in De Officiis II, 12, 5.  
45 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (trans. Hill, p. 371). 
46 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, n. 3. “But in terms of the distinction made by the apostle, To one is 
given a word of wisdom, to another a word of knowledge (1 Cor 12:8), this definition can be split up, in 
such a way that knowledge of things divine is properly called wisdom, and of things human is properly 
given the name of knowledge” (trans. Hill, p. 371). 
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proper) is not interested in this knowledge in an exhaustive way. On the contrary, wisdom 
only concerns itself with the human and contingent inasmuch as it necessary for a 
different and higher purpose.  
The position taken by Augustine regarding scientia reveals something of the 
ambiguous relationship with pagan philosophy that runs through the heart of his corpus. 
He is at once an admirer of the aspirations of pagan philosophy and is at the same time a 
constant critic of philosophy for having lost its way. In principle, Augustine might agree 
with Aristotle’s assessment that we have a natural desire to know. However, this desire is 
misunderstood if we understand it as the obsessive zeal of a researcher to uncover every 
proximate cause of every event no matter how big or small.47 
Here we can recall the claim of Fredosso, which we pointed to at the outset.  Can 
we take it for granted that Christian theologians saw theology as the completion of the 
Greek project? Augustine is ambivalent at best. More importantly, Giles directs us toward 
this claim of Augustine to make an even stronger claim: he uses the quotation to suggest 
that theology is limited not just with respect to human things, but also in the manner in 
which it considers God. On this view, theology undoubtedly still aims to be a kind of 
wisdom, but—as Augustine is made to suggest—this wisdom does not include everything 
that is knowable. True wisdom does not mean a comprehensive and all encompassing 
knowledge. If comprehensive knowledge of all that is knowable is what wisdom means 
 
47 See for example Jonathan Lear’s explanation of Aristotle’s conception of our desire to know: “Thus, 
although philosophy begins in wonder, it ends in lack of wonder” (Aristotle: the desire to understand, 6). 
And later he says: “The project of understanding the world lies at the bottom of who we are. Until we have 
pursued that project all the way, it is not just that we do not yet fully know what the desire to understand is 
a desire for, we do not yet know who we really are. That is, we don’t yet fully understand what it is to be a 
systematic understander of the world” (Ibid., 8). 
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for the Greek philosopher, then both Augustine and Giles are not trying to complete the 
Greek project of wisdom. On the contrary, they are trying to redefine it. The foundation 
of this reason is drawn out in the third and final argument of the Quodlibetal question. 
Giles’s third argument follows from the continuation of the above quotation from 
Augustine, wherein Augustine sets the parameters that limit the scope of this scientia. As 
written by Giles, the quotation continues: “To this science is attributed only that by which 
this most saving faith (saluberrima) which leads to beatitude is grown, nourished, 
defended, and strengthened” (emphasis mine).48 From Augustine’s declaration that this 
“science” (scientia) has to do with faith and/or beatitude, Giles explicitly builds his third 
argument on the presumed end or purpose of theological knowledge: “The third argument 
is taken from the part of this science, as it is refers to its end.”49 Once more in contrast to 
the classical view described by Fredosso, which values those disciplines most of all 
which are “ends in themselves,” Giles believes that the value of theology is not intrinsic 
to itself or its epistemic achievement, but only in its status as a means or instrument 
toward something else. He writes: “for this science is like an organ to felicity, and for this 
end it has been given to man so that he may arrive at beatitude.”50 Thus, for Giles, “this 
science” is taken to be the discipline of Sacra Pagina and is subordinated to and limited 
by the goal of beatitude. 
 
48 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 129. “Quod illud tantummodo huic scientiae attribuitur, 
quo fides saluberrima, quae ad beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, ac roboratur.” Hill 
translates: “All I ascribed to it was anything that breeds, feeds, defends, and strengthens the saving faith 
which leads to true happiness” (Hill, 371). 
49 Ibid., III, q. 2, 128. “Tertia via sumitur ex parte huius scientiae, ut refertur ad suum finem”. 
50 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 128.  “Est enim haec scientia quas organum ad 
felicitatem: et ad hunc finem data est homini propter beatitudinem adipiscendam.” 
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There is some ambiguity in Giles’s interpretation of Augustine in both the second 
and third argument. Giles’s use of the term theology or Sacra Pagina does not always run 
perfectly parallel to a straightforward reading of Augustine and his use of scientia. We 
typically think of theology as dealing within divine things, as opposed to other sciences 
that might deal with human things. But when Augustine speaks of scientia in contrast to 
“wisdom” he is clearly referring to those disciplines that deal with human affairs, and his 
point is that wisdom’s interest in these disciplines is limited. They are useful only when 
they strengthen faith, but are otherwise either superfluous or harmful. It is faith on the 
other hand that leads us to beatitude. It is not clear if Augustine really means to say that 
either faith or wisdom is limited when it comes to knowing God. Giles, however, has 
conflated his idea of theology both with Augustine’s references to “science” and to the 
“faith which leads to beatitude.” Thus theology or Sacra Pagina is both a limited science 
about God and that which leads us to beatitude. In this way, theology and faith appear 
almost indistinguishable in the Aegidian position. What is more, Giles has used 
Augustine’s limitation of the knowledge of human affairs to defend a limitation of 
theology in our knowledge about God. Our goal is not to establish the right reading of 
Augustine, but to articulate what Giles thinks is the right reading; nevertheless, his 
interpretation of Augustine is by no means obvious. 
Finally, the rest of the Augustinian quotation (conveniently ignored by Giles) 
complicates this conflation between science, faith, and wisdom. The rest of the quotation 
reads: 
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Very many of the faithful do not excel in such knowledge, though they 
excel very much in faith itself. It is one thing to know only what a man 
should believe in order to gain the happy life which is nothing if it is not 
eternal; quite another to know how the godly are to be assisted in this and 
how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the 
apostle seems to call by the proper name of knowledge.51 
Here there is a clear distinction between those who have the faith, which leads to 
beatitude, and those who have this science. In a later section,52 we will see that future 
Augustinian hermits will be challenged by this ignored text and will have to find a way to 
explain it, while still being faithful to the Aegidian reading of Augustine: a reading, 
which above all emphasizes that theology is merely an instrument, wherein the impetus to 
know is subordinated to the higher goal of beatitude. 
V. The Name of this Restricted Ratio and Theology’s Distinction from all other 
Sciences 
Aside from once again confirming Giles’s reliance on Augustine and his belief 
that theology must treat God in a restricted way, this third argument takes us one step 
further than the previous two arguments. The argument does more than simply tell us that 
God must be considered under a restricted ratio; it also helps Giles to identify what that 
restricted ratio is.  
However, while Giles merges these two questions together (namely whether God 
must be considered under a restricted ratio, and what that restricted ratio is), caution 
recommends that we recognize that these are really two different questions. We should 
anticipate, then, that disagreement about the name of the special ratio does not 
 
51 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (trans. Hill, p. 371) 
52 See below chapter 5, p. 233, “Whether Theology Is Something Different from Faith?” 
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necessarily indicate disagreement on the larger issue of whether God must be considered 
under a special ratio. As we look to find doctrinal unity between diverse thinkers, 
distinguishing between disagreements on a sub-issue versus disagreements on the more 
fundamental assumption is an important distinction to keep in mind.53 
In the case of Giles, the authority of Augustine leads him directly to the particular 
ratio under which he thinks theology considers God. Given theology’s purposeful 
orientation to beatitude, he says: “whatever theology considers about God, it considers 
under this ratio and this condition: that God is our glorifier and beatifier.”54 In the same 
Quodlibet, one objection is given, which is aimed not against the principle of a restricted 
ratio per se, but against the particular designation of “glorifier” and “beatifier.” The 
immediate response is revealing of theology’s supposed place within the plan of human 
salvation and beatitude. 
 
53 Consider Thomas of Strasbourg’s clear preference for the ratio “summe diligible.” Strasbourg shows a 
preference for this name over the name chosen by Giles, but he simultaneous shows reverence for Giles by 
defending his position against objections, all the while declaring that the debate over the correct name is a 
minor issue.  
 First regarding the preferred name of the ratio, he writes: “Et licet deficiamus in nominibus 
subiectum istius benedictae scientiae sub tali ratione speciali sufficienter exprimentibus; potest tamen sic 
describi, ut dicatur, verum summe diligibile ut proportionatum est rationali animae nondum perfectae per 
habitum luminis gloriae” (Commentaria, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, f. 2va).  
 Next consider his simultaneous dismissal of the controversy and respect for Giles: “Advertendum 
tamen, quod per id, quod superius posui, quantum ad rationem subiecti sacrae theologiae non intendo 
deviare a venerabili doctore nostro fratre Aegidio, qui licet per alia verba praedictam veritatem expressit, 
idem tamen (ut credo) dicere voluit: per rationem enim specialem ut ipsemet dicit, non intendit, nisi 
restrictionem in obiecto illius abyssalis rationis superius nominatae. Cum autem quandoque rationem 
subiecti istius scientiae explicando, ponit nomen glorificatoris, non est sibi cura de tali nomine, quia 
ipsemet quandoque dicit, quod non possumus nomen aptum invenire, quo talem rationem specialem 
sufficienter exprimamus. Sed per nomen glorificatoris intendit, quod ratio praedicta nominari debet in 
ordine ad finem, ad quem nos ducit illa scientia benedicta, qui finis est gloria vitae aeternae, quae 
principaliter consistit in Dei dilectione. Et ex hoc etiam patet, quod omnes illi, qui arguunt contra hoc 
vocabulum glorificator, magis laborant contra nomen, quam contra doctoris intentionem. Et licet 
praedictorum rationes non sint contra me, gratia tamen istius doctoris venerandi volo ipsis respondere” 
(Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, f. 4rb). 
54 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 129. “Quicquid considerat de Deo, considerat sub hac 
ratione, et sub hac conditione, ut est glorifcator, et beatificator noster.” 
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The objection singles out “restorer” as another possible candidate for the 
restricted ratio of theology. This candidate comes up in the initial objections listed in 
Giles’s Quodlibet. But it is identified as a problematic term by the objector because it 
suggests that the purpose of theology in leading toward beatitude is to restore our broken 
condition. That is, the goal of theology is to heal the wound incurred through sin or save 
us from our post-lapsarian status. But the objector notes: “if we suppose that man never 
sinned, there would still be Sacra Pagina. And yet man would not have been restored.”55 
This response is built on a view of theology as a body of knowledge that extends beyond 
what is relevant to our restoration. Further, it suggests that knowledge required for 
salvation is only a partial fragment of a wider body of truths enjoyed by those who have 
already been restored or never needed to be restored in the first place.56 
In reply, Giles shows us that theological knowledge is not limited to what is 
merely needed to escape our pilgrim status, but is always limited by the concern for 
beatitude. This limit exists whether we stand in need of salvation or not. The name 
“restorer” is acceptable to Giles only if by it one can mean “any kind of provision for a 
deficiency” (qualibet suppletione defectus) and not just the restoration from some 
historically incurred sickness.57 Understood in this way, we can recognize that theology 
is a tool for a supernatural end (beatitude) that lies beyond any natural end, unreachable 
 
55 Ibid., III, q. 2, 128. “Sed dato, quod numquam homo peccasset, nihilominus fuisset Sacra pagina, non 
tamen homo fuisset restauratus.” 
56 Both Scotus and Ockham will interpret the Augustinian quotation and its limited “scientia” along these 
lines. For Scotus, see p. 114; for Ockham, see p. 127. 
57 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 130. “Quod autem dicebatur tertio de restauratione, dici 
debet, quod ibi restauratio debeat sumi large pro qualibet suppletione defectus.” 
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in principle without divine aid.58 Here, we find echoes of Aquinas’s departure from the 
Aristotelian conception of one final natural end for human beings and the addition of a 
supernatural end alongside our natural end.59 As an instrument for our supernatural end, 
Sacra Pagina cannot be conceived of as a medicine for a contingent and historically 
incurred wound, but as a necessary addition to our natural state—necessary, that is, if one 
wants to transition from natural happiness to the supernatural beatitude.  
The distinct character of this ratio, as oriented toward a beatitude only achievable 
through grace and supernatural aid, explains one of the defining differences between 
theological knowledge and other human sciences. Theology does not begin from sensible 
things as all other human sciences do.60 It is not enough that a science considers God as 
one of the things under its umbrella. It may, after all, be possible for God to be 
considered qua being in metaphysics or in connection to some other sensible reality.61 
However, for Giles, this is not sufficient. Not only is theological knowledge a kind of 
knowledge that restricts itself to the goal of beatitude, it is also a unique way of knowing 
God. To know God under the ratio of glorifier and beatifier is to know God from a 
vantage point (ratio) not found in the sensible world; this is paradoxically a kind of 
knowing still within our finite capacity, yet supernatural with respect to the way it knows.  
 
58 Ibid. “Si enim homo numquam peccasset: nihilominus tamen ex puris naturalibus non potuisset consequi 
beatitudinem.” 
59 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 3. 
60 Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 64. “Theology does not directly nor principally 
treat of sensible things, nor does it begin with sensible things as humanly discovered sciences are forced to 
do. Theology follows the pattern of divine wisdom, which has itself as principal object and all other things 
as secondary object, known only in the understanding of itself.” Also see the discussion on theology and 
metaphysics below, p. 84.  
61 See below p. 84. 
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This, then, is what we can glean from the three dominant arguments with which 
Giles shapes his position. Amid the introduction of many other arguments pro and con, 
these three arguments will be repeated again throughout the fourteenth century. As such, 
they reveal the core commitments that Giles has as a theologian and what he thinks is the 
authentic Augustinian position on the matter. To summarize, the arguments are: (1) God 
in himself is an infinite ocean; to have such an infinite object as the object of knowledge 
would be to have an infinite science, which is impossible (naturally or supernaturally) for 
any and all finite creatures. (2) A science of God as infinite or under an absolute ratio 
would mean possessing a knowledge of everything. But this goes against the authority of 
Augustine, who, on Giles’s reading, states there are many things about which “theology” 
does not concern itself. And (3) closely related to the second, theology is a tool, an 
instrument, or an organ. It is not an end in itself, but is a means by which we can attain 
our supernatural end—not simply salvation, but a beatitude as proper to the pilgrim soul 
as it is to those who never fell from grace and those who enjoy beatitude in actu. 
VI. On the Nature of Beatitude 
With Giles’s core beliefs laid out, we can turn to some common concerns that 
were raised about the implications of his position. The two concerns that we will consider 
in this section and the next are about the conception of beatitude seemingly demanded by 
Giles and about the nobility of a “limited theology” in comparison to the universal 
aspirations of metaphysics. We turn first to the concern with beatitude. 
Chapter 1: Giles, Science and Theology | 70 
                                                
Godfrey of Fontaines raises this concern explicitly in a direct challenge to an 
early Quodlibetal question of Giles, Quodlibet 1, q. 21. This question, dated from Easter 
1285,62 asks whether those who are enjoying (fruentes) and seeing God, see everything 
which is in him.”63 The concern is clearly about the nature of beatitude and the 
implications of Giles’s position on the subject and nature of theology for an acceptable 
doctrine of beatitude. Giles’s position in his first Quodlibet is consistent with the position 
on beatitude taken in Quodlibet III, q. 2. Gregory the Great affirms that the Blessed do in 
fact see everything there is to see in God,64 and this opinion is taken as the traditional and 
authoritative belief about beatitude. But Giles disagrees. His key assertion comes in the 
form of a distinction between knowing God totum and knowing God totaliter. Giles 
writes: 
Thus even while they are seeing God it is not necessary that they know 
everything which is in God, and they do not know every effect that is able 
to proceed from him. Whence it is commonly customary to say that to 
know God totum is one thing and to know God totaliter is something 
else.65  
The point is made by a number of comparisons about the way things exist in God. Like 
numbers in unity, lines in a point, particular virtues in the sun, powers in the soul, and 
 
62 Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 68n1. 
63 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1504), I, q. 21, f. 11va; Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), I, q. 21, 
44b. “Utrum fruentes Deo et videntes ipsum vident omnia quae sunt in ipso.” 
64 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), 44b. “Et arguebatur quod sic per Gregor dicentem: ‘quid est quod 
non videant, qui videntem omnia vident?’ Beati ergo, qui vident Deum videntem omnia, etiam omnia 
vident.” 
 The quotation from Gregory is found his Dialogues, IV, c. 33; its status as a traditional authority 
on the nature of beatitude is visible in the fact that it is cited by Lombard (Sententia, II, d. 11, c. 2 
(Quaracchi II:275)) and Bonaventure (Commentaria, II, d. 11, dubia II (Quaracchi II: 289)). The English 
translator (Dialogues 1911) of this text list two passages from Paradiso that reflect this Gregorian vision of 
beatitude; Dante, Paradiso, xv. 55-63, xxi. 82-102. 
65 Ibid., I, 20, 45. “Sic videntes Deum non est necessarium videre omnia quae sunt in Deo, aut omnes 
effectus qui possunt ab ipso procedere. Unde et communiter dici consuevit quod aliud sit cognoscere Deum 
totaliter.” 
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conclusions in principles, all of God’s effects reside in him. Yet one may know God 
without knowing all these effects in the same way that one may know unity, point, the 
sun, the soul, and principles, without knowing all the things contained in them.66 For 
Giles, the Blessed, who know God totum, truly see God, but they do not see him totaliter 
because they do not comprehend him. That is, “they do not understand him in every 
mode in which he is able to be understood, and therefore they do not understand 
everything which shines in him, or everything which is able to proceed from him.”67 
Here, Giles reinforces the view that God is a subject in the second and “loose” sense.68 
Peter Nash draws out the most distinctive feature of this position on beatitude by 
comparing Giles’s position to that of Thomas Aquinas. Nash writes:  
Where Giles differs from St. Thomas is not with regard to the knowledge 
which the Blessed might have of God’s possible effects (cf. St. Thomas, 
De veritate, q. 8, a. 3, ad 11m), but with regard to their knowledge of God 
himself. For St. Thomas this [creaturely] knowledge [of God] does not 
differ specifically from God’s knowledge of Himself, for Giles it does 
differ specifically, thanks to a different formal aspect [or ratio].69  
 
66 Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 68. “Things exist in god as numbers in unity, 
lines in a point, particular agents in the sun, powers in the soul, and (here Giles adds a parallel given by St. 
Thomas but not by Denis) as conclusions in their premises. Now one can know all of these: unity, point, 
sun, soul, premises, without thereby having to know all the numbers, lines, particular agents with their 
effects, and the conclusions derivable from them. Hence know God does not entail seeing all that is in Him 
or all the effects that can proceed from Him.”  
 Cf. Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), I, q. 21, 45b. “Quod patet per simile, quia aliud est 
intelligere centrum totum et unitatem totam, aliud est intelligere centrum et unitatem totaliter. Nam qui 
intelligit centrum et unitatem totaliter. Nam qui intelligit centrum ipsum intelligit totum, cum non habeat 
partem et partem, cum intelligit unitatem, intelligit eam totam cum partibus careat, non tamen intelligitur 
centrum totaliter nisi intelligantur omnia quae possunt ex centro derivari, non intelligitur unitas totaliter nisi 
intelligantur omnes numeri qui possunt ab unitate procedere.” 
67 Ibid. “Nec intelligunt eum omni modo quo intelligi potest, et ideo non intelligunt omnia quae relucent in 
ipso, vel omnia quae possunt ex ipso procedere” At the end of this same passage Giles makes an 
unmistakable assertion against the Gregorian thesis: “Non oportet ergo, sanctos, qui vident in patria Deum 
totum, et non vident ipsum totaliter, videre omnia, quae sunt in ipso” (p. 46a). 
68 See above p. 50. 
69 Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 68n6. We should note that there seems to be a typo 
in the original version of Nash’s text. The actual text reads “for Giles it does not differ specifically, thanks 
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The key is Giles’s commitment to the fact that the Blessed, while beatified, remain 
creatures and therefore remain finite. Because they are finite they can truly see God, but 
they cannot comprehend him. And by “comprehend,” Giles means to exhaust everything 
knowable in God. In contrast, our finite minds are limited such that they can only know 
certain aspects of what is knowable in God. This particular characteristic is sufficient to 
make our knowledge of God specifically distinct from God’s own knowledge of himself.  
This radical contrast between our knowledge (whether as pilgrims or Blessed) and 
God’s knowledge of himself is confirmed and perhaps even more clear in Giles’s 
comparison of the three kinds of theology that appear later in Quodlibet 3, q. 2. He 
remarks that the theology of the pilgrim and the theology of the Blessed differ in only one 
thing: the light through which they know. But, surprisingly, they do not differ in any way 
with respect to the ratio under which God is known. In other words, the transition from 
faith to evidence or presence does not change the scope of finite theological knowledge. 
Both the pilgrim and the Blessed know God under the restricted ratio of glorifier. God on 
the other hand, knows himself in a unique light and under the ratio of God qua God. 
Thus, his knowledge of himself is of an altogether different type than the knowledge that 
the Blessed have of God.70 
 
to a different formal aspect.” While the “not” is present, the sense of what Nash is saying clearly demands 
that this is a typographical error. 
70 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 129b. “Haec scientia a scientia qua pollet Deus differt in 
duobus; videlicet in ratione considerandi, et in lumine, per quod considerat; sed non differt in tertio, 
videlicet, in re considerata; de illo enim eodem, ut de ipso Deo, sive de ipso pelago infinito, de quo est 
scientia Dei, est etiam et haec; sed non sub eadem ratione; quia Deus considerat seipsum, qui est pelagus 
infinitum absolute, et secundum se, et ut est pelagus infinitum et in hac consideratione clare et lucide 
comprehenduntur omnes considerationes; ut omnia nuda et apta sint oculis eius.” 
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If we were to comment on the comparison between Aquinas and Giles already 
begun by Nash, we might say that, for Aquinas, the radical break happens between 
heaven and earth. That is, the Blessed share in a kind of knowledge that is fundamentally 
different from the pilgrim on Earth and specifically the same as God’s knowledge of 
himself. For Giles, on the other hand, the break is between the infinite and the finite. 
Inasmuch as the Blessed cannot escape their finite and creaturely nature, their knowledge 
of God retains a fundamental connection to the theology of the pilgrim. But God’s 
knowledge, as the knowledge of an infinite being, is of a fundamentally different quality 
and species, in which no finite being could ever share.71 
 
71 While Nash rightly initiates a contrast with Aquinas, it is a subtle contrast and therefore needs further 
clarification. Question 12 of Aquinas's Summa Theologica addresses the issue of “comprehension” head-
on. It asks in particular if the Blessed see the essence of God and if, in doing so, they comprehend God and 
know all things. 
 Aquinas's answer at first looks very Aegidian. Or, rather, Giles's answer looks very Thomistic. 
Aquinas begins in article one by stating that the Blessed do in fact see God (Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 12, a. 1).  
Then, in article seven, he asks whether those who see the essence of God comprehend him. And, like Giles, 
he insists that it is impossible for even the Blessed to comprehend God. But the reason Aquinas gives for 
this limitation is slightly different. He attributes the limitation, not to the perspective or ratio one has in 
seeing God's essence, but to the power (or light) with which the Blessed sees the divine essence. 
Specifically Aquinas states:  
 “For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it 
receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created 
intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite 
degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God” (Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 12, a. 7). 
 The limitation of beatified knowledge is placed squarely on the shoulders of the strength of the 
light of glory. But, as we have already seen, Giles believes the knowledge of the Blessed differs from God's 
knowledge not only in terms of the light of knowing, but also in terms of the ratio under which the Blessed 
see God (see above, p. 72, n. 70). This, I think, is why Nash remarks that, for Giles, the knowledge of the 
Blessed is specifically distinct from God's knowledge of himself, whereas for Aquinas this knowledge is of 
the same type (see above p. 71, n. 69). On Aquinas's view, our weaker knowledge of God can be compared 
to the intensification and remission of an identical form, e.g., various intensities of the same whiteness: the 
greater the power of the light of glory graciously given to the beatified mind, the more comprehensive the 
vision. Despite never reaching an infinite intensity, this vision nevertheless retains a specific identity both 
with those who have been granted a less intense light and with God who knows his essence perfectly. 
 With this in mind, we can look again at the language of knowing God totum versus totaliter and 
consider how Aquinas and Giles might differ despite both agreeing that God is known totum but not 
totaliter. Aquinas suggests it is because we do not know God in the same mode that God knows himself, 
that is, infinitely. Thus, in a finite way, we know that God is infinite. But God knows his infinite self in an 
infinite way. For Aquinas these differing modes are determined entirely by the strength of the light of 
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It is to this position that Godfrey of Fontaines forms a direct response in 
Quodlibet I, q. 5. The question was written during the Christmas after Giles’s Easter 
Quodlibet of 1285, when Giles responded to the quotation from Gregory the Great.72 
Among his many objections against Giles, Godfrey directs one squarely at the conception 
of beatitude that Giles’s position requires. Godfrey writes: 
…For a similar reason, it should be said that the subject of the science of 
theology, absolutely speaking, is God simply or under an absolute ratio, 
that is not under some determined ratio, by means of which some things 
[knowable about God] are excluded. For while the enigma of faith of the 
pilgrims, of which God is the object, is succeeded by the open vision of 
 
glory. The finite creature can never know God in an infinite mode because the finite mind does not have the 
capacity to receive a light of infinite strength (Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 12, a. 7, ad 3). Particularly suggestive is 
Aquinas's emphasis on the fact that this does not mean “the whole object does not come under knowledge” 
(ibid.). For Giles, on the other hand, the limitation of the light of glory does not sufficiently explain the 
difference between beatified knowing and God's knowledge of himself. There is also the limitation of the 
ratio, which suggests that certain aspects of God's essence are not taken into consideration. Thus Giles and 
Aquinas agree that God is not comprehended even by the Beatified. But Aquinas believes that God is 
known under the ratio of Deity, and Giles continues to insist that God is known under a constricted ratio. 
(This does, however, raise some questions about how Giles can consistently claim that God is still known 
totum). 
 What does this mean plainly? I think Giles's position calls for an ontological difference in addition 
to an epistemological difference. As Aquinas makes clear, the finite knowing power of the Blessed 
approaches the infinite object, but Giles appears to be suggesting that even the Blessed cannot approach an 
infinite object directly, and thus they must view God's essence from a restricted vantage point rather than 
quidditatively.  
 This ontological difference is captured when Giles says of the Blessed: “they do not understand 
him in every mode in which he is able to be understood, and therefore they do not understand everything 
which shines in him, or everything which is able to proceed from him” (see above, p. 71, n. 67). The reason 
the Blessed cannot know God totaliter is because they do not know him in every mode. Aquinas, in 
contrast, claims that the reason we do not know God totaliter is because we do not have the strength to see 
all that the singular vision of the essence of God allows in principle. On this view, per impossibile, if an 
infinite power of knowing were granted to the finite knower, he would be able to comprehend God. But this 
does not follow on Giles's view because no matter how strong the knowing power is, since God is not 
known under an absolute ratio, it is a priori true that not everything which shines in God can be seen. 
 Does it remain true then to say that for Aquinas the decisive break is between heaven and earth 
and not between the finite and the infinite? To be sure, Aquinas is no Scotus, and he seems to be much 
closer to Giles than Scotus. Nevertheless, the beatified finite knower does distance himself from the pilgrim 
knower in a way that Giles does not allow. For Giles, the pilgrim and Blessed remain united by the 
restricted ratio through which they know God, whether that be in the light of faith or the light of glory. This 
restriction essentially differentiates the finite knowing of the Blessed from the infinite knowing of God. For 
Aquinas, the Blessed reach a kind of knowing that can only be distinguished from God's knowledge of 
himself in degree, but not in kind. 
72 Cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 69. 
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the Blessed, still it should not be said that God is seen by the Blessed 
under some determined ratio, but rather according to himself and 
absolutely, or under an absolute ratio in which are contained all special 
rationes under which God is knowable in himself. For if God were not 
known by the Blessed except under some determined ratio and would 
remain ignorant about certain aspects of God, the intellect would not be 
able to rest, which is against the very notion of beatitude…73 
This complaint illustrates a couple of important points. First, it stands as another example 
of favoring a strong distinction between earthly and heavenly knowledge of God; in 
contrast Giles, repeatedly points to a distinction between finite and infinite knowing that 
transcends a heaven and earth division. But the complaint also shows us a deeper conflict 
about the nature of the “happy life” and the role that knowledge plays in the achievement 
of that life. Godfrey’s complaint shows his commitment to the belief that the happy life 
demands comprehensive knowledge of God. If there were something left to know about 
God, we would want to know it, and an unsatisfied desire surely does not seem like it 
could be a part of the happy life.  
If Giles were willing to accept this conception of beatified happiness, Godfrey’s 
argument would surely be a fatal blow. But Giles does not accept this fundamental 
conception of the happy life, which Godfrey takes to be traditional and obvious. The 
 
73 Godefridus de Fontibus, Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets, I, q. 5 (de Wulf, II:14). “Unde et similiter 
secundum hoc dicendum quod subiectum scientiae theologiae, simpliciter secundum hoc dicendum quod 
subiectum scientiae theologiae, simpliciter loquendo de ipsa scientia, est Deus simpliciter sive sub absoluta 
ratione, id est non sub aliqua una determinata per quam aliae excludantur. Cum enim fidei aenigmaticae 
viatorum, cuius obiectum est Deus, succedat visio aperta beatorum; non debet autem dici quod deus sub 
aliqua determinata ratione videatur a beatis, sed secundum se et absolute , sive sub ratione absoluta in qua 
implicite continentur omnes rationes speciales sub quibus Deus est cognoscibilis in seipso, (quoniam si non 
cognosceretur Deus a beato nisis sub aliqua ratione determinata et remaneret incognitus sub alia, non posset 
intellectus in hoc quietari, quod eest contra rationem beatitudinis)…”  
 Nash paraphrases Godfrey’s position in the following way: “With regard to the beatific vision God 
is seen by the Blessed in Himself and absolutely, i.e. under the absolute aspect which implicitly contains all 
the special aspects whereby God is knowable in Himself. If the Blessed knew God under certain aspects 
only, they would not be happy” (“Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 70). 
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opening of Giles’s prologue to his commentary on the Sentences offers some particularly 
revealing clues to his alternate idea of happiness, which remains consistent with his 
position on the restricted subject of theology. Even more important, he once again shows 
his reliance on Augustine as an authority for his view. 
In the prologue, Giles references what he will discuss in book four: “For in the 
fourth book, it is about those things necessary for our sanctification, which is through the 
sacraments, and about the divine vision, which will be after the resurrection, or about the 
enjoyment which is determined through charity.”74 The reference to “enjoyment through 
charity” is a subtle hint, but it grows in weight as we follow Giles further and discover his 
repeated affirmations that theology is neither theoretical nor practical but affective. The 
enjoyment in which beatitude consists is not primarily an activity of thought, nor even an 
activity of the will, but the activity of affective love. Nash remarks that it is here that we 
find the germ of “Giles’ Augustinian approach to beatitude which governs his evaluation 
of theology” (emphasis mine).75 He starts this final discussion of his prologue by stating 
that “it is not inconvenient for the same thing to have diverse ends as long as those ends 
are ordered to one another.”76 The condition that “where various ends exist, they must be 
ordered one to another” means that among many possible ends, one end has to be 
identified as the ultimate end. The ultimate end is distinguished by the fact that every 
other end achieves the status of a relative end because of its contribution to the absolute 
end. Likewise, the degree to which each intermediate end must be accomplished is 
 
74 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., coll., f. 1vb. 
75 Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 66. 
76 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 4, q. un, f. 7vb. “Non est inconveniens eiusdem rei 
diversos esse fines, si unus ad alium ordinatur.” 
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determined by the ultimate end. Giles states without hesitation that theology has many 
goals. The three ends he explicitly recognizes are the end of good moral action, 
speculation of the highest knowable things, and delight since there is love of the 
perceived end.77 Of these three goals, one must be identified as the ultimate end, giving 
purpose (and a status of subservience) to the other two. Giles does not shy away from 
this, but states clearly: “because delight and charity are intended in the whole of Sacra 
Pagina, since in this depends the law and the prophets, the principal end intended by 
Sacra Pagina is to induce man to love of God and neighbor.”78 But Scripture is not the 
only reason that Giles chooses delight and love above good action and speculation (for 
undoubtedly Scriptural support can be marshaled to the other two positions as well). He 
chooses this position because he believes it receives the support of Augustine and is the 
position that he believes best represents the spirit of Augustine. He notes that this 
position—that theology is affective—is manifest in Augustine’s On the praise of Charity 
(De laude caritatis)79 and he quotes Augustine in full: 
Therefore if anyone is not prepared to examine all the Sacred pages, to 
unfold every bundle of words, to penetrate every secret of those 
Scriptures, then hold to love, on which all things depend. In this way, you 
will possess what you have learned there, and you will have what you 
have not yet learned. For if you have known love, you have known 
something, which depends on what you may not yet know. And in that 
which you understand in the Scriptures, love is clear. And in that which 
 
77 Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., f. 7vb. “Et quia videmus Sacram Paginam plura intendere, oportet diversos esse 
fines Scripturae Sacrae. Intenditur enim per eam bona operatio; nam finis moralis ut dicebatur est actio. 
Ipsa autem potissime de moribus determinat. Responsum in ea intenditur speculatio, quia de summe 
speculabilibus tracta. Intenditur in ea dilectio, quia finis praecepti charitas, igitur cum diversi fines in ea 
intendantur oportet unum istorum ad alium ordinari et unum illorum principalem esse…” 
78 Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un, f. 7vb. “Et quia dilectio et charitas in tota sacra pagina intenditur, quia in ea 
pendet lex et prophetae, principalis enim finis in sacra pagina intentus est inducere homines ad Dei et 
proximi dilectionem.” 
79 Cf. Augustine, CAG, Sermones, part 1, s. 350, 1532-1535. 
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you do not understand, love is hidden. And so he possesses both what is 
clear and what is hidden in the divine words who possesses love in his 
life.80  
Few sentiments would capture better what Giles apparently recognizes as the proper 
Augustinian outlook on the nature and purpose of theology. With delight and love 
identified as the “ultimate end of theology,” Giles is prepared to face the objection of 
Godfrey of Fontaines. The claim that the Blessed will be unhappy if they do not know 
everything there is to know about God is unfounded. Happiness does not consist in 
exhausting the possibilities of what can be known. Instead Giles favors a different vision 
of happiness, built on the authority of Augustine. Against most readings of Aristotle and 
the classical tradition, our most fundamental desire is not to know, but to love God and 
delight in him. Knowledge of God is truly an end of theology because knowledge is 
necessary to love God. But knowledge of everything knowable about God (and therefore 
all of his effects) does not appear to be necessary for loving God completely. In fact, such 
an insatiable thirst for knowledge can often get in the way. No doubt this is what Giles 
was trying to show in his later third Quodlibet (Easter 1287 /1288), and it is more than 
likely an implicit rejection of the vision of happiness that undergirds Godfrey’s concern. 
Accordingly, Giles describes theology as an instrument leading, not towards 
comprehensive knowledge, but toward a delightful loving that does not need to know 
 
80Augustine, CAG, Sermones, part 1, s. 350, 1534, ll. 17-27. “Si ergo non vacat omnes paginas / sanctas 
perscrutari, omnia involucra sermonum / evoluere, omnia scripturarum secreta penetrare; tene / caritatem, 
ubi pendent omnia: ita tenebis quod ibi didicisti; tenebis etiam quod nondum didicisti. si / enim nosti 
caritatem, aliquid nosti unde et illud / pendet quod forte non nosti; et in eo quod in scripturis / intelligis, 
caritas patet; in eo quod non intelligis, / caritas latet. ille itaque tenet et quod patet et /quod latet in divinis 
sermonibus, qui caritatem tenet / in moribus” (translation mine) Cf. Aegidius Romanus, Primus 
Sententiarum, prol., pars 4, q. un, ff. 7vb–8ra. 
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God absolutely or God qua God. Instead, God only needs to be known to that extent that 
is sufficient for beatitude, that is, qua beatifier. 
One final qualification about the nature of this loving is in order. If theological 
knowing is an instrument of beatitude and beatitude is primarily conceived of as an 
operation of loving, why isn’t theology said to be practical? Why must Giles introduce 
the third category of “affective”? This, in fact, is an objection raised by Duns Scotus:   
And therefore there is a fourth way, which claims that theology is 
affective. This position is acceptable if ‘affective’ is understood to be 
something practical. But if ‘affective’ is understood as some third 
member, distinct from the practical and speculative, this stands against 
what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is indeed a 
practice. It is also against many authorities, which believe ‘science’ to be 
distinguished precisely into the practical and the speculative, and that 
there is no third member.81 
This is the entirety of Scotus’s objection against Giles. If Giles uses the word affective to 
mean practical, then there is no real dispute. But if Giles means that love is something 
other than a practice, then we have a genuine disagreement. Scotus believes that he has 
already clearly shown what a practice is (viz. an act of the will, either actus elicitus or 
actus imperatus), and he also believes that the act of love quite clearly qualifies as such a 
practice. The burden, then, is on Giles to show whether there is any significant reason 
that we need to call theology (and the act of love it produces) affective rather than 
practical. If he cannot, then we must agree with Scotus that he and Giles are really taking 
very similar positions, and any dispute is a mere quibble over words.  
 
81 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 303 (Vatican, 1:200). “Et ideo est quarta via, 
quae dicit quod theologia est affectiva. Quod bene potest intelligi si affectiva ponatur esse quaedam 
practica; si autem affectiva ponatur esse tertium membrum, distinctum contra practicum et speculativum, 
sic est contra dicta in primo articulo, ubi est ostensum dilectionem esse vere praxim, et etiam contra 
auctoritates multas, quae sentiunt praecise scientiam distingui in practicam et speculativa, et nullum est 
tertium membrum.” 
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Despite Scotus’s apparent lack of recognition of any substantial reasons for 
rejecting the classification of theology as practical, Giles does offer arguments for why 
the theologically produced act of love cannot be classified as a “practice.” (And here we 
can see a continued emphasis on the supernatural character of a theological science.) In 
his prologue, he is obliged to respond to those who view theology and Sacra Pagina as 
practical in its nature. He lists three arguments which merit a response. The driving force 
behind all three is that if the aim of theology is to result in good work or action, we can 
assume that perfect love of God and neighbor would represent the ultimate achievement 
of such moral science. The proponent of this position appeals to the commonly cited 
verse in the book of James, “faith without works is dead” and concludes that theology or 
Sacra Pagina, like faith, receives its completion in good works. Likewise, the objector 
claims, those sciences that aim to make us good are surely practical, but theology aims to 
do this more than any other discipline.82   
The thrust of Giles’s response revolves around distinguishing the end of love or 
affection from what he considers to be the practice of good works. Further, he places 
special emphasis on the chronological priority of love and affection over good works. On 
the surface, this is a bit confusing. For Scotus, love and good works appear to be the 
same, or at least love is a type of good work. But Giles sees things differently. For him, 
the kind of love achieved through affection is a consequence of a prior actualized 
goodness, not a prior potential for goodness. This is not a good that is acquired through 
 
82 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 4, q. un, f. 7vb. “Scientiae quae sunt ut boni fiamus 
sunt practicae, sed ista maxime est talis, ergo etc.” 
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our habitual actions, but a goodness we receive, or rather is “in us from infusion.”83 The 
point comes out in two respects. First Giles, appeals to 1st Corinthians chapter 13, where 
the Apostle Paul says: “if I give my body up to the flames, but do not have charity, I 
profit nothing.”84  The verse indicates that there is a wide difference between genuine 
charity and “good work.” Secondly, Giles acknowledges the Aristotelian logic behind the 
objector’s position. It makes good Aristotelian sense to say that we become good—or 
reach the perfection of good—through doing good works. Thus, it would seem that 
theology aims to produce good works in us, so that we may love God and neighbor more 
and more perfectly. But Giles responds: while this makes good sense, this is not the way 
theology works nor is this the kind of loving operation at which theology aims. In 
response to the objection that good work leads us to perfection, he writes:  
This mode of arguing would be valid according the mode treated by the 
Philosopher in the second book of the Ethics, because we become good by 
frequently doing good. Nevertheless, this is not valid according to the 
mode of theology according to which, it is from the fact that we are good, 
that we do good things.85 
Giles shows a remarkable consistency in the way he treats theology alongside the natural 
philosophy, both in metaphysics and in ethics. Metaphysics and ethics have their proper 
mode of proceeding and function well within their own natural limits. But, as we will see 
in Giles’s comparison of theology with metaphysics, which is now visible in his 
comparison with ethics, theology cannot be subsumed into these natural categories. On 
 
83 Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., ad. 3, f. 8ra. “…sed bonitas nostra de qua hic loquimur non inest nobis ex 
operibus, sed ex infusione…” 
84 1 Corinthians 13:3. Cf. Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., ad. 2, f. 8ra. 
85 Ibid., prol., pars 4, q. un., ad. 3, f. 8ra. “Et ideo licet ille modus arguendi valeret secundum modum 
traditum a Philosopho in secundo Ethicorum, quia ex frequenti bene facere fimus boni, non tamen valet 
secundum theologicum secundum quem ex eo quod boni sumus bona facimus.” 
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the contrary, Sacra Pagina and theology run counter to our natural expectations. Where 
all human sciences begin with sensible things, theology alone genuinely studies God. 
Where sound moral philosophy depicts the proper order of moral development as a 
progressive and gradual development of a more and more perfect habit, theology 
introduces a prior perfection, received rather than achieved, from which subsequent acts 
of affective love are produced.  
When comparing Scotus and Giles, who both use the word love to signify the end 
goal of theology, we must acknowledge that there is a difference behind this word. For 
Giles, the affective love is not a human action, produced by a human will. For Scotus, it 
is. Accordingly, we can expect the relationship between theological knowledge and these 
disparate forms of love to differ. For Scotus, there is an obvious correlation between the 
completeness of our knowledge of God and the quality of the loving action that our will 
can produce.86 But for Giles, such a correlation does not exist. We can understand this 
lack of correlation as a consequence of the fact that the love or affection he has in mind is 
not reducible to an action of the will and therefore need not follow the rules of natural 
psychology. For Giles, the pre-eminent task of theological knowledge is to accompany 
the proper affection of the soul, and here the correlation between knowledge and 
affection is not so direct.87 On account of the different demands made of theological 
 
86 This will be discussed in more detail below, see pp. 149-158. 
87 How exactly they relate is something Giles does not expand on however much we wish he would. Thus 
we are primarily left with the negative claim: that the correspondence between theological knowledge and 
infused love is not direct or proportional. But we can only speculate about the positive way theological 
knowledge and this kind of love do relate. 
 Without pretending to answer the question we can note that an intriguing thread of similarity is 
visible in Tillich’s description of Karl Barth’s view on theological ethics and Christian love as a human 
impossibility. Tillich writes in the voice of Barth: “The church is commissioned to bear testimony to God 
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knowledge, we can see why Giles can continue to insist on the limited and constricted 
nature of theological knowledge, while Scotus’s practical theology still looks for 
comprehensive and all-encompassing knowledge of God: a knowledge, which Giles 
believes to be both unnecessary and beyond the capacity of any and every finite knower.  
So far, we have not seen much from Giles regarding how the theology of the 
pilgrim and the theology of the Blessed differ. For the most part, we have seen him 
emphasize how they are similar. However, back in his third Quodlibet he does in fact 
address the matter momentarily, and we would be remiss not to mention it before we 
move on. The objection is raised that if the pilgrim and the Blessed view God under the 
same ratio, then the theology of the pilgrim and the Blessed will hardly look any 
different. Giles notes first that this objection fails to appreciate the dramatic difference 
that is made by the different lights through which the pilgrim and the Blessed know. 
Knowing through the light of faith and knowing through the light of glory is, as Giles 
says, “not a small difference.”88 Presumably, knowing in the light of glory is sufficient to 
 
and his Kingdom, yet it is not identical therewith. The church is a historical reality, and as such it does not 
rank above any other historical reality…Yet it has this commission; that is its truth…That testimony can 
happen within the church but it can also fail to appear. Yet when it does happen it is not the realization of 
the Kingdom of God but is only its announcement. The same holds true of all of the church’s activity. Even 
its instructional and charitable work is the announcement of the Kingdom and not the realization of its 
presence. Thus, indeed, obedience is rendered to the commands of God, but there is no Christian ethics in 
the sense of an anticipation of the righteousness of God’s Kingdom. Paul’s hymn to love is an 
eschatological hymn and does not furnish material of a Christian ethics. For love, like the word of God and 
the Kingdom of Heaven, is not a human possibility. The one like the other is ‘impossible possibility,’ the 
object of faith and not of sight” (Tillich, “What Is Wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?,” 134–135).  
 There is no perfect parallel here. But the quotation emphasizes the point that Giles sees of 
“affective love” as something different from “good works.” Like theological knowledge, it is not something 
that a person can truly claim to possess or acquire. It is a gift, that always remains a gift, and it can be taken 
back as quickly as it was given. Like Barth, Giles sees this “charity” as a human (or natural) impossibility. 
It is a work of God that can appear, but “can also fail to appear.”  
88 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131a. “Nam cum dicebatur si scientia nostra esset de 
Deo, tamquam de glorificatore; non differret a scientia Beatorum, potest dici, quod imo, quia differet in 
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perfect our loving to the point that beatitude is made possible. But Giles also admits that 
our orientation to God as glorifier differs in view of our terrestrial status. As pilgrims, we 
consider God as our glorifier in hope (in spe), whereas, as beatified, we consider God as 
our glorifer in reality (in re).89 At the very least, this places a temporal orientation to the 
instrumental theological knowledge enjoyed by the pilgrim. Our theology, as pilgrims, is 
about God as our future glorifier, the one who will beatify us, and the one whom we will 
enjoy. The theology of the Blessed considers and loves God as the present object of 
enjoyment. It is tempting to speculate on the difference that such different temporal 
orientations might make, particularly with respect to the kind and degree of loving these 
different orientations make possible. Perhaps our love of God as pilgrims is positioned to 
change and differ as progress toward beatitude is made and our hope becomes brighter. 
For those currently and eternally enjoying God in love, this love must be totally perfected 
even as their knowledge remains forever partial. But regarding these differences, we can 
only speculate. Giles is sparing in his remarks here and leaves the ensuing tradition, and 
us, with many questions about how the pilgrim’s love of God should be contrasted with 
the love possessed by those who have been elevated to glory and know God in re. 
VII. Aegidio-Augustinian Theology and Metaphysics 
Giles’s position prompted another important concern again given a voice in the 
writings of Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodlibet I, q. 5). The complaint raises a concern 
 
lumine, quia sub alio lumine vident Beati, et sub alio viatores, et haec non est modica differentia; ut antea 
dicebatur.” 
89 Ibid., III, q. 2, 131. “Nam de Deo, ut glorificatore, aliter considerat scientia Beatorum, et aliter viatorum; 
nam scientia Beatorum considerat de Deo, ut est glorificator in re, viatorum autem considerat de Deo, ut est 
glorificator in spe, non ergo sunt eadem scientia haec et illa.” 
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about the dignity of theology among the other sciences. According to Godfrey, the 
restriction of theology to a consideration of God under a restricted ratio poses a threat to 
the superiority and dignity traditionally thought to belong to theology. Godfrey writes:  
Again it happens that, though God is not posited as the subject in 
metaphysics, nevertheless the metaphysician considers God, not under 
some determined ratio, but simply and absolutely. For although a human 
science is not able to know about God those things that properly belong to 
him except from creatures, nevertheless it should not be denied that from 
[creatures] one reaches a knowledge of God regarding what properly 
belongs to him on account of his own nature (secundum se) and 
absolutely, as is clear through those things which are discussed in the 
twelfth book of the Metaphysics. And for this reason, metaphysics more 
accurately is called a truer and more universal science about God than a 
discipline that considers God only inasmuch as he is a glorifier or supplier 
of defects.90 
The particular concern is paraphrased by Giles as follows: if this restricted ratio really 
were required for theology, then “since, in metaphysics, everything is considered 
inasmuch as it is a being, and since “being” and “one” are prior to “good,” then 
metaphysics, which considers God as “being” would be prior to that which considers God 
as our glorifier, in virtue of the fact that he is our beatitude and our good.”91 To this 
objection, Giles’s responds, not by directly denying the logic of the stated argument, but 
 
90 Godefridus de Fontibus, Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets, I, q. 5 (de Wulf, 11–12). “Item, constat quod 
licet Deus non ponatur subiectum in metaphysica, tamen metaphysicus considerat de Deo non sub ratione 
aliqua determinata, sed simpliciter et absolute. Quamvis enim scientia humana non possit cognoscere de 
Deo quae ei conveniant nisi ex creaturis, tamen non est negandum quin ex illis deveniat in cognitionem Dei 
quantum ad ea quae sibi conveniunt secundum se et absolute, sicut patet per ea quae traduntur in 
duodecimo Metaphysicae. Et secundum hoc metaphysica verius esset dicenda scientia et verius et 
universalius considerare de Deo quam illa quae considerat de Deo solum secundum quod glorificator vel 
defectuum suppletor.” 
91 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131. “Cum in metaphysica consideretur in eo, quod ens, 
cum ens et unum prius sit, quam bonum, prior esset metaphysica, quae considerat de Deo in eo, quod ens, 
quam ista, quae considerat de Deo in eo quod glorificator, et in eo quod est nostra beatitudo et nostrum 
bonum.”  
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by distinguishing precisely how metaphysics and theology treat God, so that we can 
ultimately see that the two disciplines cannot be compared side by side. 
The argument appears to set metaphysics and theology side by side as two distinct 
disciplines that are both concerned with God. But, while Godfrey admits that metaphysics 
does not consider God as its fundamental subject, the point Giles is trying to make is that 
Godfrey has not adequately seen the consequences of this admission. In the scholastic 
tradition, there was a long standing debate whether the subject of metaphysics is God or 
being.92 Aristotle did not leave us with a clear answer, and thus the idea that metaphysics 
considers God as its subject has always remained a possibility. But this has always posed 
a problem for the idea of a separate discipline known as theology. If metaphysics is the 
study of God, then isn’t metaphysics a theology? Why do we need a second theology?93 
Godfrey understands Giles’s answer to the above question in the following way: both 
disciplines consider God, but under different rationes, and in this way they differ. 
Metaphysics considers God inasmuch as he is being and theology considers God 
inasmuch as he is our good. Here we have an attractive potential solution to the problem 
of the difference between metaphysics and theology. But for Godfrey there is a problem 
with this solution. It describes the relationship between metaphysics and theology in such 
 
92 For one entry point into this debate see: Biard, “God as First Principle and Metaphysics as a Science.” as 
well as Wippel, “The Latin Avicenna as a Source of Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics”; Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines.  
93 One can see this in the very opening of the prologue of Gerard of Siena, an Augustinain Hermit and 
close-follower of Giles. (For more on Gerard, see below p.  296, “Gerard of Senis on the “Virtual Habit” of 
Theology and the Principles of Theology”.)  
 In the very first question he asks: “An cognitio divinae veritatis acquisita in Theologia possit 
haberi per scientias a philosophis adinventas.” And in the opening arguments for the affirmative, the belief 
in theological nature of metaphysics is evident. For the second affirmative argument says: “Veritas 
considerata a Theologo continetur sub veritate considerata a metaphysico, ergo cognitio talis veritatis 
haberi poterit per metaphysicam…” (Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, prol., q. 1, a. 1, 
p. 1a). 
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a way that, metaphysics must be prior to theology because “being” is prior to “good,” and 
therefore the science that studies God as being must be prior to the science that studies 
God as good.  
An obvious reply might be to question the assumption that “being” is prior to the 
“good.” But this is not the route that Giles takes. Instead his response is to argue that his 
position has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. He says explicitly: “if there were 
two sciences and each was about God only as he is known through creatures, one of them 
would be about God inasmuch as he is being and another would truly be about God 
inasmuch as he is good or under a special ratio.”94 In short, he identifies the picture 
Godfrey has painted, and then agrees that, as the picture has been drawn, the science that 
considers God inasmuch as he is being would be prior. “No one would doubt,” he says, 
“that the science considering God, inasmuch as he is being, would be prior.”95  He admits 
that, if this indeed were his position, then he would be forced to agree that metaphysics is 
prior and therefore of greater dignity than theology.  
However, he insists that this is not his actual position. He refutes the notion that 
that these two disciplines can be put on the same plane and compared side by side. Such a 
comparison overlooks one very important difference. The difference was already pointed 
to in his hypothetical example of two sciences stated above. In the hypothetical, Giles 
was careful to note that the two sciences being compared side by side were about God 
only to the extent that God can be known through creatures: that is, as a mere “thing” 
 
94 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131. “Si ergo essent duae scientiae, et quaelibet esseet 
de Deo solum, ut est cognitus per creaturas; una tamen illarum esset de Deo, in eo, quod ens, alia veroesset 
de, Deo in eo , quod bonum, vel sub aliqua speciali ratione, nulli dubium [dubium rep.] esset, quin scientia 
considerans de Deo, in eo, quod ens, esset alia prior.”  
95 Ibid. 
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falling within the larger consideration of the science in question. This means God is not 
actually the subject of either one of these potential “human sciences.” In his own words 
he actually he says that neither of these human sciences considers God “in se or 
secundum se, but only as he is known through sensible things.”96 If we keep in mind our 
earlier discussion of the four ways “things” can be considered in a science,97 we should 
be able to see that Giles is making a rather remarkable statement about metaphysics and 
its relation to God: a statement that Aristotle, in all likelihood, would not accept. The 
suggestion is that, as known through sensible things, God is not known in a primary way, 
and this relegates God to the lower two ways that a “thing” can be considered: either per 
se but not in primary or exhaustive way or accidentally. In either case, God has become 
an after-thought in all human sciences, akin to the way “accidents” are considered in 
metaphysics as derivative kinds of being or the way “risibility” can be accidentally 
considered in metaphysics. 
The position is predicated on the belief that the primary subject of any and all 
human sciences is sensible (sensibilia). Theology distinguishes itself by being the only 
discipline that does not take sensible things as its primary subject, but begins from God 
as its true primary subject. In fact, Giles says that this science is about God inasmuch as 
he is God (in eo quod Deus).98 This is a somewhat subtle point to grasp. He has been 
telling for some time now that theology does not treat God inasmuch as he is God, but as 
 
96 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131a–b. “Dici debet quod nulla scientia humanitus 
inventa possit considerare de Deo, nec in se, nec secundum se, sed solum ut cognoscitur per haec 
sensibilia.” 
97 See our discussion of the four ways a thing can be considered above, starting on p. 50. 
98 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131b. “Considerat enim haec scientia de Deo, in eo, 
quod Deus; ita quod ipse Deus sit subjectum in hac scientia; quod de nulla scientia humana dici potest…” 
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God as glorifier and beatifier. Despite the somewhat confusing use of the phrase in eo 
quod Deus, he does not mean to deny any of that here. What he is trying to point out is 
that even though theology treats God as glorifier, this does not mean that God is not the 
genuine and primary subject of this science. He only means to point out that God, as our 
primary subject is known in a restricted way (i.e., he is not known “in every way”), thus 
making God the subject of theology in the second and loose sense of the term.99 This, 
however, is not the case when it comes to a human science. While a human science, like 
metaphysics, might have something to say about God, God is not the primary 
consideration. God, if he is known at all, is known as a consequence of knowing some 
sensible thing. All this becomes evident when Giles explains why theology, as a 
discipline that has a God as its subject, is truly superior to metaphysics. He says: 
But a science considering God in himself (in se) and having God entirely 
as its subject, considering Him under any ratio, whether special or general, 
is of higher value (dignior) and prior to any other science which would 
consider God only as he is knowable through creatures. For in this mode 
[theology] is of more value (dignior) and prior to every other science, 
because it is most greatly divine, and it is like a divine science because a 
science receives its species from its subject. Since no human science is 
able to be about God as its subject, and theology is about God as its 
subject, this science will be of greater value than any other human science. 
Therefore, no matter under which ratio a human science would consider 
God, from the fact that it is not able to have God as its subject, it will not 
be of the same value as theology, and because it is of greater value, it is 
therefore prior. 100    
 
99 Again see the discussion on the subject of a science above, p. 50. 
100 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), III, q. 2, 131b. “Sed scientia considerans de Deo in se, et habens 
ipsum Deum omnino pro subiecto, sub quacumque ratione consideret ipsum, sive sub speciali, sive 
generali, dignior et prior is quamcumque alia scientia, quae considerat deum solum, ut est cognoscibilis per 
creaturas, et quae non habet Deum pro subjecto; nam hoc modo theologia [corr. ex metaphysica, quia 
metaphysica falsum patet] est dignior et prior omnibus aliis scientiis; quia est maxime divinia, et est quasi 
Dea scientiarum, et quia scientia recipit speciem a subjecto, cum nulla scientia humana possit esse de Deo, 
tamquam de subjecto, et ista sit de Deo tamquam de subiecto, erit magis digna, quam aliqua alia humana. 
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In this reasoning, nothing is more important than the belief that a science receives its 
distinctive and essential character or quality (Giles says “species”) from its primary 
subject. All human sciences are marked by their earth-bound orientation, and this 
orientation will color (or cloud) any accidental vision they provide of heavenly things. 
Considering God, then, through a human science is like spying something in one’s 
peripheral vison, while always focused on something else.  
This position offers a new and distinctive answer to the question of why we need 
theology, if metaphysics can already claim to treat divine matters. We need theology 
because metaphysics, despite appearances, does not actually treat God as its subject 
(either in strict or loose sense). As such it only tells us certain things, and more than that, 
it does so in a derivative way. To be sure, theology too, whether of the pilgrim or the 
Blessed, only tells us some things about God. But much of what it does tell us cannot be 
derived from other sensible subjects. These truths can only be known if God himself is 
the primary starting point of our knowledge. It is precisely this status as a “quasi” divine 
science that makes explicitly theological knowledge necessary, prior, and more valuable 
than what any other human science can tells us about God.  
VIII. Some Later Concerns and Questions 
By approximately 1290 (some 15 or so years after Giles began his prologue), the 
debate at Paris on the subject of theology had apparently heated up to the point that Giles 
decided to write a separate treatise on the subject of theology, Quaestio de subjecto 
 
Sub quacumque ergo ratione consideret Deum scientia humana, ex quo non potest habere Deum pro 
subjecto, non erit ita digna sicut ista; et quia hae est dignior, ideo prior.”  
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theologiae.101 This treatise contains, as Nash correctly states, “a summary of all the 
arguments he has seen raised against his position.”102 Here we can find a compiled list of 
ten arguments against the position Giles has been asserting for the last fifteen years. And, 
in different ways, the above mentioned issues can all be found within this list. In the 
opening argument, we can find a concern for theology as the noblest science and the 
requirements for theology to retain its superior status. The seventh argument points out 
that the theology of the pilgrim and the theology of the Blessed are supposed to differ 
only in the light through which they see God. But, the argument assumes, the Blessed 
must see God inasmuch as he is God if they are to be genuinely beatified, therefore the 
pilgrim must see God in this way as well. These arguments continue the fierce, but often 
unstated, disagreement about what constitutes the happy life.  
However, the majority of the arguments (2-5, 6, 8-9) raise a slightly different 
concern. These arguments revolve around the question of the requirements of a genuine 
science. More specifically, they insist from different perspectives that a science must start 
from what is prior, what is immediate, or what is absolute as opposed to what secondary, 
derivative, and relative. The arguments insist that to consider God under a restricted ratio 
is to begin from what is derivative. As such, there must be a source from which this 
derivative attribute is derived. But it is the job of science to identify and understand this 
derivation from what is prior. I draw our attention to these particular arguments because 
they have clearly taken on a greater significance since the writing of Quodlibet III, q. 2, 
 
101 Aegidius Romanus, Quaestio de subiecto theologiae; cf. Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of 
Theology,” 80n1, for approximate dating. 
102 Nash, “Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology,” 80. 
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and because they become some of the most essential points of disagreement for Scotus 
and the tradition that follows him. It gains even more weight because it is the position of 
Scotus above all others that Gregory of Rimini attempts to refute in his own response to 
the question of the subject of theology. But to recognize the concern here is at once to see 
that the objection is not unique to Scotus, though it undoubtedly receives its classical 
articulation from Scotus.  
Giles makes a concerted, though brief effort, to reply. He understands the 
objection in terms of a mandate that a genuine science of God must be understood 
“reduplicatively” (reduplicatio). The language of reduplication refers to a twofold 
priority, a priority of universality and a priority of immediacy. Relying on chapters 4 and 
5 of book one of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Giles uses a triangle and its essential 
properties as an example.103 The attribute in question is “having three sides.” While 
“having three sides” can be true of plain figures and triangles, it is true of triangles 
universally. For while some plain figures may have three sides, this is not true of all plain 
figures; however, it is true universally of triangles. At the same time, having three sides is 
also universally true of all isosceles triangles. However, it is not true immediately. That 
is, all isosceles triangles have three sides, but not in virtue of being isosceles, but in virtue 
of being triangles. Therefore when it comes to “having three sides” triangles have a 
twofold priority. In this way, triangle is understood “reduplicatively.”  
 
103 For instance in I, c. 5 Aristotle, speaking of having “two right angles” (i.e. their angles equal 180 
degress) rather than “three sides,” says: “For this reason, even if you prove of each triangle, either by one 
or by different demonstrations, that each has two right angles—separtely of the equilateral and the scalene 
and the isosceles—, you do not know of triangles that they have two right angles, except in a sophistical 
way; nor do you know it of triangles universally, not even if there are no triangles apart from these. For you 
do not know it of triangles as triangles, nor even of every triangle…” (Posterior Analytics, I, 5, 74a25-32 
(trans. Barnes, 9)). 
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This example is used to explain the kind of priority that the objection demands, 
which it supposes God under a restricted ratio does not have. But Giles’s response, in 
short, is to affirm once more that this is a kind of knowledge that created beings cannot 
have. However, he is willing to admit that this kind of priority belongs to God’s 
knowledge of himself. But created beings cannot have this kind of knowledge precisely 
because they are created and to know God reduplicatively would be to know him 
infinitely, which is simply impossible.  
In this response Giles does not tell us anything particularly new. And yet the 
response does not seem entirely satisfying, for underneath the surface there is the 
lingering question: if a genuine science demands a reduplicative object, and this is not 
possible for creatures, in what sense are we justified in talking about theology as a 
science? Giles does not give us a clear answer to this question, but we can see that it 
lingers. Thus, we should not be surprised that it will become a key question as the heart 
of the objection is raised once again by Scotus. Nor should we be surprised that 
subsequent thinkers, still attempting to be faithful to the teaching of Giles, are willing to 
abandon the idea that theology really is a science.104  
 
104 The tenth objection in this compendium of arguments also raises an important concern that has so far 
been implicit, but will become a key concern in the ensuing years. While going into detail will take us a bit 
far afield, I review the basis of the argument here.  
 The objection questions Giles’s perhaps deepest assumption and starting point. Above in our 
consideration of Gile’s core arguments we saw that he started from John the Damescene’s definition of 
God as in an infinite ocean. It was this definition that was at work in Giles’s rejection of the idea that 
creatures could have God as reduplicative object. God and infinity are inseparable notions. Thus, to have 
God as a primary and reduplicative object would be to have an infinite object, which is impossible for finite 
creatures. It is this inseparable nature of deity and infinity that the objection questions. Without a doubt this 
is the objection of Henry of Ghent which is voiced in his own quodlibet a couple of years earlier.  
Giles’s reply comes in the form of a small treatise on the divine names. For the tradition to come, this 
answer will in no way be the final word. The question will be raised repeatedly and we will need to see 
where various theologians come down on the issue.  
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IX. In Sum: The Core of Giles’s Augustinian Position on the Subject and Purpose of 
Theology 
Godfrey of Fontaines never lets up in his opposition to Giles’s fundamental 
picture of beatitude: a picture that has fundamentally shaped the entirety of his 
understanding of theology. But Giles continues to respond to Godfrey even late in his 
literary career. This later response reveals to us a consistency within Giles’s overall 
position. Such a consistency helps us to define the very heart of an Aegidio-Augustinian 
perspective on the nature of theological knowledge.  
About the same time that he was composing his specialized treatise on the subject 
matter of theology, Giles composed his fifth set of Quodlibetal questions. In the first 
question of this fifth Quodlibet, he takes up the question of whether we are united to God 
more through love or understanding.105 The heart of this question pinpoints a concern 
that has proved decisive: what does the happy life look like? In this question, Giles 
finally brings this fundamental question to the surface. His answer is as we would expect. 
It is consistent with everything he has said from the opening of his prologue until this 
point. First he brings forward the authority of Hugh of St. Victor, who famously said, 
“love goes in, where knowledge (scientia) stands outside”106 and then declares: “the 
rational creature is more greatly united to God through love, than through vision, and 
 
105 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta (1646), V, q. 1, 276b. “Utrum creatura rationalis magis uniatur Deo per 
amre, quam intelligere? an contra?” 
106 Ibid., “Intret amore, ubi foris stat scientia.” Cf. Hugh de Sancto Victore, Commentariorium in 
Hierarchiam Coelestem S. Dionysii Areopagitae, VI, c. 7, expositio; “Plus enim diligitur, quam intelligitur, 
et intrat dilectio, et appropinquat, ubi scientia foris est” (Migne, PL 175, col. 1038). 
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there is a greater union through the will than the intellect.”107 It is through love that we 
are most intimately tied to God. Giles offers three reasons for this position. But the 
second in particular continues to focus on the inescapable nature of finite knowing and 
the ability of love to circumvent these creaturely limits. In love, the soul is said to be 
moved to the thing, while in understanding the object moves to the soul.108 As the object 
comes toward us, “the thing is understood according to what is in us,” but in love, the 
thing is loved “as it is in itself” (prout est in se ipsa).109 This schema is then applied to 
what loving will be like in the presence of God. Even in heaven, the Blessed will know or 
understand God “according to our mode.”110 And as we know from what we have already 
seen, this remains a fundamentally finite knowing. But in love “we are united to God as 
he is in himself, and according to the divine mode.”111 Love is described as a kind of 
ecstatic going outside oneself. And in this way, love is allowed to reach a kind perfection 
and completion beyond what is possible in finite knowing. 112  
In sum, Giles’s conviction about the nature of beatitude leads him to expect 
certain things from a proper knowledge of God. Theology cannot just be a code word for 
any and all knowledge of God. To be sure, much knowledge about God can be derived 
from creatures. But this knowledge is neither sufficient nor always helpful to the goal of 
 
107 Ibid., “Creatura rationalis magis unitur Deo per amorem, quam per visionem, et potior est unio per 
voluntatem, quam intellectum.” 
108 Ibid., V, q. 1, 278a. “Verum est enim, quod in diligendo sit motus animae ad res, et quod objectum 
amoris sit res, ut est in seipsa; in intelligendo vero sit motus rerum ad animam…”  
109 Ibid., “…intelligitur enim res secundum quod est in nobis; diligitur autem, ut dicebaums, prout est in se 
ipsa.” 
110 Ibid. “…Deo secundum quod erit in nobis, et secundum modum nostrum.” 
111 Ibid. “Sed per diligere uniemur ei ut ut[sic] est in seipso, et secundum modum divinum.”  
112 Ibid., V, q. 1, 277b.“Quare amor transformet, quia scilicet ponit amantem extra se, et collocat ipsum in 
re amata…Divinus ergo, id est amore, quo diligimus Deum, est faciens extasim, ide est ponens amantes 
extra seipsos, non permittens eos amore, sive ipsos amantes esse sui ipsorum, sed facit eos esse amantes 
amatorum, id est, rerum amatarum.” 
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beatitude. Theology is therefore a distinctive body of specialized knowledge about God 
and his effects limited by its relevance to one particular end: the end of affective loving 
and thereby enjoying God. As he sees it, there is much knowledge about God and his 
effects (which we both can and cannot access) that should nevertheless not be included in 
theology proper. Such knowledge is at best irrelevant (vana) to the goal of theology, but 
is more likely harmful (noxia). Likewise, we can already see that this distinctive body of 
knowledge must also be known in a certain way; as a quasi-divine science, it cannot 
know through sensible things, but must be supernaturally and graciously given 
knowledge. But, in what sense this can be called knowledge and in what way this can be 
distinguished from mere faith is still a question left to consider. 
To be clear, then, we can mark out the Aegidio-Augustinian position as one that 
emphasizes the following: 1) the primacy of the love of God over the knowledge of God, 
2) the nature of theological knowledge as an instrument to that act of loving, and 3) the 
explicitly limited and restricted character of that knowledge of God in light of the finite 
character of all creatures. Moreover, we cannot deny that there is a clear Augustinian 
cloud that hovers over Giles’s opinion. This is due, in large part, to the fact that Giles 
wants his position to be recognized as such. Whether his opinion is faithful to the real 
position of St. Augustine or not, Giles is self-consciously attempting to brand his position 
as Augustinian. As we have seen, at nearly every critical juncture, Giles has appealed to 
Augustine for support. He has actively shaped his opinion in light of what he believes to 
be Augustine’s own opinion on the subject and purpose of theology. 
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I. The Subject Matter of Theology  
Turning to Rimini’s views on the subject matter of theology requires us to jump 
past the early questions of his prologue and turn directly to question four, where he asks 
the customary question: “Whether God, inasmuch as he is God, is the subject in our 
theology?”1 His answer begins in his usual way: with a clarification of terms. He divides 
his question into two parts. In the first part, he aims to explain what it means for 
something to be the subject of a science.2 Then, in the second part, he states that he will 
answer the specific question about the subject of theology. There is a point of possible 
confusion here, which we should avoid from the outset. Rimini asks specifically: What is 
the ratio of the first subject of a science? Our previous discussion of Giles’s use of the 
term ratio might tempt us to think that Rimini is initially asking about ratio under which 
the subject of a given science should be considered. But to read Rimini’s question this 
way is a mistake. The subsequent inquiry shows that Rimini is initially concerned with a 
more general question: what do we mean when we call something a subject? This is a 
question that needs to be answered before he can go on to decide whether God is in fact 
the subject of theology and in what respect (or under what ratio) he might be the subject. 
Rimini’s organization of the text is almost word for word in step with Ockham’s 
earlier treatment of the same question. In the ninth question of his prologue, Ockham 
 
1 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4 (Trapp I:121). “Utrum deus, inquantum deus, sit subiectum 
in theologia nostra.” 
2 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4 (Trapp I:122). “Quae sit ratio subiecti  scientiae inquantum huiusmodi.” 
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begins in the exact same way: first, he says we need to know what it means to be a 
subject (quid est de ratione subiecti primi alicuius scientiae?) and then we can consider 
the more specific question about the subject of theology.3  
The very fact that both Ockham and Rimini have to ask “what is a subject” in 
such an explicit way before they can even consider what the subject of theology is shows 
that this terminological question has become particularly pressing. Ockham’s next move, 
which Rimini continues to follow, points us to one major source of these developments. 
Both authors turn to Scotus, whose articulation of what it means to be a subject of a 
science is decisive for his further position on the ratio under which theology considers 
God.  We must therefore see what Scotus has to say on the matter before we can go any 
further. 
II. Scotus on the Subject (and Object) of a Science and the Subject of Theology 
The primary passage of Scotus’s corpus referred to by Ockham and Rimini is 
taken from the prologue of his Ordinatio, part three. Scotus asks, whether theology is 
about God as its first object.4 Right away we can see that Scotus is interested in the same 
 
3 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:227). “In ista quaestione est una difficultas: quid 
est de ratione subiecti primi alicuius scientiae? Ideo primo videndum est de ea; secundo ad quaestionem.” 
4 Scotus’s own discussion does not begin in a vacuum, but takes in orientation from previous discussions. 
Most notably the discussion of Henry of Ghent, SQO, a. 19, which asks two questions: “Prima de quo est 
ista scientia ut de subiecto: utrum de Deo, an de aliquo alio. Secunda de quo est ut de materia; utrum de 
quolibet scibili universaliter” (Henricus a Gandavo, Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum, a. 19 (I:114v)).  
 In the first article, Henry makes a sharp distinction between the material considered in a science 
and the proper subject of that science: a clarification similar to Giles’s distinction between the “things” 
considered in a science and the “subject” of a science. In his discussion, the subject is identified by its 
causal role in producing knowledge (see below p. 102, n. 14). Henry makes it clear that God alone can 
fulfill this role. In his second article, Henry suggest that theology does not extend to everything knowable 
absolutely, but everything knowable under the aspect (ratio) of belief, and he admits that if there are other 
knowable things that do not fall under faith, then they are not “determined” from this science. This article 
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topic as Ockham and Rimini and that he broaches the topic with a terminological 
difference. Scotus asks about the “object” of science, while Ockham and Rimini ask 
about the “subject.” In fact, while quoting Scotus, Ockham and Rimini at times both take 
the liberty of changing Scotus’s use of “object” to “subject.”5 We will venture an 
explanation for the terminological shift in due course, but for now it is enough to 
recognize that this is the passage that Ockham and Rimini are primarily reading. 
 Scotus breaks this general question down into three parts: (1) “whether God is the 
first object of theology,” (2) “Whether God is the first object under a special ratio,” And 
(3) “whether theology is about every thing on account of each thing’s attribution to the 
first subject of theology.”6 His third and final question in particular shows us that the key 
concern is how far theology extends its reach.7 Is theology a universal master science 
encompassing all knowledge within its orbit? Does it obtain knowledge about every 
knowable thing? Or is it a particular science dealing only with a special subset of things 
and propositions? This was a central issue at stake for Giles of Rome, and by linking 
 
suggests some agreement between Scotus and Henry on the causal role of the subject/object of a given 
science, but some disagreement about the extent of the theological science. The limited extent suggests that 
Henry believes God to be known under a restricted ratio. However, Henry, in his 12th quodlibet, suggests 
otherwise, and Scotus reads him as committed to the view that God is known under the absolute ratio of 
Deity in the second question of the prologue of the Reportatio. (Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, 
I, prol., q. 2 (Wolter 57, n. 158)). 
 Henry writes: “Quod est subiectum huius scientiae inquantum credibile est, ad istum scientia 
pertinet. Si qua autem sunt alia scibilia quae sub fide non cadunt, neque per fidem credenda esse 
determinantur ex hac scientia. Omnino non sunt de consideratione huius scientiae, qualia sunt quam 
plurima quae propria sunt scientiis physicis, quorum notitia etiam si per fidem teneatur firmissime, in nullis 
ad credenda de Deo adminiculatur; ut est notitia d numero, ordine, et motu caelorum et caeterorum 
huiusmodi …quia aliena sunt a nostro studio, et a divinae lectionis sacrae, his quia foris sunt relinquamus” 
(SQO A. XIX, q. 2, f. 117r X).  
5 See for example Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:227, ll. 16–17). Or Gregorius 
Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:123, l. 3). Compare with Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 
I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:96, n. 142). 
6 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:90–94, n. 124, 133, 139). 
7 Henry of Ghent’s second question of article 19 shows that he makes the same connection as well. See 
above, p. 98, n. 4. 
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these three sub-questions together, Scotus shows us that this is still very much on his 
mind.  
 In his provisional set up, with which he hopes to answer these three questions, 
Scotus takes up the discussion that initially interests Ockham and then Rimini. He says 
we first need to be aware of a distinction between (i) theologia in nobis and theologia in 
se. Second, (ii) we need to know what it means to be the first object of a science (secundo 
assignabo rationem primi obiecti). And finally, (iii) we need to be informed about the 
different parts of theology. While the first and third conditions are important, Ockham 
and Rimini focus directly on the second, and accordingly we will focus our attention 
here. 
 According to Scotus, the first object of a science is distinguished by the fact that it 
“contains virtually in itself in a primary way all the truths of that habit.”8 In effort to 
explain and defend what he means by this definition, he offers two arguments in the 
Ordinatio, both of which Ockham and Rimini cite in their descriptions of the Scotist 
position. He first argues that a first object… 
…contains immediate propositions, because the subject of them contains 
the predicate, and accordingly contains the evidence of the entire 
proposition; and immediate propositions contain conclusions, therefore the 
subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of that habit.9 
The argument offered here is based on a prior conviction about what it means for 
something to be a science. For Scotus, a distinct science is identified by the unique 
 
8 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 142 (Vatican I:96). “De secundo dico quod 
ratio primi obiecti est continere in se virtualiter omnes veritates illius habitus.” 
9 Ibid., prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 142 (Vatican, I:96). “. . . obiectum primum continet propositiones 
immediatas, quia subiectum illarum continet praedicatum, et ita evidentiam propositionis totius; 
propositiones autem immediatae continent conclusiones; ergo subiectum propositionum immediatarum 
continet omnes veritates illius habitus.” 
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interconnecting web formed by its subject, principles, and conclusions. And in the 
Ordinatio he claims that such a web must also be the result of a series of deductive 
moves.10 However, by the time he writes the Reportatio, he gives up this criterion that 
each proposition must actually be deduced and is content to accept as a science any web 
of truths that are in principle deducibile. This allows him to acknowledge that God also 
has “scientific” knowledge, since he knows all the truths of a given science, but 
obviously does not deduce them through a discursive temporal process.11 Such a 
deductive system, or potentially deductive system, requires a unique principle object. 
This object must be capable of being the starting point for every other truth within that 
scientific system, and only an object which contains “virtually” every other truth that 
belongs to that science is so capable. 
 The second argument is built around the notion of primacy (primitas) and relies 
on Aristotle’s explanation of universal predication required by a genuine science in 
Posterior Analytics I, 4.12 Scotus explains that his definition employs the notion of 
 
10 Ibid., prol., pars 4, n. 208 (Vatican, I:141). “…dico quod scientia stricte sumpta quattuor includit, 
videlicet: quod sit cognitio certa, absque deceptione et dubitatione; secundo, quod sit de cognito necessario; 
tertio, quod sit causata a causa evidente intellectui; quarto, quod sit applicata ad cognitum per syllogismum 
vel discursum syllogisticum.” However earlier evidence of the changes to be made in the Reportatio are 
already evident at the end of the same paragraph, where he toys with the idea of the dropping the fourth 
criteria about discursive reasoning: “Ergo theologia in se non est scientia quantum ad ultimam condicionem 
scientiae; sed quantum ad alias tres condiciones est scientia in se et in intellectu divino” (Vatican, I:142). 
11 Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 36, n. 106. Cf. Oleg Bychkov who writes: “If one turns to 
the account of the Rep. I-A…it becomes immediately clear that Scotus non longer distinguishes between 
the several levels at which science (and theology) is possible, but speaks of science in universal terms as 
applied to any—generic—intellect, and only then qua in the intellect of a pilgrim. Discursive thinking is no 
longer a necessary condition for science. Removing this restriction automatically removes the problem with 
such a science being in an ‘ideal’ or perfect intellect that does not employ discursive thinking; hence this 
problem is not even  mentioned”  (“The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan 
Predecessors,” 39). 
12 Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:96, n. 143). “Declaro idem 
secundo sic: quia primitas hic accipitur ex I Posteriorum, ex definitione universalis, secundum quod dicit 
adaequationem…” Aristotle himself states: “something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary 
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primacy on account of the required adequacy between the object and the habit. He writes: 
“the object would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contains all things to 
which such a habit inclines one to consider, because otherwise, the habit would exceed 
the object.”13 In other words, Scotus assumes that the first object is the real cause of our 
cognitive habit, and therefore it would be a genuine problem if we ended up with effects 
(i.e. knowledge) that were disproportionate to the capability of their cause. Once more: it 
would be problematic to know more than the cause is capable of causing us to know.  
Ockham reveals the crucial, but unstated assumption of this reasoning in his 
slightly altered restatement of the argument. He writes from the perspective of Scotus: 
“the object is to the habit just as the cause is to the effect. But the cause is not adequate 
unless it contains virtually the whole effect, therefore etc.”14 This description shows us an 
assumption that Ockham and Rimini may not share. This is the claim that the subject of a 
science is the cause of our knowledge of all the different truths that are collected under 
the umbrella of that science. This may partially explain the shift in terminology between 
object and subject. Scotus is thinking about the subject of a science in terms of the causal 
 
and primitive case” (Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73b32-33, trans. Barnes, p. 8); In the Latin that Scotus 
probably read, it reads “universal autem est tunc quod cum in quolibet et primo demonstratur” (Aristoteles 
Latinus  IV.1, p. 14, ll. 10-11).  
13 Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican, I:96–97, n. 143). “Obiectum non esset adaequatum habitui nisi 
virtualiter contineret omnia illa ad quae consideranda habitus talis inclinat, quia si non, habitus excederet 
obiectum illud.” 
14 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:228). “Obiectum autem se habet ad habitum sicut 
causa ad effectum; non est autem causa adaequata nisi contineat virtualiter totum effectum; ergo etc.” 
Rimini shows himself to be reading Ockham rather than Scotus by following this deviation to the letter, 
something not recognized or noted by the editors of the Rimini text (cf. Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp 
1:123)). 
 This causal role is also visible in Henry of Ghent’s analogy with the sensible object proper to 
sense cognition: “Subiectum sic se habet ad scientia in cognitione intellectiva, sicut se habet obiectum per 
se alicuius actus ad actum sentiendi in cognitione quam sicut obiectum est primum per se movens sensum 
ad actum sentiendi in cognitione sensitiva, ut color visum ad actum videndi, sic subiectum scientiae 
cuiuscumque est primum per se movens intellectum ad actum sciendi in cognitione intellecitva” (SQO, a. 
XIX, q. 1, f. 115r C-D). 
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connection between an external reality and the knowledge it causes. Thus he says on the 
following page: “The habit which is called a science is the intelligible species of the first 
object.”15 The concept of the intelligible species has a long history, but it suffices to say 
its function is decidedly causal; it is vehicle of transmission whereby an extra-mental 
object can become an intra-mental object. Ockham and Rimini are unhappy with this 
assumption about the subject/object and its causal role. Rimini, in his explicit rejection of 
the argument, states unequivocally that neither the subject nor object is the cause of 
knowledge. On the contrary, he says, the conclusions of a demonstration are the causes of 
an intellectual habit. Further, he says no extra-mental object is responsible for causing 
these conclusions.16  
This, then, is Scotus’s basic position on what it means to be a subject of a science, 
when the subject is conceived of as the object. As we can see, it is built upon the 
assumption about the causal role that a first object is expected to play in producing the 
integrated knowledge of a given habit. From here, we can sketch out the implications of 
Scotus’s view on the object of a science in general for of our more particular concerns 
with the principle subject matter of theological knowledge and the scope of the 
theological body of truths. 
With this understanding of the subject/object of science, Scotus feels that the 
answer to the original question of this section of the prologue—viz. what is the first 
object of theology—is rather straightforward. Given the requirement of virtual 
 
15 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, (Vatican I:98, n. 145). “Ille habitus qui dicitur 
scientia est species intelligibilis primi obiecti.” 
16 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:136). “Cum enim habitus causetur ex notitiis, 
quae sunt conclusiones, et illae ex praemissis, quas subiectum non continet primo virtualiter, ut est 
probatum, patet quod subiectum non primo et adaequate continet habitum.”  
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containment, he writes: “nothing virtually contains all theological truths except for 
God.”17 Therefore, God must be the object of theology. 
Having dealt with the question of the object of theology generally, he next turns 
to the more specific question: “Under what ratio does theology considers it object?”18 He 
first provides an analogous example that we already used to understand what scholastic 
thinkers meant by ratio,19 but it will be helpful to review this example once more. He 
says: let us think about Human Being as “rational animal,” as a “substance,” as “gentle,” 
and as “the most noble of the animals.” Each of these, for Scotus, represents a way that 
Human Being can be considered, and, as such, represents a genus of rationes under 
which Human Being can be considered. Respectively, these genera are: under the proper 
quiddity (humanitas), under a common concept (substantia), under an accident 
(mansuetum), and lastly under a relation to something else (nobilissimum animalium).20 
But, as his position on the first object of a science and the idea of virtual containment has 
already made clear, the first object must be known in a way prior to the knowledge of 
every other part of that science and must be known in the most perfect way. It is, after all, 
from the knowledge of this first object that the knowledge of everything else in that 
 
17 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 151 (Vatican, I:102). “Nihil continet virtualiter 
omnes veritates theologicas nisi Deus.” Scotus then provide the proof of this claim: “Probatio minoris: nihil 
aliud continet eas ut causa sive ut illud ad quod habent attributionem nisi Deus, quia Deus nulli alii 
attribuitur; nec aliquid continet eas ut effectus demonstratione quia, nam nullus effectus demonstrat Deum 
esse trinum, quod est potissime veritas theologica, et similia; igitur etc.” 
18 This concern belongs to the second of the three main questions that structured the third part of the 
Prologue. See above p. 99. 
19 See above chapter 1, p. 31. 
20 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:105, n. 158). “Ad cuius intellectum 
pono exemplum: homo intelligitur ut animal rationale, ut substantia, ut mansuetum, ut nobilissimum 
animalium. In primo intelligitur secundum rationem quiditativam propriam, in secundo in communi, in 
tertio per accidens, in passione, in quarto in respectu ad aliud.” 
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science depends.21 Yet in only one of these four ways of knowing Human Being is 
Human Being known in an independent and primary way, i.e. without some other truth of 
the science already being presupposed and with enough clarity so one can see all truths 
contained within it. Scotus holds that only when Human Being is known “quidditatively” 
is this knowledge of Human Being able to perform the causal function required of a first 
object. 
From this example, Scotus extrapolates that only when God is known 
quidditatively, in his essence, can there be a genuine theology. He compares the opinions 
of those who claim that God is known under a restricted ratio to those who tried to know 
Human Being under a concept which depends on a prior knowledge that lies outside of 
what is contained in this restricted ratio. The case of triangles and isosceles once more 
comes to mind.22 To know triangle under the ratio of isosceles can lead to inevitable 
errors. For instance, one might be tempted to claim that all isosceles figures have three 
sides because they are isosceles. The error in this absurd conclusion comes from failing 
to realize the dependence and virtual containment of isosceles within the more primary 
and independent concept of triangle.23 It is telling that Scotus, by way of critique, 
 
21 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican, I:97, n. 144). Here Scotus explains the preeminence that the 
knowledge of the first object must have: “Expono quod dixi ‘primo virtualiter’, quia illud est primum quod 
non dependet ab alio sed ab ipso; ita igitur ‘primo continere’ est non dependere ab aliis in continendo sed 
alia ab ipso, hoc est, quod, per impossibile, circumscripto omni alio in ratione obiecti, manente intellectu 
eius, adhuc contineret obiective. Nihil aliud autem continet nisi per rationem eius.” 
22 In this explanation and our earlier discussion of triangles used to explain what Giles meant by knowing 
something “reduplicatively” we can see that Scotus is insisting on a perspective on God that Giles 
explicitly denied to finite creatures (see c. 1, p. 92). 
23 Juan Carlos Flores in his essay on accidental and essential causality, using the example of colors, 
provides a helpful description of the sense of primacy and independence that Scotus demands of the first 
subject of a given science. He writes:  
 “This form of causality [essential causality] may be elucidated through the causal relation between 
genus and species. From a prior concept, say color, another, say redness, is derived as posterior to it. 
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explicitly mentions the position to which Giles and others adhere (viz. of God as “restorer 
(reparatoris), glorifier, or head of the Church”)24 as examples of rationes of God that are 
not suitable for the first object of theology. As the example suggests, these would not 
qualify because they lack the virtual containment of all other truths proper to God. 
Instead, like isosceles, the characteristic of God as glorifier is a concept contained in and 
dependent on higher truths within the total hierarchy of truths proper to the science in 
question.  
Despite the implicit, but obvious critique of Giles at this point, our earlier sketch 
should be enough to convince us that Giles would probably agree with much that Scotus 
has said up to this point. In fact, Giles’s agreement is practically explicit when he says in 
Quodlibet III, 2 that God is the subject of his own self-knowledge and this subject is 
under the ratio of Deity.25 Accordingly, Scotus’s critique of Giles up to this point is 
rather unfounded. Both agree in the perfectly comprehensive nature of God’s knowledge 
 
Further, redness as a quidditative concept could not exist, or would entail a contradiction if there were no 
concept of its genus, namely color. The reverse, of course is not true. One can imagine the possibility of 
someone never having seen a particular color, yet having experienced many other types of color and thus 
possessing the generic concept of color. The concept of color, then, can be understood as essentially prior 
to all concepts of particular colors, prior in such a way that particular color-concepts depend on its 
existence as their preserving, prior, higher cause. Conversely, an understanding of redness together with 
one of the other colors such a blueness or greenness, can lead one to the understanding of the generic 
concept of color as their genus. For Scotus, the hierarchical causality existing between prior and posterior 
implies that they are all related according to essential dependence rather than…accidentally related. In 
essential dependence, the existence of the posterior is virtually included in that of the prior” (“Accidental 
and Essential Causality in John Duns Scotus’ Treatise «On The First Principle»,” 101–102). 
 Important for us here is the fact that the language of virtual containment is used to identify and 
characterize essential causes. In the case of the triangle, isosceles is said to essentially depend on the prior 
concept of triangle which makes possible the existence of isosceles triangles (as well as equilateral and 
scalene triangles). But note that other types of triangles are not possible because possibility is tied to the 
definite nature of triangle as cause, and its nature is such that only certain kinds of effects are possible. In 
the case of God, God as glorifier and beatifier are similarly dependent effects of God’s nature qua God.  It 
is because of who God is in his quiddity that he can also be seen as glorifer and beatifier.    
24 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:106, n. 158). “Ita posset poni de Deo 
aliqua scientia sub ratione respectus ad extra, ut aliqui ponunt sub ratione reparatoris, glorificatoris, vel 
capitis Ecclesiae…” 
25 See above c. 1, p. 72. 
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of himself. Furthermore, both agree, as nearly all scholastics do, that God’s knowledge of 
himself is significantly different from our knowledge of God or theologia in nobis. 
However, we do find substantial disagreement when we turn to their respective attempts 
to characterize this difference.  
Characterizing Scotus’s vision of this difference is difficult and controversial.  
Since following this thread could take us on a long detour, I simply want to emphasize 
one aspect of this position germane to our thesis: namely, that the resulting sub-division 
between the theology of the Blessed and the pilgrim is fundamentally anti-Aegidian. In 
this division, theologia in nobis in principle still considers God under the absolute ratio 
of Deity. Scotus then deals with the obvious concern about whether this means pilgrims 
know everything about God in a twofold manner. He admits that, in extreme cases, this is 
actually still possible for pilgrims, but he also insists that in most cases, theologia in 
nobis is limited either by our confused earthly way of knowing a quidditative concept of 
God or by the limited revelation of Scripture. The main point here is that any limits and 
restrictions imposed on “our theology” are not intrinsic to “our theology” in principle. 
Rather, they are historically incurred limits pertinent to our earthly existence, but not our 
finite nature; thus they are limits made to be surpassed. To see this, we need only look at 
three aspects of Scotus’s position. First, we need to look briefly at his description of the 
theology of the Blessed. Secondly, we need to see that, in rare cases, Scotus thinks even 
creatures without evident intuitive knowledge can know God under the absolute ratio of 
deity distinctly and with absolute clarity. Thirdly and finally, we need to note that for 
most earth-bound creatures, our theology is limited to what can be derived from creatures 
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or revealed Scripture. Again, important here are two facts: that what can be derived from 
creatures is still considered to be about God and therefore theological knowledge (contra 
Giles), and that the knowledge acquired through Scripture is considered to be a 
contraction of what is theoretically possible for finite creatures. 
Theology of the Blessed 
One witness to the fact that Scotus believes “our theology” for the Blessed treats 
God under an un-restricted ratio comes from his discussion of abstractive and intuitive 
knowledge. For him, two facts are taken to be obvious. (1) The Blessed enjoy a direct 
vision of God as present, which he labels intuitive knowledge, and, as a present causal 
object, (2) the Blessed known God absolutely or under the ratio of Deity.26  But in 
understanding intuitive knowledge through the direct causal presence of the object, we 
know that Scotus means to indicate that God, as the object of this habit, virtually contains 
all truths of the theological habit.  
 In the end, Scotus qualifies his position slightly by admitting that theological 
knowledge of the Blessed can be restricted in one particular way. He writes:  
I say that that it is possible that [this knowledge] extends to anything, that 
is to everything knowable, since all knowable things are not infinite. 
However, de facto, the only limitation comes from the will of God 
 
26 Cf. Lectura, III, d. 3 (Vatican XVIII:322, nn. 288-89). “Primum autem cognitionem non exspectamus in 
Patria, quae est abstractiva, quia illa possumus deum cognoscere posito – per impossibile – quod non esset 
(sicut modo cognoscimus rem cognitione abstractiva, quae abstrahit ab exsistentia, etsi res non sit): sed 
aliam cognitionem, qua videtur Deus intuitive, exspectamus in Patria.” 
 Steve Dumont notes this assumption when he explains Scotus’s development of the division 
between abstractive and intuitive knowledge. He writes: “Scotus carefully specified that “intuitive” is here 
taken narrowly, opposed not to discursive reasoning but to cognition through a species. Scotus then argued 
that thes two types of cognitoin are distinct because we expect intuitive, not abstractive, cognition of God 
in beatitude. Thus, in his earliest text on the matter Scotus introduced the term ‘intuitive’ only when dealing 
with the beatific vision and seems to have regarded this usage as uncontroversial” (Dumont, “Theology as a 
Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 582). 
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revealing something in his essence; and therefore the theology of the 
Blessed in actuality is of as much as God voluntarily shows to them in his 
essence.27 
But this restriction only confirms our central thesis: that finite theological knowledge is 
in principle unrestricted. Any limitation is external to the creaturely nature itself and only 
subject to the caprice of God. 
The Subject of our Earthly Theology 
That our theology in principle can consider God under the absolute ratio of Deity 
is even more visible when we turn away from the knowledge of the Blessed and turn to 
the creature who has not yet reached beatitude.    
Earthly knowledge of God is distinguished from heavenly knowledge by 
evidence. This is true for Scotus as much as it was for Giles, though Giles focuses 
especially on the unique light enjoyed by the Blessed, while Scotus focuses on the direct 
presence of the beatific object.  However, when the object is no longer present, Scotus’s 
language shifts, from the considering the “object” of our knowledge to considering the 
“subject” of our knowledge. He describes this terminological shift in the following way: 
Therefore, to such habit not having evidence from an object, a first subject 
is given about that first known thing, that is, about the most perfect first 
thing, to which the first truths of this habit immediately inhere.28 
 
27 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:137, n. 203). “Dico quod possibile est 
eam esse de quocumque, quia de omnibus scibilibus, quia scibilia illa omnia non sunt infinita. De facto 
autem non habet limitationem nisi ex voluntate Dei ostendentis aliquid in essentia sua; et ideo actualiter 
theologia eorum est de tot quot Deus voluntarie ostendit eis in essentia sua.” 
28 Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:110, n. 168). “Tali igitur habitui non evidenti ex obiecto datur 
subiectum primum de aliquo primo noto, id est perfectissimo primo, id est cui immediate insunt veritates 
primae illius habitus.” 
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Richard Lee notes the same shift in terminology from the object as the complete objective 
cause of a science to the linguistic and referential function of a subject in the overall 
construction of a mental habit. He writes:  
Scotus’s terminology shifts from speaking of the ‘subject’ of a science to 
speaking of the ‘object’ of a science, though at times he uses both 
interchangeably. However, these two terms have different senses that 
point out different aspects of the role it fulfills. The term ‘subject’ finds its 
philosophical site in Aristotle’s logical and metaphysical writings as that 
which is able to take predicates. The term ‘object,’ on the other hand, finds 
its philosophical site in relation to a potency (such as sight and its proper 
object) or as the relation of cause and effect. Scotus likens the ‘object’ of a 
science to the latter. The object of a science is related to the habitus of 
science as a cause is related to its effect. Each science would have one 
determinate thing that serves both as the subject to which all propositions 
must refer and as the object that functions as a cause of the habit. These no 
longer need to be held apart.29 
The name “object” is reserved for the reality that actually contains the truths of a given 
habit. When an object is directly causing the habit through its presence, then the subject 
and object of a given science are identical. However, our earthly, non-beatific knowledge 
lacks this presence. Thus, we can only speak of God as the subject of our earthly 
theology, but not as the immediate object. If anything might cause a restriction to our 
knowledge of God, we can imagine it would be this lack of presence. But Scotus, 
somewhat controversially, concedes in his later Reportatio that it is theoretically possible 
for the earthly pilgrim to know God through a representing species, but still under the 
absolute ratio of deity. Further, he concedes that this species, while representing God 
 
29 Lee, Science, the singular, and the question of theology, 60. Cf. Honnefelder, Ens in quantum ens. Der 
Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns 
Scotus, 7 (Cited by Lee, 138n10). 
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without evidence, is capable of providing us with complete and comprehensive 
knowledge of all the truths of this habit. He states:  
I respond to the question that the pilgrim is able to know truths knowable 
per se about God under the ratio of Deity, that is to know them absolutely 
and perfectly; absolutely and not a posteriori, but a priori under the ratio 
of Deity; perfectly, because with a cognition that is superior to the 
cognition of faith.30  
He even goes to the extreme of saying that, with this species, the theologian is capable of 
being a “perfect theologian.”31 However, we also need to note that Scotus thinks this is 
not a frequent occurrence and it requires supernatural aid.32 His main point is that it is 
possible to have distinct and perfect theological knowledge of God, without being in a 
beatified state or in the direct presence of God. It is a state he grants to special pilgrims, 
 
30 Johannes Duns Scotus, 1 Add. magn., prol., q. 2, n. 15 [Vives 22:31a]). “Respondeo ad quaestionem 
quod viator potest scire veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis, scire, inquam, simpliciter et 
perfecte; simpliciter non a posteriori, sed a priori sub ratione Deitatis; perfecte, quia cognitoine superiori 
quam sit cognitio fidei” (quoted by Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction 
between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 590.) 
31 Johannes Duns Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 7 n. 10 [Vives 25:290b-91a; ed. Alluntis, pp. 262-63]; “Iuxta istam 
conclusionem haberi potest corollarium, quomodo theologia potest esse scientia in intellectu viatoris, stante 
simpliciter statu viae, quia intellectus potens habere conceptum virtualiter includentem omnes veritates de 
ipso necessarias ordinatas, immediatius scilicet, et mediatius, potest de illo obiecto habere scientiam 
completam, sic autem potest intellectus viatoris habere de Deo; ergo etc.…Esset ergo viator perfecte 
scientifice theologus…” (Quoted by Ibid.) See also Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, 535. 
“Abstractive understanding of this sort fully sufficed for science strictly construed, and Duns insisted that 
any theologian receiving it would be able to theologize ‘perfectly scientifically’.” 
32 Dumont writes: “Scotus held that although such a strict science of God under the aspect of Deity is 
compatible with the wayfarer state absolutely speaking, it is nonetheless not available according to 
common disposition. The distinct knowledge of God from which this strict science of theology is derived 
results from divine action, which while, while going beyond common revelation, does not violate the 
wayfarer state. Apparently, Scotus had in mind some sort of infusion by God of a species distinctly 
representing the divine nature, or perhaps the retention of such a species in abstractive cognition after the 
intuitive cognition of God given in rapture had passed” Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s 
Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 591–592 see also 592n57. 
 Marrone writes: “One had only to be cautioned that where Henry believed such special knowledge 
was available to all hard working theologians, he was sure God granted it in just the most extraordinary 
circumstances” (The Light of Thy Countenance, 535). 
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like the prophets and apostles, but not to the everyday theologian.33 Thus, for the 
everyday theologian, there is another kind of earthly theological knowledge, which the 
pilgrim possesses in, what Dumont calls, the “common disposition.”34 
The Subject of our Earthly Knowledge in the Common Disposition 
As both Steve Dumont and Steve Marrone note, the exceptional case of earthly 
theology is a later anomaly and aberration in the context of Scotus’s larger corpus. 
Marrone states: “Here was Duns positing for the wayfarer just the kind of scientific 
theology he had twice rejected elsewhere in the commentaries on the Sentences.”35 The 
more usual position held by Scotus (especially in the Lectura and Ordinatio) is that our 
earthly theology is not a complete science because the “subject” representing God is not 
an intelligible species directly infused by God, providing distinct knowledge of God’s 
essence. Rather, it is a complex concept, providing “confused” but still quidditative 
knowledge of God. Continuing the passage quoted above, where Scotus describes the 
shift from subject to object, he tells us what the subject of our earthly theology usually is.  
The first thing is the “infinite being” because this is the most perfect 
concept that we are able to have about that which is in itself the first 
subject. But nevertheless this concept has neither of the aforementioned 
 
33 Marrone sees this as a slight concession to Henry of Ghent who wanted to raise the profile of the 
theologian above the philosopher by introducing a distinct knowledge of God. Scotus is sympathetic to 
Henry and his concerns for theology, but severely restricts the number of pilgrims who enjoy this kind of 
distinct knowledge. Marrone writes: “[Scotus] even added that if such intellection in a species was what 
Henry had had in mind with his theory of a lumen medium, as unlikely as he thought this to be, then 
Henry’s ideas could be nearly totally vindicated. One had only to be cautioned that where Henry believed 
such special knowledge was available to all hard-working theologians, he was sure God granted it in just 
the most extraordinary circumstances. The Apostles and prophets might have theologized scientifically; in 
his own day theology was routinely a less strictly demonstrative business.” (See also Johannes Duns 
Scotus, Reportatio I-A, I, prol., q. 2 (Wolter 65, n. 184ff)).  
34 Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive 
Cognition,” 592. 
35 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, 534. 
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conditions, since it does not contain virtually our habit in itself, nor does it 
contain this habit as it is known to us.36 
The substitution of “infinite being” as an intelligible species “confusedly” representing 
God, for the first time, genuinely limits our earthly theology. This is a theology derived 
from natural sensible things, and we can wonder if this should count as a discipline, 
which takes God as its subject in any way. For Giles it is clear that it does not; he was 
adamant that any science that began from sensible things was not really about God. But 
Scotus is more optimistic about our natural access to God and insists that even this 
theology still considers God “quidditatively.”37 The limitation, therefore, does not stem 
from the ratio under which God is considered, but simply from the confused, and 
 
36 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:111). “Illud primum est ens 
infinitum, quia iste est conceptus perfectissimus quem possumus habere de illo quod est in se primum 
subiectum, quod tamen neutram praedictam condicionem habet, quia non continet virtualiter habitum 
nostrum in se, nec multo magis ut nobis notum continet ipsum habitum.” 
37 Something still remains unclear here about whether this quidditative knowledge amounts to knowing 
God under the ratio of Deity or not.  
 Marrone shows that it is absolutely essential to Scotus’s project that we are naturally able to reach 
a quidditative concept of God. He writes: “First among all scholastics, Duns moved beyond the analogical 
unity of ‘being’ to claim that the concept was, in its absolute simplicity, fully univocal. At a stroke he 
thereby eliminated the noetic discord between knowing creatures and knowing the divine and made it easy 
to explain how, starting with only knowledge drawn from and legitimately referring to created objects, one 
could work by natural means to meaningful, indeed quidditative, cognition of God” (The Light of Thy 
Countenance, 500). And later “For Duns, the wayfarer’s concept of God was quidditative in the full sense 
of the word” (491). His critique of Henry’s analogical approach to God through a knowledge of creatures 
centers on the fact that without a univocal concept of we can never truly bridge the gap between creatures 
and God. The prospect of a univocal concept of being allows for us to a construct a truly quidditative 
concept of God – as “infinite being”. However this concept remains complex – rather than simple – and as 
such it provides us with confused or general knowledge of God rather than a distinct or special knowledge 
of God, which would allow us to have a perfect and exhaustive theological knowledge. However, Scotus 
continues to insist that this is a quidditative and proper concept nonetheless, and judging by his earlier 
remarks about a quidditative ratio it seems like even the pilgrim in the common disposition must have a 
concept of God under the ratio of Deity, otherwise it would not be quidditative and proper.  
 Nevertheless, elsewhere, Marrone and Scotus suggest that the pilgrim in this life does not know 
God under the absolute ratio of Deity. Marrone writes: “Both [William of Ware and Scotus] conceded one 
could make the same point by noting that mind’s natural knowledge of God in via was not under the formal 
aspect of divinity (sub ratione Dei) or the Godhead’s particular essence (sub ratione huius essentiae ut 
haec)…” (p. 492);  
 Whatever the right answer, the important thing for us is the fact the limited nature of the pilgrim’s 
knowledge comes from its earthly and common status not from its finite or essential nature. Thus this is an 
accidental limitation, which will eventually be overcome. 
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indistinct, nature of this knowledge. It is as if an earthly cloud hangs over what it in 
principle could be a complete knowledge of God. But once this extrinsic and historically 
incurred limitation is removed, our natural finite capacities are sufficient for complete 
and total knowledge of God.  
   Finally, our earthly and common theological knowledge can be supplemented by 
a knowledge of Scripture. As confused, this knowledge does not allow us to deduce all 
further theological truths, and thus the revealed Scripture becomes a necessary 
supplement for the purposes of salvation.38 But special emphasis should be laid on the 
fact that what Scripture reveals is a partial and utilitarian fragment of the totality of 
theology enjoyed by the Blessed and in principle possible for the finite creature. This is 
how Scotus answers the very Aegidian objection based on Augustine De Trinitate 
passage. In the opening sic et non, Scotus cites Augustine, XIV De Trinitate, c. 1, as a 
 
38 For a further division in the knowledge of God through scripture, see Scotus’s fourth and fifth ways of 
knowing God, presented in the prologue to the Reportatio (q. 2, Wolter 68-69, n. 197). Here, there is a 
division between those who know in Scripture what is necessary for salvation and those who know in detail 
what Scripture says as well as how to defend, solve doubts, and provide further reasons. Thus, on one 
reading, we can see an earthly natural theology and scripture colliding. 
 It should also be noted that Marrone spends a good deal energy showing that Scotus believes that 
the natural quidditative, but limited, knowledge of God is of particular importance for our earthly 
understanding of Scripture. He writes: “But what today might be called positive theology – looking to 
divinity’s precise attributes, like “triune,” and manifesting its hidden truths, was also in Duns’s opinion 
elaborated on the basis of natural understanding of God as “infinite being.” Although the particular 
propositions Christian theology held as true were divinely revealed, the intentional content of the term 
‘God’ contained in them did not exceed the concept compounded naturally by the wayfarer’s intellect. It 
was, in fact, the very referential limitation of positive theology to concepts that could be devised naturally 
by intellect which opened it up to general discourse, exposition as well as debate, even among non-
believers” (Ibid., 528–529). 
 Two things are important here: our engagement with Scripture remains limited not by what is 
proper to finite creatures, but by our contingent mode of understanding through sensible creatures, endemic 
only to our earthly existence. This is also visible in a later quote from Scotus, who suggests that Scripture is 
understood according to the common quiddities available to us as earth-bound knowers (see below p. 115, 
n. 41) Secondly, Scotus shows a concern for grounding even positive theology within the wider academy, 
where its results and claims can be tested and discussed by those outside of the community of belief. This is 
an approach to theology that we will see even more clearly in Peter Aureoli and ultimately rejected by 
Gregory of Rimini. 
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potential objection to his conclusion, which claims on the basis of the authority of 
Augustine that knowledge of everything “should not be attributed to this science.”39 
Scotus then responds at the end of the question saying that Augustine is not speaking 
about theologia in se but “only to what is treated Scriptures.”40 In other words, he means 
this restriction applies to what is included in the Scriptural text – a special body of 
knowledge set aside for the purpose of achieving earthly salvation. But Augustine’s 
restriction does not apply to the knowledge that will be enjoyed by the Blessed when they 
view the naked essence of God.  
 Once again, it is important to see that the common earthly theological knowledge 
is a truly limited theological knowledge, whether limited through our confused 
knowledge derived from creatures or from the limited salvific purpose of Scripture. It 
certainly does not extend to all things knowable about God.41 However, this limit is 
 
39 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 140 (Vatican, I:95). 
40 Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:140, n. 207). “Ad primum argumentum dico quod concludit de 
theologia non in se sed prout traditur in Scriptura sacra.” 
41 This is further confirmed when Scotus discusses the limited nature of “our theology” after pointing out 
that knowledge of the Blessed is only limited by God’s will (discussed above). Regarding the theology of 
the pilgrim he writes: He writes: “Just as the theology of the Blessed has a terminus which comes from the 
will of the revealing God, so it is for our [theology]” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:137, n. 204) 
“Sicut theologia beatorum habet terminum, ita et nostra, ex voluntate Dei revelantis.”).  
 Then he indicates where this limit has been set, saying: “The terminus established by the divine 
will, beyond general revelation (quantum ad revelationem generalem), is of those things which are 
contained in the divine Scripture. . . . Therefore theologia nostra is about nothing but what is contained in 
Scripture and about those things that are able to be elicited from it” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican 
I:137–138, n. 204). “Terminus autem praefixus a voluntate, quantum ad revelationem generalem, est 
illorum quae sunt in Scriptura divina . . . Igitur theologia nostra de facto non est nisi de his quae continentur 
in Scriptura, et de his quae possunt elici ex eis.”) 
 Scotus clearly identifies the contents of Scripture as the central locus for theologia in nobis. His 
reference to “general revelation” is ambiguous, but suggests that theologia in nobis includes what can be 
known from general revelation or from the sensible things (which certainly fits well with his discussion of 
“infinite being” as the quidditative but confused subject of theology from which the truths of theology can 
be deduced), and that beyond this God has willed to reveal to us only what is contained in Scripture.  In this 
sense, then, theologia in nobis would be inclusive both of a kind of natural theology and a theology that 
begins from the claims of revealed scripture.  
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proper to our common earthly existence. It is not a limit intrinsic to finite knowledge of 
God in general. In the end, it is a limit we ought to aspire to transcend and we should 
hope to one day leave beyond. In contrast, the Aegidian perspective views creaturely 
theological knowledge as essentially limited; to hope to one day transcend this limitation 
is a grave error and a distraction from the more ultimate goal of beatific loving.  
III. Ockhamist Critiques of Virtual Containment 
Having seen Scotus’s understanding of both the first object and first subject of a 
science, as well as the believed consequences for finite theology (of the earthly and 
beatified type), we are now in a position to consider how Ockham and Rimini receive this 
position. Distinctive of their response is a deep-seated suspicion about what can only be 
described as realist assumptions built into Scotus’s general account of how a genuine 
body of potential knowledge becomes known. It was, after all, from the requirement that 
“each science have a single object, which can be identified as the cause of the entire 
cognitive habit,” that Scotus built his entire system. Such an object was said to contain 
virtually all the truths that make up the habit in question, and from that object or 
representing subject, the practitioner of a given science could draw out all the truths that 
belonged to that discipline. It is to this realist supposition about the causal production of 
 
 In the next paragraph he adds to this volitional limit, but points to a particular earthly defect; not a 
defect or limit of finitude, but a limit proper to the creature in its transitory earthly state. This defect limits 
our ability to know “many special quiddities” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 3, q. 1–3 (Vatican I:138, n. 205). “De 
potestate theologiae nostrae dico quod non potest esse de omnibus, tum propter defectum intellectus nostri, 
non potentis concipere in speciali multas quidditates.”) Following this there is an appeal to the “revelation 
of the common law,” saying that this “common” revelation is limited to those truths, the terms of which are 
commonly [and] naturally conceived by us” (Ibid. “Revelatio autem secundum communem legem non est 
nisi de his quorum termini communiter naturaliter possunt concipi a nobis”).  
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knowledge that Ockham and Rimini initially react. While providing some modifications 
of his own, Rimini generally follows Ockham in his response, and Ockham begins his 
response with three negative conclusions against the Scotist position. 
  In the first place, Ockham rejects the idea that someone’s knowledge of one 
“incomplex” reality could be the sufficient cause of another “incomplex” knowledge of 
another thing.42 By “incomplex,” Ockham is employing a customary way of 
distinguishing between the knowledge of a simple reality versus the knowledge of a 
proposition (something “complex”). Rimini glosses Ockham’s rejection in the following 
way: if the terms “subject” and “passion” (predicates) are understood as nothing other 
than the “incomplex” knowledge of what the terms signify in the common way of 
speaking, then the “subject” term (as an “incomplex” knowledge) does not contain an 
attribute or passion (as another “incomplex” piece of knowledge).43  Ockham’s second 
conviction is that the subject itself, not just the knowledge of it, likewise does not always 
virtually contain its actual attributes.44 Third and finally, Ockham complains, even if 
someone had a distinct knowledge of both the subject term and the predicate term, this 
would not be enough to also have the knowledge that they go together, that is, that one 
term is actually the predicate of the other. In Ockham’s terms, to have knowledge of two 
 
42 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:240). “Primo, quod universaliter numquam notitia 
unius rei extra incomplexa est causa sufficiens, etiam cum intellectu, respectu primae notitiae incomplexae 
alterius rei.” 
43 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:124). “Secunda, quod notitia subiecti non sic 
continet, scilicet primo virtualiter, notitiam passionis. Et, si subiectum et passio primo modo accepta non 
sint aliud quam notitiae incomplexae subiecti et passionis secundo modo acceptorum, ut aliqui volunt, tunc 
idem est dictum primo modo accipiendo subiectum et passionem, quod subiectum non continet passionem.” 
44 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:240). “Secundo, quod subiectum non continet 
semper virtualiter suam passionem.” cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:124). 
“Prima est, accipiendo subiectum et passionem secundo modo [that is, as signifying the external reality 
itself and not the knowledge of that reality] quod non omne subiectum scientiae vel principii continet primo 
virtualiter suam passionem.” 
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related realities is not enough to know that they are related (or form a true composite 
proposition).45 At this point, Rimini goes on to provide a further negative conclusion, 
which only furthers the point Ockham is making. He says: “in the fourth place, one 
principle does not virtually contain knowledge of another nor does one premise virtually 
contain knowledge of another premise.”46 In other words, just because a person knows 
one proposition, it does not follow that they know the other premises of the syllogism. 
 The general point, on which Ockham and Rimini are insisting, contra Scotus, is 
that the body of knowledge that makes up an intellectual habit is not simply caused, 
either in an actual or virtual way.47 Rather this body of known conclusions is constructed 
from several different sources of knowledge. These different pieces are brought together 
from different places to form a distinct habit. The notion that a science is the simple 
unfolding and deduction from the reception of a single (and simple) cognitive cause, 
according Ockham and Rimini, simple does not stand up to experience.48 All in all, this 
shift suggests a real adoption of “Ockhamist tools” that neither Giles nor Duns Scotus 
share.49 We need to watch, therefore, whether this sends Rimini’s vision of the 
 
45 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:240). Tertio, quod non semper notitia distincta 
subiecti incomplexa et notitia distincta passionis sufficiunt ad notitiam propositionis compositae ex isto 
subiecto et illa  passione.” Cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:124). “Tertia, 
quod notitia incomplexa subiecti et notitia passionis incomplexa etiam secundo modo acceptorum seu 
subiectum et passio ad intellectum iam datum non continent primo virtualiter ipsum principium seu 
propositionem immediatam, quae est evidens notitia.” 
46 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:124). “Quarta, quod unum principium non continet primo virtualiter aliud 
seu una praemissa aliam.” 
47 We will however see some disagreement between Ockham and Rimini about the “caused” vs. 
“constructed” nature of metnal propositions later in chapter 7. See pp. 318-327. 
48 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:125–133). Here Rimini goes through example 
after example, showing how one piece of knowledge cannot be derived from another. 
49 As we have seen, Giles shares with Scotus the fundamental view that the subject of a science determines 
the species and nature of a science. It was for this reason that Giles thought the ratio under which theology 
considers God must be restricted. For if God was considered under the ratio of deity, theology would be 
forced to be an infinite science on account of the fact that the subject God as God is an infinite subject. But 
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theological subject in a radically new direction or whether he can still be seen as pursuing 
a recognizably Aegidio-Augustinian position. 
IV. What it Means to be a Subject for Ockham and for Rimini 
If an object or concept virtually containing an interconnected body of truths does 
not exist, then this clearly cannot be what we mean when we talk about the subject of a 
given science. From the point of view of Ockham and Rimini, then, the question of just 
what we mean when we speak of a “subject” needs to be revisited. While Ockham does 
not say so explicitly, we can imagine that, after surveying the preceding discussion of 
subjects and objects, virtual containment, and rationes of consideration, he thought that 
the whole discussion had become rather murky. In an apparent attempt to bring rigor 
back to the discussion, Ockham provides us with what might, at first, appear to be his 
own definition. However, any good Aristotelian will recognize that rather than giving us 
a new definition, Ockham is trying to lead us back to the strict Aristotelian meaning of 
the term. He writes: “Therefore I say that what it means to be a subject of a science (de 
ratione subiecti scientiae) is nothing other than to be a subject with respect to a predicate 
in a proposition known in a science properly speaking.”50 Here we find Ockham echoing 
 
Ockham explicitly rejects this point view. As he turns to provide his own account of what it means to be a 
“subject” he writes: “I say that it is not part of what it means to be a subject to contain virtually its 
attributes, as has been declared. Nor is it the case that a science is determined and specified by that 
subject…” (Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:246). “…dico quod non est de ratione 
subiecti continere virtualiter passiones, sicut declaratum est. Nec etiam quod ab ipso determinetur et 
specificetur scientia…”) Ockham even goes further: “Nor is it from the subject that a science receives its 
dignity.”  
50 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:247–248). “Ideo dico quod de ratione subiecti scientiae non est aliud nisi quod 
subiciatur respectu praedicati in propositione scita scientia proprie dicta…” 
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the precise definition that Aristotle gives to hypokeimenon in the Categories,51 the Greek 
predecessor of the Latin word subiectum. What distinguished a hypokeimenon for 
Aristotle was its ability to receive and lose accidents, while remaining intact. And here 
Ockham follows this definition. The subject of a science is that part of the scientific 
demonstration which takes on an accident or attribute, “such that,” he says, “what is the 
subject of the science and the subject of a known [or demonstrated] conclusion are 
universally the same.”52 
 With this definition, we also can recognize that Ockham is using the term scientia 
in a stricter way than we have seen previously.53 Where Scotus was speaking of a body of 
knowledge involving many known truths and was asking what the subject of this body of 
knowledge was, Ockham understands scientia to refer to a single demonstrative 
syllogism beginning from two known premises and resulting in one known conclusion. 
Once again, we can think of Ockham as attempting to cut through murky waters and 
bring us back to a strict Aristotelian demonstration of epistēmē.54  
However, this divergence in the use and meaning of the word scientia provides 
space for an objection, which Ockham fully recognizes. The objection runs along the 
following lines: perhaps it is true to say that the subject of a single demonstrative 
syllogism is just the subject term of the concluding proposition, but what if we are 
 
51 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, II, 1b10-1b15. 
52 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:248). “…ita quod universaliter idem et sub eadem 
ratione est subiectum scientiae et subiectum conclusionis scitae.” 
53 Of Ockham’s innovation here, Armand Maurer once said: Ockham “was the first, to my knowledge, to 
speak of a science as an arranged ensemble of written propositions…In this respect, as in so many others, 
he was truly the initiator of the via moderna” (Maurer, “Ockham’s Conception of the Unity of Science,” 
112). 
54 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b20-71b24, “But we say now that we do know through 
demonstrating. By demonstrating I mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific I mean one in virtue of 
which by having it, we understand something” (The Complete Works, trans. Barnes, I:115). 
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interested in the subject of a science, conceived of as a collected body of knowledge 
composed of many conclusions?55 
Responding to this objection, Ockham introduces an important distinction that 
both he and Rimini will continually employ in this and other contexts. The distinction is 
between a “partial” and a “total” science or habit. When we speak of a scientia as a single 
demonstrative syllogism resulting in one known conclusion, Ockham and Rimini regard 
this as “partial habit.” However, they both acknowledge the possibility of a “total habit,” 
which is a habit that includes within itself—“either formally or equivalently,”56 says 
Ockham—many partial habits. A central question that accompanies this division is how a 
total science is constituted. What accounts for its unity is a question to which both 
Ockham and Rimini devote separate questions.57 For the moment, however, if we are 
willing to concede to Ockham that such a unity exists, then he finds the objection easy to 
answer. He posits the possibility of a “total subject” conceived through an analogous 
relationship with the subject of partial sciences, saying: “Therefore just as the subject of a 
partial science and the subject of the conclusion are absolutely (simpliciter) the same, so 
the subject of the total science and the subject of all the conclusions are absolutely the 
 
55 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:248). “Si dicatur quod ista ratio non procedit nisi 
de scientia unius conclusionis habita per unam demonstrationem, nunc autem quaeritur de subiecto 
scientiae per quam sciuntur multae conclusiones…” 
56 Cf. Ibid.; Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4., a. 1 (Trapp I:133). Rimini lays this out quite 
nicely, saying “scientia potest etiam dupliciter accipi: Uno modo pro aliquo uno habitu unius conclusionis 
determinatae seu de sic esse, sicut illa significat. Alio modo pro collectione plurium habituum diversarum 
conclusionum pertinentium ad unam totalem scientiam, illa videlicet unitate, quae superius in praecedenti 
quaestione declarata est.” 
57 See below, p. 123 and p. 124, n. 65. 
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same.”58 While he states this rather assertively—as if there was nothing problematic 
about what he says—his meaning is not absolutely clear. It is easy to see how the subject 
of the single conclusion and the subject of a “partial science” could be the same. But it is 
much harder to understand how the subjects of many different conclusions can all be the 
same as one single subject. It would be one thing if all the many conclusions that make 
up a total science all had the same subject, but, as a later objection makes plain, this is 
rarely the case. 
The objection complains:  
It does not seem that the subject of a science and the subject of the 
conclusion are the same, because in any science, like metaphysics, 
mathematics, and natural philosophy, there is one subject, and yet there is 
not one subject of a conclusion, but there are many subjects of many 
conclusions.”59 
Ockham’s initial response is to deny the assumed major premise of this argument. 
Namely,  
he counterintuitively claims that, when speaking strictly or according to the force of the 
word (de virtute sermonis), there is not one subject of metaphysics, mathematics, or 
natural philosophy, but several subjects. And so it seems that, strictly speaking, the 
subject of the total science should always be rendered as the plural, “subjects,” for the 
 
58 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:248). “Ergo sicut subiectum scientiae partialis et 
subiectum conclusionis sunt simpliciter idem, ita subiectum totius scientiae et subiectum omnium 
conclusionum erunt simpliciter idem.” 
59 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:251). “Tertium dubium est, quia non videtur quod idem sit subiectum scientiae 
et subiectum conclusionis, quia cuiuslibet scientiae, sicut metaphysicae, mathematicae et naturalis 
philosophiae, est unum subiectum, et tamen non est unum subiectum conclusionis, sed sunt multa subiecta 
multarum conclusionum.” 
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subject of total science is an array of as many subjects as are found in a unified science.60 
Nevertheless, Ockham makes a concession according to a more common mode of 
speaking. He writes: 
Frequently a first subject among all the subjects is assigned to be the first 
subject of a total science. Still, according to the truth, there is not one 
subject, since just as this science is not one, so it does not have one 
subject. Nevertheless, among all these subjects there is able to be some 
first subject on account of some kind of primacy.61 
Along these lines, Rimini follows Ockham quite closely. In his effort to identify a single 
first subject of a total habit, Rimini appeals to what it is that makes this collection of 
partial sciences one total science in the first place, and here we can see in part how 
Rimini, at least, will attempt to account for the unity of science.62 According to Rimini, 
any total science must be constituted by a group of partial sciences whose own subjects 
“have some analogy or order between themselves.”63 Rimini tells us further to “think 
about that one subject from among these [partial] subjects, to which other subjects have 
such an order and on account of which other subjects are considered, the more perfectly it 
 
60 Cf. Chambers who writes: “Indeed the unity of a science such as theology or metaphysics for Ockham 
will only be that of an aggregate or collection of habits. The unity of a habitus for Ockham depends upon 
the unity of its proper act(s) and the unity of act in turn is dependent upon the ‘object(s) of those acts. Thus 
the various objects of the habit(s) of the theologian are the various concluding propositions and the 
“subject-parts” of those propositions that comprise the conclusions of his science. Consequently, while 
theology may be specifically distinguished from other scientific habitus by either the subjects or the 
predicates of its propositional conclusions, its internal unity consists in a ‘collection of several habits 
related according to a certain and determinate order’. Once again we see a hint of the merely propositional 
unity of even a real science such as theology” (“William Ockham, Theologian,” 386–387).  
61 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh 1:255–256). 
62 For Rimini’s complete discussion one needs to consult the entirety of q. 3 of his Prologue. 
63 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp, I:134). “Verum, quia quandoque talia subiecta 
habent ordinem inter se” and later “aliquam aliam analogiam seu ordinem habent inter se, talis scientiae 
dicitur esse aliquod unum primum subiectum.” Ockham says very much the same thing, and pinpoints three 
types of order. He writes: “Veruntamen inter illa subiecta potest esse multiplex ordo, sicut aliquando est 
ordo praedicationis, quia in illa scientia demonstrantur aliquae passiones de communi, aliquae de 
inferioribus suis” (Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 [OTh I:255]). 
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is known.”64 By finding an ordering principle, which organizes and orders the subjects of 
all the partial habits, we will be able to identify something which we can call the first 
subject of the total habit.65  
V. Ockham’s View of the Primary Subject and the Extent of Theological Knowledge 
When Rimini takes up this further question of whether God is the subject of 
theology, in article 2, question 4 of his prologue, he begins by reminding us that we can 
mean theology in two ways, either as a “partial habit” or a “total habit.” If we mean 
theology as a partial habit, then Rimini asserts nonchalantly that God is sometimes the 
subject and sometimes not, and Ockham is certainly in agreement here.66 But we can still 
 
64 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp, I:134). “Puta illud ex his subiectis, ad quod 
cetera talem ordinem habent et propter quod perfectius cognoscendum cetera considerantur.” 
65 However, Ockham and Rimini do show some small divergences when it comes to distinguishing the 
ordering principle through which a first or primary subject can be distinguished.  Both agree that the order 
in question revolves around a certain kind of primacy among the multiple subjects of any science. But 
Ockham notes three types of primacy corresponding to three types of order: primacy of predication, 
primacy of perfection, and primacy of totality (Cf. Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:256–257)). Likewise, 
Ockham thinks different partial subjects can by primary according to different kinds of primacy, in his 
example of metaphysics he seems to favor the primacy of predication as decisive for what should be seen 
as the first subject of metaphysics.  
 Rimini, in contrast, only focuses on two kinds of primacy: “primacy of attribution” and “primacy 
of community or predication.” Rimini writes of the subject of medicine: “Sic medicinae primum subiectum 
est corpus sanabile inquantum huiusmodi; nam quaecumque in medicina totali partialiter considerantur, 
attributionem habent ad ipsum inquantum huiusmodi, vel sicut causativa sanitatis vel conservativa vel 
significativa aut aliquo alio modo, ut patet ex 4 Metaphysicae, et hoc solum est vocari primum subiectum 
primitate attributionis.” About Physics and Logic he writes: “Quandoque aliqua subiecta non habent talem 
ordinem inter se, eis tamen est aliquod commune, cuius per se passiones in aliqua parte illius totalis 
scientiae considerantur et in aliis partibus passiones partium subiectivarum. Verbi gratia est physica; in 
aliqua enim eius parte consideratur de corpore mobili ad ubi, et in aliqua de mobili ad formam et sic de aliis 
generibus corporum mobilium, quibus commune est corpus mobile, de quo consideratur in libro 
Physicorum. Similiter in aliqua parte logicae consideratur de syllogismo topico, in aliqua de syllogismo 
demonstrativo, quibus commune est syllogismus simpliciter, de quo consideratur in libro Priorum. Et illud 
tale commune consuevit vocari primum subiectum in illa totali scientia, primum, inquam, primitate 
communitatis vel praedicationis” (Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:134–135)). 
66 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:137). “Si primo modo, dicendum quod alicuius theologiae deus est 
subiectum et alicuius non. est enim subiectum illius, qua aliquid de ipso probatur; illius autem, qua nihil de 
ipso, sed de alio probatur, non est subiectum. Exemplum primi “Deus potest per se ipsum, quidquid potest 
Chapter 2: Gregory of Rimini on the Subject of Theology | 125 
                                                                                                                                                
ask about the primary subject of the entire aggregate of “partial habits.” It is with this 
question that we can turn once again to the scope of theological knowledge and make a 
comparison between not only Ockham and Rimini, but also between these two thinkers 
and Scotus and Giles. A comparison is warranted because, despite different conceptions 
of what constitutes a science, the primary subject for Ockham and Rimini says a lot about 
the kinds of propositions that are to be included in a discipline. As we will see, Ockham 
and Rimini have no problem entering into conversation with Giles on this point, and thus 
we must conclude that there remains room for a kind of comparison here, despite 
differing conceptions about why a first subject is the subject of a given discipline. 
For Ockham’s part, he claims that when we use the word “subject” to indicate that 
which is supposited (not that which actually terminates our act of knowledge), and we 
mean to reference a subject which has a kind of primacy among many other subjects, then 
“God” is indeed considered under the ratio of deity.67 Ockham’s reasons stem first from 
the fact that he thinks it obvious that God is the subject of many partial habits included 
 
mediante creatura’, aut aliquid tale. Exemplum secundi: ‘Creatura est annihilabilis’, ‘accidens potest 
conservari sine subiecto’, et aliae, in quibus de creatura aliquid enuntiatur.” 
 In light of the fact that Ockham provides a complicated discussion about the nature of suppositing 
subjects, it is notable that in Rimini’s text no discussion precedes this assertion about the proper and 
improper sense of the word “subject,” nor is there a discussion of whether our earthly and finite minds can 
have an act of knowledge that terminates in God himself or whether they must be directed toward a “stand 
in” concept like “infinite being.” Rimini simply asserts: sometimes God is the subject and sometimes not, 
depending on the subject term of the theological conclusion in question. 
 This does not necessarily mark a divergence with Ockham. Rimini could very well be operating 
under the assumption that we working with the improper sense of term “subject” that Ockham previously 
distinguished. If so, then he and Ockham are very much in agreement. For Ockham thinks that sometimes 
the subject term of a theological conclusion will be “suppositing” for God as God, sometimes for person of 
the Trinity and sometimes for creatures. Nevertheless, it is odd that Rimini, who had been tracking with 
Ockham so closely, would leave out a discussion of whether God is the subject as the terminating object of 
the act of understanding or simply as that for which the object or act of understanding supposites. 
67 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:271). “Nam opinio quod Deus sub ratione deitatis 
est subiectum theologiae potest verificari intelligendo subiectum illud pro quo supponitur et quod est 
primum aliqua primitate.” 
Chapter 2: Gregory of Rimini on the Subject of Theology | 126 
                                                
within the habit of theology.68 From here it is only a short step to claim that this “partial 
subject” has a kind of primacy over all the other “partial subjects.”69 The primacy is 
accounted for on the following basis: “For with respect to creatures, He is first by 
primacy of nature and causality; with respect to the persons, he is in some mode prior.”70 
Ockham is quick to point out that this does not mean that this subject itself contains 
virtually all other theological truths or it is the subject of every other conclusion. 
Nevertheless, all the other conclusions in some way reference and depend on the 
attributes predicated of God qua God.  
Ockham then goes on to try to show the concord of diverse historical positions on 
the subject of theology. But, importantly, there is one historical position that he cannot 
tolerate: the position of Giles of Rome (viz. that God is the subject inasmuch as he 
glorifier). He dismisses this opinion as “entirely irrational”71 and gives the following 
reason: 
All these [names], [glorifier, beatifier, redeemer, restorer] are predicates 
attributed to a subject. Thus the following are theological propositions: 
God is glorifier, God is redeemer, God is restorer, and the same for other 
like things; and thus such [names] are not the ratio of the subject, but the 
predicates attributed to the subject.72 
 
68 Of course, Ockham is willing to admit this, if we are going to speak properly, namely that God is the 
subject if we are talking about what is being supposited for by the actual term that terminates our act of 
knowledge.  
69 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:271). “Nam inter omnia pro quibus subiecta 
propositionum theologicarum possunt supponere ipse Deus habet aliquam primitatem…” 
70 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:271). 
71 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “Videtur omnino irrationalis …” See below for a further consideration of 
Ockham’s opposition. 
72 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273)., “…quia omnia talia sunt quaedam praedicata attributa subiecto. Unde 
ista est propositio theologica; Deus est glorificator, Deus est redemptor, Deus est reparator, et sic de aliis; et 
ita talia non sunt ratio subiecti sed praedicata attributa ipsi subiecto.” 
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At precisely this point, Ockham shows himself to be aware of the same Aegidian 
objection, based on De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, that Scotus addressed: “But then there is a 
doubt concerning what theology is about: whether it is extends to everything, or 
something and not about other things.”73 
His reply comes in the form of another division between types of theology that 
resembles, not Scotus’s initial division between theologia in se or theologia in nobis, nor 
the distinction between partial theology and total theology, but Scotus’s nuanced 
distinction between sub-types of theologia in nobis. The distinction identifies a type of 
theological knowledge that encompasses only those things that are necessary for 
salvation and another type that is about every “incomplex” thing (though not every 
“complex” truth).74 
In finding a precedent for the former meaning of theology, Ockham turns to the 
passage from De Trinitate and interprets it the way Scotus did.75 Concerning the part of 
the quotation that says this science “does not extend to everything that is knowable by 
man,”76 Ockham interprets Augustine to be speaking of a type of theology which is 
necessary for this stage of life and for reaching eternal life.77 Later he speaks of it as 
being concerned only with those things that are necessary for salvation.78  
 
73 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “Sed tunc est dubium: de quibus est theologia? An scilicet sit de omnibus, 
vel de aliquibus, et de aliquibus non.” 
74 Ibid. “Ad hoc potest dici quod theologia potest accipi dupliciter: vel pro habitu qui est nobis necessarius 
pro statu isto ad vitam aeternam consequendam…Secundo modo, dico quod theologia est de omnibus 
incomplexis sed non de omnibus complexis.” 
75 Cf. Scotus’s answer to the same objection derived from De Trinitate XIV, c. 1. See above page 114. 
76 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “‘Non utique quidquid sciri ab homine 
potest’, etc”; Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, n. 3.  
77 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “Vel pro habitu qui est nobis necessarius pro statu isto ad vitam aeternam 
consequendam.” 
78 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:274). “Quia enim tempus vix sufficit ad illa quae sunt necessaria ad salutem…” 
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But while similar in certain respects, this is not exactly the way Giles chose to 
interpret this very important quotation. For Giles, Augustine was not speaking of 
theology’s focus as limited to only what would procure salvation from this life, but rather 
to those things which are appropriate for beatitude, not just for the pilgrim progressing 
towards beatitude in hope (in spe), but also for the Blessed enjoying beatitude (in re).79 In 
Ockham’s view, the limitation of this meaning of theology is attributed to the fallen state 
of humanity, and, in this way, he, with Scotus, puts a limitation on earthly finite theology 
which is not proper to finite theology per se and which therefore does not apply to the 
Blessed. But as Giles’s discussion of the difference between God as glorifier or beatifier 
and God as restorer made clear,80 he does not think theology’s subject matter and extent 
is determined by the fallen earthly status of the pilgrim. The subject matter of the limited 
theology of creatures Giles spoke of was in principle the same for both the earthly 
pilgrim in need of salvation and the beatified saint. Any difference was only attributable 
to light and clarity of the knowing, not the subject matter or extent of the knowing. To 
see that this is not the case for Ockham, we only need look at his understanding of the 
second meaning of theology.  
Of the second mode of theology, he at one point suggests it should be considered 
theology simpliciter (indicating that this is the more proper meaning of theology).81 And 
regarding this type, he asserts that it does extend to every simple thing that exists. He 
reasons that “there is no incomplex thing about which a theological attribute cannot be 
 
79 See above, c. 1, page 83. 
80 See above chapter 1, p. 66. 
81 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:273). “Aliter accipitur theologia pro omni habitu 
simpliciter theologico sive sit nobis necessarius pro statu isto et investigandus sive non.” 
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predicated.”  And then he reasons further, “but about everything about which a 
theological attribute is able to be predicated, theology is able to prove this attribute, 
therefore [theology] is able to consider about every such [incomplex] thing.”82  He does, 
however, limit theology’s extension with regard to complex propositions, unless perhaps 
a theological attribute can be predicated of a given proposition.83 Therefore theology is 
not a universal knowledge in the sense that it encompasses and claims to prove every 
possible truth—or as Scotus said, to everything knowable—but it is universal in that it 
extends to every real thing and can claim to include every possible knowledge of God 
and every relation to God within its scope.  
Finally, Ockham’s concluding remark to this section is worth noting as it 
illustrates an ambiguity about the meaning of “our theology” in his own thought. He 
writes:  
But speaking about our theology in the first mode, I say that our theology 
is not about everything, neither complex or incomplex. For since time 
hardly suffices for [reaching] those things that are necessary for salvation, 
therefore man in this life ought not to investigate other things.84  
Particularly interesting about this quotation is that Ockham slightly modified it in 
a later revision. He qualifies the strong sense of “ought not” and adds “or rather, it is not 
 
82 Ibid. “Primum patet, quia non est aliquod incomplexum de quo non praedicetur aliqua passio theologia; 
sed de omni illo de quo praedicatur passio theologica potest theologia suam passionem probare; ergo de 
omni tali potest considerare.” 
83 Ibid., I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:274). “Secundum patet, quia multa sunt complexa quae in nullo penitus sunt 
theologica, sicut ‘omnis triangulus habet tres’ etc., et huiusmodi, et ideo de istis non est theologia tamquam 
de aliquibus scitis in theologia, nisi praedicando forte aliquam passionem theologicam de istis.” 
84 Ibid. “Sed loquendo de theologia primo modo, dico quod theologia nostra non est de omnibus, nec 
complexis nec incomplexis. Quia enim tempus vix sufficit ad illa quae sunt necessaria ad salutem, ideo alia 
non debet homo pro statu isto investigare, [vel non oportet] maxime in particulari.” 
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necessary” to investigate other things.85 A couple of things are revealed here. First, 
Ockham again defines the limited nature of theology’s consideration as a this world, 
earthly limitation. Because we are fallen and have a hard time knowing even the things 
necessary for salvation, our theology in this life should not focus on anything else. The 
implication is that once salvation has been procured, this limitation is no longer 
necessary, and the theology of the Blessed will extend at least to every knowable thing, 
though perhaps not every knowable proposition. The second noteworthy thing is the way 
Ockham goes on to qualify the limitation of our theology in this earthly life. By changing 
“ought not” to “need not,” he is suggesting that the theologian, in this life, could extend 
his work outward to other possible theological propositions if he wanted to, though this is 
not necessary and perhaps not advisable since simply attaining a knowledge of things 
necessary for salvation is a difficult task in itself. In the end, there does not seem to be an 
intrinsic limit on the nature of finite theology itself, but simply a limit of prudence: a 
prudence that is no longer necessary when our creaturely knowledge transitions from that 
of a fallen creature to that of a beatified creature. As has been emphasized before in 
Scotus, the real division between types of theology is between our earthly theological 
knowledge and that which we will enjoy in heaven. But for Giles, the emphasis has 
always been on the fundamental division between infinite knowledge and creaturely 
knowledge (whether that creaturely knowledge is of the earthly pilgrim or the Blessed in 
heaven).  All in all, Ockham’s division of theology can be roughly summarized in the 
following chart.  
 
85 Ibid. 
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Type of Theology Subject Extent 
theologia in se God himself (quod supponit et 
pro quo supponitur) 
Total and complete 
nostra theologia in patria God himself (quod supponit et 
pro quo supponitur) 
To every incomplex thing and 
their theological attributes 
nostra theologia in terra 
simpliciter 
Infinite being (quod supponit) 
God (pro quo supponitur) 
To every incomplex thing and 
their theological attributes 
nostra theologia in terra 
respectu necessaria ad salutem 
Infinite beng (quod supponit) 
God (pro quo supponitur) 
To those propositions 
necessary for salvation 
 
Here we can see a three-fold division of “our theology” that roughly corresponds to 
similar three-fold division in Scotus. 
VI. Rimini on the Primary Subject of Theology and the Extent of Theological 
Knowledge 
While Ockham dismisses Giles’s position on the “restricted” ratio of the subject 
of theology as “completely irrational,” Rimini in stark contrast begins his treatment of the 
topic by claiming: “I put three conclusions in conformity with the doctrine of our brother 
Giles.”86 The first conclusion he introduces is that: “God, inasmuch as he is God, is the 
first subject of our theology.”87 This, however, is a bit disconcerting because it does not 
seem like an opinion Giles would want to hold. Yes, Giles believes God is the subject of 
                                                 
86 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:137). “Pono tres conclusiones conformiter 
doctrinae nostri fratris Aegidii.” 
87 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:137–138). “Prima est quod deus, inquantum deus, est subiectum primum 
theologiae nostrae” (emphasis mine). 
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our theology, but not under the ratio of deity, or inasmuch as he is God, but under the 
ratio of glorifier or beatifier.  
We will see below why Rimini can appear to contradict Giles while declaring his 
intention to be faithful to him.88 But first we need to see Rimini’s justification that God is 
the primary subject among many partial subjects. Here he provides an explanation more 
or less in step with Ockham. He writes:  
From the subjects of partial theological habits, the first subject of the total 
theological habit is that for which the other theological subjects (inasmuch 
as subjects are of this type, namely theological) have, through themselves, 
an analogy or order. The subject of the total habit, in as much as it is of 
this type, is ordered to nothing.89 
But God, says Rimini, is precisely this kind of ordering subject, through which all the 
partial subjects have a kind of “analogy” and “order”.  
The presence of this primacy for Ockham, and order for Rimini, can also help us 
explain a problem resulting from their rejection of Scotus’s position. The problem is that 
once the deductive tie between all theological truths and the first object, virtually 
containing all the truths of the discipline, have been severed, it is not always apparent 
why a particular conclusion should be labeled “theological.” The presence of an ordered 
relation to the primary subject “God” is certainly part of this answer. However, as we 
turn to later chapters, we will see that this order around a first subject can only be a 
necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. By the end of this chapter, we will see 
 
88 See below, p. 134. 
89 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:138). “Ex subiectis partialium theologicarum 
illud est primum totalis theologiae subiectum, ad quod cetera subiecta theologica, inquantum huiusmodi 
subiecta scilicet theologica sunt, habent per se analogiam et ordinem , ipsum vero ad nihil aliud inquantum 
huiusmodi ordinatur. Deus est huiusmodi.” 
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that Rimini thinks that it is quite possible for the other sciences to say something about 
God without this knowledge being theological.90 And in a later chapter, we will see him 
fully acknowledge that the same proposition can be part of theology as well as part of 
another science.91 Something else, therefore, must be added besides this order before a 
proposition can be truly labeled a theological proposition. Nevertheless, a certain 
connection to God inasmuch as he is God is a necessary condition for inclusion within 
the body of knowledge classified as theology.  
Rimini then goes on, as Ockham does, to give examples of the kind of 
connectivity between partial habits that he has in mind. His general rule is stated as 
follows: “Generally, nothing ever really enters theological consideration, unless that 
[partial] subject in some way has an attribution to God.”92 He leaves us with two 
categories of such attribution.  In the first way, subjects are admitted to theological 
considerations when they are considered as effects of God, which manifest some attribute 
or perfection of God. He includes under this category God’s power, justice, mercy, 
disposition, and providence. The second way in which a subject can be admitted to the 
total habit of theology is when it is considered as part of a “precept or instruction” which 
is showing God’s will or what pleases and displeases God.93 True to the claim Rimini 
said he would defend, he insists that the subject which provides the kind of primacy 
 
90 See below, p. 141, n. 112. 
91 See below, c. 6, p. 287. 
92 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:138). “Et generaliter nihil omnino intrat 
considerationem theologicam, nisi secundum quod ipsum aliquo modo habet attributionem ad Deum.” 
93 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:138). “Minor declaratur, quoniam quaecumque alia intrant 
considerationem theologicam, vel considerantur inquantum sunt effectus Dei manifestantes eius potentiam, 
iustitiam vel misericordiam, dispositionem et providentiam, vel inquantum praecepta et documenta Dei 
manifestantia eius voluntatem sive quid ei placeat vel displiceat, et generaliter nihil omnino intrat 
considerationem theologicam, nisi secundum quod ipsum aliquo modo habet attributionem ad Deum.” 
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needed for this connectivity between theological conclusions is God “under the ratio of 
deity or inasmuch as he is God.”94 
Given the fact that Rimini has claimed—even while stating that he was trying to 
defend the position of Giles—that the subject of the total habit of theology is God 
inasmuch as he is God, we can legitimately wonder if Rimini shares Ockham’s view that 
finite theology extends to every knowable relation to God and therefore to everything 
knowable about God. By turning to the second and third supposedly Aegidian 
conclusions, we can see how the first conclusion, which Rimini defends, might not 
necessitate further allegiance with Ockham and might still fall in line with the intention 
of Giles and the spirit of the Aegidian tradition.  
At the outset of his second conclusion, he is willing to acknowledge the danger of 
his position up to this point. He writes: 
If God were the subject of our theology under the ratio of deity absolutely, 
then God would be comprehensible through our theology habit in act, or it 
would be possible to have such an act. The consequence is false (emphasis 
mine).95 
Rimini is speaking about the matter in slightly different terms than Giles did. Giles would 
never want to say that God is considered under the ratio of deity. Rimini, as we have 
seen, is perfectly willing to use this expression (to the point that it makes us doubt 
whether he can really be holding the same position as Giles.) However, he adds a further 
qualification that we have not yet seen. He distinguishes between God under the ratio of 
 
94 Ibid., prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:138). “Quod vero sit subiectum sub ratione deitatis sive inquantum Deus, 
declaro.” 
95 Ibid., prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:139). “Secundam conclusionem probo: Si deus sub ratione deitatis absolute 
esset subiectum theologiae nostrae, deus esset comprehensibilis per theologiam nostram actu habitam vel 
possibilem haberi.”  
Chapter 2: Gregory of Rimini on the Subject of Theology | 135 
                                                
deity absolute from that same ratio considered contracte. From an Aegidian perspective 
this is a redundant move, since to know God under the ratio of deity is to know God 
absolutely, whereas to know God under any other ratio is to know God in a more 
constricted way.96 Nevertheless Rimini dismisses the idea that the ratio of deity could be 
known absolutely, for this would lead to a comprehensive vision or knowledge of God, 
which is simply impossible.  
The reason given for this impossibility is Aegidian. He explains: the consequence 
is false because “God is not able to be comprehended by the knowledge of any created or 
creatable creature, otherwise it would not be accurate to believe that God is 
incomprehensible.”97 Two things stand out here. First, the commitment to God’s 
incomprehensibility hearkens all the way back to the assertion of John Damascene that 
loomed so large in Giles’s thought. God is an “infinite sea” (pelagus infinitum) that 
cannot be fully explored. The second point is the manner in which Rimini identifies this 
inability to comprehend as an essential attribute of “creaturelyness.” This lack of 
comprehension is not due to human beings’ earthly or fallen status. On the contrary, this 
limitation belongs to all creatures in virtue of being created. In fact, Rimini extends this 
limitation to all “creat-able” things whether actual or merely possible. This stands in stark 
contrast to Ockham’s division between a theology which only considers what is 
 
96 Rimini actually comments on this shift in language towards the end of his second conclusion. Cf. Ibid., I, 
prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:140).“Infert enim quod theologia esset infinita, si haberet deum pro subiecto sub 
aliqua ratione deitatis, id est Deum inquantum deum absolute absque contractione ad aliqua de ipso 
cognoscibilia, cum ut sic infinitae veritates sint de ipso cognoscibiles.”  
97 Ibid., prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:139). “Consequens est falsum, nulla enim notitia et nullis notitiis creatis 
vel creabilibus deus comprehendi potest, alias non veraciter incomprehensibilis crederetur.” 
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necessary for salvation and a more strict sense of theology, proper to those who have 
already been saved or are ready to go beyond what is necessary for salvation. 
This difference grows even starker in Rimini’s comments on the nature of 
theology of the Blessed. In the background, we should call to mind once more Godfrey of 
Fontaines’s complaint against Giles’s limit on the knowledge of the Blessed.98 He 
complained that any such contraction in our knowledge of God would prevent true 
beatitude. For as long as there is more to know about God, we will continue to be 
dissatisfied. Despite various disagreements and disputes, Duns Scotus and Ockham 
appear to share this conviction. But in his third argument for his second conclusion 
Rimini shows that he cannot be said to follow Ockham here. With Giles, he rejects this 
kind of vision of beatitude and heavenly happiness, arguing that even the Blessed do not 
know God under the ratio of deity absolutely because their theological knowledge is still 
a creaturely knowledge, and, as such, they cannot know God in a comprehensive and 
unlimited way. The following quotation from Rimini makes the case plain, and 
accordingly, it ought to be singled out as the foundational quotation for the main 
argument of this chapter. 
 
98 See chapter 1, pp. 69-84. We can see that this is a clear concern persisting into the fourteenth century as 
it is a concern raised explicitly by Rimini’s predecessor, Thomas of Strasbourg: “Praeterea in theologia 
beatorum Deus est subiectum sub ratione absoluta, ergo et in theologia nostra. Consequentia patet etiam per 
contrariae opinantes, et similiter per illud Psalmus: ‘Sicut audivimus, sic vidimus in civitate domini 
virtutum’. Antecedens probatur tripliciter. Primo, sic, quia si non, tunc appetitus beatorum maneret 
incompletus. Secundo, quia cognitio beatorum est intuitiva, quae terminatur ad essentiam divinam 
secundum suam propriam existentiam, et non secundum aliquam rationem contractam. Tertio, quia dicit 
Augustinus in: ‘Hoc est plenum gaudium nostrum frui trinitate; ad cuius imaginem facti sumus.” 
(Commentaria, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (1564 f. 2vb)). Strasbourg’s response continues the Aegedian-like position 
that Rimini will also advance. He admits that the blessed are completely happy and enjoy an infinite good, 
but he denies that this enjoyment is the result of an infinite comprehensive knowledge (Cf. f. 3vb). 
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If therefore our theology or some other created or creatable theology has 
God as its subject inasmuch as he is God absolutely, then this theology has 
to consider everything about Him; everything, which is able to be verified 
and known, and, as a consequence, to comprehend, either by believing, if 
such theology is only faith, as is ours, or by seeing, if it is the knowledge 
which the blessed have. Whence Giles was elsewhere able to argue in the 
same vein for the proposed conclusion: God is not the subject of the 
theology of the Blessed inasmuch as he is God absolutely, otherwise he 
would be comprehensible by a created science.”99 
In this quotation we have stumbled upon a direct confrontation with the opinion of Scotus 
and Ockham. Here we see that the restricted nature of theology—i.e. the restriction that 
Augustine suggest in De Trinitate XIV, c. 1—cannot be accounted for on the basis of our 
temporary and earthly status or limited to our temporal concern for eternal life. 
Moreover, this restricted body of truths cannot be seen as a small fragment of the total 
theology we look forward to in beatitude. On the contrary Rimini believes that this 
limitation is proper to finite creatures, whether fallen or beatified. The thirst for an all 
encompassing comprehensive knowledge of God is not, then, a desire we await to be 
fulfilled, but only a temptation to what is improper, unnatural, and inappropriate to finite 
human beings. For Rimini, beatitude is not a transition to a more comprehensive 
knowledge of God, but a coming to see intuitively those truths which are necessary for 
beatific enjoyment, which were previously only known through faith.  
 In sum, we can see that Rimini joins Giles in his opposition to Godfrey of 
Fontaines’s view of beatitude. Our complete and utter happiness does not appear to lie in 
 
99 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:139). “Si igitur theologia nostra vel aliqua 
alia creata vel creabilis habet deum pro subiecto inquantum deus est absolute, igitur habet considerare de 
ipso omne, quod de ipso verificari et cognosci potest, et per consequens comprehendere vel credendo, si 
talis theologia sit fides tantum, ut est nostra, vel videndo, si sit notitia, qualis est beatorum. Unde potest 
aliter in eadem virtute sic argui ad propositum: Deus non est subiectum theologiae beatorum inquantum 
Deus absolute, alias ipse esset creata scientia comprehensibilis…” 
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the satisfaction of our every cognitive curiosity about God, but only in the knowledge of 
those truths that are necessary for finite creatures to love God in the manner proper to 
their creaturely nature. Here, too, lies the possibility of an enduring conception of 
theological knowledge that does not see itself as the heir of Greek philosopical 
aspirations (as suggested by Freddosso in chapter 1).100 On the contrary, we have here a 
kind of philosophical critique that throws into question the goal or end of comprehensive 
knowledge (of everything knowable or simply everything knowable about God). This 
critique, in turn, suggests that human nature is not fulfilled by having every question 
answered, but actually in putting many of those “curious” questions aside and turning to 
perfectly love what is incomprehensible.   
However, we know that the limited character of theology, even in its perfected 
state, is only half of Giles’s core position. His denial that God as God is the subject of 
theology is the negative half which is coupled with his positive position, that God is the 
subject of theology as glorifier and beatifier. Similarly, up to this point, we have only 
seen the negative half of Rimini’s position. In his third conclusion, he introduces his 
positive position on the extent or orientation of the contraction. Unsurprisingly Rimini 
turns to the passage from De Trinitate XIV and states: “From [this quotation] it is 
acknowledged that God is the object [confusingly, he says ‘object’ here] of theology 
under the same ratio, both in faith and also in the vision of heaven.”101 Having given us 
an interpretation that shows that the theology of the pilgrim and the Blessed are united in 
 
100 See above, c. 1, p. 47. 
101 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:140). “Ex quo innuitur quod deus sub eadem 
ratione est obiectum theologiae et fidei ac etiam visionis patriae” (emphasis mine). 
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their creaturely status, he then uses the quotation to declare under what contracted ratio 
God is consider by the pilgrim and the Blessed. Given that Augustine suggests theology’s 
job is to lead us to beatitude, Rimini admits that it is perfectly apt to identify this 
contraction as God inasmuch as he is glorifier or beatifier, just as Giles claimed.102  
But Rimini ends his defense of this conclusion by making a concession to those 
who worry about the specific name Giles has given to this contraction (a worry most 
visible in Rimini’s immediate Augustine predecessor at Paris, Thomas of Strasbourg).103 
Rimini points out that what is important here is the contraction and limit to our theology 
and not the precise name. The name is inserted to insist on this contraction and that fact 
that God is not known as deity absolutely.104 But, while he is not adamant about the 
precise name, the derivation of the name from the Augustinian quote makes it plain that 
the body of knowledge collected under the umbrella is grouped together on account of a 
common purpose, the ultimate end of beatific love of God.  
 
102 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:140). “…et per consequens secundum illam contractionem videtur obici 
fidei et theologiae, secundum quam obicitur visioni gloriae, et cum haec ad illam ordinetur, satis congrue 
potest talis contractio per illam denominari, ut dicatur quod deus inquantum glorificatur vel beatificator sit 
theologiae subiectum.” 
103 Strasbourg writes: “Dico, quod Deus est subiectum Sacrae Scripturae sub ratione speciali, et non sub 
ratione absoluta, sive abyssali. Et licet deficiamus in nominibus subiectum istius benedictae scientiae sub 
tali ratione speciali sufficienter exprimentibus; potest tamen sic describi, ut dicatur, Verum summe 
diligibile, ut proportionatum est rationali animae nondum perfectae per habitum luminis gloriae. . . .” 
Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (1564 f. 2va) . But he later says: “…non intendo 
deviare a venerabili doctore nostro fratre Aegidio, qui licet per alia verba praedictam veritatem expressit, 
idem tamen (ut credo) dicere voluit: per rationem enim specialem ut ipsemet dicit, non intendit, nisi 
restrictionem in obiecto illius abyssalis rationis superius nominatae . Cum autem quandoque, rationem 
subiecti istius scientiae explicando, ponit nomen glorificatoris, non est sibi cura de tali nomine; quia 
ipsemet quandoque dicit, quod non possumus nomen aptum invenire, quo talem rationem specialem 
sufficienter exprimamus. Sed per nomen glorificatoris intendit, ad quem nos ducit illa scientia benedicta, 
qui finis est gloria vitae aeternae, quae principaliter consistit in Dei dilectione. Ex hoc etiam patet, quod 
omnes illi, qui arguunt contra hoc vocabulum glorificator, magis laborant contra nomen, quam contra 
doctoris intentionem. Et licet praedictorum rationes non sint contra me, gratia tamen istius doctoris 
venerandi volo ipsis respondere” (4rb). See above, chapter 1, p. 66, n. 53. 
104 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., I, q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp, I:140). “Cui tamen hoc non placet, aliter 
exprimat contractionem illam, dummodo fateatur quod non inquantum deus absolute, sed contracte sit 
subiectum theologiae…” 
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In wrapping up his overall position on the subject of theology, Rimini turns to 
defend Giles’s opinion against ten objections which can more or less be attributed to 
Scotus, Peter Aureoli, and William of Ockham. For the most part, the objections involve 
a variation on a common theme. The objections of Scotus circle back and forth over the 
predictable concern that God, under a restricted ratio, is not sufficient to virtually contain 
all the truths of the science.105 But of course, Rimini, with Ockham, has rejected that such 
containment is a requirement of the subject of any given discipline, and he therefore 
easily dismisses these objections.  
The objections from Peter Aureoli and Ockham are only slightly different. The 
complaint is that the notion of God as glorifier simply leaves out too much. As Aureoli 
points out, if we understand God as glorifier, then we are not really understanding that by 
which God glorifies. God glorifies, according to Aureoli, not as a restricted entity, but 
under the ratio of absolute deity.106 Likewise, he complains that, to restrict God in this 
way would be to leave out theological truths like the Trinity.107 Ockham, as we saw, 
complains that attributes like glorifier and beatifier are just that, “attributes,” and 
therefore they cannot be the ratio of the subject.108 With respect to these objections 
Rimini more or less flatly disagrees. To Aureoli, he responds that the Trinity is in fact 
included in the notion of God as glorifier. To Ockham, he replies, if this reasoning were 
true, then we would not even be able argue that the essence of God is the subject of 
 
105 Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:140–142).  
106 For the objections attributed to Aureoli and Ockham see: Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:142). 
107 Ibid. 
108 See above, p. 126. 
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theology, since certain propositions attribute existence to God, asserting that “God is,” 
yet it belongs to the very substance of God (absolutely considered) “to be.”109 
Finally one further objection attributed to Ockham is worth mentioning in light of 
an early critique raised against Giles.110 Ockham insists that theology is the noblest habit 
and yet, if it begins from a constricted ratio, it could be subordinated to another science. 
It is suggested that metaphysics, which often considers God in its different parts, would 
therefore have a claim to be a more noble discipline than theology which considers God 
only in a limited way.111 In response, Rimini offers another Aegidian-like answer. In the 
first place, he admits that theology which considers God under a restricted ratio is 
subordinate; that is, the contraction of the subject matter of theology is a real limitation. 
But he insists that it is only God’s knowledge of himself that considers God in a less 
limited way than our theology. In contrast, even if metaphysics or some other human 
science does consider God, it does so in a more, not a less, restricted way than theology: 
“since no other science considers as many truths about God as theology.”112 So Rimini 
appears to concede that natural human sciences do at times treat propositions where God 
is the subject matter. However, this still does not appear to count as theological 
knowledge, suggesting again that theological knowledge cannot be solely defined by the 
 
109 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:145). “…si ratio valeret, potest eodem modo 
argui quod Deus non sit subiectum sub ratione essentiae; quod est contra doctorem sic arguentem. Hoc 
patet, quia etiam ista propositio est theologica ‘deus est’, sicut probatur ex illo verbo Apostoli Ad Hebraeos 
11 ‘Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est’.” 
110 Here we have in mind the critique about the nobility of theology in comparison to sciences, like, 
metaphysics with more universal aspirations. See, c. 1, pp. 84-90, “Aegidio-Augustinian Theology and 
Metaphysics.” 
111 Cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:142). Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, 
I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:227, ll. 10–11). 
112 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Trapp I:145). “Cum nullus alius tot veritates de Deo 
consideret quot theologia.” 
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proposition itself, but also has something to do with the special way that it considers 
God.113 Here we brush up against the question of “how” one knows in the discipline of 
theology, which is the proper concern of later chapters. 
VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to describe the different characterizations of the 
theological knowledge as “body of truths,” while momentarily abstracting from the 
question what it means for that body of truths to be classified as “known.” In short, the 
concern here is decidedly more ontological than epistemological. We have concerned 
ourselves with distinct fields of knowledge that claim to possess within them truths about 
God, and we have considered this question both with respect to the knowledge possessed 
by finite earthly pilgrims and beatified creatures. We have left off for subsequent 
consideration both why we would want to know this select body of truths and what it 
means to really know it. At the present, a couple of important results have risen to the 
surface. 
First, in the fourteenth century, from Giles to Scotus, from Ockham to Rimini, 
competing conceptions exist over how to characterize the body of knowledge that 
theology intends to claim as its own. With Scotus on one extreme, Giles and Rimini on 
another, and Ockham somewhere in the middle, we can see a spectrum of ideas.  
On the one hand, Scotus sees theology (not just God’s knowledge of himself, but 
also the knowledge of the perfected finite creature, in principle) as a universal science: a 
 
113 See above, p. 132. 
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science which extends to all that is knowable, and when known, clarifies all truths, and 
illuminates all realities. Even if this is not a knowledge that the earthly pilgrim can 
possess, it is presented by Scotus as a knowledge for which the pilgrim should hope and 
even strive. In short, perfect theology has a place among all the other sciences as their 
parent, and as a parent, it embraces all other sciences, and is the key to unlocking all the 
mysteries held therein.  
In Ockham we see something similar, though tempered by the fact that theology is 
not an interconnected web containing within it and explaining all possible truths. 
Nevertheless, it is a body of truths that extens to everything that is, inasmuch as it is 
related to God. Again, this seems to be a theology that creatures should look forward to 
and strive after. There is even the hint that eager pilgrims should be allowed to strive 
towards this wider spectrum of truths, if the necessary theological truths have already 
been obtained. 114 
But Giles and Rimini have a different orientation. There is no emphasis on a 
wider, comprehending body of truths in the hoped for beatific knowledge. They always 
put emphasis on the difference between the appropriate body of truths for an infinite 
knower (God) and the appropriate body of truths for finite knowers. From this 
orientation, the pilgrim is not encouraged to hope for a knowledge that someday 
illuminates all realities and quenches completely the human longing to know. Nor is there 
any encouragement to know truths about God that fall outside of the purview of God as 
glorifier and beatifier. Instead, the knowledge that pertains to beatitude is treated as 
 
114 See above, p. 129. 
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sufficient, not just for the earthly pilgrim, but for the creature per se. There is little, if 
any, hint that one should go beyond, whether in this life or the next.  
 Secondly, we have also begun to see glimpses, first in Giles, but now in Rimini, 
that the designation “theological knowledge” cannot be accounted for solely by reference 
to a unique body of truths that lies within it.  To be sure, in order to be numbered among 
the truths of theology, the truth or proposition in question must have a connection to God 
as its primary reference point, (that is, God only inasmuch as he beatifies and glorifies). 
However, the supernatural (non-sensible) character of this knowledge also seems to be 
equally important. This was a dominant theme in the work of Giles, and it will be 
reiterated in our later consideration of Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio.115 
We have also seen Rimini mention the fact that theology is a discipline that treats God 
more sufficiently and exhaustively than other sciences, which also claim to conclude 
things about God. Here there is no explicit de-legitimization of the work of these other 
sciences; Rimini simply does not make room for their results under the umbrella of strict 
“theological knowledge.”  
The importance of the supernatural, non-sensible, and otherworldly 
characterization of theological knowledge takes us toward the question of “how” we are 
to know this given body of truths, both in a descriptive and normative sense. This is a 
transition, however, that we must put off for one more chapter because we still need to 
consider the question of “why we should pursue this knowledge” or “what is the purpose 
of theological knowledge.” This is a question that, as we will see most clearly in the 
 
115 See chapter 5. 
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this knowledge, and this in turn has consequences for how we should think about the 
acquisition of this habit.
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I. Introduction 
As we transition from the question of theology’s principle subject matter and the 
degree of its extension to the question of the purpose of this knowledge, one puzzle still 
lingers. This puzzle stems from an unstated assumption hidden within Scotus’s argument 
for why theology must extend to all things knowable in the first place. Scotus believed 
that the first object of theology must virtually contain everything knowable only because 
he thought the first object must be adequate to the truths that constitute the habit in 
question. His answer therefore to the specific ratio under which God must be considered 
started from the assumption that theology includes everything knowable and then 
proceeded to look for an object that would be adequate to such an extensive body of 
truths. However, we have not yet seen why Scotus assumes that theology should be so 
comprehensive. 
 Previously, we mentioned how competing notions of happiness stood in the 
background of discussions about beatitude and the proper extent of theological 
knowledge. Godfrey of Fontaines was at odds with Giles because he thought that 
happiness or beatitude could not possibly be achieved if there were still more to know 
about God.1 In Godfrey’s case it is easy to see the connection between happiness and the 
requirement of comprehensive knowledge. Godfrey believes that theology has two ends, 
 
1 See above, c. 1, p. 69. 
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one which is practical and one which is theoretical. While he admits that theology has a 
practical component, he also believes that theology goes beyond this practical purpose 
and includes an exclusively speculative element. Thus, while we may use theological 
knowledge to help us to love God, we also want to know other things about God that do 
not help us to love better, and therefore theology aims to achieve this latter objective as 
well.2 The case is different, however, for Scotus. Unlike Godfrey, he claims that 
theological knowledge is entirely practical. Its only goal is to direct and guide us toward 
the right love of God. It is not immediately clear, therefore, why a less than an exhaustive 
knowledge of God will be insufficient for theology to achieve this purpose. Giles, for 
example, thinks that an exhaustive knowledge of God is not necessary for perfect 
beatitude and therefore for a perfect love of God. Even Godfrey acknowledges this, since 
he admits that theology is not only practical, but also has some purely speculative 
intentions. If these two thinkers can conceive of theology as achieving its practical (or 
affective) aims without requiring us to comprehend God or know everything there is to 
know about God, then why can’t Scotus take this position as well? 
 The question reminds us that the concern over what theology considers as its 
subject is not an isolated question. On the contrary, it is question intimately tied up with a 
different set of questions: why do we need theological knowledge, what is its purpose, 
 
2 See especially Godfrey’s thirteenth Quodlibet, q. 1 in Godefridus de Fontibus, Les Quodlibets onze-
quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, (Hoffmans V). There he writes:  “…videtur aliquibus quod ipsa est 
simpliciter practica, non obstante quod tractat de aliquibus puris speculabilibus sed istud etiam non videtur 
…oportet ponere praeter scientiam moralem alias scientias speculativas in quibus de istis principaliter et 
propter se tractatur plenius et magis explicite” (Hoffmans V:172-173);  and later: “Sed quia, ut dictum est, 
talis speculatio non sic perficit quod quietet appetitum, nec etiam sufficit ut per eam solam adipisci 
possimus illam perfectissimam in vita futura, ideo etiam praeter illa quae scientia docet de talibus 
speculabilibus debet cum illis docere de agibilibus per quae illa perfectam speculationem per modum meriti 
consequi valeamus. Quod autem magis principalis finis huius scientia sit speculatio…” (Hoffmans V:177). 
Chapter 3: Rimini and the Purpose of Theological Knowledge | 148 
                                                
and what does it need to achieve this purpose? For Giles, Scotus, Ockham, and Rimini 
this is the final concern in each of their respective prologues. Yet in many ways it is 
decisive for everything else. In declaring the final cause of theological knowledge, one 
sets the tone for all the other questions under consideration, including the debate over the 
proper subject of theology. 
 As was the case with the last chapter, answering the specific question about 
whether theology is a practical or speculative knowledge involves answering many 
preliminary questions. Rimini’s fifth and final question follows, by his time, a customary 
set of preliminary questions. The general consensus is: first we need to understand what a 
practice (praxis) is. Then we can consider what the difference is between practical and 
purely speculative knowledge, as well as between a practical and speculative habit. And 
finally, once these questions have been answered, we will be in a position to say whether 
theology is practical or speculative. 
II. From Giles to Scotus: On the Nature of a Practice 
While Giles does not steadily follow this division of subordinate questions, the 
definition of a practice is hugely important for his own position. We can recall that it was 
because he understood a praxis to be something “within our power” that he insisted 
theology was not a practical knowledge but affective. The love that theology aimed to 
achieve in us was, for Giles, a loving affectation because it was an act which “was not in 
our power.”3 
 
3 See above, c. 1, p. 79. 
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 In Scotus’s account, his attention turns first to defining precisely what a practice 
is, and in this way, he sets the agenda for the ensuing tradition. Aureoli, Ockham, and 
Rimini all begin from this question and Scotus’s answer to it. Naturally, therefore, we 
must start with the definition of a practice given by Scotus and its consequences for 
theology.4 
III. Scotus on the Nature of a Practice 
The opening question is put bluntly: “what is a practice?” The response of Scotus 
is equally direct: “Therefore I say in the first place that a practice, to which practical 
 
4 In his monograph, Duns Scotus (1999), Richard Cross makes some generalizations regarding the division 
of opinions about the end and purpose of theology. I regard this division as simply too broad to be of any 
use. On the one hand, he writes, there is the “majority non-Franciscan view in the late thirteenth, and early 
fourteenth centuries is that theology is a theoretical science, or at least primarily a theoretical science . . .” 
On the other hand, there exists, “a different broadly Franciscan, view is that theology is neither theoretical 
nor practical but rather affective or contemplative” (p. 9). The division between Franciscan and non-
Franciscan here is misleading, as Cross’s own footnote makes clear (see his n. 36). As examples of this 
“broadly Franciscan position,” that theology is affective, he lists one Dominican (Albert the Great), one 
Augustinian (Giles of Rome), and two Franciscans (Gonsalvus of Spain and Bonaventure).4 But of course 
we can and do find a host of Franciscans before and after Scotus identifying theology as preeminently 
practical. Likewise, we will see that some Augustinians continue to identify theology as affective (like 
Gerard of Siena and Strasbourg), while other Augustinians concede that theology is indeed practical (like 
Gregory of Rimini). But the Franciscan William of Ware and the Augustinian Augustinus of Ancona  
identify theology with a fourth characteristic, namely as “contemplative.”  
 For Ancona’s opinion see see I, prol., pars 1, q. 1, a. 2 (Troyes, BM, ms. 0296, f. 5ra) where he 
writes: “viso ergo nullum istorum modorum perfecte intellectum quietare, volumus illum modum ponere 
quem magis concedimus esse verum et consonum dictis Sanctorum, dicendo hanc scientiam, nec esse 
principaliter speculativa et practica…nec simpliciter affectiva…sed esse simpliciter contemplativam.” 
For William Ware, see Daniels, “Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Wilhelm von Ware und Johannes Duns 
Scotus,” p. 225, n. 1. “M fol. 4v col. Per Augustinum De Trinitate ubique ubi loquitur de hac materia. Nam 
talis est ista scientia, non est speculativa nec practica sed contemplatiua” 
 The point here is to resist any easy identification of a school based solely on the surface opinion 
they take. The commitments that underlie that opinion are for more important. Likewise the fact that 
opposition by certain Augustinian thinkers to the idea that theology should be classified as practical shows 
us that an easy assimilation between practical and affective positions is not possible and that there is 
something deeper at stake here than a simple disagreement over words.  
 In order to understand this opposition, we need to appreciate what it means to think of theology as 
practical. Cross is, of course, correct when he says that Scotus identifies theology as practical. And since 
Scotus’s own position will loom large both in the influence it extends to subsequent developments and 
within Rimini’s arguments for his own position, an outline of the Scotist position vis a vis the Aegidian 
position outlined above  is a necessary prerequisite of moving forward. 
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cognition extends, is [1] of some potency other than the intellect, [2] naturally posterior 
to intellection, [3] able to be elicited in conformity with right reason, so that this act itself 
is right.”5 He, then, proceeds to justify and explain each of these conditions. 
From the first and second conditions, a corollary is said to follow: simply that a 
practice can be nothing other than an act of the will. The reasoning is this: if a practice is 
naturally and necessary posterior to intellection (condition two) and also not an act of the 
intellect (condition one), then the only act that meets these conditions is an act of the 
will.6 In this reasoning, Scotus is implicitly excluding those acts which exist only in a 
sensitive exterior power on the belief that they do not meet condition two. Acts and 
operations that belong to our sensitive nature, like sensing, feeling, reflexes, etc., are not 
“essentially” posterior to an act intellection. Without an essential connection to our 
knowledge, it remains possible for actions of this type to occur without our consent. But 
Scotus wants to reserve the term “practice” for morally praiseworthy and blameworthy 
actions alone. Acts that can acquire praise or blame are essentially posterior to 
intellection because morality requires that we know what we are doing.7  
 
5 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 228 (Vatican, 1:155). “Dico igitur primo quod 
praxis ad quam cognitio practica extenditur est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus, naturaliter 
posterior intellectione, natus elici conformiter intellectioni rectae ad hoc ut sit rectus.” 
6 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 230 (Vatican, 1:156). “Ex his duabus condicionibus sequitur corollarium, 
quod videlicet praxis ad quam extenditur habitus practicus non est nisi actus voluntatis elicitus vel 
imperatus, nam nullus alius actus ab intellectione vel praeter intellectionem essentialiter posterior est 
intellectione, quia quicumque alius detur actus eiusdem rationis cum ipso, posset esse prior, sicut patet 
discurrendo per actus potentiarum omnium.” 
7 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 231 (Vatican, 1:156). “Hoc patet secundo sic, quia praxis est actus qui est 
in potestate cognoscentis.” 
 Scotus is relying on his understanding of Aristotle here and he bases his argument on what he 
reads in Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics VI. He writes: “Quod probatur ex VI Ethicorum, quia artifex eget 
virtute ad recte agendum; non autem indiget virtute respectu illius quod non est in potestate sua; igitur 
artifex in potestate sua habet factionem: multo magis prudens habet in potestate sua actionem, quia est 
formaliter virtuosus” (Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 231 (Vatican, 1:156–157)). 
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His third condition only furthers this point. By insisting that a practice be one of 
the types of actions that are capable of being in conformity and directed by right reason, 
he is restricting these actions to those kinds which can in principle be directed by reason 
and can therefore be considered virtuous and meritorious.8 However, despite ruling out 
those actions for which we are not morally responsible, his corollary emphasizes that the 
meaning of “practice” extends to include both acts of the will themselves (actus elicitus) 
as well as acts commanded (actus imperatus) by the will.9 The former act might be an act 
like love, while the latter might be an act such as giving money to the poor, which clearly 
involves operations that lie outside of the will, but nevertheless is still directly 
commanded by the will. But the latter possibility raises an objection regarding the 
consistency of this corollary with his first condition. This objection, while addressed by 
Scotus himself, will be raised again by others who remain unconvinced by his reply. 
 
8 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 233 (Vatican 1:158). Later readers, like Ockham and Rimini, will take 
this third condition to mean that a practice in its strictest definition is only those operations which are done 
in conformity with right reason. Thus, even actions within our power, but which are morally bad, would not 
count as true practices.  
9 Scotus acknowledges two kinds of acts that can be said to be acts of the will: an actus elicitus and an 
actus imperatus. Cf. Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 231 (Vatican, 1:157). “Ex hoc ultra: si omnis praxis est 
in potestate cognoscentis et nihil est in potestate voluntatis nisi vel actus elicitus vel imperatus, sequitur 
propositum ut prius.” 
 This is a distinction perhaps made famous in contemporary philosophy in the works of Roderick 
Chisholm, but it has plenty of scholastic precedent. The distinction is not only present, but is also discussed 
by Aquinas. In short, an actus elicitus is meant to describe a direct intention to act elicited by the will and is 
sometimes called an actus interior. The actus imperatus is an actus exterior which is actually an act of 
another power of the soul, but commanded by the previously elicited act of the will. Thus Aquinas says that 
every actus imperatus has its origin in an actus elicitus (cf. Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, p. 86.) 
Some acts of the will do not need to manifest themselves in exterior acts, like the act of loving, but most 
acts do, such as helping the poor or caring for widows and orphans. Chisholm picks up the language 
because it helps him explain the distinction between metaphysical freedom and political freedom. For 
example: in a prison cell, one still has the metaphysical freedom to help one’s neighbor. That is, the act can 
be elicited even though the agent is denied power to perform the actus imperatus by the physical coercion 
of the prison walls. 
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Someone might say: if you extend the meaning of an “act of the will” to acts 
merely commanded by the will (actus imperatus), then intellection can surely be a 
practice (which was expressly denied by the first condition). After all, what prohibits the 
will from choosing—and therefore commanding—that an individual engage in a purely 
intellectual activity?10 Scotus does not derive his reply to this concern from something 
intrinsic to his initial description, but instead he appeals to a further assumption. He 
replies: if we grant a very wide and loose definition of “practice” as a mere operation, 
then speculation can indeed be a practice. However, if we understand a “practice” to be 
“an operation to which the intellect is able to extend, then no intellection is a practice.”11 
The assumption is that the intellect cannot be (strictly speaking) the terminus of its own 
extension.12 Little more is said on the subject and it is no wonder that this assumption 
will be routinely questioned in the ensuing years. 
IV. Scotus on the Nature of Practical Knowledge 
From this precise definition of a practice and its three conditions, we can move on 
to identify when a particular piece of knowledge is practical and extends to the operation 
of another power and when it does not. This is the very next question Scotus raises by 
 
10 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, a. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican, 1:157). “Contra istam condicionem videtur sequi quod tunc 
aliqua intellectio erit praxis, quia aliqua potest esse actus imperatus voluntatis sicut actus alterius potentiae 
imperatur ab ipsa. Et tunc ultra: ergo prima condicio est falsa, quod scilicet praxis est operatio alterius 
potentiae ab intellectu.” 
11 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican, 1:157). “Respondeo: licet speculatio sit quaedam operatio et 
ita praxis, extendendo nomen, tamen ut praxis dicitur sola operatio ad quam intellectus potest extendi, nulla 
intellectio est praxis; et hoc modo accipitur praxis quando ad praxim dicitur cognitio practica extendi.”  
12 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican 1:157). “Ipsa enim nata est denominari quasi accidentaliter a 
praxi ad quam est extensibilis, non autem potest esse terminus talis extensionis.” 
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asking: “How does practical cognition extend to a practice?”13 Once again, he provides a 
very direct answer: the extension “consists in a double aptitudinal relation, namely of 
conformity (conformitas) and natural priority (prioritas).”14 While a direct answer, it is 
not a very clear answer. He gives us only a few brief indications of what he means by 
conformity and priority, and then points us directly to book VI of Aristotle’s Ethics 
where he believes their meanings are rather plain. The passage of Aristotle at issue is 
taken from book VI, c. 2, where Aristotle says:  
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are 
in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with 
choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must 
be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must 
pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth 
is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor 
productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively 
(for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is 
practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right 
desire (emphases mine).15 
In the present passage, Scotus draws the criteria of priority from the mere fact that for a 
practice or choice to be good, the choice must pursue what intellect has already asserted. 
And the criteria of conformity simply asserts that to be practical knowledge it must be a 
truth that directs or commands what is, in itself, the correct or right desire. In later 
discussions by other authors, we will see that practical knowledge is sometimes described 
as “directive” of right action. But this is meant in very much the same spirit as Scotus’s 
 
13 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 236 (Vatican 1:161). “Qualiter cognitio practica extendatur ad praxim.” 
14 Ibid., “Nam ista extensio consistit in duplici relatione aptitudinali, videlicet conformitatis et prioritatis 
naturalis.” 
15 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI, c. 2 1139a21-31 (trans. Ross, p. 1024-1025). 
Chapter 3: Rimini and the Purpose of Theological Knowledge | 154 
                                                
use of “conformity,” which Scotus himself suggests a few paragraphs later.16 In fact, 
when Scotus begins to speak of conformity as an adjective rather the an abstract noun it is 
hard to find an appropriate English translation for conformis other than to describe the 
piece of knowledge in question as “directive of” or “appropriate to” what is the correct 
and right practice.17 
While addressing priority and conformity only briefly, Scotus’s primary attention 
is on the use of the term “aptitudinal.” This word is used to indicate the fact that practical 
knowledge does not have to achieve an actual relation of priority and conformity with a 
given practice in ordered to be classified as practical. If such a relation were required in 
actual fact, Scotus argues that such knowledge would be called practical only 
accidentally and contingently since actual practice is always a contingent affair. That is, it 
would only be practical when it is actually being employed on behalf a practice currently 
in operation. But as soon as the operation is to be over, it would cease to be practical 
knowledge and would become speculative knowledge once more. It is sufficient, then, for 
practical knowledge to be practical simply by being knowledge that is appropriately 
disposed (both by priority and conformity) for the direction of an actual action, whether 
 
16 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 237 (Vatican 1:162). Hoc declaratur, quia 
conceditur communiter cognitio practica extendi ad praxim ut directiva ad directum sive ut regulativa ad 
regulatum. Cognitionem autem esse priorem naturaliter praxi et ei conformem, non est esse conformatam 
praxi quasi priori, sed est esse conformativam praxis quasi posterioris, sive, est esse cui praxis sit 
conformanda, quod est cognitionem dirigere et regulare in praxi.” 
17 Accordingly, I will vary between using the word “appropriate,” “suitable,” and “directive” to translate 
Scotus notion of “notitia conformis.” 
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or not that action ever takes place.18 Richard Cross confirms this reading through his own 
synopsis of the speculative possibilities of theology in the Scotist system:  
Scotus does not hold that it is necessary that any of the propositions in 
theological science actually have acting-directing force. For any science to 
be practical it is necessary merely that the contents of this science could 
have action-directing force (emphasis mine).19 
What Scotus refers to as the “aptitudinal” nature of certain kinds of knowledge, Cross 
interprets as its “action-directing force.” 
The final question Scotus asks before he puts these preliminary definitions to 
work is: why does some knowledge acquire this “aptitudinal” extension to a practice 
while other pieces of knowledge do not?20 In other words, where does this “aptitudinal 
disposition” come from? What is the cause that distinguishes some knowledge as 
practical and some as purely speculative? Is it from the final cause of the said knowledge 
or from the object of the science? Against the opinion of Henry of Ghent,21 Scotus is 
adamant that the aptitude for extension that this knowledge has does not come from the 
intended purpose of the knower, but from the “object.” His argument is a version of his 
previous insistence that knowledge can only be identified by its “aptitude” and not by its 
actual use. His overall point is that the intention of the one who knows (i.e., what they 
 
18 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 237 (Vatican 1:161–162). “‘Aptitudinali’ 
dixi, quia neutra relatio requiritur actualis. Quod enim praxis actualiter sequatur considerationem quae sit 
conformis ipsi considerationi, hoc omnino est accidentale considerationi et contingens; si enim ab actuali 
extensione diceretur praxis, nulla esset necessario practica, sed eadem quando quae practica quandoque 
speculativa, quod nihil est; igitur sufficit duplex aptitudinalis extensio sive aptitudo ad extensionem.” 
19 Cross, Duns Scotus, 9. 
20 The explicit way he asks this is: “a quo habeat cognitio extensionem ad praxim” (Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 
5, q. 1–2, n. 239 (Vatican I:164)). 
21 In his opening remarks, Henry seems to acknowledge three co-causes practical/speculative knowledge: 
“Quarum diversitatem declarat ex tribus; et ex parte obiectorum, et ex parte modi cognoscendi, et ex parte 
finis…ex parte finis (quam ut expressius dicit de Anima) practicus intellectus differt a speculativo, fine” 
(Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum, a. 36, q. 4, f. 234v). 
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plan to do with this knowledge) can only account for the actual use of the knowledge and 
not its more fundamental intrinsic “aptitudinal” disposition. Thus, at one point, he gives 
the following argument: if the knowledge were determined to be practical by its “actual 
extension,” then a worker who did not intend to work would not have practical 
knowledge.22 For Scotus, this is clearly absurd, and therefore knowledge must be 
distinguished only by its aptitude for extension, which comes prior to the knower’s 
intended use for that knowledge. Along these lines he says: “An aptitude does not belong 
to one nature while being repugnant to another, unless on account of something absolute 
in its nature, for it is because a nature is of such a kind, that such an aptitude belongs to 
it.”23 In this quotation, Scotus concludes that an “aptitude” is part of the intrinsic nature 
of knowledge and is already predetermined prior to its use.  
By ruling out the possibility that the end or intention of the knower could 
determine the extended nature of certain types of knowledge, Scotus looks for something 
else that can explain the intrinsic and essential orientation of all practical knowledge. He 
writes:  “This condition of consideration in itself is from some other cause prior to its 
 
22 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 252 (Vatican I:169). “Contra istam 
positionem arguo sic: quaero, aut habitus et actus dicantur practici propter extensionem actualem ad opus, 
vel tantum propter extensionem aptitudinalem vel habitualem ad opus? Non propter actualem (ut habetur in 
secundo articulo, et ipsi concedunt), quia tunc faber non intendens operari non haberet cognitionem 
practicam; igitur propter extensionem aptitudinalem. 
23 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 252 (Vatican I:169–170). “Sed aptitudo non convenit uni naturae quae 
repugnat alii nisi propter aliquid absolutum in tali natura; quia enim haec natura est talis, ideo convenit sibi 
talis aptitudo; igitur praesupponit in ipsa consideratione aliquam condicionem intrinsecam per quam 
conveniat sibi talis aptitudo.” 
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[intended use]; but its prior causes are the intellect and the object; therefore [the intrinsic 
nature of this knowledge] is acquired either from the intellect or from some object.”24 
 Appearing to dismiss the former possibility,25 Scotus describes why it is the 
“object” of knowledge and not the end for which that knowledge is used that is the 
decisive factor in determining the directive aptitude of practical knowledge. Building on 
his earlier discussion of the first object of a science and its virtual containment, he writes: 
The first object includes principles, as well as the means leading to 
conclusions, and thus it [includes] the entire practical knowledge; but this 
is not true when it comes to the end of that knowledge;26  
One of the arguments for why “end” does not virtually contain the aptitudinally directive 
knowledge required of a practical habit runs as follows: 
Because from the end as end no nature or natural aptitude is had except 
when [that] end is loved or desired and thus moving the efficient cause to 
action.27 However, this knowledge [caused by the object] includes these 
principles and conclusions naturally and before the [end is actually] loved. 
For the truth of the practical principles does not depend on the will any 
more than speculative principles, and the same goes for conclusions 
necessarily following from the principle.28  
 
24 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 252 (Vatican I:170). “Ista condicio considerationis in se est ab alia causa 
eius priore; sed causa priores eius sunt intellectus et obiectum; igitur convenit sibi ab intellectu vel ab 
aliquo obiecto.” 
25 I presently cannot find any explicit discussion of why it is not the knowing intellect that determines the 
aptitudinal character of knowledge. However, it may be that Scotus believes it obvious why this cannot be 
the decisive factor. Namely, since it is the same intellect that knows speculative and practical things, this 
same intellect cannot account for the prior aptitude of our knowledge. Thus it must be the distinctive 
character that determines the nature of this knowledge, prior to being put to some use in order to achieve 
some particular end. 
26 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 262 (Vatican I:176).“Ideo enim praxis dat 
talem aptitudinem sive talem naturam habentem aptitudinem, quia ut obiectum primum includit principia, 
et mediantibus illis conclusiones, et ita totam notitiam practicam; non autem in quantum finis…”    
27 On this point, see also Ibid., I, prol, pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 253 (Vatican I:170). 
28 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 262 (Vatican I:176).“…tum quia a fine ut fine nulla natura vel aptitudo 
naturalis habetur nisi amato et desiderato et sic movente efficiens; prius autem naturaliter quam ametur 
includit dicta principia et conclusiones; veritas enim principii practici necessarii non dependet a voluntate 
magis quam speculativi, nec conclusiones necessario illatae ex tali principio.”  
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Thus, what we see here is Scotus’s continued dependence on the notion of virtual 
containment. But now it is employed, not to explain the extent and unity of a given 
science, but to explain how all the knowledge within a given science should be classified 
either as practical or speculative, prior to the intention of its possessor. Everything 
depends on the nature of the object, which virtually contains both the principles and the 
many conclusions of a given science. And through determining and virtually containing 
all the conclusions of a given science, the first object also determines the aptitudinal 
character of the habit as a whole (i.e. whether or not it contains a potential conformitas or 
propositions that are able to direct a practice). 
V. Scotus on the Practical Nature of Theology 
Within this framework, we can now turn to see how theology should be classified 
and why Scotus’s outright claim is that theology is indeed practical. The proof for this is 
based on the fact that theology meets the criteria of a practical science. “All of necessary 
theology is for, the created intellect, directive (conformis) of the act of the created will 
[condition 3] and also prior to that act [condition 2].”29 Scotus is confident in making 
such a statement because he believes that “the first object of theology (God under the 
ratio of Deity) is virtually directive of right volition, because it is by reason of this first 
 
29 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 314 (Vatican, 1:207). “Sed tota theologia necessaria intellectui creato est 
sic conformis actui voluntatis creatae et prior eo; igitur etc.” 
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object that principles of right volition are found.”30  Richard Cross points us to place in 
the Lectura where Scotus says this perhaps more clearly and succinctly.  
The intellect perfected by the habit of theology apprehends God as one 
who should be loved, and according to rules from which praxis can be 
elicited. Therefore, the habit of theology is practical.31 
The job of theology is to apprehend God—this we have already seen. And through such 
apprehension, everything that is known is somehow directive of a right and proper love.   
One objection to his position (and Scotus’s response) helps clarify how it is that 
knowledge of all necessary truths about God could have such a regulative function for the 
practice of love.  In the third objection, the objector begins by agreeing with Scotus that 
the first object of theology does in fact virtually include within it a conformity or 
applicability to right practice. However, the objector also thinks that this first object 
contains many other truths that do not have this kind of suitability/applicability to right 
action. (This might easily be seen as the position held by Godfrey of Fontaines.) For the 
objector, propositions like “God is three” and “the Father generates the Son” are obvious 
instances of truths which carry no practical implication. That is, they are not applicable 
(conformis) to right action. Scotus’s response is instructive. 
I say that the first object includes only knowledge that has an application 
(conformem) for a correct will, because by virtue of this object, nothing is 
 
30 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 314 (Vatican, 1:207–208). “Probatio minoris, quia primum obiectum 
theologiae est conforme virtualiter volitione rectae, quia a ratione eius sumuntur principia rectitudinis in 
volitione.” 
31 Johannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, I, prol., pars 4, q. 1–2, n. 164 (Vatican 16:54). “Sed intellectus, perfectus 
habitu theologiae, apprehendit Deum ut amandus et secundum regulas ex quibus potest elici praxis; ideo est 
habitus practicus” (trans. Cross, Duns Scotus, 9). 
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known from it that is not either the rectitude of some volition or virtually 
including knowledge of such rectitude.32 
Regarding propositions like “God is three” and “the Father generates the Son,” Scotus 
sees these as having real importance for the rectitude of the will. They are good examples 
of the latter of the two options stated in the above quotation: those truths virtually 
including knowledge of the rectitude of a given volition. In this case, the proposition 
“God is three” contains “knowledge of the rectitude of love tending into three persons, 
such that if an act [of love] were elicited about only one person, while excluding the other 
(as the infidels would elicit), this act of love would not be right.”33 
From one perspective this description of the practical function of theology sounds 
rather similar to some of the things we have seen in Giles’s own account.  Notice the way 
Scotus says in the quotation cited above from the Lectura: “theology apprehends God as . 
. .” The function or end of theology appears to be depicting how God is perceived by the 
intellect. Likewise for Giles, we say that the intellect grasped God as our glorifier and 
beatifier because the affective end only requires cognitive assistance from this limited 
and constricted perspective.  
Is Scotus saying something similar here? Cross helps us answer this question by 
reaffirming what Scotus has already said: namely, that all knowledge included in the first 
 
32 Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 321 (Vatican, 1:209–210). “Ad tertium dico 
quod primum obiectum solummodo includit notitiam conformem volitione rectae, quia virtute eius nihil de 
ipsa cognoscitur quod non sit vel rectitudo volitionis alicuius vel virtualiter includens notitiam talis 
rectitudinis.” 
33 Ibid., I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 322 (Vatican, 1:210). “Prima quidem includit virtualiter includit notitiam 
rectitudinis dilectionis tendentis in tres personas, ita quod si actus eliceretur circa unam solam, excludendo 
aliam (sicut infidelis eliceret), esset actus non rectus.” 
 Here we can anticipate an objection raised explicitly by Gregory of Rimini: namely, if Scotus is 
going to rely on his virtual containment theory, then why shouldn’t metaphysics be counted as practical as 
well since surely almost anything that can be said about being can have implications of “right practice.” 
See below, p. 185. 
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object is practical, even if it is not currently resulting in an actual practice. The point, in 
short, is that every ounce of theological knowledge that we can obtain has an application 
for the way we love God. Cross says:   
Scotus, however, provides a further argument to show that theology is not 
at all theoretical. He reasons that every item in the science of theology is, 
or can be, action–directing, because the more we know about theology, the 
more we might be disposed to love God. And Scotus proposes a 
distinctive description of a merely practical science that theology thus 
described would satisfy: ‘Every science that deals with theoretical items in 
no greater detail than is necessary for praxis is practical and not 
theoretical’. Theology on Scotus’s account will necessarily satisfy this 
description, since any putatively theoretical item that theology covers 
increases, or can increase, our disposition to love God34 (emphases mine). 
On the one hand, Scotus’s commitment to the practical nature of theology seems to align 
him with the basic intuition of Giles: that the knowledge quotient that makes up the 
discipline of theology only extends as far as is necessary to complete the desired end. 
However, we can see that despite such an emphasis on the purely practical importance of 
our knowledge of God, Scotus’s position—as Cross explains it—immediately makes 
conceivable the notion that theology might demand a comprehensive knowledge of God, 
since everything knowable about God, everything contained in the first object,35 orients 
us toward loving of God with greater rectitude. As long as our knowledge of God remains 
incomplete, our love remains incomplete. A strong connection is therefore made between 
the ideal of perfect loving and perfect knowing, such that we must expect that for the 
Blessed to love God perfectly they must also know and comprehend him perfectly. This 
 
34 Cross, Duns Scotus, 9. 
35 Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars 5, q. 1–2, n. 321 (Vatican, 1:209). 
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is not an intuition Giles of Rome would share. For him, no such connection exists 
between perfect comprehension and perfect loving.   
To this we need only add the fact discussed earlier: that Giles does not believe the 
loving that theology produces is actually practical. Instead, he calls it affective to 
emphasize the fact that the limited nature of theological knowledge does not produce or 
enable us to elicit an act within our power. In contrast, the supernatural character of 
theological knowledge produces in us an act of loving that, strictly, speaking lies outside 
of the power of the will to elicit.36 This difference, combined with Giles’s insistence that 
no essential connection exists between perfect loving and perfect knowing constitutes the 
real disagreement between Scotus and Giles. 
VI. Aureoli and his Modified Scotism  
Since both Ockham and Rimini consider the opinion of Aureoli alongside Scotus, 
we must move from Scotus to the position of the most important Franciscan at Paris after 
him. In treating Aureoli, Ockham and Rimini both remark on the strong similarities 
between his position and that of Scotus. In his survey, Ockham first lists the opinion of 
Aureoli as: theology is absolutely (simpliciter) practical. He then moves—without 
providing a rebuttal—directly to Scotus, saying: “There is another opinion agreeing in the 
conclusion that theology is purely practical.”37 While there is truth in what Ockham says, 
namely that Aureoli and Scotus both conclude that theology is purely and absolutely 
practical, in this section we will see that that Scotus and Aureoli reach this conclusion for 
 
36 See c. 1, p. 79. 
37 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I,  prol., q. 12 (OTh 1:334). “Alia est opinio concordans in 
conclusione, quod est pure practica.” 
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somewhat different reasons. While the qualifications that Aureoli makes are subtle, they 
are not inconsequential. We will focus on two such changes here. The first is his 
disagreement with Scotus’s definition of a practice. The second is the fact that he adds a 
third condition to the two conditions (viz. conformitas and prioritas) given by Scotus to 
explain when knowledge extends to practice: or in other words, why knowledge can be 
called practical. After describing these changes, we will point out how these changes 
reflect substantial differences between Aureoli and Scotus about the precise reason why 
theology is in fact practical. 
VII. Aureoli on the Nature of a Practice and Practical Knowledge 
Aureoli announces that if Scotus’s definition of a practice were accepted: “logic 
would not be practical, of which the opposite will be shown below, and neither will 
theology be able to be practical inasmuch as it is ordered to nourishing and generating 
belief.”38  
This early objection shows that one of the primary motivations in his concern 
with how to define a practice comes from his assumption, not merely about the practical 
nature of theology, but more precisely about the kind of act or practice to which 
theological knowledge extends. But since we will see this assumption put to work in 
Aureoli’s two explicit arguments (an a priori and a posteriori argument) for why 
theology is purely practical,39 we can momentarily put this concern aside and look at how 
 
38 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 1, n. 32 (Buytaert 1:227). “Alioquin logica non esset 
practica, cuius oppositum inferius ostendetur, nec theologia prout ordinatur ad nutriendum credere et 
gignendum.” 
39 See below p. 169. 
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Aureoli’s conviction that logic is a practical forces him to qualify Scotus’s definition of a 
practice. The definition of a practice according to Scotus, once again is: 
…An operation of some potency beside the intellect, naturally posterior to 
intellection, able to be elicited in conformity to right reason toward that 
which is right.40 
Aureoli is concerned with the first of these three conditions: namely, that a 
practice must be the operation of some potency other than the intellect. As we have 
already seen,41 Scotus anticipated the objection that an intellectual activity could be 
considered a practice as well, seeing as how such an operation could be an act 
commanded by the will (actus imperatus). Scotus, however, insisted that the intellect 
“cannot extend to itself” and therefore intellectual operations cannot be counted as 
practices. Aureoli pin points this as the precise point of contention and writes:  
Although in the preceding many things have been said well [by Scotus], 
nevertheless that definition of a practice, from which a practical habit is 
defined, as an operation ‘of some potency other than the intellect’, as if a 
practical habit is not able to be considered directive of any operation 
remaining within the intellect, does not appear to contain the truth.42 
Rather than directly oppose Scotus’s belief that the intellect can not extend to itself, 
Aureoli takes an indirect route. Drawing on Aristotle as an authority, he provides several 
arguments for why logic cannot be speculative. For example, he says, no habit which is 
not pursued for its own sake can be called speculative, but logic is not pursued for its own 
 
40 Cf. Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 44 (Buytaert 1:231). “Est operatio alterius 
potentiae ab intellectu, naturaliter posterior intellectione, nata conformiter elici rationi rectae ad hoc quod 
sit recta.” Cf. Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, prol., pars. 5, q. 1–2, n. 228 (Vatican 1:155). See above 
p. 150. 
41 See above p. 152. 
42 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 3, a. 2 (Buytaert, I:235, n. 58). “Quamvis autem in 
praemissis multa sint bene dicta, illud tamen quod dicitur praxim, a qua dicitur habitus practicus, esse 
operationem ‘alterius potentiae ab intellectu’, quasi nullius operationis intra intellectum manentis possit 
poni habitus practicus directivus, veritatem non continet ut videtur.” 
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sake, but in order to direct the acts of other sciences.43 The rest of his reasoning runs as 
follows. If logic is not speculative, it must be practical; if it is practical it must extend to 
some act besides itself. But what can logic “extend to” and “be directive of” except an act 
of the intellect? Thus, Scotus’s definition must be revised because it demands 
consequences that cannot be accepted.  
At the conclusion of this argument, Aureoli presents his final redefinition of a 
practice in the form of a general rule about what counts as practical knowledge: “Every 
habit is truly and purely practical, which not only has as its end some act which it elicits, 
but also an act which it directs, wherever and in whatever the directed act exists.”44 The 
final line wherever and in whatever the directed act exists represents Aureoli’s 
qualification to the Scotist definition of a practice, and by extension, practical knowledge. 
The key condition is not whether the act lies inside or outside of the intellective potency, 
but whether the act in question can be directed. 
Leaving behind the definition of practice, Aureoli offers a second qualification to 
the Scotist position, of which—he continues to insist—he generally approves.45 Now the 
concern is not the definition of practice, but why knowledge is classified as either 
practical or speculative. Scotus argued that knowledge was deemed practical because of 
the object and the double aptitude of the knowledge deducible from that object. This 
 
43 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 3, a. 2 (Buytaert I:236, n. 61). “Praeterea, nullus habitus cuius finis non est actus 
proprius, sed actus alterius, potest pomi [sic] speculativus. Talis enim non est “gratia sui,” quae ponitur una 
conditio speculativi habitus in I Metaphysicae. Sed logica et similes non habent pro fine actum proprium 
mediantibus ipsis elicitum, sed actum aliarum scientiarum mediantibus ipsis directum. Unde non sunt gratia 
sui, sed propter introductionem, ut patet in eodem. Ergo non erunt speculativae, sed magis activae.” (For 
the entire list of arguments see pp. 235-237, nn. 58-65). 
44 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 65 (Buytaert I:237). “Ex praedictis potest colligi regula generalis quod 
omnis habitus est vere et pure practicus, qui non solum habet pro fine actum quem elicit, immo et actum 
quem dirigit, ubicumque et in quacumque potentia sit actus ille directus.” 
45 Cf. Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 58 (Buytaert I:235) and n. 74 (I:239). 
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double aptitude was an aptitude of primacy and conformity to right practice. Aureoli parts 
ways with Scotus at this point, saying: “It does not seem sufficient to say” that a practical 
habit consists in these two aptitudinal attributes.46 On the contrary, knowledge is 
practical on account of a certain activity (activitas) attributable to the knowledge, not per 
se, but on account of the particular capacities and abilities of the beholder of that 
knowledge.47 His examples for why the condition of “activity” must be included give us 
a clearer picture of what he exactly means by “activity” and why the capacity and ability 
of the knower are relevant. These examples show that Aureoli is not rejecting Scotus’s 
aptitudinal criteria, but simply claiming that the two conditions identified by Scotus are 
insufficient and that a further aptitudinal condition is necessary.  
Two examples are especially vivid. The first example asks us to imagine someone 
with a perfect natural knowledge of all the changes a rose undergoes and every mode 
through which it comes to be. In this case the knower in question has knowledge in 
perfect conformity with right practice. If they perchance happened to meet someone with 
the power to produce a rose, they would be able to give them step by step instructions for 
producing the actual rose. In the same way, this knowledge would enjoy a kind of 
primacy over the practice of production because the knowledge of the rose about to be 
generated would precede its production. And yet, for all this, Aureoli insists that the 
possessor of this physical knowledge does not have practical knowledge because she is 
not able to put her knowledge of how a rose is produced into action. Only a person who 
 
46Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 66 (Buytaert I:237). “Illud autem dicitur habitum practicum consistere ‘in 
duplici respectu aptitudinali’ non videtur sufficienter dici.” 
47 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 66 (Buytaert I:237). “Verius enim dicitur quod consistit in respectu 
activitatis.” 
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can use their knowledge to produce the rose can be considered to have practical 
knowledge, everything else is just abstract speculative knowledge. So Aureoli concludes: 
“Therefore it is by reason of activity alone that a habit can be called practical, and not on 
account of priority and conformity.”48 Again, he is not denying that this knowledge must 
also be prior and have some conformity, but he is simply asserting that these are not 
sufficient conditions. Nor is he denying the aptitudinal character of these conditions; one 
does not have to be in the actual act of producing a rose for it to count as practical. 
Rather, they simply must be capable of performing this action, which, in the case of the 
rose, is something the natural scientist lacks.  
This reading is confirmed in Aureoli’s second example. Here he considers the 
knowledge that an angel has of moral science (i.e. ethics). Aureoli insists that this 
knowledge in the mind of angel is of the exact same kind or species as the moral science 
existing in the mind of a human being. However, this same knowledge in the mind of the 
angel should not be called practical, while the knowledge in the human being should 
most definitely be called practical. He then moves to point out the decisive difference, 
allowing us to draw an analogy between the angel’s knowledge of ethics and the human 
being’s knowledge of the generation of a rose. 
For inasmuch as the angel knows what chastity is, just as he does about all 
the other virtues, still this knowledge of chastity is not practical in the 
angel, in the same way that knowledge of the generation of a rose is not 
practical in us. But truly moral knowledge, in our intellect, is practical. 
But these two moral sciences differ in nothing except in activity. For the 
 
48 Ibid., I, proem., pars 3, a. 2, n. 71 (Buytaert I:71). “Ergo sola ratio activitatis dat habitui quod sit 
practicus, et non respectus prioritatis et conformitatis.” 
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knowledge of chastity which is in us who are able to acquire chastity has 
the nature of active knowledge. But this is not the case in an angel.49 
At the end of his angel example Aureoli turns back to the rose example once more to 
bring the point home. If God gave us the power to create a rose, then the person with the 
knowledge of how a rose is generated could certainly be said to have practical 
knowledge.50 This emphasizes that the question of practical knowledge rests primarily on 
the ability and power to carry out a practice which is in conformity with right reason. The 
requirement of a certain capacity in the knower—as entailed in the idea of activitas—
forces Aureoli to qualify Scotus’s subsequent conclusion that the object (or formal cause 
of the knowledge) alone is responsible for whether or not this knowledge is practical or 
speculative. Scotus was, according to Aureoli, correct to conclude that practical 
knowledge does not receive extension to a practice through its end. But he also thinks 
that the object is not quite sufficient.51 Given his reasoning on behalf of the criteria of 
activity, this qualification is a mere corollary to what he has already said. He returns once 
again to the angel and moral science. The same object, it is assumed, is responsible, for a 
moral science of the exact same kind in the angel and in us. And yet in us the knowledge 
is practical and in the angel the knowledge is speculative. The object is clearly not 
sufficient to explain this, and therefore the “object in relation to the one knowing” is the 
 
49 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 71 (Buytaert I:238). “Quantumcumque enim sciat angelus quid est 
castitas, sicut et omnes virtutes morales, non tamen scientia de castitate est practica in eo, quemadmodum 
nec scientia generationis rosae est practica in nobis. Moralis vero, in nostro intellectu, est practica. Sed istae 
duae morales in nullo differunt, nisi in activitate. Scientia namque de castitate quae est in nobis habet 
rationem activi, qui possumus acquirere castitatem; in angelo non habet.” 
50 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 71 (Buytaert I:238–239). “Et confirmatur quia si habenti scientiam de 
generatione rosae Deus communicaret potentiam exsequendi, scientia illa statim indueret practici 
rationem.” 
51 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 74 (Buytaert I:239). “Illud vero, quod dicitur rationem speculativi et 
practici non sumi a fine, sed ab obiecto habitus, utique verum est et bene dictum. Non tamen sufficiens est 
ut videtur. Non enim obiectum sufficit.” 
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decisive factor for determining an object’s extension.52 The criteria of activitas is not 
something that can be determined by looking at either the object or the knower 
independently. It can only be assessed through an awareness of the type of relation that 
holds between the object and the knower. 
VIII. Aureoli on the Purely Practical Nature of Theology 
When Aureoli finally turns to describe his position on theology’s purely practical 
nature he relies on two proofs, an a priori proof and an a posteriori proof, each of which 
rely in turn on the qualifications and adjustments Aureoli has made to Scotus’s initial 
position. 
We can start with his a priori proof. This proof begins from understanding 
practical knowledge as something which is caused by an object which holds a special 
relationship to the knower. Aureoli then builds on what he has just argued for by saying: 
“a purely practical habit is about an object which is attainable by the knower, through 
more excellent operations and through more noble acts than the acts of this [practical] 
habit.”53 The latter clause through more excellent operations and through more noble 
acts is not a qualification that we have seen yet, but is one that Aureoli thinks is intrinsic 
(and therefore a priori) to practical knowledge. It is after all better to be healthy than to 
simply know what health and sickness are, and likewise, he says, it is better to have 
 
52 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 2, n. 76 (Buytaert I:240). “Apparet igitur quod practica vel speculativa ratio 
non competit habitui ex obiecto solo, sed ex obiecto relato ad talem scientem, qui habeat posse agere et 
fabricare obiectum.” 
53 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Ille namque habitus est pure practicus, qui est de 
obiecto attingibili a scienti, excellentioribus operationibus et per nobiliores actus quam sit actus illius 
habitus.” 
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virtue than to simply know what virtue is.54 From this definition and justification, Aureoli 
makes his final move to show that his own conception of theology fits this description 
perfectly. In so doing, he tells us a lot more than the simple fact that theology is purely 
practical. He also reveals in detail the conception of theology and its primary task which 
he has assumed from the outset.55 He writes:  
But, the theological habit has God as its object, which is attainable by us 
through more excellent operations, more noble acts, than [the act by which 
we] understand believed things (creditiva) through an intellection had in 
this life from purely natural things… (emphasis mine)56 
The quotation continues, but we must stop and note the position already emerging. The 
specific and primary act that constitutes theological knowledge is to produce an 
“understanding” of “believed things” through the observance of nature alone. This is a 
radical departure from the Aegido-Augustinian position. For Giles, theology 
distinguished itself from all other human sciences by its operation solely in the light of 
faith and its refusal to begin from sensible things. All other sciences proceed from purely 
natural things, but theology does not. Yet, for Aureoli, the opposite is true. The proper act 
of theology is an “understanding” achieved through natural means. Moreover, Aureoli’s 
description sharply separates the “understanding” produced by the theological act from 
an altogether different intellectual act of belief. As the quote continues we see this 
separation of theology and faith even more clearly. 
 
54 Ibid., I, proem., sect 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Melius est enim homini habere sanitatem et esse 
sanum quam scire sanitatem et esse sanum quam scire sanitatem et esse aegrotum; et melius est habere 
virtutes quam scire quid est virtus…” 
55 See the opening quotation of our discussion of Aureoli above, p. 163. 
56 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Sed, habitus theologicus habet 
pro obiecto Deum, quod est a nobis attingibile excellentioribus operationibus, per nobiliores actus, quam sit 
intelligere creditiva intellectione ex puris naturalibus habita in hac via.” 
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For God is attained more nobly if he is adhered to through faith and is 
looked up to through hope, and loved through charity, and if his counsel 
and precepts are obeyed, than if believable things are expounded in murky 
way [through the habit of theology]. Therefore this habit is purely 
practical.57 
Theology is identified as practical because it is said to be directive of four different 
practices that are superior to it in nobility.58 (Aureoli later tells us that he takes these four 
acts from a list given by Augustine in De doctrina christiana.)59 Among these four 
practices, one in particular has been repeatedly singled out as the proper end of theology 
by the tradition that precedes Aureoli , namely to love God. It is more unusual to see the 
act of faith put alongside the act of charity (as though theology’s job is to produce both 
acts of faith, hope, love, obedience) as opposed to theology and faith being somehow 
connected and working together to produce the love of God. For Aureoli, at least part of 
theology’s immediate directive job is to produce and maintain a proper and correct assent 
of faith, not simply acts of love. This stands at odds even with Scotus, who also sees 
theology as purely practical, but does not say anything about theology producing a 
separate act of faith, but only speaks of theology as disposing us to more perfect acts of 
love in accordance with right reason. If anything, faith, for Scotus, functions as a kind of 
substitute theology that allows us to practice the right kind of loving even in this life, 
 
57 Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 82 (Buytaert I:243). “Nobilius enim attingitur Deus, si sibi adhaereatur 
per fidem et in eum assurgatur per spem, et diligatur per caritatem, et si eius oboediatur conciliis et 
praeceptis, quam si hoc modo nubilose credibilia exponuntur. Ergo iste habitus erit practicus pure.” 
58 This emphasis on the nobility of these four practices over the practical knowledge of theology itself is 
emphasized in Aureoli’s third proposition, that theology as practical science is more noble than any other 
speculative science and likewise is more noble than it would be if theology were speculative. The reason it 
is said to be so noble is because it elicits and directs acts which are so much more noble than its 
‘declarative’ function. Cf. Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 3, a. 3, nn. 89–91 (Buytaert I:246). See in particular where 
he states: “Sed constat quod Deum diligere, in Deum credere et sperare, nobilius est quam credibilia 
declarare” (Ibid., I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 90 (Buytaert I:246)). 
59 See below, p. 174. Though this does not appear to be an explicit citation, Aureoli is probably referencing 
Book I, c. 39 (PL 34:36). 
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where perfect evident knowledge of God is impossible.60 What was true for Scotus was 
even more true for Giles. The close alignment between the acts of faith and the 
theological habit is something we saw to be a distinctive element of Rimini’s account of 
the subject matter of theology.61 Nevertheless, at this point, it still seems like Aureoli can 
easily accept the idea that “the love of God” is the end of theology, just as much Scotus 
did, as long as the acts of faith, hope, and obedience can be set alongside the act of love. 
 However, in Aureoli’s second argument the distinctiveness of his division 
between faith and theology becomes even more pronounced, to the point that the act of 
love is better seen as an indirect end of theology, while the true end is the act of faith. In 
this case theology’s primary practical function is to direct and support right belief and 
faithful assent, while belief is oriented toward producing the act of love.62 The argument 
for this position is what Aureoli’s calls his a posteriori argument. It is a posteriori 
because it looks not to the intrinsic nature of the knowledge itself, but to the proper end 
that the knowledge in question is meant to direct. It then attempts to show that this end is 
a genuine practice and therefore the knowledge that produced it must be practical. In 
doing so, Aureoli once again reveals much about his underlying assumptions about 
theology. He says: a true practical science has as its end not just an act which it elicits but 
one which it directs, “but,” he says “the theological habit does not have as its proper act 
[merely] something which it elicits, but rather an act which it directs, which is to believe 
 
60 This is a conjectural conclusion, owing to the fact that Scotus gives little explicit attention to rigorously 
distinguishing between the act proper to theology and the cognitive act proper to faith. 
61 Consider in particular the quotation where Rimini speaks of theology “when it is only faith” and theology 
when there is direct vision. See above c. 2, p. 137, n. 99. The quotation identifies earthly theology as almost 
the very same thing while contrasting it with a theology that trades faith for a direct vision of God. 
62 See below for some speculation about what is motivating Aureoli here, p. 175. 
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(credere).”63 Here he singles out the act of belief as the proper act, which theology 
directs. What is even more important is where Aureoli finds an authority for this decisive 
position. He looks to no further than De Trinitate XIV, c. 1, the quotation that has again 
and again proved decisive. Where Giles looked to this quotation to show that theology 
leads to beatitude (and affective love), Aureoli reads this as saying theology’s job is to 
direct right faith, and it is this correctly produced faith that will lead to beatitude, namely 
the act of loving God. Through this interpretation the act of loving is no longer 
considered the direct goal of theology, even though theology can continue to be called 
“purely practical” as it was for Scotus. It is practical, not because it helps us to love, but 
primarily because it helps us to believe. This is why it was so important that the 
definition of a practice not be restricted to an act outside the intellect. Aureoli wants to 
call theology practical, but he also wants the primary practice it directs to be a purely 
intellectual act, i.e. to believe. He cannot have it both ways unless we are allowed to 
acknowledge purely intellectual acts as genuine practices.  
In the next paragraph, Aureoli will assert once more the priority of the act of 
belief over and above the other three acts; the act of the belief is the one theology is 
primarily concerned with, while the other acts, including love, will follow from a proper 
faith. He writes:  
 
63 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 84 (Buytaert I:244). “Sed habitus theologicus non 
habet proprie actum quem elicit, immo actum quem dirigit, qui est credere…” Ockham sites this passage 
explicitly in support of the fact that Aureoli like Scotus thinks theology is purely practical. However he 
does not comment on the quite different reasons that theology is thought to be purely practical. For Scotus 
it was because theology directs the act of love. But as this very passage indicates, for Aureoli theology is 
purely practical primarily because it directs the act of belief. Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., 
q. 12 (OTh 1:334). 
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But it should be considered, that although this habit is extended to 
directing four acts, namely to believe, to hope, to love, and to live 
virtuously according to every virtue, as Augustine deduces in the end of 
book I of De doctrina christiana, nevertheless the act of believing 
(credere) is directed by this habit [theology] in a more immediate way 
since this habit is declarative of believable things. Nevertheless, in a more 
final and ultimate way, [theology] is ordered to love, just as faith is 
ordered to charity.64 
Because the ultimate goal of faith is to produce charity, theology can be said to produce 
love. But this is only possible through the transitive mediation of faith: a separate act and 
habit from theology. The primary and immediate task of theology is to direct faith and 
assent in accordance with right reason. This is a fundamentally new position on the 
nature of theology that does not fit either the Aegidio-Augustinian tradition or even the 
Scotist position, despite much agreement with Scotus elsewhere. 
But once more we ought to linger long enough to appreciate how decisive the 
interpretation of the quotation from De Trinitate XIV has been. Already in the last 
chapter, we saw that it was Scotus and Ockham’s interpretation of this quotation that led 
them to the believe that a restricted theology only applied to those in need of salvation 
and it did not apply to those who wanted to go beyond what was necessary for salvation. 
More decisively, this restriction did not apply to those who no longer needed salvation, 
but enjoyed a heavenly and beatific knowledge of God. It was Rimini’s more Aegidian 
interpretation that led him to disagree with Ockham. But now we see another 
interpretation of this quotation that proves even more dramatic. For Aureoli, theology 
 
64 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 85 (Buytaert I:244). “Est autem considerandum 
quod, quamvis iste habitus extendatur ad dirigendum quatuor actus, videlicet credere, sperare, diligere et 
virtuose vivere secundum omnem virtutem, ut Augustinus deducit I De doctrina christiana in fine, 
nihilominus credere immediatius dirigitur per istum habitum, cum sit habitus credibilium declarativus; 
finalius tamen et magis ultimate, ordinatur ad diligere, sicut et fides ordinatur ad caritatem.” 
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cannot be identified with that “saving faith, which leads to beatitude.” The theologian’s 
job is simply to assist people with the independent act of belief. However, in the end, it is 
belief alone that disposes us and leads us to right love, not the work of a very specific 
theological procedure, which attempts to use natural and universally accessible sensible 
realities to expound and “declare” believable things. The notion of theology as 
“declarative” will prove to be a decisive description of theology that is perhaps the most 
distinctive feature of Aureoli’s position. But this is something we will take up in a later 
chapter.65 
In the meantime, we are in a position to speculate about at least one reason that 
Aureoli might be inclined to take this distinctive position and equally distinctive 
interpretation of Augustine. In his opening list of objections, Aureoli points to one 
argument that is especially damning to the field of professional theology. The argument 
that bothers Aureoli states that the habit of theology cannot be responsible for producing 
our love for God because the simple believer often loves God more than those 
professional theologians possessing a theological habit.66 This argument is damning 
because, whether a person denies the consequence or accepts it, they are in bad shape. If 
they accept it, then the question must be asked, if the goal of all this intellectual effort is 
to love God, and lots of people love God without theology and many people without 
theology love God much better than those with theology, why do we need theologians at 
all? At best, they are superfluous. At worse, they are a harmful distraction. But if 
 
65 See chapter 6, p. 256. 
66 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, n. 17 (Buytaert I:223). “Quod patet, quia habitus iste non 
augmentat dilectionem, cum fideles simplices aliquando plus diligant quam habitum huiusmodi habentes. 
Ergo nec erit affectivus, nec practicus, nec ad dilectionem ordinatus.” 
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someone wants to deny that simple people love God more than theologians, one will have 
to admit that many simple believers, who appear to love God, may actually not love God 
and many people, who appear to be theologians, but do not love God, are not actually 
theologians. These are hard conclusions to accept, though in various ways many of those 
who accept that the end of theology is a greater disposition to love do end up biting the 
bullet and holding one of these possible positions.67  
However, if one did not want to admit either of these alternatives, but still wanted 
to insist that theology was practical and was still connected to love as its ultimate end, 
then Aureoli’s own position might provide this possibility. Holding to Aureoli’s position, 
a person could explain how a person without theology could still love God. This person 
can love God because theology is not really necessary to love God, rather only faith is 
necessary. And as Aureoli has made abundantly clear these are two different things. But 
theology can still be said to work towards the love of God by trying to build up, 
encourage, and strengthen faith. Of course, not every faithful person will need this extra 
help, but some might and the theologian can help these people. Likewise, by separating 
the habit of theology and the habit of faith, we can explain why some genuine theologians 
may not show signs of loving God. Though theology aims to build up faith, it is not 
identical with faith. Therefore, it is conceivable that a person could come up with very 
strong arguments for those things that ought to be believed without actually taking the 
step to believe through faith. But since it is through faith and not theological knowledge 
(as Aureoli conceives it) that we love rightly, it follows that this unbelieving theologian 
 
67 See for example Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, prol, q. 5, a. 5 (Padua, 1598), 73a-
74b. 
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could have a very impoverished or distorted love for God. In Aureoli’s reply to this 
particular argument we only get a few suggestive hints confirming our speculation. To 
Henry of Ghent, who insists that theology must be for its own sake (or speculative) rather 
than for something else, like love, Aureoli replies: no, in fact, theology is not for its own 
sake, but for the sake of the act of faith and virtue.68 In replying that theology is for the 
sake of faith, his position would appear to bypass Henry’s concern over who loves God 
more, the theologian or the simple believer. Consequently, theology’s connection to 
virtue, especially the theological virtue of love, should be conceived of as the indirect 
result of theology’s assistance with right belief.  
IX. Ockham and Rimini on Practice  
With the positions of Scotus and Aureoli in the background, we can now turn our 
attention to Ockham and Rimini. In posing the question, “Is theology practical or 
speculative?” both Ockham and Rimini, like Aureoli, follow the pattern of questions set 
by Scotus: first taking up what it means for something to be a practice, then asking what 
makes knowledge in general either practical rather than speculative, and finally 
answering the original question about theology. Ockham divides these questions into the 
three final question of his prologue, while Rimini turns them into the three articles of the 
fifth and last question of his prologue.  
 For our present purposes any consideration of Ockham and Rimini’s view on the 
definition of a “practice” need only be brief because they both come to roughly the same 
 
68 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 3, a. 3, n. 102 (Buytaert I:249). “Ad ea vero quae in 
oppositum inducuntur dicendum. Ad primum quidem quod iste habitus non est gratia sui, sed gratia actus 
fidei et virtutis.” 
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conclusion as Aureoli. Namely, both thinkers agree with Aureoli’s critique of Scotus and 
both believe that the definition of a practice should be expanded to include those 
operations occur entirely within the intellect. An example of Ockham’s explicit critique 
of Scotus on this point is visible when he says: “every operation following a choice is a 
practice, but the act of understanding follows a choice and deliberation.”69 And then he 
gives an illustration: “for someone is able to deliberate whether they should study or not, 
and afterwards choose to study. Therefore this [act of] study, which follows deliberation 
and choice, is truly a practice.”70 For Rimini’s part, we see the exact same objection and 
even a comparable example. He writes: “[Scotus] argues against himself, [because he 
admits that] every act commanded by the will is a practice, but speculation is of this 
type.”71 The consequence he proves: “For the consideration of logic and metaphysics and 
other speculative habits is able to be commanded by the will.”72 
Likewise, both Ockham and Rimini recognize the fundamental objection that 
Scotus has to this conclusion, namely, that it is impossible for an intellectual act to extend 
to itself and that if this were the case then logic would be a practical knowledge.73 And 
both Ockham and Rimini find this highly suspect. Rimini, for one, highlights Scotus’s 
 
69 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 10 (OTh I:281). “Praeterea, omnis operatio sequens 
electionem est praxis. Sed actus intelligendi sequitur electionem et consilium…” 
70 Ibid. “Potest enim aliquis consiliari an debeat studere vel non, et postea eligere studere. Ergo istud 
studium sequens consilium et electionem est vere praxis.” 
71 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:151).“Praeterea, ipse arguit contra se ipsum: 
Omnis actus imperatus a voluntate est praxis, speculatio est huiusmodi, ergo etc.” 
72 Ibid. “Potest enim imperari a voluntate consideratio logicalis et metaphysicalis et aliae quaelibet 
habituum speculativorum.” 
73 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 10 (OTh I:282). “Si dicatur quod non extenditur, sicut 
modo loquimur de extensione, quia non tendit extra se, hoc non sufficit …”; Gregorius Ariminensis, 
Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, (Trapp 1:151). “Contra hoc autem ipse arguit probans illam primam partem sua 
desciptionis ‘quoniam stando praecise in actibus intellectus nulla est extensio intellectus, quia non extra se 
tendit nisi ut actus eius respicit actum alterius potentiae…” 
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heavy reliance on his prior belief that logic is not a practical science. But, he points out 
that lots of respectable people believe that logic is a practical science.74 Both Aureoli and 
Ockham show themselves to be among such people.75 
In the end and despite their criticisms, Ockham and Rimini do hang on to an 
important aspect of Scotus’s definition of a practice. Namely, while they recognize that 
the word “practice” can be used very loosely, the technical definition they want to use 
mandates that a practice is an operation that lies within the power of our will, where 
reason functions as the moving principle and the action is a result of choice of the will.76 
This is the gist of their definition of practice, more or less in conformity with the 
qualified Scotist position given by Aureoli, and it was a definition of practice like this 
that motivated Giles to reject the classification of theology as either practical or 
speculative.  From here, Ockham and Rimini turn to consider what makes knowledge 
practical. 
X. Ockham and Rimini on Practical Knowledge and Practical Habits 
While appearing to argue for similar positions, Ockham and Rimini pick up in 
different places. Ockham begins at question eleven, asking “whether practical and 
 
74 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:152). “Ad illud vero, quod de logica infertur, potest primo dici quod istud 
a multis non reputatur falsum sed verum.” 
75 This is something we have already seen in Aureoli, and Ockham states explicitly: “Et quando dicitur 
‘tunc logica esset practica’, ista conclusio est concedenda, sicut post patebit” (Ordinatio, I, q. 11 (OTh 
I:310, ll. 4–5)). See also Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:316, ll. 3–7). 
76 Ibid., I, prol., q. 10 (OTh I:294). “Circa tertium dico quod praxis ultimo modo dicta est omnis operatio 
exsistens in potestate voluntatis, consiliata ab intellectu, respectu cuius est electio voluntatis”; Gregorius 
Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:148). “Dico quod omnis operatio existens in potestate 
nostra est praxis, ita quod descriptio praxis, a qua habitus dicitur practicus, sit operatio existens in hominis 
potestate,” and on (p. 152, “Ad istud dico quod extensio illa, qua intellectus dicitur esse practicus, non 
semper est ad aliquam operationem extra intellectum, sed aliquando ad actum alium intellectus directum 
per illum.” Cf. pp. 154, ll. 26-29 - 155.ll.1-4. 
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speculative knowledge are distinguished through their ends or through their objects.”77 
Rimini asks in question five, article two: “What [kind of] knowledge is practical and 
what [kind of] knowledge is speculative?”78 In other words, what is the difference 
between these two kinds of knowledge? It is only after answering this question that 
Rimini turns in his third article to ask Ockham’s question about the reason for, or cause 
of, this difference. Recalling the order Scotus followed, Ockham has left out a question, 
which Rimini reinserts. We must therefore turn to Rimini first to see what he thinks 
properly distinguishes practical knowledge from speculative knowledge. Along the way, 
we will aim to assess whether this might be Ockham’s position as well, despite not taking 
up the question explicitly. Then, and in light of the definitions given by Rimini, we can 
turn simultaneously to how Ockham and Rimini will use a very un-Scotistic 
understanding of the “object” of a science to answer the question: from where does a 
given habit derive its practical or speculative nature? 
 Rimini begins his response by stating outright the definition of “practical 
knowledge” that he wants to defend. While acknowledging that “practical knowledge” 
can be used and defined in loose and imprecise ways, he says he wants to reserve the 
strictest meaning for the present discussion:  
Strictly and properly, practical knowledge is knowledge formally directive 
of a practice, and anything of this type is a complex knowledge declaring 
 
77 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:302). “Secundo quaero utrum notitia practica et 
speculativa distinguantur per fines vel per obiecta.” 
78 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:155). “Quantum ad secundum articulum, quae 
notitia sit practica et quae speculativa et similiter de habitu, videndum est.” 
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how or through which means something should be done or something 
similar.79 
In this definition he first demands that this knowledge be “directive” of a practice. This is 
quite in keeping with the previous tradition. That practical knowledge is directive was 
acknowledged by Aureoli80 and was an idea conveyed in Scotus’s notion of practical 
knowledge as conformis.81  However, he adds that this knowledge must be “formally 
directive.” What he means by “formally” is that this knowledge is directive by explicitly 
stating how or by what means something should be done. And since only a proposition 
can give direction in this formal way, he adds the further condition that all practical 
knowledge is necessarily complex or propositional. This requirement is already contained 
within the requirement that practical knowledge be formally directive. A simple example 
is given to drive home the point: “The humors of a man laboring with a certain sickness 
should be tempered with a kind of medicine, which when prepared in the proper way 
ought to be taken with his food.”82 This piece of knowledge gives explicit direction that 
some action or operation should be done. Rimini believes this definition to be at odds 
 
79 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:156). “Stricte et proprie notitia practica est notitia formaliter praxis 
directiva, et quaelibet talis est notitia complexa enuntians qualiter vel per quae aliquid est agendum vel 
aliquid simile.”  
80 See above, p. 165.  
81 See the discussion of Scotus sense of conformis above, p. 153. If there is a difference it might only be 
that Scotus thinks true practical knowledge is only that which directs or commands rightly. For of course, if 
it commands us to do something incorrect or wrong, it can hardly be called knowledge. Nevertheless, this is 
a description suited the forth and most strict definition of a ‘practice’ (Cf. Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp 
I:154)). But while Rimini acknowledges this definition, he wants to use the penultimate definition of a 
‘practice’: namely, an operation that has its starting principle in reason, but does not necessarily have to be 
the correct or ethically right action. (Cf. Ibid., I, prol. q. 5, a. 1 (Trapp I:148, 155)). 
82 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:156). “Humores hominis tali aegritudine laborantis tali medicamine 
contemperandi sunt, taliter dispositus talibus cibis uti debet.”  
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with both of the positions marked out by Scotus and Aureoli. He immediately turns to 
four corollaries following from this definition directed against the two Franciscans.83  
Adding the criteria of “formally directive” is the decisive part of Rimini’s 
definition. He mentions two other, less proper, uses of practical knowledge and both lack 
this formal directive sense. As a result they are described as merely virtually directive, 
either in an immediate way84 or in a more remote way (remote).85 As an example of the 
second use of “practical knowledge” which comes closest to the proper use, Rimini gives 
the following examples: 
‘Health is due to the proper or adequate mixture of the humors’, ‘such and 
such a medicine has such and such a power’, ‘the flesh of birds makes for 
smooth and easy digestion’ and similar things, which do not direct 
according to themselves formally and immediately to the production of 
health or another related operation, nevertheless they virtually contain 
knowledge, which immediately directs according to itself for the causation 
of health.86 
The difference in this example is plain. It does not tell us precisely what to do. However 
it is knowledge that, with only a few connections, could turn into an explicit direction 
 
83 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:158–161). The first corollary insists, contra Scotus, that “no complex 
knowledge can be called practical.” The second insists that despite what Scotus says, that “God is three” 
and that “the Father generates” are not practical pieces of knowledge. The third is a bit more involved but is 
again aimed against Scotus. According to Rimini, Scotus believed that while theoretical medicine can be 
called speculative relative to the concrete knowledge used to practice medicine, it is still practical. But 
Rimini insists that this is false: theoretical medicine does not tell us to do anything, whether generally (or 
universally) or in particular (dealing with individuals). The fourth and final corollary is aimed against 
Aureoli. According to Rimini, Aureoli believes practical and speculative can be distinguished by the fact 
that practical knowledge is acquired through experience and speculative knowledge is acquired through 
deduction. But Rimini counters that Aureoli is wrong because the practical knowledge of medicine can be 
acquired merely through study and not through experience (or actual practice), but this knowledge is still 
practical. 
84 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:161–162). 
85 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:162–163). 
86 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:161). “‘Sanitas est debita humorum temperies vel adaequatio’, ‘tale 
medicamen talis virtutis existit’, ‘carnes volatilium sunt leves et facilis digestionis’ et similes, quae licet 
non secundum se formaliter et immediate dirigant ad sanitatis causationem aut aliam operationem de 
propinquo, tamen virtualiter continent notitias secundum se immediate ad causandum sanitatem dirigentes.” 
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about what to do. Rimini’s explanation of this example also serves to fill out the meaning 
of “formally” a bit more. Now we see the criteria of “immediately directive” added as a 
synonym. What distinguishes practical knowledge in the proper sense is the direct and 
immediate command it gives about action. This looser sense of practical knowledge does 
not directly tell us “to do” anything. 
 The last sense of “practical knowledge” that Rimini recognizes is similar to the 
second in that it can only be practical knowledge because of its potential to produce 
formally directive knowledge. It is distinct from the second sense only because it 
“virtually contains” formally directive knowledge in an even more remote and distant 
way. Identifying this sense of practical knowledge allows Rimini to acknowledge that 
even metaphysics, physics, and mathematics can be useful as principles to a practitioner, 
just as the geometric knowledge can eventually be useful to the mechanic who wants to 
build something. Nevertheless, this knowledge is distinct from the second type of 
knowledge (i.e. knowing what different medicines do or what kind of wood is the best for 
different kinds of projects) because this second type, while not immediately directive, is 
only one step away from being directive. On the contrary, many deductions may be 
needed before the geometer’s knowledge of a point can be useful to the mechanic or 
builder.  
 With these three senses in hand, Rimini ends article two by insisting that when we 
talk about practical and speculative knowledge in the proposed question, we mean only 
the proper sense. Everything else, whether it is virtually directive or not, should be 
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classified as speculative knowledge.87 While Ockham does not explicitly treat the 
different senses of “practical knowledge” as Rimini does,88 we do find him identifying 
“practical knowledge” in accordance with Rimini’s strict definition.  At one point 
Ockham states: 
But in that conclusion which is known in a practical knowledge, 
something doable by us is posited…since practical knowledge is about our 
actions…therefore I say that since practical knowledge is directive of 
some practice, it is necessary that practical knowledge always has some 
practice or something doable by us as its object, at least, as its partial 
object.89 
From this strict definition of “practical knowledge” as formally directive, Rimini 
extends this definition to the proper meaning of a practical habit taken as a whole. In the 
course of doing so, he reveals his further criticisms of Scotus and Aureoli. 
 Opening the discussion, Rimini first states his understanding of Scotus’s position 
and then documents his complaint. The definition as stated by Rimini reads:  
A practical habit is that which concerns an object virtually containing 
knowledge directive of an operation of the will…that truly is a speculative 
habit, which is about an object not virtually containing directive and 
correct knowledge of an operation of the will regarding it.90 
 
87 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163). “Ex his patet quae notitia proprie practica dicitur, quoniam notitia 
complexa secundum se praxis formaliter directiva, omnis vero alia notitia speculativa dicenda est.” 
88 At least, we do not find Ockham doing this in his prologue. 
89 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:315). “In illa autem conclusione quae scitur 
notitia practica ponitur aliquid operabile a nobis…cum notitia practica sit de operibus nostris.…Ideo dico 
quod cum notitia practica sit directiva alicuius praxis, oportet quod semper notitia practica habeat 
praxim…vel aliquid operabile a nobis pro objecto saltem partiali.” 
 We find Ockham using the definition of practical knowledge defined by Rimini as part of an 
argument for why the nature of practical science is in fact determined by the ‘object’ of the science or habit 
and not the ‘end’, showing us the importance of this understanding of “formally directive knowledge” for 
the further arguments both Ockham and Rimini want to make. 
90 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163). “Hic dicitur quod habitus practicus est 
ille, qui est de obiecto virtualiter continente notitiam directivam operationis voluntatis circa ipsum ac etiam 
rectitudinem operationis praedictae, quae operatio secundum ipsum est vere et primo praxis. Ille vero 
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We can add to this definition the facts that emerged from of our treatment of Scotus; 
namely that a practical habit is that which descends from an object and therefore is able 
to produce knowledge which is “aptitudinally” prior and conformis to an action or 
operation within our power. (And of course Scotus excludes intellectual acts from 
qualifying as said operations.) 
Rimini finds this position troubling for two related reasons. First, Scotus himself 
identifies God as an object fulfilling the above criteria. But if this were true, it would be 
impossible for there to be any purely speculative knowledge about God.91 Rimini finds 
this consequence to be problematic and even inconsistent with other things Scotus has 
said.92 Despite this accusation of inconsistency, our own exposition has shown that 
Scotus would most likely accept this consequence.93 In Scotus’s account, we saw that all 
knowledge that was deduced from God as the object was to be regarded as practical 
because it could potentially (or virtually) direct us to a more correct loving of God.94 
Thus for Scotus propositions like “God is three and one” and “the Father generates the 
Son” were clear instances of practical knowledge and therefore genuine parts of a 
 
habitus est speculativus, qui est de obiecto non virtualiter continente huiusmodi notitiam directivam et 
rectitudinem operationis voluntatis circa ipsum.” 
91 Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp, I:163). “quia, cum secundum ipsum deus sit tale obiectum, unde et 
theologiam ideo ponit practicam, sequitur quod de Deo non possit esse aliquis habitus speculativus.” 
92 Cf. Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:163–164). Rimini writes: “Hoc etaim consequens, ut apparet, videtur 
esse falsum secundum hunc doctorem; nam in solvendo quoddam argumentum factum in principio 
quaestionis ad probandum theologiam non esse practicam ex auctoritate Boethii assignantis ‘tres partes 
scientiae speculativae, quarum una est theologia’ ait sic ‘dico quod Boethius intelligit per theologiam 
metaphysicam’. Hic, ut apparet, non vult negare Boethium, sed exponere quasi concedens dictum Boethii 
secundum expositionem quam dat; quod si sic, ipse hic videtur concedere metaphysicam esse speculativam, 
quod, si non concedat, ex confessione tamen sua auctoritas Boethii est contra eum.” (See Scotus, Ordinatio, 
I, prol., q. 2, p. 228, 12-13.)  
93 Rimini too notes this, despite his subsequent accusation of inconsistency in other passages. He writes of 
Scotus: “hoc autem consequens, quamvis ipse [Scotus] concedat mihi…” ((Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp 
I:163)). 
94 See above, p. 158. 
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practical habit. But Rimini raises a concern about these examples in his earlier section on 
the proper meaning of practical knowledge. “None of these,” he says, “formally direct us 
to an operation.” That “God is three and one” does not immediately tell us to do anything, 
and therefore it cannot be practical.95 
In light of Rimini’s earlier distinction between the different senses of practical 
knowledge and his willingness to acknowledge that propositions which are not formally 
directive can still be very useful, he cannot be disputing with Scotus about the fact that 
non-directive actions can have practical import. On the contrary, his complaint is that 
Scotus’s way of explaining the matter ruins a very common sense distinction. Namely, 
there is something categorically different about a proposition like “God is three in one” 
and “God should be loved above everything else.” The distinction between speculative 
and practical knowledge was a helpful way of designating this difference. But Scotus, in 
his effort to show how very theoretical sounding propositions can have important 
consequences for right action, has lost any way of meaningfully articulating this 
difference. This is something Rimini wants to recover. 
The second criticism is really a more general version of the first and reinforces the 
key point at issue. Rimini claims that if Scotus’s position were accepted, not only would 
speculative knowledge of God be impossible, but so would speculative knowledge of any 
kind. He argues, again from a rather common sense perspective, that it is obvious that we 
have knowledge that does not make direct claims about how we should act, but he 
 
95 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:159).“Et hoc etiam ulterius sequitur contra 
eundem doctorem in eadem quaestio quod nulla talium ‘deus est trinus’, ‘pater generat filium’ est vere et 
proprie practica cum nulla talium formaliter dirigat nos ad aliquam operationem.” 
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believes Scotus’s position disallows this obvious possibility. He reasons as follows: 
“There is nothing in the world that is not good, and as a consequence does not virtually 
contain some knowledge directive [i.e. both having priority and conformity] of an 
operation of the will regarding the thing in question.”96 This consequence is the logical 
conclusion of Scotus’s minimal condition of virtual containment, for he leaves no verbal 
room for the obvious difference between certain kinds of propositional knowledge.  
Immediately after finishing his critique of Scotus, Rimini turns to Aureoli’s 
position, which itself was formed in response to Scotus’s position. In Aureoli, Rimini 
thinks he has actually found a temporary ally in his campaign against Scotus. In his 
opening remarks, he writes:  
I agree with [Aureoli] in his negative judgment of [Scotus’s] position, 
namely that a habit is not practical on account of those criteria of 
conformity and priority, nor precisely from the fact that an object is of 
such a kind. However, when he says that a habit is practical on account of 
the criteria of activity…that the one knowing has the ability to do or make 
the object of this science…this does not seem to me to be true.97 
Despite his agreement with Aureoli’s negative position, Rimini is not impressed with his 
solution of adding activitas or the capability of doing the action in question. There are 
five particular complaints.98 We need not labor through all of them. Suffice it to say that 
Rimini thinks Aureoli’s position is incoherent and at the same time does not solve the 
 
96 Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp, I:164). “Quoniam nulla res est in mundo, quae non sit bona, et per 
consequens quae non contineat virtualiter aliquam notitiam directivam operationis voluntatis circa ipsam.” 
97A paraphrase translation from: Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:166). “Demisso eo, quod haec opinio dicit 
contra aliam, videlicet quod habitus non est practicus propter illos respectus conformitatis et prioritatis, nec 
ex eo quod est talis vel talis obiecti praecise, quia in his negativis convenio secum, quantum tamen ad illud, 
quod dicit, quod habitus est practicus propter respectum activitatis ad intellectum supra positum et quem 
habet, et ‘ex obiecto relato ad scientem, qui habet posse agere et fabricare obiectum’ ac alia quaedam, quae 
consequenter dicit, ipsa non videntur mihi vera.” 
98 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:166–169). 
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initial problem resulting for Scotus’s position. That is, it fails to make sense of the 
common sense impression that a clearly practical piece of knowledge, which immediately 
and formally directs action, could rely on pieces of knowledge that by themselves are 
clearly speculative and offer no explicit direction whatsoever. Rimini believes Aureoli’s 
modified Scotist position still demands that we regard some abstract non-directive 
knowledge as practical because of its virtual practical implications. But once again this 
leaves us with no verbal space to articulate the difference between these potentially 
practical propositions and those that give us explicit direction. One example taken from 
among Rimini’s critique can show this sufficiently: namely, his critique of Aureoli’s 
appeal to the natural scientist’s knowledge of the production of the rose. 
 Rimini remarks: if you simply say a practical science is one which virtually 
contains knowledge that we are in principle capable of doing, then, despite what the rose 
example suggests, natural philosophy or physics will still be considered a practical 
science. This is not because Rimini thinks we are actually capable of producing a rose 
with our knowledge of the natural world, but because we are still capable of producing 
lots of things with our physical knowledge. Turning more to psychology than to pure 
physics, he asks us to think about our natural knowledge of the acts of the soul, namely, 
our acts of understanding and volitions. The natural knowledge of these acts and how 
they are generated, combined with the fact that intellection and volition are within our 
power, would make this natural philosophy (or psychology) practical.99 The same thing 
could be said about geometry, since the geometer both knows and is capable of making 
 
99 Cf. Ibid., I, prol. q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:169). 
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shapes.100 In both cases, Rimini deems it apparent and well supported by authority that 
both physics and geometry are not practical habits despite the fact that Aureoli’s 
definition would mandate that they be categorized as such. 
Rimini’s answer to what a practical habit is depends primarily on the distinction 
he already made between “partial” and “total habits.”101 When it comes to the single 
demonstrative syllogism constitutive of a “partial habit,” the answer is quite easy. If the 
habit, through the mediation of the act it elicits, is “formally directive of a practice,”102 
then the partial habit is practical. Likewise, that habit which does not produce (elicit) a 
conclusion, which is “formally directive of habit,” is a speculative habit.  
 The only other question Rimini now needs to answer is: how do we classify a 
“total habit,” which is constructed of several conclusions or elicited acts? Again the 
answer is straightforward if we are discussing a “total habit” which includes only 
speculative “partial habits.” In this case such a “total habit” is speculative. Geometry is 
such an example for Rimini.103 On the other hand, if a “total habit” includes only 
practical “partial habits,” then the “total habit” is clearly practical. Rimini cites “practical 
medicine” as an example, which is supposed to be distinct from theoretical medicine.104 
The last difficulty is to decide what to call a “total habit” that encompasses both practical 
 
100 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:169–170). 
101 See chapter 2, p. 121. 
102 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:171). “Et isto modo sumpto habitu dico quod 
ille habitus est practicus, qui mediante suo actu elicito est formaliter praxis directivus, hoc est cuius 
proprius actus elicitus est formaliter praxis directivus.” 
103 See immediately below. 
104 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2, (Trapp I:171–172). “Alio modo sumitur habitus pro 
collectione plurium partialium habituum, ut frequenter supra dictum est. Et sic sumendo habitum dico quod 
vel ille includit praecise habitus speculativos, sicut verbi gratia tota geometria proprie sumpta, et constat 
quod talis est speculativus, vel includit praecise practicos sicut verbi gratia medicina practica condistincta 
contra medicinam theoricam, et tunc non est dubium talem esse proprie practicum…” 
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and speculative “partial habits.” Rimini gives a more detailed description of such a “total 
habit,” where the speculative “partial habits”…  
…have an agreement of the type of subject and an analogy to the practical 
habits105 such that they are like principles, or rather the conclusion of 
those [speculative habits] are the principles of the conclusions of the 
practical habits.106  
Such speculative “partial habits” are said to be virtually directive and Rimini cites the 
whole of medicine as such an example of a “total habit,” which includes both theoretical 
and practical medicine. 
In such cases, Rimini thinks it is perfectly fine to call these mixed “total habits” 
practical as long as we remember that not every “partial habit” included in them needs to 
be classified as a practical habit. In this way, he keeps the good and gets rid of the bad 
within Scotus’s initial position. He recognizes the practical import and potential of many 
explicitly theoretical propositions. Nevertheless, by employing the distinction between 
“partial” and “total habits,” he has found a way to justify our intuitions that there is 
something different between propositions that directly and immediately tell us what to do 
and those propositions that only have potential implications for what we should do. 
XI. Ockham and Rimini on the Object of a Practical Habit 
Ockham and Rimini’s discussion of the “object” of a practical science differs 
significantly from the way Scotus and Aureoli discussed the “object” and its impact on 
 
105 We must remember that it was analogy and order through the primary subject that united the diverse 
parts of a total habit. See above, chapter 2, p. 123.  
106 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:172). “…habentes convenientiam generis 
subiecti et analogiam ad practicos, ut pote quasi principia seu potius quorum conclusiones sunt principia 
respectu conclusionum habituum practicorum quales.” 
Chapter 3: Rimini and the Purpose of Theological Knowledge | 191 
                                                
the practical nature of knowledge. As part of his critique of Aureoli’s appeal to the 
natural philosopher’s knowledge of a rose, Rimini’s offers a helpful illustration. In this 
illustration, he introduces us to an important terminological shift at the center of this 
discussion. In the previous chapter we already saw the transformation of meaning and use 
of the term “subject.”107 But now we are faced with a similar transformation of the 
meaning of the term “object.” 
 Aureoli, we can recall, had claimed that the natural philosopher’s knowledge of a 
rose could be called practical (if it were in our power to produce it) because the rose, as 
an object, yields knowledge that is doable in principle. But Rimini asks: “What does 
[Aureoli] mean by saying that a practical science has ‘as its object something doable from 
itself’ and that a science is not practical, unless it belongs to a knower who is able to do 
and make the object?”108 The reason Rimini asks this is because of his confusion 
regarding the way Aureoli (and also Scotus) generally uses the word “object.” He 
continues: “For it happens that, by the word ‘object’, he understands that which is 
commonly called a ‘subject’, namely that which signifies or as that for which the subject 
of the conclusion supposits.”109 What Aureoli means by “object” is really what Ockham 
and Rimini (apparently, the new standard of common usage) mean by “subject.” Rimini’s 
identification of the subject as either that which signifies or that for which the term 
 
107 See above c. 2, pp. 119-124. 
108 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 2 (Trapp I:168). “Quomodo intelligit quod scientia 
practica habet ‘pro obiecto rem operabilem a se’ et quod scientia non est practica, nisi sit scientis, qui possit 
‘agere et fabricare obiectum’” (emphasis mine). Cf. Aureoli (Buytaert I:165, ll. 30-166).  
109 Ibid. “Constat enim quod per obiectum intelligit illud, quod communiter vocatur subiectum, rem scilicet, 
quam significat vel pro qua supponit subiectum conclusionis et de qua dicitur aliquid sciri…” (emphasis 
mine). 
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supposites is a definition we can also find explicitly in Ockham.110 But important for both 
Ockham and Rimini is the fact that the subject is necessarily incomplex or non-
propositional. But, then, it must be asked: how can an incomplex non propositional 
knowledge be “doable” as Aureoli suggests? Rimini speculates that Aureoli must have 
some propositional directive action in mind regarding the rose, but the point about the 
imprecision of Aureoli’s language has been made. An object can only be doable, and 
therefore formally directive, if it is propositional. Thus, the “subject” and “object” of any 
habit need to be more sharply distinguished.  
 In Ockham and Rimini’s respective discussions of whether the “object” or the 
“end” of a habit determines if a habit is practical or speculative, we see a new and sharply 
distinguished meaning of “object” in use. In question 11, Ockham generally takes this 
new meaning for granted, but at one point states it clearly, equating objects with “known 
conclusions.”111 Rimini in question 5, article 3 more exhaustively reviews the different 
possible meanings of the term, while pinpointing the one he would like to use. “In one 
mode,” he says, “[object is meant] properly as that, namely, which is known, and thus the 
 
110 In question 9 of his prologue Ockham explains the difference between the subject as “that which does 
the suppositing” and “that for which something is supposited.” He only acknowledges the latter as the 
“subject” in an improper way. The truest and most proper sense of subject (the former) is the actual mental 
term that supposites for something else. He writes: “Secundo, dico quod subiectum primo modo dictum 
potest accipi dupliciter: vel pro illo quod supponit in conclusione, vel pro illo pro quo supponitur, |§ et tunc 
accipitur subiectum improprie, §| nam non semper est idem quod supponit et pro quo supponitur. Hoc patet, 
nam in ista propositione 'omnis homo est risibilis' illud quod supponit est aliquod commune ad omnes 
homines, sive sit conceptus sive non; sed illud pro quo supponitur est aliquod singulare, quia per istam non 
plus denotatur nisi quod omne singulare contentum sub homine potest ridere, et non denotatur quod aliquod 
commune potest ridere” (Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 9 (OTh I:266)). 
111 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Sed isto ultimo modo distinguuntur per obiecta, hoc est per 
conclusiones scitas.” 
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object is the total significatum of the scientific conclusion.”112 Rimini agrees with 
Ockham and then takes his definition a bit further. He says the object is “that which is 
known” just as Ockham said the “known conclusions.” But, then, Rimini goes on to 
clarify that what is actually known at the end of demonstration is the “total significatum” 
of the proposition, not merely the proposition itself. Ockham will not agree with this 
further description.113 Nevertheless, both agree that the proper meaning of an “object” 
should be what is known through the demonstration. And what is known through a 
demonstration is necessarily complex and propositional, for it is always the known 
predication of some attribute to a “subject.” But, as Rimini’s treatment of Aureoli already 
made clear, he is willing to recognize that the term “object” is sometimes used in other 
ways. He says: “In another mode, the object is accustomed to be called by some that 
about which something is known.”114 But he is quick to let us know that he thinks this 
use of “object” “is more properly called subject than object, after the fashion of the 
 
112 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:174). “Uno modo proprie pro eo, scilicet 
quod scitur, et sic obiectum scientiae est significatum totale conclusionis scientificae.” 
113 For more information on the complexe significabile see my article “Adam Wodeham” in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia as well as Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini. 
 Considering the amount of scholarly attention given to idea of a complexe significabile it is worth 
acknowledging that it does not make a major impact in our discussions here. For Rimini, it appears to be an 
ontological concept that lies a different level than the concern over the subject matter and purpose of 
theology. We will however have a chance to briefly revisit the issue in our final chapter where it will make 
a larger impact. See below, c. 7, pp. 318-327. 
114 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:174). “Alio modo consuetum est vocari ab 
aliquibus obiectum scientiae illud, de quo aliquid scitur, sive illud, quod scitur esse tale vel tale, et illud est 
id, pro quo supponit subiectum scientificae conclusionis…” (emphasis mine).  
 There is a potential point of confusion here as the editors provide a footnote after “ab aliquibus” 
almost appear to suggest that this is Ockham’s usual way of speaking of an object. But this is clearly not 
the case. The passage referred to is the passage which identifies the two different ways we might mean a 
subject (viz. as that which supposites or that for which it is supposited.) But the passage in no way suggests 
that Ockham would like to refer the “object” as that that which supposits or that for which it is supposited. I 
think it much more plausible that by “ab aliquibus” Rimini has Aureoli and Scotus in mind. The above 
example about the rose as ‘object’ in Aureoli’s terminology, but ‘subject’ in Ockham and Rimini’s makes 
this amply clear. 
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moderns [he must have Ockham in mind here, as well as Adam Wodeham].”115 At the 
end of this introductory paragraph, Rimini indicates that he will continue to use “object” 
and “subject” in the modern way to avoid ambiguity, despite the fact that he is sometimes 
forced to use these terms otherwise when treating the opinions of others.116 
 I belabor the point about terminology because the definition is decisive for the 
position both Ockham and Rimini will take. For one thing, it helps us to recognize a 
difference underlying verbal sameness, since this new definition opens up the possibility 
of two different positions encoded in the same language. Scotus asked whether it was the 
object or the end of a science that was decisive for determining why knowledge was 
practical or speculative. But even if Ockham or Rimini were to conclude that an object 
were the determining factor, this would not indicate agreement with Scotus. Scotus used 
the word “object” for something close to their meaning of a subject. But Rimini begins 
his position by stating that “no practical habit is distinguished from a speculative habit by 
its subject.”117 Thus, with a different vocabulary Rimini has flatly contradicted Scotus’s 
position. This can be easy to lose sight of since he will later affirm that the object can and 
does distinguish a practical habit from a speculative habit. Thus, verbally, he appears to 
hold the same position as Scotus. But in meaning, he is expressly rejecting the Scotist 
position. Before we fill in the rest of Rimini’s position, let us look at how Ockham builds 
the position and then see how Rimini follows. 
 
115 Ibid. “Et magis proprie vocatur subiectum, et sic aliqui moderni tantummodo vocant, et non 
obiectum…” 
116 Ibid. “Et sic etiam ego usus sum pro maiori parte in quaestionibus praecedentibus, quamvis aliquando 
conformans me in modo loquendi opinionibus, de quibus tractabam, etiam subiectum appellaverim 
obiectum. In praesenti autem articulo ad vitandum ambiguitatem significationis utar distincte nominibus 
subiecti et obiecti iuxta sensum praemissum.” 
117 Ibid. “Prima est quod non quilibet habitus practicus a quolibet speculativo distinguitur subiecto.” 
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 For Ockham the major challenge of the present question comes not from Scotus 
or Aureoli, but from Henry of Ghent, who goes unmentioned in Rimini’s account. Henry 
of Ghent’s opinion, visible in his Summa, a. 36, q. 4, ad. 2, is that speculative and 
practical sciences are distinguished by their ends.118 Undoubtedly it was against this 
opinion that Scotus formed his original position about the decisiveness of the object 
rather than end for determining the practical or speculative character of a science. 
 The central move of Ockham’s response is to recognize that an “end” can be 
understood in two ways: 
In one mode [we understand an ‘end’] as something being acquired 
through some operation, as health is the end of walking; and this end is 
loved and desired by the love of desire (concupiscentia). The other ‘end’ 
is loved by the love of friendship (amicitiae), on account of which the first 
end is produced, for it is because man loves (diligit) himself that he desires 
(concupiscit) health for himself, and therefore works to achieve the 
latter.119 
Ockham then applies this distinction to the different senses in which we can speak of an 
“end of a science.” “Properly speaking,” he says, “the end of a science is that which is 
loved by the one acquiring the science (ab addiscente).”120 But while the “end of a 
 
118 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:303). “Ad istam questionem dicunt aliqui quod 
scientia speculativa et practica distinguuntur penes fines suos.” Henricus a Gandavo, Summae Quaestionum 
Ordinariarum, a. 36, q. 4, ad. 2. See Scotus’s engagement with Henry referenced above, p. 155. 
 One of Henry’s arguments (cited by Ockham in Ordinatio, I, q. 11 (OTh I:304)) suggests that a 
science cannot be determined by a subject because the same subject is able to belong to both a practical and 
speculative science. Therefore he concludes it must be determined by its end. But Ockham and Rimini can 
disagree with both Scotus and Henry because they recognize a third possibility: namely that science can be 
distinguished by its object or its proper conclusion. (See our earlier mention of Henry and his ambiguous 
statements about the “cause” of practical knowledge in c. 2, p. 155, n. 21.) 
119 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:306). “Uno modo pro aliquo adquirendo per aliquam operationem, sicut 
sanitas est finis deambulationis; et iste finis est amatus et desideratus amore concupiscentiae. Alius est finis 
amatus amore amicitiae, propter quem primus finis producitur; quia enim homo diligit seipsum concupiscit 
sibi ipsi sanitatem, et ideo ad illam habendam operatur.” 
120 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:307). “Secundo, dico quod finis scientiae proprie loquendo est illud quod 
amatum ab addiscente…” 
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science” can ultimately be seen as the same thing as the “end of the one acquiring this 
science,” he warns us to avoid thinking that the final cause of the science and the final 
cause of the one acquiring the science are exactly the same thing.  The final cause of the 
science is said to be the direct reason that the science was acquired, but this final cause 
cannot always be equated with the final cause of the knower. He gives an example: often 
a student will endeavor to acquire a given habit or knowledge because it leads to certain 
gain or profit (lucrum). This, then, is the final cause of the science in question, but 
Ockham does not want to identify this as the final cause of the knower or learner in 
question. Rather this gain or profit is something loved by the knower for some other 
further end. In Ockham’s example, it is the knower’s love of self that is this further end. 
In this case, the end of the science is the end of the knower, in the first sense mentioned 
above (amor concupiscentia), but not the second (amore amicitiae). Accordingly, while 
the profit of this science is in fact an ‘end’ of the knower, it is not the final cause of the 
knower. Nevertheless, this profit is the final cause of the acquired science in question.121 
 By making this clarification and closely tying the final cause of a science to the 
instrumental end sought by the knower in the pursuit of their own final cause, Ockham 
reaches the following conclusion: it is quite possible and valid to think that “of the same 
 
121 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:307–308). “Verbi gratia, aliquis addiscit scientiam propter amorem amicitiae 
ad seipsum et concupiscit ipsam scientiam sibi ipsi vel aliquod lucrum attingibile per ipsam scientiam, tunc 
dico quod ipsemet est causa finalis illius scientiae quia est amatus amore amicitiae, et aliter ipsa scientia 
non produceretur in effectum. Et ita ipsemet amatus a se ipso est causa finalis scientiae, quia ipsa scientia 
est cuius esse sequitur ad ipsum sic amatum; et ita ipse habet rationem alicuius causae, quia est ad cuius 
esse sequitur aliud. Et tamen ipsemet non est causa sui ipsius, quia ipsemet non dependet sic a se ipso. 
Similiter, ipsum lucrum vel aliquid tale est causa finalis aliquo modo ipsius scientiae, quia est per quod 
respondetur ad questionem factam [per] ‘propter quid’. Si enim aliquis quaerat ‘quare iste addiscit’ vel 
‘quare scientia producitur’, convenienter respondetur ‘propter lucrum per ipsam adquirendum’. Et tamen 
illud lucrum non est causa finalis ipsius scientis, quia ipse sciens non dependet ab eo essentialiter, sed 
tantum est desideratum et concupitum a sciente, propter quod agit ad adquirendum scientiam.” 
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science of the same species there are able to be many final causes.”122 Given the above 
distinction, the logic seems obvious. A person could attempt to master the science of 
geometry for many reasons: to impress people, to build things, or just for the sake of it. 
Thus the very same science could have diverse final causes, depending on the reason it is 
sought.  
 An objection faces the above conclusion, which Ockham acknowledges: “isn’t the 
real final cause of a science, not what is actually intended, but what ought to be intended 
(apta nata)?”123 A related objection is listed just below: “doesn’t everything have just 
one essential cause, but how could this be, if everything intended [by the one acquiring 
the science] can count as a final cause?”124 He dismisses the first objection in a typically 
parsimonious fashion, noting that there can only be a discussion of a thing’s cause 
inasmuch as it is actually being caused, and it is not actually caused unless it is actually 
being intended. Accordingly, the only final cause is the actual final cause, and to speak of 
“a non-actual final cause” is meaningless. However, he qualifies this slightly in his 
response to the second objection. Concerning the objector’s insistence on an “essential 
final cause,” Ockham is willing to concede some coherence to this notion. Namely, if we 
are discussing how everything “ought to be intended, if everything were ordered 
appropriately,” then it is possible to acknowledge one suitable final cause that is ordained 
by nature. However, he reminds us that what “ought to be” is distinct from what actually 
 
122 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:309). “Et ita eiusdem scientiae secundum speciem possunt esse plures causae 
finales.” 
123 Ibid. “Si dicatur quod non est de ratione causae finalis actualiter intendi sed quod sit apta nata 
intendi…” 
124 Ibid. “Praeterea, unius rei est una causa finalis essentialis, sed si omne tale intentum esset causa finalis, 
essent plures causae finales, cum talia plura possint intendi.” 
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is. And if this “suitable final cause” is not what is actually intended, then it is not the true 
and proper final cause.125 We mention this here because Rimini will discuss a science’s 
“proper (or essential) end,” and if we do not have clarity about the distinctions Ockham is 
allowing and disallowing here, then we will not be able to understand how Rimini is 
using the phrase “proper end.” 
 Clarity about the actual end of a science allows Ockham to move forward and 
provide a direct answer to the question, which he backs up with four supporting 
arguments. He begins with a claim, which the first of the four arguments aims to 
establish: “sciences are distinguished among themselves intrinsically and formally.”126 
To look closely at his argument for this will take us far afield. But it is sufficient to say, 
Ockham thinks a science possesses a kind of simplicity such that no external factor can 
differentiate them. If sciences are different, he says, it is because of something intrinsic to 
their own nature.127 It is from this claim that he builds his case. An “intended end” would 
only distinguish these sciences causally, that is, according to the reason for which they 
came into being, but this is not a formal or intrinsic determination.128 Ockham’s 
argument relies on his earlier arguments about the true end of a science to show how such 
causal determinations are unhelpful since one and the same science could have distinct 
reasons for coming to be; again, one might simply enjoy the knowledge or one might 
 
125 Ibid. “Ad omnes auctoritates respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui secundum rectam rationem – saltem 
ut in pluribus – deberet intendi si omnia essent convenienter ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua habet 
quod sit ordinabilis ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter intendatur non est vere et proprie causa finalis.” 
126 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Ex his respondeo ad quaestionem quod istae scientiae se ipsis 
distinguuntur intrinsece et formaliter…” 
127 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:311). “Primum patet, quia istae scientiae sunt formae simplices, sicut alias 
declarabitur de omnibus accidentibus; sed formae simplices non possunt distingui intrinsece et formaliter 
nisi se ipsis; ergo etc.” 
128 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Sed per fines vel per finem distinguuntur causaliter, sicut causaliter 
distinguuntur per causam efficientem.” 
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want to impress people with the knowledge. The raison d’être is clearly different, but the 
science itself remains the same. He does, however, make one concession following from 
his willingness to allow a “suitable final cause” in accordance with right reason. He says: 
Still, it should be known that by accepting ‘end’ as that which ought to be 
the end according to right reason—in the mode already explained—[the 
sciences] are distinguished through their ends as through something 
proper, because one thing is the [ordained, though not necessarily actual] 
end of one science and something else [is the ordained end] of another 
[science].129 
The logic behind this concession is found in that sense of “end,” which does not appeal to 
the causal account of a science’s coming into being. The “ordained end” may in fact have 
nothing to do with the actual reason that a science was acquired. But the “ordained end” 
is somehow proper or intrinsic to the nature of the science itself.  
 From rejecting the actual “end” as a candidate of distinction, Ockham turns to 
another candidate, which was not expressed in the formal title of this question (which 
asked about “ends” and “objects”). He turns to the notion of a “subject.” As we already 
anticipated, Ockham and Rimini both reject this view based on their understanding of a 
subject that which occupies the grammatical role of a subject in a proposition. Therefore, 
depending on what is predicated of the subject, we can have both practical and 
speculative knowledge about the same subject. Again, this is a clear rejection of the 
positions offered by Scotus and Aureoli, who take the opinion that a science is 
determined by its “object,” but by “object” they mean something closer to what Ockham 
means by “subject.” And when Ockham next turns to argue that sciences are formally 
 
129 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:311). “Verumtamen sciendum quod accipiendo finem pro illo qui secundum 
rectam rationem deberet esse finis, - modo exposito -, sic distinguuntur per fines tamquam per aliqua 
propria, quia alius est finis unius et alterius.” 
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distinguished by their “objects,” this cannot be construed as agreement with Scotus or 
Aureoli despite the verbal similarity. 
 Ockham concludes that since sciences cannot be distinguished by their actual 
ends or their subjects, they must be distinguished by their objects. It is here that he 
defines objects as “known conclusions.”130 The fourth and final argument supporting his 
overall position addresses this final claim. Objects determine a science because the 
known conclusions either express something doable by us or not doable by us. In this 
division between a directive proposition and non-directive propositions, we can see that 
Rimini has followed Ockham closely. For Ockham, like Rimini, if the known conclusion 
expresses something immediately doable, then this object formally determines the 
science as practical. But if the known conclusion does not give us immediate formal 
direction, then this object is the decisive factor that determines the science to be purely 
speculative. These designations hold fast, regardless of the actual purpose for which the 
science is acquired. 
 The thorough and straightforward account given by Ockham makes following 
Rimini’s concerns rather simple. Rimini’s third article of question five is structured 
around three conclusions: 1) the subject of science does not determine whether it is 
speculative or practical; 2) the object of science does determine whether it is speculative 
or practical; 3) the proper end of a science does determine whether it is speculative or 
practical.131 Of these three, the first two follow the reasoning of Ockham closely. Rimini 
 
130 Ibid., I, prol., q. 11 (OTh I:310). “Sed isto ultimo modo distinguuntur per obiecta, hoc est per 
conclusiones scitas.” 
131 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:174).“Prima est quod non quilibet habitus 
practicus a quolibet speculativo distinguitur subiecto. Secunda, quod quilibet practicus a quolibet 
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shares the same subject/object terminology that Ockham employs and reaches the same 
conclusions. But only Rimini’s third conclusion initially stands out as confusing and 
potentially problematic. Resolving the problem is only a matter of understanding how 
Rimini is employing the term “proper end.” 
 After declaring that, indeed, a “proper end” can be the decisive factor because the 
proper act elicited by all speculative habits is to know, while the properly elicited act of 
all practical habits is something other than simply to know, Rimini stops to clarify the 
sense of “proper end” he is using. He states: “And I speak about the end suitable to the 
habit from its proper nature not from the will of the one having the habit.”132 Very much 
in the language of Ockham, he speaks of an end according to the intrinsic “proper nature” 
of a science. However, Rimini does not linger to differentiate this “ordained proper end” 
from the “actual final cause” of the science determined by the intentions of the particular 
knower in question. 
 With all these components, distinctions, and definitions in the background, we are 
finally in a position to look at how Ockham and Rimini apply this background reasoning 
to the central question at hand: Is theology itself practical or speculative? 
XII. Ockham and Rimini on Theology’s Practical Nature 
 The treatment of this question by both thinkers at once presupposes much. In 
neither case are we given an argument that theology should be practical or should be 
 
speculativo distinguitur obiecto. Tertia, quod quilibet practicus proprio fine a quolibet speculativo 
distinguitur.” 
132 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 3 (Trapp I:76). “Et loquor de fine competente habitui ex propria natura non ex 
voluntate habentis habitum” (emphasis mine). 
Chapter 3: Rimini and the Purpose of Theological Knowledge | 202 
                                                
speculative. But rather they assume certain things about theology and the kinds of 
propositions that fall under its aegis. They then proceed to ask how we should classify 
this body of conclusions, given all the things that have been said about practical and 
speculative habits thus far. Despite not arguing for what theology should be, their 
respective discussions of this habit does or does not conform to the characteristics of 
speculative or practical habits reveal much about what theology is presupposed to be. 
 With such a concordant account of the nature of practices, practical knowledge 
and what makes a habit practical or speculative, it comes as little surprise that Ockham 
and Rimini develop answers to this final question along similar lines. Ockham’s rather 
brief response starts by reminding us: neither theological knowledge nor a theological 
habit or science is one single thing. On the contrary, theology is made up of many really 
distinct pieces of knowledge. In line with this distinction, some of the pieces of 
knowledge are strictly speaking speculative and others are simply practical.133 Rimini 
also begins his formal response in a similar way. He opens by drawing two conclusions 
based on the two different ways a person could mean “theology.” The first conclusion 
treats theology as referring “to one habit of only one theological truth.”134 When 
speaking about theology in this way, Rimini draws the same conclusion as Ockham: since 
it is the individual objects (or “known conclusions”) that determine whether or not an 
individual “partial habit” is speculative or practical, the nature of each “partial habit” will 
depend on the distinct theological truth in question. Rimini, like Ockham, points out that 
 
133 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:337). “Ideo aliter dico ad quaestionem quod 
theologia non est una notitia vel scientia, sed habet vel continet plures notitias realiter distinctas quarum 
aliquae sunt practicae simpliciter et aliquae speculativae.” 
134 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:180).“Prima est loquendo de theologia 
secundum quod est unus habitus unius tantum veritatis theologicae.” 
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the presupposed body of theological truths contains many propositions that are not 
“formally directive” of a practice and many propositions that are “formally directive” of 
a practice. Both thinkers give roughly the same examples. “God is three and one,” “God 
is omnipotent,” “God creates the world,” and “the Father generates” are all examples of 
non-directive propositions.135 These partial theological habits are speculative. But the 
category of “theological truth” is also assumed to extend to propositions like “God should 
be worshipped,” “God should be loved on account of himself and above all things,” 
“Your neighbor should be loved on account of God,” and “Pray in all times and 
places.”136 These propositions are “formally directive” of an operation within our power 
and therefore are practical.  
 With this conclusion, Ockham ends his formal response, but Rimini, who appears 
to be more concerned about acknowledging the legitimacy of the second sense of 
theology as a “total habit,” goes further. In treating theology as a “total habit” including 
many “partial habits” within it, Rimini draws on his earlier definition of how to identify a 
“total habit.”137 Rimini previously explained that when a “total habit” is made up of a 
combination of speculative and practical “partial habits” then this overall habit is most 
conveniently called practical. And this is what Rimini says is true of theology in the 
second sense. The speculative partial habits, after all, are virtually directive of a practice, 
 
135 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:338). Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., 
q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:181). 
136 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:338); Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., 
q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:181). 
137 See above, p. 189. 
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in that formally directive habits can easily be drawn from their conclusions.138 To show 
us that this kind of “virtual direction” takes place, Rimini tells us to…  
…think of the love of God and the principles of such practical conclusions 
…since those theological truths signify divine perfection or divine 
operation to the outside, of creation or providence or of other benefits, like 
the incarnation of Christ or other things on behalf of our redemption and 
training or glorification or other things contained in Sacred Scriptures not 
from itself formally directive of the love of God, all of which virtually 
(virtualiter de proximo) contain truths formally directing us to love 
God.139 
By drawing special attention to the “total habit” of theology in a way that Ockham does 
not, Rimini really makes the full circle connection between the original position of Scotus 
and the common sense corrections he wants to make. In showing the close connection 
between purely speculative theological truths and the practical act of properly loving 
God, Rimini has drawn a picture that looks similar to the one Scotus drew, wherein all 
the different theological propositions are working together to bring about an act of love in 
perfect concord with right reason. However, by insisting on more rigorous definitions, 
Rimini, with the help of Ockham, has sought to preserve an observable difference 
between the kinds of propositions that theology houses under its roof. Rimini is willing to 
admit that speculative propositions do much of the work Scotus wants them to do, but he 
 
138 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:181).“Secunda conclusio probatur sic: Omnis 
habitus totalis includens aliquos partiales habitus practicos et aliquos etiam speculativos, quorum 
speculativorum actus sunt virtualiter de proximo tamen praxis directivi et ex quorum conclusionibus vel 
propositionibus tamquam ex principiis conclusiones practicorum sequuntur, convenienter denominatur 
practicus.” 
139 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:181–182). “Puta dilectionis erga deum, et talium practicarum 
conclusionum sunt principia; ergo etc. Assumptum patet, quoniam quaecumque veritates theologicae 
significant divinam perfectionem aut divinam operationem ad extra, creationis vel providentiae aut alterius 
eius beneficii, ut incarnationis Christi et aliorum pro redemptione nostra aut eruditione vel glorificatione 
aut quaecumque alia in sacra scriptura contenta non secundum se formaliter directivae dilectionis dei, 
omnes virtualiter de proximo continent veritates nos formaliter dirigentes ad diligendum deum…” 
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has tried to maintain the linguistic space wherein he can verbally mark the distinctions 
between the clearly diverse components of theological knowledge.  Rimini also maintains 
his distance from Scotus, by never drawing the further conclusion: because many 
formally speculative truths contribute to practical knowledge, therefore theology must 
include every possible speculative truth about God. In refraining from such a claim, 
Rimini remains consistent with his earlier position on the contracted nature of the body of 
theological truths. 
XIII. Assessment of Gregory of Rimini vis-à-vis the Position of Giles of Rome 
This then is the basic position on theology’s practical nature that both Ockham 
and Rimini take. In concluding this chapter, we should assess the compatibility of this 
overall position with observed position of Giles of Rome. There are some striking 
differences which we need to identify, and then we need to asses the extent of these 
divergences.  
 The most significant divergence is the unhesitant classification of the “total habit” 
of theology as “practical.” Aside from the fact that Giles does not distinguish between the 
“partial” and “total habits” of theology, the label “practical” to any piece of theological 
knowledge is a designation that Giles and the Aegidian tradition rejects. Giles does not 
reject this because he thinks theology is speculative. Rather, he identifies the act of love, 
which the theological habit is said to produce, as an act which is not in our power. 
Because the act is not in our power, it cannot be a practice and therefore neither is the 
habit which elicits this act practical. Giles instead opts for the name “affective.” Rimini, 
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along with Scotus, Aureoli, and Ockham, agrees with Giles in one respect. Namely, they 
agree that a practice is something which is in our power. However, Rimini departs ways 
with Giles, as Scotus did, by noting that our theology in this life elicits acts of love which 
are in our power.140 These acts can in fact be called practices and theology can be 
designated as a practical knowledge. Here is a dramatic divergence with Giles. Rimini 
and Ockham are linked closely to Scotus regarding the ultimate act elicited from theology 
in this life, though they clearly have significant disagreements about how to describe the 
various parts of the habit. Aureoli continues to call theology practical as well. However, 
in directing theology primarily toward the act and practice of faith/belief rather than love, 
he stands out as unique. 
 However, there is a manner in which we can see Rimini departing from the 
ultimate position of Scotus and approaching the Aegidian position in a partial way. This 
possibility is found in some brief discussions of the nature of the theological knowledge 
of the Blessed that appear in Rimini’s reply to certain objections at the very end of this 
same question. The objection states: 
 
140 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:185). “Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio Dei, quae habetur in via, illa 
nec est beatitudo nec pars beatitudinis, et talis est praxis, cum sit operatio in nostra potestate existens, et 
huiusmodi est theologia nostra directiva” (emphasis mine). 
 There is something slightly surprising in this divergence since Rimini is well known for strong 
views on predestination. (Consider for example his not so endearing epithet, “Torturer of Infants”). 
Schüler, Prädestination, Sünde Und Freiheit Bei Gregor Von Rimini. Consider also Schabel’s description 
of Rimini on predestination: “Gregory reacted by charging that both the theory of the privative cause and 
the notion of the positive cause of predestination in those who are predestined are Pelagian. Instead 
Gregory returned to the traditional view as it concerned predestination: it stems only from God's merciful 
will. However, Auriol's criticism of the asymmetry of the traditional position led Gregory to claim that not 
only do the predestined play no causal role in their salvation, but neither do the reprobate contribute to their 
damnation. In short, there is no reason either for one person's salvation or for another person's damnation 
except the inscrutable will of God: we do not know why some are saved and others damned. This, after all, 
Gregory believed, was the theory of Paul and of Augustine” (“Gregory of Rimini,” section 4). There is 
something both Augustinian and Aegidian about this view, and it would be an interesting further study to 
consider how this view squares with his view that the love of God directed by theology in this life is within 
our power. 
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Love of God is not a practice, for beatitude consists principally in 
enjoyment and delight of God. However, according to the philosopher, 
beatitude consists in speculation, therefore the love of God does not 
belong under the genus of practice but rather should be reduced to the 
genus of speculation”141 
Now we have already seen that Giles himself would agree with this objection in certain 
respects and disagree in others. In the first place, he would agree that the kind of love he 
has in mind is not an actual practice. However, he would strongly disagree with a vision 
of beatitude which is a purely speculative vision of God. On the contrary, the culmination 
of the proper love of God in actuality, rather than merely in hope, is how he would 
characterize beatitude (a love that is perfected, even though knowledge of God remains 
incomplete). We have already seen how this position stands in opposition to those who 
envision beatitude as a complete comprehensive knowledge, which leaves nothing 
unknown.142 
 But in his reply, Rimini stakes out a third position between the Aristotelian point 
of view held by the objector and the position of Giles. Rimini creates a new division 
between the practice that the theology of this life directs and the activity proper to 
beatitude, which is directed (or somehow follows from) the theological knowledge of the 
Blessed. Rimini replies to the objection as follows: 
To the fourth objection it should be said that the love of God, which we 
have in this life, is neither beatitude nor part of beatitude. And this 
 
141 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., a. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:183). “Quarto, ostenditur quod dilectio Dei 
non sit praxis, nam beatitudo consistit principaliter in fruitione seu dilectione dei, secundum Philosophum 
autem beatitudo consistit in speculatione, igitur dilectio dei non ad genus praxis sed potius speculationis 
reducenda est.” 
142 See above chapter 1, p. 69. 
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[earthly] love is a practice, since it is an operation existing in our power, 
and it is this type of operation which our theology directs.143 
Subtly, Rimini creates a distinction between our love of God in this life and whatever it is 
that the Blessed do in the state of beatitude. The explicit focus on the operation of love in 
this life as an operation within our power and the rejection of this kind of love as having 
any place in beatitude suggests that the activity of beatitude is not an act equally within 
our power, and therefore cannot be called a practice. This inference is confirmed as 
Rimini goes further: 
Indeed [the activity], which we have in heaven, is not a practice, if it is not 
in the power of the one loving, as is more commonly held. Nor does our 
theology direct this [activity]. Rather, with respect to this [activity] there is 
no formally directive knowledge, and therefore no properly practical 
knowledge. For this [heavenly activity] is accompanied only by an 
intuitive and simple vision of God which is not able to able to be called 
practical in a strict sense (emphasis mine).144  
This continued quotation reveals a more detailed account of the relationship between the 
proper act of beatitude and the knowledge act of beatitude. Not only is the act of 
beatitude not in our power, but the kind of knowledge proper to beatitude cannot even 
qualify as practical or formally directive. Rimini’s explanation betrays his assumption 
that all knowledge of beatitude is simple and intuitive. That is, there is no “propositional 
knowledge” in the theology of the Blessed. But since practical knowledge as formally 
directive is by definition propositional, the knowledge of the Blessed cannot be described 
 
143 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp, I:185). “Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio 
Dei, quae habetur in via, illa nec est beatitudo nec pars beatitudinis, et talis est praxis, cum sit operatio in 
nostra potestate existens, et huiusmodi est theologia nostra directiva” (emphasis mine).  
144 Ibid., prol., q. 5, a. 4 (Trapp I:185). “Illa vero, quae habetur in patria, non est praxis, si non sit in 
potestate diligentis, sicut communius tenetur, nec ad illam dirigit nostra theologia, immo nec respectu illius 
est aliquae notitia formaliter directiva, ac per hoc proprie practica; solam enim intuitivamac simplicem Dei 
visionem comitatur, quae nequaquam practica proprie dici potest” (emphasis mine). 
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as practical. And yet we must assume there is some connection between this intuitive and 
simple vision of God and the proper act of loving God which is no longer in our power. 
At this point, we can only speculate since Rimini does not elaborate. We can, at least, 
wonder if a fitting name for this knowledge is “affective.” Rimini only provides us with 
one clue: he speaks of the fact that the proper activity of beatitude is not within our power 
as a position which is “commonly held.” But we can wonder: “commonly held by 
whom?” However common this position, it is not a position held by Scotus or even 
Aureoli. For Scotus, the most ideal conception of theology in se is practical and the 
practice it produced was most certainly something within our power. Could it be that 
Rimini means to refer to the common position of the Aegidian tradition? It is, of course, 
possible, since this was a position held by Giles and many Augustinians who followed 
him, including his immediate predecessor at Paris, Thomas of Strasbourg.145 But, as 
Rimini gives us few other clues, we can do little more than speculate here.  
We must finally also look to Ockham, who up till now has been left out of this 
final consideration. Could it be that Rimini means to single out Ockham and the so-called 
“moderns” by his reference to this “common” position?  Ockham does not provide us 
with an explicit consideration of the practical or speculative nature of beatific knowledge, 
but the question does come up in one of the objections to his general opinion at the end of 
question twelve. Here the over-arching objection is concerned with Ockham’s 
classification of some parts of theology (some “partial habits”) as practical while other 
parts are not. The objection starts by admitting that this might be true when we treat 
 
145 Cf. Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2 (Venice, 1564: 14vb). “Dicendum quod 
dilectio dei sive affectio, est proprius finis nostra theologiae.” 
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theology as merely what is contained within Scripture, but not when we considered 
theology in se. Ockham’s general reply begins by questioning this Scotist idea of 
theology in se. “There is no such thing,” he says, “as theology in itself if we mean that it 
is not in some intellect.”146 However, Ockham goes on, “if we mean theology in se as that 
knowledge which has evidence from its object and is an evident habit from its object, as 
is the case for the Blessed, then I say there are distinct habits or there are at least able to 
be distinct habits.”147 It is here that a concern for the theology of the Blessed makes an 
appearance, even if beatific knowledge is not exactly what Scotus meant by theologia in 
se. The immediate import is Ockham’s claim that even for the Blessed, theology is a 
conglomeration of many distinct habits with many distinct pieces of knowledge. This is 
true even when it comes to direct and immediate knowledge of the divine essence—not 
merely some concept suppositing for the divine essence—because “diverse attributes are 
[still] able to be known about God.”148 
 But this commitment to the diversity of habits that make up theology raises 
several other concerns for the objector, the second of which is especially relevant. The 
objector claims that, if this is true, theology cannot be practical, because, “when the 
Blessed knows [the distinct proposition] ‘God should be loved most of all by the 
 
146 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:342). “Ad secundum dico quod nulla est 
theologia in se ita quod non sit in aliquo intellectu.” 
147 Ibid. “Si tamen loquatur vocando theologiam in se illam quae habet evidentiam ex obiecto et est habitus 
evidens ex obiecto, sicut est in beato, dico quod ibi sunt habitus distincti vel saltem possunt esse.” 
148 Ibid. “Sed dico quod de eodem subiecto possunt esse distinctae notitiae propter distinctionem 
praedicatorum, sicut declaratum est in praecedenti quaestione…ita de Deo possunt sciri diversae passiones, 
et per consequens poterunt haberi diversi habitus.” 
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pilgrim’” he will not have practical knowledge,”149 though this was surely a piece of 
practical knowledge for the pilgrim.  Ockham responds, first by partially conceding the 
point. Indeed, this particular piece of knowledge for the Blessed remains a part of beatific 
theology, but it can no longer be considered practical. However, Ockham goes on to 
state: “the Blessed knowing [the distinct proposition] “God should be loved most of all 
by the Blessed” does in fact have a practical piece of knowledge and this knowledge is 
theological.”150 By committing himself to this counterexample, Ockham has distanced 
himself from the position of Rimini in two ways. First, he admits that while the Blessed 
have an intuitive and direct knowledge of God, this does not prohibit them from having 
complex propositional knowledge as well. Thus, in principle, practical knowledge 
remains a possibility for the Blessed: a possibility ruled out by Rimini. But more 
importantly, by conceding that the Blessed do in fact have practical knowledge, Ockham 
also commits himself to the view that the Blessed still engage in “practices.” This 
practical knowledge formally directs the act of love required of the Blessed, which in turn 
must be construed as a practice, if it is directed by practical knowledge. Accordingly, this 
act of love must be an act within the power of the Blessed; it must be an act which 
proceeds from the knowledge that the Blessed possess and enacted or elicited by the 
choice of their beatified will. Rimini explicitly ruled out the idea that the love of the 
Blessed is an act within our power, and thus Ockham cannot be listed as one of the 
“common” opinions that view the beatified act of loving as act not within the power of 
 
149 Ibid., I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:343). “Quia beatus cognoscens quod Deus est summe diligendus a viatore 
non habet scientiam practicam…” 
150 Ibid., I, prol., q. 12 (OTh I:344). “Tamen dico quod beatus cognoscens quod Deus est summe diligendus 
ab ipso beato habet notitiam practicam et illa erit theologica.” 
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the Blessed. The question forces itself upon us one last time: Who does Rimini have in 
mind when he appeals to “common opinion” now that Ockham has been ruled out along 
with Scotus and Aureoli? We must acknowledge a separate influence: an influence which 
we can currently only identify in the position Giles of Rome and anyone who follows him 
on this point. 
XIV. Conclusion  
In sum, Rimini’s position is characterized by a common sense division of the 
obvious difference between types of theological propositions. He stands in opposition to 
Scotus here and is an acolyte of Ockham. Practical knowledge, for both Ockham and 
Rimini, is a proposition “formally directive” of a genuine practice. When the habit of 
theology is taken as a whole, Rimini privileges the practical. Love appears to be the true 
end of our theology and Rimini is ready to acknowledge, with Scotus, that abstract 
speculative propositions can have an important practical import. 
While love is distinguished as the real and proper end of the theological habit, we 
need to be very careful about what we mean by the act of love. Scotus carefully 
distinguished the act of love he had in mind from the act of love identified by Giles. For 
Giles, theology produced an affective love, which was not an act that originated from a 
human will; that is, it was not an act lying within our power. For Giles, theological 
knowledge produced this act and was the originating cause of further good acts. For 
Scotus, theological knowledge provided the possibility wherein we ourselves could will 
and produce an act of right love and thereby become good. Rimini’s analysis of practical 
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knowledge and its ensuing act of love departs from Giles on this point. The practice of 
love that theological knowledge directs is identified by Rimini as an action that lies 
within our power and is produced through the choice of our will.  
But finally, at the last moment, Rimini departs from this generally Scotist 
position. Departing from Ockham as well, Rimini hints at a difference between the act of 
love that theological knowledge in this life aims to produce and the act of love that the 
still contracted theological knowledge of the Blessed serves and directs. In this way 
Rimini has taken a middle position between Scotus and Ockham on the one hand and 
Giles on the other.151 Both extremes refuse to acknowledge a difference between the 
elicited act on earth and in heaven. For Giles theological knowledge in this life and 
theological knowledge in beatitude produce an affective love, which is not an act of love 
elicited by the agent’s will. For Scotus and Ockham, theological knowledge in this life 
and the next both direct an act of love that is still elicited through the agent’s will. Rimini 
takes a Scotist position regarding the practical nature of theology in this life, but takes a 
more Aegidian position regarding the affective nature of theological knowledge in the 
next. Of course, regarding the latter, we are forced to speculate a bit since Rimini does 
not invoke the language of an affective knowledge. However, in clearly ruling out the 
notion of both beatified love as a practice and beatified knowledge as a practical 
knowledge, he comes very close to taking this position.  
 
151 This is an intriguing middle position because it focuses on a divide between heavenly and earthly 
“theological practices,” despite the fact that (as we saw in the last chapter) Rimini was adament about 
denying any differnece between the subject matter of earthly and heavenly theology. On the subject matter 
of theology, Rimini follows Giles in focusing on a divide between finite and infinite theology over any 
divide between earthly and heavenly theology. But when it comes to the practices elicited from that 
knowlede, Rimini re-focuses on an earth/heaven divide. 
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The previous three chapters have in a way set the table for the main concern of 
Part II. In particular, three results of our study so far help to shape the discussion going 
forward. 
[1] The first is the close Aegidian assimilation of faith and theology, built in large 
part on Giles’s reading of the passage from De Trinitate XIV, c.1. [2] The second and 
closely related point that emerged is Peter Aureoli’s strong opposition to this Aegidian 
assimilation. In contrast, he opts for a separation between the habit of belief and the habit 
of theology, which supports the habit of belief. [3] A third important point that emerged 
especially from chapters one and two was that, whatever theological knowledge is, its 
content alone is not sufficient to distinguish from the other sciences. For Giles especially, 
the supernatural character by which these truths were known was an especially important 
part of what it means to know something theologically. Rimini, in turn, showed signs of 
following suit (signs which we will find confirmed as we go forward). 
The first and third results in a sense go together, and the second helps to highlight 
a problem. Theological knowledge is distinguished for Giles and Rimini, not just by what 
it claims knows, but by how it claims to know it, namely through the supernatural light of 
faith. Where other sciences and disciplines begin from evident principles, theology is said 
to treat that which cannot be accessed through appeals to sensible or natural things. 
Rather, theology treats a subject matter, which can only be directly accessed through a 
supernatural, but nevertheless inevident, faith. 
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The question that faces those who so strongly assimilate theological knowing with 
faith and inevident beginnings is: in what sense can this claim to knowledge really count 
as a kind of knowing? Embedded as it is in faith, what separates the simple believer from 
the theologian? Or in other words, how can theologians claim to distinguish themselves 
from the simple believer, if their knowledge continues to rely on faith and never finds a 
certainty or evidence apart from or beyond faith? As we will see, in Aureoli’s account of 
theological method, his separation of theology from faith and his insistence that theology 
looks to naturally known probable principles (while faith remains a separate inevident act 
of assent) allows him a path of escape from this problem. However, for thinkers like 
Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini, a more nuanced and subtle response will be 
required.  
In the following section, then, we are first going to look at the clues that Giles 
gives us about how he thinks the habit of theology is acquired and his relative silence 
about how this theological skill should be distinguished from the possession of faith. 
Then we will look at two early Augustinians, Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of 
Reggio, who share Giles’s basic convictions, but provide some further details about how 
the theologian could still be distinguished from the person of mere faith, despite the fact 
that no outside justification or evidence has been acquired.  
Finally, in the last two chapters, we will look at Gregory of Rimini’s general 
position on both the method of theological knowledge (what for earlier scholastics, like 
Giles, would be called the “efficient cause”) and the epistemic status of this achievement 
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(or the “formal cause” of theological knowledge), that is whether or not theology should 
be classified as a genuine science. 
Within these two formally distinct questions, we will actually see Gregory of 
Rimini establish and defend one basic position against two Franciscan extremes, the 
position of Peter Aureoli (chapter 6) on the one hand and Francis of Marchia (chapter 7) 
on the other. I will argue that, in different ways, both of these Franciscan positions 
attempt to solve the above problem by sharply separating the theological habit from mere 
faith. In their own manner, each Franciscan appeals to arguments and evidence that come 
from outside of faith and thereby bring a kind of external justification to faith that can be 
universally recognized, or at least appreciated. In contrast, Gregory of Rimini will defend 
a position that attempts to keep the theological habit entirely contained within the same 
habit of faith. In so doing, he will work out a solution to the above problem that makes no 
appeal to outside justification, but looks at theology as a habit of self-description or as a 
peculiar kind of self-knowledge. In this way, he remains faithful to the original core of 
Giles’s position and stands in accord with other Augustinians, who further developed this 
Aegidian position. 
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I. Introduction 
The combination of Giles’s position on the unique and restricted subject matter of 
theology with Sacra Pagina’s purely instrumental status as means to a supernatural kind 
love leads us to the central ambiguity of the Aegidian position: the relationship between 
faith and the discipline or habit of theology claimed by the professional academic 
theologian. 
As we have seen, the important quotation from Augustine’s De Trinitate is a 
customary place that theologians went to formulate an answer to this concern. 
Consequently, Giles’s interpretation of this passage provides us with some clues as to 
how he conceives of this relationship. Augustine speaks of a particular scientia whose job 
is to consider human and mortal matters only to the extent that knowledge grows, 
nourishes, defends, and strengthens that most salvific faith which leads to beatitude. 
Giles employs this quotation to show a couple of things. First, he uses it to show that 
theology is an instrument or an organ that leads to beatitude. Of course, Augustine does 
not use the word theology or Sacra Pagina here. He simply speaks of faith as leading us 
to beatitude. In the course of using this quotation to defend the idea that theology leads to 
beatitude, Giles clearly aligns Augustine’s use of the word “faith” with his use of the 
word “theology” and Sacra Pagina. At the same time he uses the quote to say that 
theology is limited in its knowledge of God, where Augustine was simply speaking about 
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the limited value of knowledge about human affairs for genuine wisdom. Thus, 
Augustine distinguishes between a faith (or faith-knowledge) that is instrumental to 
beatitude and a science that supports and aids that faith, while Giles elides the two 
concepts to speak about a knowledge that both leads to beatitude and is limited in its 
knowledge of God. 
But such elision raises questions. If theology proper is distinguished from other 
human sciences by its reliance on special revelation and infusion from God, then it is 
questionable whether it should be distinguished as a science at all. If it is not a science, it 
becomes an open question whether this quasi-scientific knowledge should or can be 
distinguished from the regular faith of the simple believer. A customary trope was to 
compare the knowledge of the theologian to the faith of an illiterate old woman (vetula).1 
Considering the closeness of Giles’s conception of faith and Sacra Doctrina, what 
difference can there be between the vetula and the professional theologian? Either the 
theologian is nothing other than a simple believer who adheres to revealed truths or the 
professional theologian alone possesses the instrument leading to beatitude, while the 
person incapable of a rational investigation of revealed truth is out of luck.  
II. The Efficient Cause of Theological Knowledge 
Giles’s discussion of the efficient cause of Sacra Pagina or theology offers us 
some clues about how an answer to this ambiguity might eventually be developed. 
However, we do not get much more than clues. In fact the most distinctive characteristic 
 
1 Cf. Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula.” 
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of Giles’s position on this question is that God is the real teacher of this knowledge, 
which must be received, just as faith is received. Thus the central ambiguity is reinforced: 
how does the faithful theologian differ from the one who simple receives God’s 
instruction in the light of faith? 
In light of his stark divorce between the human sciences and theology as 
something given by God, the question posed at the beginning of part three of his prologue 
raises an understandable concern. The question asks: “does God alone teach theology”? 
Given that theology is in no way a human science, can anyone really teach it but God 
himself? What is more, this concern has a genuinely Augustinian precedent standing 
behind it. The conclusions of De magistro resound implicitly in the background of the 
question; God alone is the true teacher of knowledge. But if this is true, what justifies the 
intellectual effort of the theologian to teach himself and others? Wouldn’t ceaseless 
prayer and supplication be the best means of acquiring theology? Might the pious 
religious practice of the simple believer be a more effective means of acquiring 
theological knowledge than anything that can be accomplished in the classroom? This is 
not merely a theoretical question, but one with real world implications. Throughout the 
Middle Ages, sitting side by side with the schools and its universities, were the 
monasteries, which represented a very different approach to the pursuit of knowledge and 
God.2 The answer one gives, therefore, to this kind question is decisive for the value one 
gives to each of these institutions.  
 
2 For a survey of monastic culture in the Middle Ages begin with Jean Leclerq, The love of learning and the 
Desire for God, (Fordham, 1996).   
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Giles’s sed contra reserves hope for the justification of the theologian’s efforts 
through recourse to an Aristotelian adage: “The sign of one who knows is the ability to 
teach.”3 This single appeal to the commonsense notion that if I really know something, 
whether God taught it to me or not, then I can explain it and share it with someone else. 
This is a criterion of knowledge that will be raised again by later theologians asking 
similar questions.4 But it presupposes that human effort can still achieve results even 
when we are dealing with a knowledge that lies beyond what our purely natural capacities 
are able to discover on their own. 
With the supernatural character of theology firmly established on the one hand 
and the belief that genuine knowledge brings with it the power and capability to teach, 
Giles attempts to reconcile this Augustinian-Aristotelian difficulty. His first response is to 
identify different layers of efficient causality. These are identified as distinct types of 
agents: a universal, particular, and administrative agent.5 The identity of these three 
efficient causes is discovered through observing nature, particularly the production and 
growth of life. In one respect, the rotation of the celestial bodies is responsible for this 
growth. Here one must think of the action of the sun. But the sun by itself does not cause 
a fruit tree to bear fruit. The nature of a fruit tree also has something to do with the 
production of its fruit. Finally, even the sun and the intrinsic nature of the fruit true are 
 
3 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 3, f. 7rb. “...quia nullus docet aliquem aliquam 
scientiam, nisi habeat illam...” Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, c. 1, 981b8-10. 
4 Cf. Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem. sect. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:150–151). 
5 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 3, f. 7rb–7va. “Respondeo dicendum quod 
secundum quosdam triplex est agens: universale, particulare, et administrativum, sicut est videre in rebus 
naturalibus. Nam agens universale est ipsum corpus superceleste[?] sive Deus; particulare est natura 
alicuius rei; ut natura frumenti in productione frumenti[?]; administrativum est, quod adhibet semina, vel 
subministr[?] ea per quae operatio habet fieri, sicut est videre in sanitate.”  
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not sufficient. Nature teaches us that there is also an administrative efficient cause. In the 
case of the fruit tree, the administrative is something that helps the seed to grow and 
become a fruit. Judging by Giles’s second example, he must have in mind a farmer who 
waters and cares for the seed. The second example deals with the production of health. 
Here God is identified as the universal efficient cause and the nature of the human person 
is identified as the particular cause. But the doctor is said to be an administrative cause to 
the effect of health.6 
From these two examples, a transition is made to the production of learning in 
general.7 Giles writes: “In this instance, the universal agent is God, the particular agent is 
human reason, and the administrative agent is man or an angel.”8 The final explanation of 
how this process works is fully Augustinian in character. He proceeds from the belief that 
in human reason are some inchoate seeds planted by God, just as is the case with the 
growth of natural things. And from these seeds, the knowledge is drawn out into 
actuality. In the mind, these seeds are the first principles, which God, the universal 
effective cause, inserted “naturally” into the mind. From these seeds or principles 
knowledge is ultimately produced of which God is the universal author, reason is the 
particular author, and men or angels are the administrative authors.9 
 
6 Ibid., prol., pars 3, f. 7va. “. . . sicut est videre in sanitate, nam agens universale est corpus superceleste[?] 
sive Deus; particulare est natura hominis; adminstratum est medicus, qui nihil aliud facit nisi quod scientia 
adhibet.” 
7 Ibid. “Sic est et in doctrina sicut est in productione naturalium.” 
8 Ibid. “Nam agens universale est ibi Deus; agens particulare est ibi ratio humana; agens adminstrativum est 
ibi homo vel angelus.” 
9 Ibid. “Et sicut videtur in rebus naturalibus quod sunt ibi quaedam inchoationes  seminum ex quibus 
seminibus res in esse producuntur, ita etiam in doctrina, sunt enim quaedam seminaria scientiarum in 
intellectu nostro ex quibus omnes scientiae oriuntur. Haec enim seminaria sunt prima principia quae Deus 
unicuique naturaliter inseruit et ex istis seminibus scientia efficitur Deo auctore universaliter, ratione 
particulariter, homine et angelo administrative.” 
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Giles leaves us to speculate somewhat about how this general schema is to be 
applied in the case of faith-knowledge. When it comes to the knowledge of Sacra 
Doctrina, the revealed doctrine is a likely source of God’s general teaching. It stands as a 
data source, which human beings cannot derive or deduce for themselves, but can only 
receive and pass on.  However, the above account also leaves room for human beings and 
angels to have an administrative role in the passing on of theological knowledge. This 
question occupies the final section of Giles’s treatment of this subject and requires him to 
provide a separate analysis of knowing that focuses on the immediate mechanics of 
knowing rather than the three different efficient causes.  
Giles asserts that, in order to really know something, two things are required: an 
arranged order of species and a light. We have already seen that he discuss the necessity 
of a light for any cognitive discipline, but now it is discussed in more detail alongside the 
initially obtuse requirement of an “arranged order of species.” Behind this assertion is a 
way of thinking about cognition, quite common to the medieval world. Cognition and the 
acquisition of knowledge is modeled after the physical act of seeing.10 Giles explains that 
the eye cannot see its object unless there is a light. But at the same if there is no object, 
then the light is useless. This helps explain the second requirement of an arranged order 
of species. Referring still to visible objects he writes: “An order of species is also 
required, because if the visible thing did not diametrically offer itself to the eye, such that 
 
10 For a definitive history of this causal theory of knowing see Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of 
Ockham. 
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there would be an indirect multiplication of species, then there would never be vision.”11 
Giles, like those before him, thinks vision takes place through the object’s impression of 
a likeness on the ocular organ. But of course, in viewing a stone, it is not a stone itself 
that physically affects the eye. Rather the stone emits a physical, though transparent, 
likeness that eventually affects the eye. But here he is particularly attentive to the orderly 
nature in which a chain of species reaches the eye. It must proceed diametrically 
otherwise there is no vision. If the process is somehow distorted or “unordered,” then real 
vision does not happen. (One might think here of a transmission of species distorted by a 
prism). In any case, a proper succession is essential to Giles for proper vision.  
This then is analogously applied to intellectual vision. In addition to some light 
which illuminates the intelligible objects that our minds hope to see, a proper ordered 
arrangement of species is necessary. He gives us one more analogy.  
Just as letters rightly ordered make syllables and speech, which the same 
letters arranged differently constitute nothing. So the same words arranged 
in one way make us to know, while arranged in another way do not 
generate knowledge.12 
 
11 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 3, f. 7vb. “Requiritur etiam ordo specierum quia 
nisi res visibilis diametraliter offerretur oculo, ita quod esset indirectum multiplicatio speciei, nunquam 
esset visio.”  
 The translation is a bit difficult here, since in one way the sentence seems like it could be 
construed to say “unless the visible thing was diametrically offered to the eye, with the result that there 
would be an indirect multiplication . . .” But on the other hand it seems like it could also say, “if the visible 
thing was not offered diametrically, and as a consequence, the multiplication of species would then be 
indirect, then there would be no vision.” I opt for the latter, since the passage wants to emphasize order 
versus disorder, and it is possible that the ‘diametrical’ and ‘indirect’ form a parallel contrast. 
12 Ibid., prol., pars 3, f. 7va. “Quia sicut litterae recte ordinatae faciunt syllabas et orationes quae eaedem 
aliter ordinatae nihil constituunt, ita eadem verba uno ordine prolata faciunt scire, quae prolata aliter non 
aggenerant scientiam.” 
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These elements lead Giles to assert that there are actual two distinct ways to teach 
someone. The first way of teaching has to do with the light. The second has to do with the 
order of species. 
Teaching by the light actually involves two sub-modes; either by the creation of a 
new light or by the strengthening a created light. Angels, according to Giles, are not able 
to create a new light in us, but that can strengthen an existing light. It is left to God alone 
to be able to create new lights in us. But angels are instructive because besides being able 
to strengthen an existing light they can contribute to the ordered arrangement of species 
in us. How do they do this? Giles says “by leading the phantasms back, in an orderly 
manner, to the first sensitive object.”13 While suggestive, he does not expand on this 
statement and leaves us to guess exactly what he has in mind.  
In comparison to angels, human beings are even more limited. Like angels, they 
cannot create new lights for people, and unlike Angels, human beings cannot even 
strengthen the lights of other people. However, human beings do have one teaching 
power in common with angels, and this is the human ability to “in some way affect the 
order of phantasms.”14 But how do human beings engage in the task of ordering and 
arranging? Giles provides us with one small clue. Human beings can teach or order in this 
 
13 Ibid. “Potest etiam angelus efficere in nobis ordinationem specierum reducendo phantasmata ordinate ad 
primum sensitivum.” 
14 Ibid. “Potest tamen aliquo modo ordinem phantasmatum efficere…” 
 It is worth noting the way the language of phantasms has entered in our discourse, when before we 
had only been concerned with the ordered arrangement of species. Giles offers us no help in sorting out this 
shift in language. I suggest that we do not get thrown off track too much by this language. It is quite 
conceivable that Giles uses the word phantasms to indicate a kind of intra-mental species analogous to the 
physical species affecting the eye in the production of physical sight. Perhaps the focus on phantasms rather 
than species is indication of the way human beings can teach other human beings, namely by helping to 
order the thoughts of others, while human beings are less likely to be able to affect and alter the physical 
transmission of sensitive species, though this might be possible as well. 
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way when “they write or say things in an ordered way; on account of these things [written 
or said] the ones hearing or reading are moved to grasping (capturing) knowledge.”15 
This is all the help we get, but he appears to suggest that through language we can help 
order the concepts of others and help them see the sources and causes of what they know. 
He concludes by acknowledging that people often say that God alone teaches 
(here we must think of those who argue from Augustine’s De Magistro); he admits that in 
a way they are right, for neither humans nor angels teach without the power of God. In 
this case, it is God’s infusion of the light of faith that makes all other teaching within 
theology possible. But if God’s power is operating, angels and humans can have some 
positive effect. This positive effect is primarily achieved through speaking and writing, 
and through speaking and writing we are able to order and arrange the phantasms in our 
minds and the mind’s of others. The extent of our knowledge, therefore, is in many ways 
limited by the light we have been given and that which has been illuminated. But with 
regard to what we are given, we can make a better and worse use of it; what has been 
illuminated can be organized poorly and thus we can still lack vision or it can be arranged 
well and thus we can see. Human effort and teaching are not, according, to Giles 
ineffectual in this process of ordering. While the effect of this effort is limited and 
contained within the context of what was originally given or taught by God, it can still 
produce results. 
In conclusion, Giles’s position on the human ability to teach Sacra Pagina, and 
thus the definining characteristic of the theologian, remains general, but it does retain 
 
15 Ibid. “Potest tamen aliquo modo ordinem phantasmatum efficere inquantum aliqua ordinate scribit vel 
dicit; propter quae audiens vel legens movetur ad scientiam capiendam.” 
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some defining characteristics. [1] One characteristic is the fact that the human teacher 
begins from what is first supernaturally given; their knowledge and their teaching begin 
from a supernatural source. If Giles is clear about anything, it is that theology does not 
begin from any knowledge of sensible or natural things. [2] The second characteristic is 
that the theologian does not go beyond what God has taught. The administrating human 
being only arranges and orders in an effectual way what God has already given.  
In light of these two characteristics, we must again note how oddly Giles’s 
description of theology fits with Augustine’s definition of that science, which nourishes 
and strengthens faith. For Augustine, the person with science was able to use their 
knowledge of temporal matters to bolster faith. But this is not allowed in Giles 
understanding. The human involvement with Sacra Doctrina is merely to arrange what 
has already been given and to never go beyond it. Thus, our original ambiguity remains: 
How does the theologian go beyond faith? What possible claim to knowledge can he 
make, since he always begins with what has been received through faith and never 
progresses beyond it? Let us turn now to two later Augustinian witnesses, who attempt to 
nuance Giles’s position, while remaining committed to the two characteristic of 
theological teaching articulated above. 
Chapter 5: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper Reggio: On the Habit of Theology and the 
Habit of Faith
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I. Augustinus of Ancona 
The exact birthdate of Augustinus of Ancona is unknown, but the present 
conjecture is that he was born sometime around 1275.  In the year 1300, the Augustinian 
order selected him to “read” the Sentences and he finished those lectures in 1303, which 
now survive in one manuscript (Troyes ms. 0296). When he completed his education in 
Paris, he was sent to teach in Italy. He later returned to Paris around 1315 as a Master of 
Theology, where he conducted quodlibetal debates and disputations. He died in the year 
1328.1  
While Augustinus is most well known for his political works,2 Adolar Zumkeller 
notes that “in both epistemology and psychology, as expressed in his widely known 
treatise De cognitione animae, Augustine of Ancona is a faithful disciple of Giles of 
Rome.”3 And later he writes: “his teaching bears quite a Thomist stamp, and in the way 
that for him Giles is always the mediator of Aquinas’ teaching. Yet, even in relation to 
 
1 For a full account see: B. Ministeri, ‘Agostino d’Ancona (Agostino Trionfo)’, Dizionario Biografico degli 
Italiani, Url = http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/agostino-d-ancona_(Dizionario-Biografico); Zumkeller, 
Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 31–32. 
2 See Michael Wilks (1963), The problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages. The Papal Monarchy 
with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists; William J. Bouwsma (1968), Venice and the Defense of 
Republican Liberty, University of California Press, p. 312; As Zumkeller noted in 1996, of the “many-sided 
and voluminous writings. . . only the works on ecclesiastical policy have until now been examined in more 
detail” (Ibid., 31). This claim seems to me to be as true today as it was when it was written. 
3 Ibid., 32. 
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Giles, Augustine shows a pleasing independence.”4 For us, two questions from his 
prologue give us a rare glimpse into the lasting influence of Giles’s thought on later 
Augustinian hermits. The two questions are strikingly familiar in their content and 
phrasing. 
In part two of his prologue, question three, Augustinus asks, just as Giles did, 
“whether God alone teaches this science.”5 The second question of the same part of the 
prologue asks “whether the habit of theology differs from the habit of faith.”6 This 
question in particular, which Giles did not explicitly treat, shows that the ambiguity 
identified in the previous chapter has not gone away. Instead it has become an urgent 
question needing direct attention.  
In treating the position of Augustinus of Ancona, we will first look at how he 
expands Giles’s description of how God and humans respectively teach theology. We 
will then look at how he addresses the central problem of distinguishing faith from 
theology, while preserving its entirely supernatural character. 
II. Whether God Alone Teaches this Science? 
Augustinus begins his response to this question by positing two Aegidian 
requirements in order for any doctrine to be learned. First a light is needed and second an 
“order of species is needed.” From this assertion, he makes the predictable division that a 
doctrine is able to be taught in two ways, either through the light or through the ordering 
 
4 Ibid. 
5 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, 9rb; “Tertio quaeritur utrum solus Deus hanc 
scientiam doceat?” 
6 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, 8rb; “Secundo quaeritur utrum habitus istius 
scientiae differat ab habitu fidei.” 
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of species.7 And here, Augustinus is particularly valuable because he adds helpful details 
where Giles was vague and opaque.  
These two possible ways of teaching are further broken down by Augustinus into 
five sub-types. Teaching can occur (1) through the creation of a light (sometimes called 
the infusion of a light); (2) through the determination or unification of a light; (3) through 
the impression of an intelligible species; (4) through the formation of propositions or 
words from a previous impression; (5) through the expression and explanation of those 
formed propositions or words.8 
Like Giles, Augustinus believes it belongs to God alone to create new lights. 
Theology especially can only be taught by God in the first mode, because it belongs to 
God alone to infuse the light of faith.9 Likewise, the second mode is proper to God and 
angels, who are able to strengthen (comfortare) an existing light.10 But stages three, four, 
and five are especially interesting since they touch upon the teaching role of Christ and 
 
7 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, 9rb; “Responsio: dicendum quod aliqui dicunt duo 
esse requirenda ad hoc, quod in aliquo doctrina causetur. Primum est lumen; Secundum est ordinatio 
specierum.” 
8 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, 9va; “Dicamus ergo alia via incedendo unum posse 
alium docere, quinque modis. Primo: lumen creando, et sic praedictum lumen infundendo. Secundo: lumen 
eius determinando et uniendo. Tertio: speciem intelligibilem imprimendo. Quarto: propositionem et 
sermonem ex illa impressione formando.  Quinta: illas propositiones et sermones formatos aliis exprimendo 
et exponendo.” 
9 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9va; “Primo modo possumus docere quod hanc 
doctrina docet solus Deus, quia cum ista scientia innitatur immediate lumeni fidei.” 
10 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; “Hic igitur modo angelus potest nostrum 
lumen confortare, et angelus superior potest angelum inferiorem illuminare, quia angeli multa sciunt et 
multa vident in divina essentia, quae nos ignoramus. Ex hoc igitur quod nobis illa tenebant nostrum lumen 
determinatur et unitur, ut sicut antequam sciamus, noster intellectus vacillat et fertur in diversa, sic, 
postquam scimus et causam rei cognoscimus, noster intellectus unitur et determinatur, sic etiam angelus 
superior plura videt et limpidius et clarius cognoscit aliqua in lumen gloriae vel in divina essentia quam 
angelus inferior; potest angelus superior illa, quae sic clare cognoscit, angelo inferiori revelare, ex qua 
revelatione incipit angelus inferior cognoscere prius non cognoscebat, et eius lumen unitur et determinatur, 
sicut prius erat sparsum et diversum. Et per consequens lumen eius dicitur esse fortificatum, quia virtus 
unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa. Per hunc ergo modum hanc doctrinam potest docere ipse angelus. Ideo, de  
multis quae in hac sacra doctrina continentur, per revelationes angelorum edocti sumus.” 
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the Apostles and the Modern Doctors. As such, they provide welcome detail about how 
and in what way human beings can teach theology.  
Christ, present in the flesh, (inquantum homo) was able to impress unique species 
on those who were present with him, i.e. those who witnessed his passion, resurrection, 
ascension, and diverse miracles. Augustinus seems to grant that human beings can teach 
indirectly through the impressions of species, for he says: “man is able to impress an 
intelligible species into the intellect of another indirectly, by pressing something on to the 
sense.”11 This kind of teaching is only possible for teacher and student who are 
physically and temporally together. There is nothing particularly supernatural about the 
general mechanics of Christ’s teaching at this level. What is special about Christ’s 
teaching was what he chose to impress on the sense organs of those who were present 
with them.12 As Augustinus says:  
Through his incarnation, he impressed on the senses of his disciples and 
others believers the mystery of his incarnation, passion, resurrection, and 
ascension and in some mode the mystery of his divinity through the 
operation of diverse miracles. From the impression of which, they 
received intelligible species in the intellect, through which they were able 
to be taught all the things which were contained in this doctrine [i.e. 
theology].13 
 
11 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; “Nam sicut homo potest imprimere speciem 
intelligibilem in intellectum alterius indirecte, imprimendo aliquid in sensu, ex qua impressione formatur 
idolum et similitudo in phantasia, et ex phantasmate illo, virtute intellectus agentis, gignitur species 
intelligibilis in intellectu potentiali.” 
12 The role of miracles in Christ’s teaching and in compelling assent is a topic that will emerge again in the 
debates between Marchia and Rimini and we would do well to not this connection here. See below, 
“Interlude,” p. 306 and chapter 7, pp. 338-353. 
13 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; “Per suam incarnationem, impressit sensibus 
suorum discipulorum et aliorum credentium mysterium suae incarnationis passionis, resurectionis et 
ascensionis, et aliquo modo mysterium divinitatis per diversorum miraculorum operationes. Ex quorum 
impressione, receperunt species intelligibiles in intellectu, per quas doceri poterant de omnibus quae in hac 
doctrina continentur.” 
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Especially important here is what Augustinus emphasizes again at the end of the 
passage: this kind of teaching and acquisition of theological knowledge is unique to those 
who were present with Christ and who could be taught by him. With Christ’s temporal 
departure, this way of teaching theology ceased.14  
The fourth way of teaching, therefore, belongs to those who were direct receivers 
of the teaching of Christ. Only those who were present with Christ are able to take those 
“intelligible species” “which they have regarding those things about Christ which they 
heard and saw through the senses" and teach others. The manner of their teaching is to 
take those intelligible species, which they uniquely possess and to form words and 
propositions in writing for the benefit of those who were not able to be physically present 
to Christ’s teaching.15  
The fifth and final mode of teaching is the mode of teaching left for “the doctors 
and teachers who are now” (qui nunc sunt).16 In this mode, we have reached a description 
of what the modern day theologian does: the function that defines the theological 
profession. The teaching role of those “who are now” is different from the previous 
modes, in that it is restricted to the propositions and words (sermones) that were 
bequeathed to them by the Prophets and the Apostles. Their job is take to take these 
words and expressions and articulate them and expound them for others (aliis inferioribus 
 
14 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9vb; Unde ipse Christus dicebat eis:4 "beati oculi 
qui vident quae vos videtis." 
15 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, ff. 9vb-10ra; “Quarto modo hanc scientiam 
docuerunt Apostoli, qui ex speciebus intelligibilibus, quas habebant de hiis quae per sensus audierunt et 
viderunt de Christo debitas propositiones et debitos sermones formaliter et praesentes, docebant; et propter 
fictos et absentes in Scriptis redigebant.” 
16 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 10ra; “Quinto modo docent istam scientiam 
doctores et praedicatores qui nunc sunt.” 
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exprimunt et exponunt). Especially characteristic of Augustinus’s position is his 
insistence that the teaching theologian should have no interest in going beyond what they 
receive from the Prophets, Apostles, and Evangelists. Nor is there any mention of proving 
or defending what the Scriptures have handed down. The job is to begin from these 
formed propositions and then express them (exprimere) and expound (exponere) them.17 
Augustinus includes a citation from John the Damascene that furthers this point:  
All those things which are handed down to us through the law in the 
prophets, the apostles, and the evangelists, we undertake and we venerate 
and we know, while inquiring about nothing beyond these things.18 
Through the above schema, Augustinus has provided us with a significant expansion of 
Giles’s brief description of the teaching function of the theologian, while remaining 
generally faithful to the basic spirit of the Aegidian position. Where Giles leaves us with 
the somewhat ambiguous statement that “human beings aid in God’s teaching of Sacra 
Pagina through the ordering of species,” Augustinus has taken this basic position and 
added precision. The “ordering of species” available to professional theologians now 
means to “express” (exprimere) and “expound” (exponere) the propositions and words 
handed down through the scriptural text by those who were present with Christ. The job 
for the present-day theologian is to make the consequences of these propositions clear to 
those who cannot always see them.  
 
17 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 10ra; “…qui illa, quae conscripta sunt per 
prophetas et apostolos de mysterio Trinitatis et de Christo incarnato, aliis inferioribus exprimunt et 
exponunt.” 
18 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 10ra; “Unde Damascenus primo libro et capitulo 
ait: ‘omnia quae tradita sunt nobis per legem prophetis et apostolos et evangelistas suscipimus et venerantur 
et cognoscimus, nihil ultra haec inquirentes’.” Cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, I, c. 1. 
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The defining characteristics of Giles’s position also characterize conception of 
theology held by Augustinus. The knowledge that the present day professional theologian 
can make a claim to is [1] a knowledge that is entirely supernaturally given, even if it was 
initially received through the senses of the Apostles who were present with God 
incarnate. And, second [2] Augusitnus expects the theologian to begin only from what 
has been given and to arrange this knowledge so as to help others receive it as well.19 
Again, there is no hint that the theologian should be looking for ways to prove what God 
has already given or to ground that knowledge in a naturally acquired knowledge that can 
be derived from sensible things.  
But still confined only to what is given and known through faith, we are still left 
to wonder if and how the theologian can be distinguished from the simple believer. 
Augustinus attempts to address this question in the second question of the second part of 
his prologue, where he addresses the last part of the quotation from De Trinitate XIV that 
Giles conveniently ignored.  
III. Whether Theology Is Something Different from Faith? 
In question two of part two of his prologue, Augustinus asks whether theology is 
a different habit from the habit of faith. He begins his response by citing the pro and 
contra for each side of the question. One argument, in favor of the distinction, relies on 
the last part of the all-important passage from Augustine’s De Trinitate XIV, c. 1.20 After 
 
19 See these two characteristics as the conclusion of our treatment of Giles in the previous chapter, p. 218.  
20 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, f. 8rb; “Praeterea: quando aliqua duo sunt unum 
realiter, ubicumque reperitur unum, invenitur reliquum. Si ergo habitus et habitus istius scientiae sunt idem 
Chapter 5: Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper Reggio: On the Habit of Theology and the 
Habit of Faith | 234 
 
                                                                                                                                                
asserting that this science is somehow tied to faith in its aspirations toward beatitude, the 
remainder of the quotations reads: 
Very many of the faithful do not excel in such knowledge, though they 
excel very much in faith itself. It is one thing to know only what a man 
should believe in order to gain the happy life which is nothing if it is not 
eternal; quite another to know how the godly are to be assisted in this and 
how the attacks of the ungodly upon it are to be met, and it is this that the 
apostle seems to call by the proper name of knowledge.21 
The quote seems to mandate a difference between those who have this science and the 
simple faithful, “who do not excel in such a science.” Particularly important is the 
emphasis on theology’s “defensive” nature against the “impious” or “ungodly.” The 
ability to defend is a key characteristic that separates the theologian from the simple 
believer. But just what it means “to defend” and just who the “impious” are remain open 
questions. 
In the sed contra, we can see two clear Aegidian-like concerns with such a 
rigorous separation: the first is that if faith and theology were distinct habits, then it 
would be necessary to posit two infused lights, the impossibility of which, Ancona says, 
was proved in an earlier question. But such a concern is concordant with Giles’s 
 
realiter quicumque haberet unum, haberet reliquum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum XIV De Trinitate 
capitulo primo, ubi ait: ‘quod multi pollent ipsa fide qui non pollent ista scientia’.” 
21 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, n. 3, (trans. Hill, 371); “qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, 
quamuis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter 
adipiscendam uitam beatam quae non nisi aeterna est, aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis 
opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quam proprio appellare uocabulo scientiam uidetur apostolus’ (De 
Trinitate in Cornelius Mayer (ed.), Saint Augustine: Opera Omnia CAG, Electronic edition, 
(Charlottesville, Virginia, 2000), IV 424, ll. 61-67. 
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insistence that Sacra Pagina is a knowledge that is achieved in and through the light of 
faith alone.22 
In the second place, Augustinus takes it for granted that habits are distinguished 
through their acts. However, he notes what will be a central conviction of Gregory of 
Rimini: namely, that the proper terminating act of faith and the proper act of this doctrine 
(i.e. theology) is “to believe,” and therefore there is only one habit. That theology’s 
proper act is an act of belief means that if faith and theology were separate habits, they 
could not co-exist. This is not a consequence for those, like Peter Aureoli, who hold that 
theology’s proper act is something other than “belief.” For him, faith and theology can be 
separate and yet co-exist in the same subject, because they do not culminate in mutually 
exclusive acts. Because Augustinus thinks they both culminate in belief and both belong 
to the same subject, it is impossible that they should be classified as different habits or 
abilities.  
The rest of Ancona’s response aims to respond to the concern derived from the 
quotation from De Trinitate, while upholding this Aegidian position. So he says:  
Having seen what is meant by the different intellectual habits and the 
different gifts of grace, we aim to provide some reasons that show that the 
habit of this science, that is about believable things (credibilibus) only 
(simpliciter) is not to be distinguished from faith.23 
He first points out some further problematic consequences of allowing a distinction like 
this: (1) the merit of faith would be removed; (2) the enigmatic faith in this life would be 
 
22 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, ff. 8rb-8va; “In contrarium est, quia si habitus istius 
scientiae esset alius ab habitu fidei, cum uterque esset infusus, oporteret ponere duplex lumen infusum, 
quod reprobatum est in superiori quaestione.” 
23 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, f. 8vb; “Viso ergo quomodo dixerunt ista, ut sunt 
habitus intellectuales, et ut sunt dona gratis data, volumus aliquas rationes adducere ostendentes habitum 
istius scientiae, ut est de ipsis credibilibus simpliciter, non distingui ab habitu fidei.” 
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overcome, (3) the most noble habit [i.e. faith] would be overshadowed; (4) a person 
would know and believe at the same time. 
Underlying each of these further concerns, we can see a clearly Aristotelian sense 
of “to know” (scire or epistasthai) standing in the background. Aristotle first defines 
knowledge (translated as “understanding” by Barnes) in a general way. We have scientia 
when “when we think we know of the explanation of which the object holds that it is its 
explanation, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise.”24 But then Aristotle 
goes on to make a further qualification about the kind of “understanding” or “knowledge” 
he is talking about.   
Whether there is another type of understanding we shall say later: here we 
assert that we do know things through demonstrations. By a demonstration 
I mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific deduction I mean a 
deduction by possessing which we understand something.25  
We can see, then, that there are really two criteria of the kind of understanding Aristotle 
has in mind. The first (1) is that it is deductive; the “knowledge” he has in mind comes 
through a deduction from other premises. The second (2) is that this knowledge alerts us 
to both the cause of the conclusion and that such a conclusion cannot be otherwise. This 
latter criterion comes with certain conditions about the premises, which are employed in a 
given demonstration. He says:  
Then demonstrative understanding must proceed from items which are 
true and primitive and immediate and more familiar to and explanatory of 
the conclusions. (In this way the principles will also be appropriate to 
what is being proved.) There can be a deduction even if these conditions 
 
24 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 71b10-13 (Barnes 2). 
25 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I:2, 71b16-19 (Barnes 2). 
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are not met, but there cannot be a demonstration—for it will not bring 
about understanding.”26  
In short, we can see that the requirement that this knowledge be deductive is a necessary, 
but insufficient condition of “knowledge” or scientia. In addition, the deduction must be 
made from premises that yield evidence and certainty about a given conclusion. From 
these premises, we can say that knower possesses his or her own justification for the truth 
of the conclusion in question. It is on the basis of this evidence that the knower knows 
that she “knows.” 
 Augustinus has this full Aristotelian definition of knowledge in mind in the third 
question of the second part of his prologue. In his attempt to explain how angels teach, he 
appeals to Aristotle directly: “For since ‘to know’ is ‘to know the cause of a thing’ 
according to the teaching of the Philosopher, the one who makes someone to know the 
cause of something is properly said to teach.”27 For Augustinus, it is not enough that 
someone performs a deduction; to have genuine “science,” they must also possess an 
“explanation” that provides indubitable evidence for the conclusion.  
 From this definition, we can see why Augustinus presents the above worries. (1) 
If theology as a science brings its own certainty and justification for the truths of faith, 
what would be meritorious about this assent? It would simply be a natural compulsion of 
the intellect. (2) Likewise, what good would faith be, if what was once known obscurely 
and engimatically, were now known with evidence and clarity? (3) Third, this theological 
science would be better than mere faith, even though faith is supposed to be the noblest 
 
26 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I:2, 71b20-25 (Barnes 2-3).  
27 Augustinus de Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 3, f. 9va; “Secundo modo docere ipse angelus. Nam, 
cum 'scire' sit 'causam rei congnoscere' secundum doctrinam Philosophi, ille proprie dicitur 'alium docere', 
qui 'facit eum causam aliquamquicuius[?] cognoscere.” 
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habit. (4) And finally, if these two habits coexisted, then we would at once be saying we 
believed something on faith, which we also knew to be certain through evidence that no 
one could doubt. In each of these rebuttals it is the supposition of evidence in the 
Aristotelian definition of the knowledge that makes the two habits incompatible.28  
 It cannot be, then, that the theologian surpasses the simple believer because he 
knows with evidence what the simple believer only believes. We know this is not what 
Augustinus meant because we have already seen that, for him, those with the theological 
habit begin only from what is supernaturally taught. They begin from inevident principles 
passed down by those who were taught by Christ, not from self-evident propositions 
drawn from nature. The quotation from De Trinitate XIV must be interpreted in some 
other way than by appeal to the Arisotelian conception of epistēmē. In his response to the 
principle argument based on the Augustinian quotation, Augustinus attempts to interpret 
this passage in another way, consistent with the Aegidian tradition. He writes:  
For with respect to those things which are contained in this science, which 
do not exceed our intellect, ‘many are strong in the faith, who are not 
strong in this science’. Similarly, with respect to those things, which are 
only able to believed, many are strong in the ‘cognition of faith’, such that 
they know what ought to be believed, who are not strong in the cognition 
and aforementioned science, and through this [cognition of faith] they are 
able to defend the faith against the impious and instruct others in each 
both. Nevertheless, there is one habit of faith, not in number, but in 
species, although, in those who are stronger, it exists in a clearer mode and 
with greater effect than it does in weaker people.29 
 
28 See Sweeney, “Aquinas’ Notion of Science,” pp. 149-160 for a helpful discussion of similar concerns 
about the relationship between faith and science at the turn of the thirteenth century, especially in the 
writings of William of Auvergne. 
29 Augustinus of Ancona, Lectura, I, prol., pars 2, q. 2, f. 9ra-9rb; “Secundum autem sic solvitur: nam 
quantum ad illa quae continentur in ista scientia, quae non excedunt nostrum intellectum, multi pollent ipsa 
fide, qui non pollent hac scientia. Similiter quantum ad illa, quae sunt simpliciter credibilia,  multi pollent 
ipsa cognitione fidei, ut simpliciter sciunt quid credere debeant, qui non pollent cognitione et scientia 
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Of particular interest here is the way the “science” that Augustine speaks of can be two 
different things depending on which kind of proposition we are talking about. If a truth of 
the faith or of theology can be proved through metaphysics, it is true that there are many 
faithful people who are not trained in metaphysics and who therefore do not contain this 
knowledge. Giles would not want to identify this as theological knowledge, though he 
might acknowledge its possibility.30 More interesting is the notion of being strong in the 
“cognition of faith,” which he contrasts with those who have some skill in theologico-
metaphysics. Those who are strong in the “cognition of faith” are not necessarily strong 
in metaphysics, but they seem to be the real theologians that Augustinus has in mind. 
Augustinus, then, quite helpfully goes on to identify their distinctive ability, which in turn 
explains how we should understand Augustine’s notion of “defence.” The special ability 
of the theologians lies in their capacity to “know what ought to be believed.” Here we can 
see the sense of “express” and “expound” already introduced being carried forward, from 
those propositions left to us by the Apostles, the present day theologian can draw out 
what ought be explicitly believed.  The defense then cannot be against those who do not 
begin from a common belief in the truth of Scripture. On the contrary, this conception of 
theology can only oppose those who begin from the common starting point of faith, but 
makes errors about the conclusions that can or should be drawn from the initial point of 
belief.   
 
praedicta, ut per eam contra impios fides defenditur et alii instruetur in utriusque. Tamen est unus habitus 
fidei, non numero, sed specie, quamvis clariori modo et cum aliquo effectu sit in maioribus quam in 
minoribus.”  
30 Rimini will later show no ambiguity and will restrict theology proper to only those truths deduced from 
scripture even if the same truth can reached through metaphysics. See below, c. 6, p. 287. 
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 Finally, we need to note that Augustinus allows for a division internal to the habit 
of faith, similar to a division that will be visible in Gregory of Rimini.31 Augustinus 
suggests that the theologian, by having expressed (exprimere) and expounded (exponere) 
the teaching passed on through writings of the Apostles, acquires a clearer knowledge. 
But clearer here cannot be understood in terms of Aristotelian evidence because the 
theologian never turns to principles other than what are given through faith. Instead 
“clearer” must be understood as “fuller” or “more robust,” since it is the theologian who 
is able to explicitly draw out the consequences of what is first only implicitly believed. 
And this is what Augustinus intends when says the “stronger people” have faith in a 
clearer mode with some effect. The theologian is able to see the effects of faith; she is 
able to see where the truths of Scripture lead. She is able to show others where they have 
erred in their deductions and to teach others to see the consequences of their faith.  
IV. Prosper of Reggio and His Reading of Ancona 
In contrast to Augustinus, the Augustinian Prosper of Reggio at first appears to be 
an Augustinian hermit who is about to abandon the Aegidian tradition wholesale. In the 
opening question of his prologue, he opposes Augustinus of Ancona, stating confidently 
that faith and theology are separate and distinct habits. 
 Prosper of Reggio Emilia was born sometime in the 1270’s and was presumably 
educated within the studia of the Augustinian Order. He read the Sentences at Paris and 
 
31 See below c. 7, p. 338. 
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then revised the prologue and other parts of the first distinction while in Italy sometime 
after 1318. In 1321 he was sent to Bologna to teach, and he died in 1332.32 
Prosper’s opening arguments against such a distinction between faith and 
theology reflect the core arguments of Ancona and further illustrate the basic Aegidian 
Position. As Ancona argued: habits are said to be distinguished by their acts, but the 
proper act in theology is belief, thus they must be the same habit.33An even more 
illuminating argument acknowledged by Prosper (again, visible in the text of Ancona) is 
the following: 
The intellectual habits are enumerated in book VI of the Nichomachean 
Ethics. But none of these kinds of habits are able to be acquired through 
the study of Scripture. 34 
The revealing part of this argument comes in the proof of the minor. 
The minor is proved because any acquired habit resolves into principles 
received from the senses. But the [the study of] Sacred Scripture resolves 
into divinely inspired principles.35  
In this proof, the criterion for an “acquired intellectual habit” is laid bare; it must be a 
knowledge that is derived from one’s experience with sensible things. The criterion is 
similar to what we described above as a criterion for evidence, where one acquires 
 
32 For a more extensive biographical overview and further reference points, see William J. Courtenay, 
‘Reflections on Vat. Lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia, O.E.S.A’, in Christopher Schabel (ed.) 
Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The fourteenth century (Leiden, 2007), 345-358); Zumkeller, 
Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 32–33. 
33 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Item, habitus distinguuntur per actus, ut habetur, II De anima, et 
habitus habentes eundem actum non distinguentur.  Sed haec doctrina et fides inclinant in eundem actum, 
scilicet in actum credendi articulis;  ergo etc.” 
34 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Item, habitus intellectuales numerantur, VI Ethicorum.  Sed 
nullus eorum potest adquiri ex studio sacrae Scripturae;  ergo etc.”  
35 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Minor probatur, quia quilibet habitus adquisitus resolvit in 
principia a sensu accepta.  Sed sacra Scriptura resolvit in principia divinitus inspirata.” 
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certainty for himself instead of relying on the teaching and authority of someone else.36 
Likewise, the inspiration behind this opening negative argument is very similar to Giles 
and Augustinus’s original understanding of Sacra Pagina. First, it does not begin from 
sensible things. It was this that constituted theology’s superiority over metaphysics and 
any other science that took its beginning from sensible things. Second and connected to 
the first, we see once more the criteria that the starting points or principles of this 
theology must be given; in this case, they are said to be principles, which are divinely 
inspired, meaning they cannot simply be taken or discovered in the world.  
In the opposition to these arguments, we face the familiar concern: what separates 
the professional theologian from the simple believing vetula? This is what Prosper asks in 
the Sed Contra: 
If besides the habit of infused faith, no other habit were posited in those 
studying Sacred Scripture, then the one knowing Sacred Scripture would 
not know how to defend the faith any better than the baptized vetula.37 
Prosper shows that he is preeminently concerned with the later part of the De Trinitate 
quotation.38 To make room for Augustine’s distinction between the faithful and those 
who are also “full of this science,” Prosper takes a different strategy. In an effort to 
recognize that the theologian possess a true ability that the simple believer does not, 
Prosper does not shy away from admitting that theology is a separate habit. Even more 
than this, he is willing to call this a “science,” raising for us all the concerns that 
 
36 See above, p. 236. 
37 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1ra. “Si praeter habitum fidei infusae non poneretur alius habitus in 
studentibus sacram Scripturam non magis sciens sacram Scripturam sciret fidem defendere quam vetula 
baptizata.” 
38 See above, p. 234, n. 21. 
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Augustinus raised about this very position. Prosper avoids these criticisms, not by 
denying their force, but by redefining the conception of scientia so that the criticisms 
become no longer relevant.  
He writes:  
By the word ‘habit’ we mean that thing possessed through which the one 
having the habit is disposed well or badly for performing an operation. For 
this is how the Philosopher defines habit in the fifth book of the 
Metaphysics, saying: ‘Habit is the disposition according to which one is 
disposed well or badly. And in the second book of the Ethics he states the 
same opinion saying: ‘Potency is that by which we are able to do 
something, a habit is that by which we are able to do something well or 
poorly’. When ‘habit’ is taken in this way, any science which disposes the 
one having it so that he can easily and quickly deduce conclusions from 
principles, is called an intellectual habit. (emphasis mine).39 
Relying on the Metaphysics and the Ethics, rather than the Posterior Analytics, Prosper 
identifies a science as one of those intellectual habits which disposes us to “deduce 
conclusions from principles.” Notably this definition makes reference neither to where 
one begins (from sensible things or from divine inspiration) nor to any criteria of 
evidence or self-evident principles. This definition focuses solely on the ability (“a habit 
by which we are able to do something well or poorly”) of a person to take what is given 
and to deduce further conclusions from the pre-existing data set. As we can now see, this 
is a long way from Aristotle’s definition of “science” in the Posterior Analytics,40 and, 
 
39 Propser de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, 1rb. “Sed accipitur hic habitus pro re ipsa quae habetur secundum quam 
habens disponitur bene vel male in ordine ad operationem.  Hunc enim habitum definiens Philosophus, V 
Metaphysicae, dicit: ‘Habitus est dispositio secundum quam disponitur bene vel male dispositum’.  Et II 
Ethicorum ponit eandem sententiam, dicens: ‘Potentia est qua possumus, habitus vero quo bene vel male 
possumus’. Secundum quem modum scientia quaelibet quae disponit habentem ut prompte et faciliter 
possit deducere conclusiones ex principiis dicitur habitus intellectualis. Et de tali habitu est praesens 
quaestio: Utrum aliquis talis habitus adquiratur ex studio sacrae Scripturae? Et dico quod sic, et quod non 
est idem quod fides infusa.” 
40 See above, p. 236. 
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through recognizing this definition, we are able to see a commonality between Prosper 
and Giles and Augustinus that is hiding behind the verbal disagreement. Giles and 
Augustinus are insistent that the theologian does not acquire an intellectual habit beyond 
faith because belief remains the central and only claim to certainty. For them, the 
theology never begins from universally evident things, but only from what the authority 
of faith imparts. But Prosper has re-defined “science” without reference to evidence, 
external justification, or self-evident first principles. Rather a “science” is restricted to the 
skill of deduction. This, then, becomes strikingly similar to Giles and Augustinus’s view 
of the theologian as someone who can order, express, and expound what the Scripture 
says. All three Augustinian hermits believe that this ability is something that the vetula 
does not possess. 
The important Augustinian criteria of the “ability to defend” against the impious 
must be understood in this light as well. The “ability to defend” comes from the power to 
“quickly and easily deduce conclusions,” and this cannot be understood as a justification 
of belief through proofs taken from the natural world and other natural sciences. On the 
contrary, the defense consists of valid deductions aimed at a correcting those who begin 
from what is revealed, but draw wrong, misleading, and potentially harmful 
conclusions.41 
 
41 There is something Barthian about this idea of “defense.” It is a defense that is inward focused, closely 
associated with a defense against the heretic, who exists within the religious community because he 
acknowledges the same starting points. But the heretic is classified as such because he makes errors in 
drawing on the consequences of the community’s common beliefs. In an extended discussion of the kind of 
‘unbelief’ opposed by theology, Karl Barth attributes to dogmatic theology the kind of internal focus seen 
in the Augustinian positions presented here. He writes: ‘The conflict of faith with unbelief can be truly 
significant only as and when it is a conflict of faith with itself, since in faith unbelief has in some sense 
expressed itself and claims a hearing. This paradoxical fact is a real fact. Faith does not stand only, or even 
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At the heart of this response is an ambiguity about what it means “to know.” 
When knowledge, understood as the possession of independently possessed evidence, is 
contrasted with belief, Giles, Ancona, and Prosper all seem to be on the same page. The 
theologian does not receive an external justification for what is divinely revealed. The 
primary act of belief remains central. However, when “to know” is thought of as an 
ability to make logical connections within a given data-set, the theologian is thought to 
have an identifiable acquired skill which the normal believer does not have. And this is 
something Giles, Augustinus, and Prosper have all acknowledged, though Prosper, in 
defining this intellectual habit as the power of deduction, has given us the clearest 
formulation thus far.  
One final confirmation of this reading occurs when Prosper responds to 
Augustinus’s explicit concern that, if theology acquires a separate habit of knowing, then 
divine revelation would not be needed. (In this objection, Augustinus clearly shows that 
he understands this separate intellectual habit as a separate alternative source of evidence, 
not just a deductive reasoning ability, and therefore he is opposed to it.) 
In response Propser says: Augustinus should understand that I think revelation is 
made about the articles, the assent to which is called “infused faith.” But, he goes on, this 
other habit [theology] does not prove these articles (i.e. it does not derive or justify the 
 
in the first and most important sense, in conflict with unbelief. It stands in conflict with itself, i.e., with a 
form or forms of faith in which it recognises itself in respect of form but not of content ... The paradoxical 
fact to which we refer is that of heresy. By heresy we understand a form of Christian faith which we cannot 
deny to be a form of Christian faith from the formal standpoint, i.e., in so far as it, too, relates to Jesus 
Christ, to His Church, to baptism, Holy Scripture and the common Christian creeds, but in respect of which 
we cannot really understand what we are about when we recognize it as such, since we can understand its 
content, its interpretation of these common presuppositions, only as a contradiction of faith’ (Karl Barth, 
Church Dogmatics 1.1: The Doctrine of the Word of God, G. W. Bromiley (trans.) (London, 1975) §2.1, 
31-32). 
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knowledge of these principles from another source besides faith or belief in the given 
revelation). Rather he says: this “other” habit presupposes these articles known only by 
faith.42 Thus the “science” possessed by the theologian is an ability to “quickly and 
easily” deduce conclusions from the principles received through an “infused faith.” 
Prosper makes this even more explicit in his response to Augustinus’s concern 
that the proper act of theology is only belief. Showing some real disagreement here, he 
says: “the proper act of this habit is not belief itself, but the deduction of conclusion from 
believed articles.”43 Here he shows that the proper act of theology is not a competitor 
with the belief, but an ability to articulate what is believed. 
V. A Lingering Question: Theology or Logic? 
A lingering oddity remains when Prosper, in one particular argument, says that a 
person could potentially possess the habit of theology without infused faith. This 
admission comes in one of his arguments for why faith and theology should be seen as 
distinct. This argument takes as an example a “Saracen” boy who had previously been 
schooled in Christian theology, but was never baptized. Such a person lacks infused faith, 
but Prosper seems to think that he can still acquire the theological-deducing skill.44 This 
 
42 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1rb. “Ad primum: cum dicitur quod ‘non oportuisset revelationem 
fieri’ etc., nego consequentiam. Et cum probas ‘quod scitur habitu adquisito non oportuisset revelari,’ 
dicendum quod revelationes factae sunt de articulis propter quorum assensum ponitur fides infusa.  Iste 
autem habitus non probat articulos sed supponit.” 
43 Propser de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, f. 1rb. “Ad secundum: cum dicitur "habitus distinguuntur per actus," 
concedo pro nunc, licet bona declaratione indigeat.  Et cum additur quod actus credendi est actus utriusque, 
dicendum quod actus istius habitus proprius est deducere conclusiones ex articulis creditis fide infusa vel 
adquisita;  ideo falsum supponit illa minor.” 
44 Prosper de Reggio, q. 1, Venice, 1rb. “Minorem probo, nam si puer Sarracenus instruatur in fide et 
articulis et studeat in theologia tantum quod efficiatur doctor , sciet fidem defendere, Scripturam declarare 
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appears to be at odds with his later claim that the habit of theology does not prove or 
justify what is believed by faith, but presupposes faith.  
The incongruity here raises the question of what it means to presuppose faith.  
Does the presupposition of faith simply mean that the propositions of Scripture or of the 
creed must be “in hand” as formal sentences or propositions? Or does the presupposition 
of faith mean that someone must really believe them, i.e. be convinced that reality is as 
the propositions signify reality to be? The lingering ambiguity in Prosper’s text leads 
nicely to the second question of his Prologue. Here he asks whether the “science” of 
theology is merely a science of consequents or whether the theologian can claim to 
“know” something about reality itself.45 “To know” here should be understood as having 
a conviction about the way the world is (whether or not some sort of evidence is 
responsible for this conviction). A mere knowledge of consequents suggests only a 
conviction that certain conclusions do in fact follow from a set of given premises. It 
makes no claim about whether or not these conclusions signify something true in reality. 
Prosper’s response appears rather confused and contradictory. As we have seen in 
question one, his method suggests that the theologian always begins from a claim which 
is received and justified by one’s faith in the revealed data. But his answer in question 
 
sicut doctor habens fidem infusam, et tamen in ipso non est fides infusa, quia non est baptizatus. Ergo hoc 
facit alio habitu.” 
45 Prosper de Reggio, q. 2, Venice, 1va. “Ad secundum sic proceditur et arguitur quod per talem habitum 
solum habeamus cognitionem de consequentiis et aliis quae in sacra Scriptura traduntur, sciendo loca ubi 
sancti loquuntur de Deo, de angelis, et [de] moribus hominum, ita quod totum studium theologiae est ut 
habeatur notitia consequentiarum et non eorum de quibus sunt consequentiae, quia notitia rerum non stat 
cum fide earum.”  
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two brings together a host of authorities to suggest that the theologian helps the intellect 
to assent with evidence to what is previously known only by faith.46 
While it is not our purpose here to reconcile these different facets of Prosper’s 
thought, the tension is illustrative of the kind of dissatisfaction felt by later Scholastic 
thinkers toward the Aegidian, deductive, and supernatural conception of theology. We 
will see this dissatisfaction, most clearly in the thought of Petrus Aureoli, but also in his 
influence on Ockham.47 The dissatisfaction centers on how much epistemic value should 
be placed on the achievement of the theologian who deduced explicit claims from 
previous claims, but never truly uncovers evidence for those conclusions.  
Through our survey of Giles, Augustinus, and Prosper, we have seen the basic 
foundation of an identifiable Aegidian conception of the theologian. This basic system, 
while coherent, still leaves its readers with questions, to which opponents will gladly 
draw atttention. However, the picture drawn here is robust enough to assess the Aegidian 
character of Rimini’s own description of theological method, and it is to this that we must 
now turn. 
 
 
46 Prosper de Reggio, q. 2, Venice, 1va. “Alii vero, quod magis credo, dicunt quod hoc est nimis 
parvipendere theologiam et theologum.  Ideo ponunt maiorem notitiam quam consequentiarum ex studio 
theologiae adgenerari. 
 Et hoc videtur fuisse de intentione Richardi, I De Trinitate, cap. 4, ubi dicit quod suae intentionis 
est in hoc opere adducere non solum probabiles rationes sed etiam necessarias. 
 Item, Anselmus, De Incarnatione Verbi, cap. 8, dicit: ‘Si quis legere dignabitur duo opuscula, 
Monologion et Proslogion, quae ad haec facta sunt ut quod fide tenemus de divina natura et personis 
necessariis rationibus et auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae probari possint.’ 
 Item, Augustinus, Super Ioannem, sermone 21:  ‘Conari debemus ut sciamus verba Dei.  Quare 
enim dicta sunt nisi ut audiantur;  quare audita sunt nisi ut intelligantur?’ 
 Item, idem Augustinus, Ad Consentium:  ‘Ea quae fidei firmitate iam tenes etiam rationis luce 
conspicias.’” 
47 See below, c. 6, pp. 256-285. 
Chapter 6: Theological Method
Chapter 6: Theological Method  
 | 249 
 
                                                
I. Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium and the Response of Peter Aureoli 
Henry of Ghent’s Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum contains an important 
early concern with Giles’s position: a concern that he could equally level against 
Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio.1 Henry’s concern and his proposed 
solution is a forerunner of a similar concern raised later by Petrus Aureoli. Understanding 
the full context of Peter Aureoli’s position is important for us, since Rimini severely 
criticizes Aureoli. Our ultimate goal is to assess to what extent Rimini’s critique of 
Aureoli can be interpreted as a return to an Aegidian position, which Henry and Aureoli 
are trying to avoid.  
 An outstanding example of Henry’s position is in article 13 of his Summae 
Quaestionum Ordinariarum. The overarching title of this article is “concerning the mode 
of learning theology.” In other words, this article is once again about method, though the 
question is now about the learner rather than the teacher. The third question of this article 
wonders whether “faith” is a prerequisite for theology. Henry’s answer is an emphatic 
yes, and thus he stands in agreement with Giles on this point. But, then, in question four 
 
1 The date of Henry’s birth is currently not known. Scholarship suggests sometime before 1240. He first 
appears in official documents in 1267 and he disputed his first quodlibet in 1276. From then on he worked 
as a Parisian regent master in theology until his death in 1293. Henry’s long career as regent master is 
attributable to his status as a secular rather than a religious. While the members of religious orders only 
occupied the seat of regent master for a couple of years to make room for the next generation, this was not 
the case for seculars. Thus, Henry leaves us with a uniquely long set of Quodlibetal questions in addition to 
his massive Summae Quaestionum Ordinararium. For a good beginning point see Porro, Pasquale, "Henry 
of Ghent," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/henry-ghent/>. 
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we begin to see a departure. The thesis presented here states: “in order to learn this 
science the light of faith is not sufficient.”2 The real concern behind this thesis follows 
directly:  
In the first place, if the light of faith alone was able to be sufficient for 
learning [this science], then the stronger one is in faith, the more perfect 
one learns this science, since when the cause is posited it is necessary to 
posit the effect.3 
The implicit worry here is a variation on a familiar theme: if one takes a position like 
Giles’s, then the simplest believer who believes fervently will be a superb theologian. 
But, for Henry, this is patently false. The theologian is able to do things and understand 
things that the simple believer is not, no matter how strong their faith is. Henry identifies 
two different tasks for the theologian, only one of which is shared with the initiated 
faithful.  
This science, since it is about the necessity of salvation for men, it is 
necessary for them, not only to receive this so that he might assent to the 
truth of believable things, but also to perceive this, so that he knows how 
to aid the pious and to defend against the impious from every falsity. The 
first [task] is necessary for everyone. The second is necessary only for the 
better and superior people in the church (emphasis mine).4 
In the above quotation we can see the now familiar language of Augustine. Henry does 
not think that the merely received light of faith (or the mere power of deduction, from 
 
2 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 92v M, “Circa quartum arguitur; 
quod ad istam scientiam discendam non sufficit lumen fidei.” 
3 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 92v M, “Primo sic, quoniam si 
solo lumine fidei sufficienter disci posset, ergo plus pollens fide plus proficeret discendo hanc scientiam, 
quia posita causa necesse est poni effectum.” 
4 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 92v N, “Dicendum ad hoc: quod 
ista scientia cum sit homini de neccessitate salutis, est ei necessaria: non solum eam sic recipere ut veritati 
credibilium assentiat; sed etiam sic eam percipere; ut veritatem credibilium piis opitulari et contra impios 
ab omni falsitate defensare sciat, Primum necessarium est cuilibet. Secundum est necessarium solum 
maioribus et superioribus in ecclesia…”  
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revealed truths) is sufficient for his understanding of what it means to defend the faith 
against the impious. Besides receiving, the theologian must also perceive the truth. This 
notion of perceiving rather than receiving on the authority of another hints at a 
conception of knowing that comes close to Aristotle’s requirement of evidence for true 
demonstrative knowledge. But in order to gain this deeper quasi-evidential 
understanding, Henry does not think that the natural light of the intellect will work. 
Instead, he famously introduces to scholastic discourse the existence of another light, 
unknown to most of his contemporaries. He writes:  
For knowing in the second mode, and thus for learning this science, some 
illumination is necessarily required, which is superior to the illumination 
of faith, because in this mode, they know, not only by believing, but by 
understanding (intelligendo) the things believed.5 
This special light and the “perceptive” understanding it provides distinguish the 
professional theologian and allow him to defend and encourage the faith of others. In the 
next quotation, Henry goes on to do two things. First, he shows us that, like Giles, 
“knowing through the light of faith” is closely identified with “knowing through 
Scripture” (revelation). Second, he sharply distinguishes theological knowledge from 
merely knowing what Scripture says. He writes:  
And just as the first [task] comes through the authority of Sacred 
Scripture, with the help of the light of faith, so the second happens by 
perceiving the truth of the ones who wrote [the Scriptures] with the help of 
a superior illumination.” 
 
5 Henricus a Gandavo, Summa Quaestionum Ordinararium, a. 13, q. 4, f. 93r N. “Ad sciendum vero ea 
secundo modo: et ad sic addiscendum hanc scientiam, necessario requiritur illustratio aliqua superior 
illustratione fidei; quia hoc modo sciuntur non solum credendo: sed et credita intelligendo…” 
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This explanation not only shows the point of agreement and divergence with Giles, but 
also highlights a key characteristic of the theologian. The theologian does not just know 
what the writer wrote, but possesses the knowledge with which the writer of Scripture 
wrote; this is a characterization that Peter Aureoli also wants to preserve.6 
Aureoli’s criticisms of Henry’s lumen medium have been well documented by 
Reijo Työrinoja in his 1998 article “Auriole's Critique of Henry of Ghent's Lumen 
Medium.”7 While Työrinoja helpfully describes Aureoli’s criticism of the way in which 
Henry thinks the theologian arrives at the kind of knowledge which the authors of 
Scripture had, his article obscures one important fact: the identical impulse that is driving 
both Aureoli and Henry.  
This common impulse is visible first and foremost in Aureoli’s initial list of 
opposing positions and his early criticisms of these positions. One of these opening 
arguments makes the following claim: “Theology, to the degree that it can be called a 
science, is such because it is a habit through which those things contained in divine 
Scripture, both the understanding (intellectus) of them and the exposition of them, are 
known.”8 Though exactly what it means to have an understanding (intellectus) of 
Scripture is precisely what has been in question this whole time, Aureoli understands this 
 
6 We can also note here that Gerard of Siena (writing closely after the time of Aureoli) represents a 
distinctively Augustinian precedent for rejecting Henry of Ghent’s appeal to a lumen medium (Gerardus 
Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, prol., q. 4, a. 2, p. 49a. “Primum est, quod detur lumen 
medium inter lumen Fidei, et gloriae, et possit stare cum lumine Fide; hoc autem videtur falsum…”) 
7 Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium.” See also: Työrinoja, “Lumen 
medium. Henry of Ghent on the accessibility of Theological Truths”; Työrinoja, “Peter Aureoli: Theology 
as an Imaginary Science.” 
8 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:150, n. 60). “…theologia pro tanto dicitur 
scientia, quia est habitus, quo sciuntur contenta in divina Scriptura et intellectus eorum et expositio.” 
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position as implying that theology simply understands the contents of Scripture on its 
own terms and can share the meaning of the Scriptural author with others. 
Aureoli confirms this in his initial objections to the above position. The third 
objection echoes nearly verbatim the concern raised by Henry of Ghent. Aureoli writes: 
In the one studying a book, a habit ought to be generated in that student 
similar to the habit which the one composing this book has: for the one 
studying the book of Physics acquires in himself the habit of physics of 
the same species with that habit that Aristotle had. Therefore the one 
studying the Bible does not acquire a habit, in which he knows what has 
been written, but through this he knows about God what the one writing 
the biblical text knew.9 
In short, understanding Scripture does not mean simply knowing what Scripture says, but 
rather, with the help of Scripture, one comes to know things about God, whereby they 
become capable of writing books of the same sort. 
Aureoli makes a similar point in his fourth and final objection. Here he points out 
that we sometimes use the term “to know” in different ways. Sometimes we mean it 
properly, when we mean a conclusion known from its premises, but other times we just 
mean that we hold something in our memory. Thus when someone holds a Psalm in their 
memory, we say that they know (scire) the Psalm, and when they forgot the Psalm, we 
say they do not know. So, someone who studies Scripture and memorizes what they say 
and the meaning of the words (intellectus verborum), can be said to know (scire), but 
only improperly. Further, this is not what we mean by theology. When we say someone 
has the habit of natural science, we do not mean that they have merely memorized 
 
9 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:150, n. 63). “Quia conformis habitus debet generari in studente 
aliquem librum ei habitui, quem habuit componens ipsum; studens enim librum Physicorum acquirit in se 
habitum physicae eiusdem speciei cum illo, quem Aristoteles habebat; ergo studens in Biblia non acquirit 
habitum, quo sciat quid est scriptum sed quo cognoscat de Deo id quod scribentes cognoverunt.” 
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Aristotle’s Physics, but someone who knows what Aristotle knew in order to be able 
write the Physics. The case is similar for theology: for while there are many people who 
are able to grasp and memorize the words of Scripture, we nevertheless do not say that 
they possess theological knowledge.10 
These rebuttals by Aureoli are enough to show that he shares a common concern 
with Henry, which goes unmentioned in Työrinoja’s expositions of Aureoli’s critiques of 
Henry. But in laying bare Aureoli’s criticism of Henry’s lumen medium, Työrinoja helps 
us to see that Aureoli does not think Henry’s solution to this problem is successful. 
As explained by Työrinoja, Aureoli’s main criticism surrounds the belief that 
there is no middle between a proper concept and common concept of God. Our 
knowledge is either one or the other.11 But Henry thinks that the theologian can get a 
clear knowledge of complex propositions, without attaining equally evident knowledge of 
the terms of those propositions. In this way, he thinks the theologian “perceives” 
necessary truths about God and does not merely “receive” these truths on the authority of 
another. However, the light of the theologian remains less than the light of glory because 
 
10 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:150–151, n. 64). “Unde considerandum est quod scientia 
aliquando sumitur proprie, et tunc pro habitu quo propter praemissas conclusionibus adhaeretur; aliquando 
vero sumitur pro memoria; Qui enim recordatur de Psalmo aliquo et tenet illum memoriter, dicitur illum 
scire; et per oppositum, dum oblitus est, dicitur ignorare. Studens ergo in canone Scripturarum tenesque 
memoriter quod in eis scriptum est et intellectum verborum, scire dicitur improprie; nec tale scire est 
habitus theologiae, sicut nec tenere memoriter librum Physicorum est habere scientiam naturalem, quoniam 
multi complectuntur sermones quo non habent scientiam.” 
11 Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 623. “Auriole does not accept any 
of these arguments as valid for warranting the idea of a middle light. For him, God cannot give an evident 
knowledge of himself without giving at the same time a distinct notion and cognition (notitia et distincta 
cognitio) of the relevant terms. Of course, God can give such a distinct notion of the terms concerning him, 
but the question is no longer of the middle light but of the light of glory and an intuitive cognition. Only the 
latter can involve the proper concept (conceptus proprius) and the knowledge of the terms ‘God’ and 
‘Trinity of Persons’.” 
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the simple terms of the proposition are still known in a common and confused way.12 
Aureoli simply denies that such a middle way is possible. From a confused knowledge of 
simple realities comes a necessarily confused knowledge of the propositions derived from 
them. Only from a proper concept of God could one naturally and demonstratively derive 
the truth that “God is three and one.” However, since Henry admits that such a proper 
concept of God is not possible for the earthly pilgrim, no evident knowledge (notitia 
clara) of the propositions about God are possible. Työrinoja explains Aureoli’s reasoning 
this way:  
Because we cannot have a proper and distinct notion of the Trinity in this 
life, but only a common and confused one, we cannot draw any necessary 
conclusion from this concept. And further, because a proposition is 
composed of its terms, we cannot get to know a proposition clearly and 
distinctly without getting to know its terms as well.13 
Aureoli’s quasi agreement with Henry about the need for the theologian to do more than 
know what is contained in the Scripture, and his disagreement with Henry’s way of 
explaining this difference, sets the stage for Aureoli’s account. Having rejected Henry’s 
 
12 Henry is said to hold that one can have a clear and proper vision of the ‘inherence of terms’ even one 
does not have a clear vision of the individual terms themselves. Työrinoja summarizes the argument 
attributed to Henry of Ghent this way: “There is a real distinction between the knowledge of terms (notitia 
terminorum), the knowledge of the inherence of terms (notitia inherentiae), and the knowledge of a 
propositional complex. Hence, one can have a better knowledge of the inherence of terms and of a complex 
without knowing the simple terms any better than before. For example, one can have a clear knowledge 
(notitia clara) of the proposition Deus est trinus et unus, though the single terms Deus, trinus, unus, would 
remain enigmatic and obscure. Such a light is higher than the common light of faith, but inferior to the light 
of glory and the beatific vision by which the Blessed intuitively cognise God and the Trinity.” Ibid. Cf, 
Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, Proem., sect. 2, q. 2 (Buytaert I:179, n. 13). “Praeterea, alia est notitia 
terminorum realiter a notitia inhaerentiae et complexionis eorum, ut de se patet; ergo poterit clarificare 
notitiam de complexione et inhaerentiae terminorum, non clarificata notitia simplici terminorum. Poterit 
itaque dare notitiam claram de ista propositione: ‘Deus est trinus et unus’, stante aenigmatica et obscura 
cognitione amborum terminorum, Dei videlicet et trini. Sed tale lumen et talis notitia est altior fide, inferior 
autem beatifica visione, in qua Deus et Trinitas intuitive cognoscentur; ergo. Deus potest dare tale medium 
lumen.” 
13 Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 625. 
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lumen medium, Aureoli must show how a theologian possesses a kind of knowledge that 
is something more than a skillful repetition of Scripture and something less than an 
evident “perception” of the revealed truths of faith. 
II. Peter Aureoli and Theological Discourse (an alternative to the lumen medium) 
One look at the opening of Gregory of Rimini’s discussion of theological method 
in the third article of the first question of his prologue alerts us to the fact that Aureoli’s 
positive response in section one, article two of his own prologue quickly became a locus 
classicus for the ensuing tradition. Both Ockham and Rimini will consider this passage in 
detail. Rimini’s own account of theological method begins by closely paraphrasing 
Aureoli at this precise point and only subsequently turning to offer a critique of the 
position found there. Thus in articulating Aureoli’s position, we prepare ourselves for a 
more complete understanding of the heart of Rimini’s position. 
Aureoli opens this important second article by insisting on the fact that 
professional theologians are using many different types of procedures.14 As he says: “in 
theology, many procedures are found,”15 and he divides these procedures into three main 
types.  
 
14 We should note, however, that Aureoli is not the first to recognize that diverse methods are employed 
within the professional field of theology. In his Sentences Commentary, Durandus of St. Pourçain writes: 
“notandum est, quod Theologia videtur posse accipi tripliciter.” His list includes a sense of ‘theology’ 
where one simply assents to what is contained in Scripture as it is in Scripture. His second sense is a 
‘defensive’ notion of theology which attempts to defend the faith from “principles more know to us”. And 
his third sense of theology, is a sense similar to that employed by Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of 
Reggio, where the practitioner “deduces things from the Articles of Faith” (In Sententias commentaria, I, 
prol., q. 1, f. 2va). We can also see an acknowledgement of diverse activities within the theological 
profession in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Trinity of Boethius, q. 2, a. 3. 
15 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:154,  n. 75). “Circa secundum ergo 
considerandum est quod in theologia multiplex processus invenitur.” 
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(1) First, there is a procedure through which a conclusion is reached and 
genuinely known. What Aureoli has in mind here presupposes Aristotle’s definition of 
what it means “to be known,” which we discussed above.16 Such a procedure begins from 
naturally known principles and not only leaves us with a conclusion that is true, but also 
reveals the reasons for its truth. In other words, we know “that we know,” and we know 
that it cannot be otherwise. He willingly acknowledges that, as the works of Aristotle 
themselves appear to show, we can reach and know certain truths about God in this way, 
and in some manner this procedure deserves to be called theology. As an example of this 
procedure, he points to those demonstrative syllogisms used to show that God is one or 
infinite.17 Of course what is missing here is the element of belief, Scripture, and the so 
called light of faith, which have been essential aspects of the Christian theologian’s self-
identity. It was this self-identity that was the source of dissatisfaction with an Aristotelian 
definition of “science.” And it is out of this dissatisfaction that other procedures, besides 
the Aristotelian demonstrative syllogism, were pursued and recognized as genuine 
candidates for theology. Thus, the second and third procedures described by Aureoli 
present themselves as alternative candidates. 
(2) The second procedure recognized is when a theologian proceeds toward a 
conclusion that will come to be believed (and therefore not “known” according to the 
 
16 See c. 5, p. 236. It is “knowledge” conceived along these lines that Henry wants to impart to the 
theologian through the lumen medium, wherein the theological conclusions are not just “received,” but are 
“known.” However, Henry was trying to create room for this kind of evidence, while nevertheless 
restricting it to a particular group of people. The special lumen medium was his way of achieving this 
balance. 
17 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:154, n. 75). “Aliquando enim proceditur 
ad conclusionem scitam, ut cum quaeritur: Utrum Deus sit unus vel infinitus; et sic de aliis conclusionibus 
metaphysicis, quae in theologia tractantur.” 
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criteria of Aristotelian science), the content of which has not yet been determined. The 
example given here is “whether the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Son, if it 
did not proceed from him.”18 An Aristotelian demonstration cannot answer this question, 
and so the question is approached in a different way. (We will see Aureoli’s full 
description of this approach momentarily.)19 
(3) The third and final recognized procedure proceeds to a conclusion already 
determined and already believed through faith.20 What distinguishes this third and final 
procedure from the second is the fact that the practitioner assents (through faith, not 
science) to the conclusion in question from the outset, prior to any kind of procedure. 
This is in contrast to the second case, where the procedure leads to belief in the 
conclusion. 
Despite recognizing that some truths about God can be demonstrated according to 
the rules of a demonstrative syllogism, Aureoli wastes no time in ruling out the first 
procedure as a genuine candidate of theology proper. His reasoning is simply this: 
although providing genuine demonstrations for truths concerning God, such as, “God 
exists” and that “God is one,” is sometimes an activity that a professional theologian 
engages in, this is actually a metaphysical activity rather than a theological one. The 
science of metaphysics, even when it proves things about God, is a procedure 
accomplished in the natural light of reason.  And if one were to restrict theology to the 
 
18 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:154, n. 75). “Aliquando vero proceditur ad conclusionem 
credendam, de qua nondum determinatum est quid tenendum, ut cum quaeritur: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus 
distingueretur a Filio, si non procederet ab eo.” 
19 See below, p. 261. 
20 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:154, n. 75). “Aliquando autem ad 
conclusionem iam creditam et determinatam per fidem.” 
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range of truths illuminated by this light, many theological truths held dear by the 
theologian would be left out. With Giles and Henry, Aureoli wants to share the 
conviction that theology employs something foreign to all other naturally known 
sciences, which requires a new kind of procedure.21  
What Aureoli believes is missing in metaphysics and other naturally known 
sciences is revealed in a second argument against the classification of metaphysics as 
theology. The specific language of lights is not present here, but it nonetheless remains 
clear that Aureoli wants to single out the habit of faith as that which initially separates the 
theologian from all other sciences. We ought to be especially attentive at this point, since 
both Ockham and Rimini will say that the eventual procedure that Aureoli singles out as 
theology proper contradicts the criteria he lays down here.22 He writes: 
That habit which does not suppose (supponit) faith, but compels the 
intellect of a philospoher or pagan is not a theological habit because this 
habit supposes (supponit) faith, according to Augustine in Contra 
epistulam Fundamenti: ‘I profess the catholic faith and through this I 
presume to be able to reach to certain science’ . . . whence Augustine calls 
theology the science of faith.”23 
Perhaps what is most important in this passage is not what Aureoli says about 
metaphysics, but what he seems to say about theology. Genuinely demonstrated truths 
 
21 Ibid., I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:154, n. 77). “In processu itaque primo acquiritur habitus 
metaphysicus et non theologicus. Quod sic patet: Omnis nempe demonstrativa notitia de Deo et divinis 
veritatibus ex propositionibus necessariis et notis naturaliter comprehensa est metaphysica…”  
 I say “want” because, as we will see, it will become clear that Aureoli thinks theology operates in 
the ‘light of faith’ in a very different way than it does for anyone within the Aegidian tradition. 
22 For Ockham, see below p. 278; for Rimini, see below p. 285. 
23 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert 1:155, n. 78). “Praeterea, ille habitus qui non 
supponit fidem, immo cogeret intellectu cuiuscumque philosophi vel pagani, non potest esse habitus 
theologicus, quia ille supponit fidem, iuxta illud Augustini, Contra epistulam Fundamenti: ‘Ego fidem 
catholicam profiteor et per hanc me pervenire posse ad certam scientiam praesumo’ . . . Unde et Augustinus 
vocat theologiam scientiam fidei.”  
Cf. Augustine, Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti, XIV (CAG I:210, ll. 14-15). “Ego 
namque catholicam fidem profiteor / et per illam me ad certam scientiam peruenturum esse praesumo.” 
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about God clearly do not fall under theology proper because they are accessible to 
everyone and do not require belief in any form. Theology proper, in turn, is set apart by 
the fact that it begins from a starting point not universally recognized or, in other words, 
it “supposes (supponit) faith.” But critical here is what it means for theology to “suppose 
faith.” Connected to this, we must be clear about what we mean when we say a procedure 
“begins from something else.” In anticipation of what is to come, we note that Rimini 
will explicitly raise a concern with the sense in which Aureoli understands theology to 
“begin from faith.”24 The central question here is how a believed proposition is used or 
involved in theological reasoning. 
This question should take on a heightened interest for us in light of our earlier 
review of Aureoli’s description of the practical task of theology—that theology’s direct 
and immediate practical task is to direct and strengthen the act of faith, not to 
immediately elicit an act of love for God.25 By itself, this directive function could easily 
prompt to us to view the act of faith as a subsequent act that follows upon and is the 
result of a theological procedure. But in the above passage, Aureoli indicates that this is 
not the case. Conversely, the above passage suggests that theology, unlike metaphysics, 
begins from propositions believed on account of the habit of faith alone (or we might say 
“through the light of faith”) and then proceeds to subsequent truths. But we will see 
shortly that this also is not the case. Thus Aureoli means something very specific—and 
not at all obvious—when he says that theology supposes (supponit) faith. 
 
24 See below, p. 285. 
25 See above, c. 3, pp. 169-177. 
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From his rejection of this first type of procedure, Aureoli turns to the second 
procedure: a kind of reasoning that leads us to believe something, without having any 
demonstrable reasons for giving our assent. He breaks down this general procedure into 
four sub-types.  
In order to understand these procedures, we must become familiar with some 
traditional scholastic terminology. Aureoli’s descriptions centers around the difference 
between three types of propositions: a necessary proposition, a probable proposition, and 
a believed proposition, each corresponding to distinct habits: scientific, opinative, and 
creditive habits, respectively. 
In the customary scholastic parlance, a believed proposition is, first of all, an 
inevident proposition. That is, its truth does not compel the mind to consent. The mind is 
typically said to be compelled to assent either through the immediate self-evidence of a 
proposition or through an “acquired” evidence discovered through a deduction from two 
self-evident principles. But this, in itself, is not enough to distinguish a believed 
proposition from a probable proposition, which is often described as a mere opinion. 
Both beliefs and opinions are appropriate propositional attitudes with respect to inevident 
propositions. However belief, in a strict sense, differs from opinionative assent on 
account of the type of assent it gives to an inevident proposition. The technical meaning 
of belief in a believed proposition is that the agent in question assents to the proposition 
without doubt (sine formidine), just as one does with demonstrated knowledge.26 In 
 
26 In the work of Pierre d’Ailly, we can see this phrase used in his definition of faith: “Secundo 
declarandum est quid sit fides. Unde dico quod multipliciter potest sumi, ut alias videbitur, sed ut ad 
presens sumitur fides potest describi quod est assensus verus firmus sine formidine non evidens. Vel 
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contrast, the person who holds a mere opinion assents to the proposition, but always does 
so with some hesitancy. It as though the one who assents says “it quite possible that this 
is the way things are though I acknowledge that I don’t really know for sure and I am 
open to the possibility that things are different than they seem.” The person who assents 
with faith rather than mere opinion shows no signs of this hesitancy, but assents with the 
same certitude and conviction that a person does who knows a proposition with genuine 
knowledge. The person assenting with faith says: “I recognize that I cannot prove, 
demonstrate, or make evident that this is the ways things are; nevertheless I believe that 
this is how things actually are, and I do not acknowledge the possibility that things might 
turn out to be otherwise.” Needless to say, the category of faithful assent is not a category 
explicitly recognized by Plato or Aristotle, who bequeathed to us the original division 
between opinion and knowledge.27 Faith as an intermediate category, which shares in the 
unhesitant conviction of knowledge and the non-evidence of opinion, is a later invention 
born of the questions and problems peculiar to revealed religions. With these basic 
meanings in mind we can look at the four sub-type procedures Aureoli has in mind. 
(1) First we sometimes assent to an inevident truth when we take for our 
principles one necessary and evident proposition and one proposition which is merely 
believed (with faith, not opinion) to be true. This procedure produces a conclusion which 
we cannot truly claim to know, but to which we are often willing to give our assent 
without any doubt (sine formidine). “Willing” is the key word here because the two 
 
brevius, fides est assensus certus non evidens.” (Petrus de Alliaco, Comment. in Sent., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2, f. 
43vb). 
27 See for instance Plato’s Meno, 97e-98a 
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principles by themselves are not sufficient to compel or force the mind to assent. On the 
contrary, it is through the same initial will “to believe the believed principle” that we can 
say we also “will to believe the believed conclusion.” The other three types of procedures 
operate along similar lines, but with a decreasing quality of assent. (2) The second sub-
type is simply a procedure where we reason from two principles that carry no evidence in 
themselves, but are both believed (with faith) to be true. From this, it is quite possible 
that new conclusion is reached. But again Aureoli insists that the conclusion reached is 
only a believed conclusion and nothing more. (3) The third sub-type Aureoli imagines is 
a procedure where a person begins from one believed principle and one probable 
principle. (4) In the fourth sub-type, a person begins from two different probable 
principles and then proceeds to produce a conclusion from them. The result in these last 
two cases is not “belief” in the strict sense, but only an opinion which can co-exist with 
doubt. 
The requirement that theology supposes (supponit) faith and the clear reliance on 
believed (rather than just probable) propositions in sub-type procedures one and two 
suggest that these are likely candidates for theology proper. In contrast, sub-type three’s 
reliance on a probable proposition appears to weaken its results, leaving the practitioner 
with an opinion rather than a faithful conviction. Likewise, subtype four makes no 
reference to a presupposed belief or believed proposition and therefore is not a likely 
candidate for proper theological method.  
However, Aureoli confounds our intuitions. Not only does he reject subtypes 
three and four, he also insists that subtypes one and two do not suppose (supponit) faith 
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in the way he understands the phrase. As we said, much depends on how to take this 
phrase, and through his rejection of subtypes one and two as candidates for genuine 
theology, he clarifies his meaning.  
Treating sub-type procedures one and two as a unit, he declares: “no habit is 
acquired [here] other than faith.”28 By this he means to say that neither of these 
procedures can count as a genuinely theological procedure. Up untill now, he has 
displayed a certain like-mindedness with Giles’s exclusion of purely natural 
demonstrations from the discourse of theology. But at this point, he begins to depart as 
Henry of Ghent did. Aureoli and Henry believe that in order to preserve the distinction 
between the simple believer and the industrious theologian, theology cannot simply be 
reduced to the habit of faith. For this reason, Henry introduced his lumen medium. And 
although Aureoli rejects the lumen medium as an unsatisfactory solution, he completely 
agrees with Henry that the habit of faith and the habit of theology must be sharply 
distinguished. His complaint, then, about sub-type procedures one and two is not that 
they do not require faith, but that they actually never move beyond faith. Such procedures 
provide us with something akin to the knowledge of what was written in Scripture, but 
not the knowledge that was used to write Scripture.29 Here we may wonder if the literal 
meaning of supponit, “to place under” can actually be illuminating in the sense that 
Aureoli expects theology to place faith underneath itself as it goes on to practice a new 
habit. In procedures one and two, faith is never superseded or “placed under.” Instead, 
 
28 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, proem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:155–156, n. 80). “In processu vero secundo, 
dum proceditur ex una propositione credita et alia necessaria aut ex ambabus creditis ad inquirendum de 
aliquo, quod est in fide dubium quid tenendum, non acquiritur alius habitus nisi fides.” 
29 See above, p. 252. 
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these procedures are part and parcel of the habit of faith. The reasoning is this: the type of 
knowledge obtained through any procedure is only as good as its weakest principle. And 
in these procedures, whether one begins from one necessary and one believed proposition 
or from two believed propositions, the conclusion never reaches the kind of evidence 
required for genuine knowledge, nor is there any reason for doubt or hesitation (formido) 
to creep in. (This latter possibility is the problem that plagues sub-types three and four.)30 
However, the objection can be raised: it does seem like something is happening 
here that takes us beyond the initial point of belief, and if we do not call this a theological 
procedure, how do we distinguish it from a simple belief that never attempts to draw out 
and articulate the implications of believed principles?31 Aueroli’s general response is to 
acknowledge that there is movement taking place from a confused and entangled habit of 
faith (fides implicita) to a clear and untangled habit of faith (fides explicita). However, he 
insists that this movement from entangled to untangled belief “does not diversify 
habits.”32 The position taken here is curious. On the one hand, he acknowledges that a 
type of reasoning process is taking place in this movement from a faith implicita to a faith 
explicita. Yet on the other hand, he refuses to acknowledge that this is a reasoning 
process that should be called theology proper because he thinks it would be quite 
dangerous to classify faith implicitum and faith explicitum as separate habits. (All the 
 
30 See Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem. sect. 1, a. 2, (Buytaert I:156, n. 81). “Praeterea, omnis 
adhaerens certitudinaliter alicui inevidenti propositioni, propter solam veritatem primam, adhaeret illi ex 
habitu fidei, ut patet ex fidei ratione; sed talis conclusio est inevidens, sicut articulus ex quo probatur; aeque 
enim inevidens est in Christo duas esse voluntates quemadmodum duas naturas; illi etiam adhaeretur 
propter divinam veritatem, qua adhaeretur proprie primae propositioni; ergo habitu fidei tenetur veritas 
eius.” 
31 This is the kind of procedure that Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio acknowledge, each in 
their own way. See chapter 5. 
32 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:156, n. 82). “Praeterea, implicitum et 
explicitum non diversificant habitum…” 
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while, he is adamant that theology must be a separate habit from the habit of faith.) On 
this point Työrinoja’s reading needs a slight correction. He writes: 
By means of infused faith, a person is committed to all revealed truths 
simultaneously, not discursively to one and then another. This infused 
habit is for Auriole the only habit of faith. Theology is an exposition that 
specifies, explicates, and clarifies the implicit faith (fides implicita) 
included in the habit of faith. The number of theological truths does not 
increase so that a person now believes more than she did before. An 
implicit faith and an explicit faith cannot be two distinct habits; if they 
were, different people at different times would have different faiths, and 
not one and the same faith (emphasis mine).33 
Työrinoja is correct to point out that for Aureoli the infused habit of faith is the only habit 
of faith (a point with which Rimini will disagree).34 But he is wrong to suggest that 
theology, for Aureoli, is to be identified with the task of drawing out this fides implicitum 
into fides explicitum. As Työrinoja himself says, this fides implicitum and fides explicitum 
cannot be two distinct habits, and yet we know that Aureoli is quite concerned to show 
that the habit of faith and the habit of theology are distinct. As evidence for this reading 
of the proper description of what theology is, Työrinoja actually points to one of the 
passages where Aureoli is trying to explain why this first and second sub-type should not 
be counted as theology proper.35 
Aureoli presents two arguments for why it would be dangerous to consider this 
movement from fides implicita to fides explicita as two distinct habits. In the first place 
he says: if this were the case, then “the fathers of the Old Testament would not share the 
same faith with the fathers of the New Testament” (the assumption being that the New 
 
33 Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 627. 
34 See Rimini’s discussion of acquired faith below, p. 338. 
35 Työrinoja, “Auriole’s Critique of Henry of Ghent’s Lumen Medium,” 627n16. 
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Testament fathers know explicitly certain things that the Old Testament fathers only 
knew implicitly).36 The second argument contrasts the priest and the illiterate old woman, 
the now familiar archetype of the simple but devout believer (vetula). He writes: “Still, to 
believe explicitly many things or a few things does not diversify the faith, otherwise the 
priest, who is thought to believe many things explicitly would not have the same faith as 
the old woman (vetula), who is thought to believe few things.”37 The latter argument is 
revealing because it gives a professional name to a person who has engaged in the type of 
discourse identified in sub-types one and two. This person is not the theologian, but the 
priest. The priest represents a type of person who can draw conclusions from what he 
holds to be true; however, he is not yet the kind of person who can engage in a “defense 
of the faith.”38 Someone who does not believe cannot acknowledge his reasoning. His 
reasoning lacks any universal appeal or connection with the body of truths known in a 
natural way. This is the kind of person who knows well what is said in Scripture, but still 
does not possess the knowledge possessed by those who wrote the Scriptures. Aureoli 
follows this example with a more detailed description of how the priest might partake in 
this process, while retaining the same faith and never going beyond faith. He writes:  
Whence, by explaining (exponens) the canon of the Bible, he [e.g. the 
priest] acquires for himself an explication and specification. For he takes 
as an article the fact that he believes the whole of Scripture because he 
believes the Church and he believes that it has been inspired by the Holy 
Spirit. Then he takes something else, namely that this or that is written in 
 
36 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:156, n. 82). “Alias non esset eadem fides 
patrum Veteris Testamenti et Novi.” 
37 Ibid. “Adhuc plura vel pauciora credere explicite non diversificant fidem, alias sacerdos, qui tenetur plura 
explicite credere, non haberet eandem fidem cum vetula, quae tenetur ad pauciora.” 
38 But here we should note that a “defense” of faith in the mind of Aureoli looks quite different than the 
sense of “defense” that emerged from the description of theology in the accounts of Giles, Augustinus, and 
Prosper. See Chapter 5, p. 239. 
Chapter 6: Theological Method | 268 
 
                                                
the Holy Scriptures, and this he acquires through study and lecture, and 
accordingly he concludes: ‘Therefore this or that should be held to be 
certain by faith’.39 
With this procedure laid out, Aureoli interprets for us what has happened: “In this 
process, a new faith has not been acquired,” but the priest or practitioner (which of course 
can be a theologian, just not qua theologian) simply knows through anticipating or 
articulating the consequences of the original belief. Aureoli compares this to what 
Aristotle says in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, where the one knowing that 
triangles in general have three sides knows at the same time through an induction 
(inducens) about this or that particular triangle.”40 In the case of the priest and the 
geometer, no new knowledge has been acquired; rather what was known implicitly has 
simply been made explicit.41 
Finally, we should note Aureoli’s description of sub-types three and four. These 
too are procedures that he acknowledges are sometimes used in the faculty of theology; 
however unlike sub-types one and two, these procedures are not classified either as 
theology or even as part of the habit of pure faith. In the case of the fourth sub-type, this 
should appear rather obvious; here, both of the principles of the reasoning process are 
merely probable reasons or opinions. The only result that can be deduced from these 
 
39 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:157, n. 85). “Unde et exponens canonem 
Bibliae talem explicationem et specificationem sibi acquirit; assumit enim tanquam articulum quod credit 
totam Scripturam, quia credit ecclesiae et credit ipsam a Spiritu Sancto inspiratam fuisse. Tunc sumit aliam, 
videlicet quod hoc et illud scribitur in hac Sacra Scriptura, et hanc sumit per studium et lecturam, et sic 
concludit: Ergo hoc et illud est fide certa tenendum.” 
40 Ibid., “In hoc ergo processu non acquiritur nova fides, sed simul inducens cognoscit, sicut Aristoteles 
dicit primo Posteriorum quod sciens triangulum habens tres simul inducens cognoscit de triangulo isto vel 
illo.” 
41 While this procedure is not recognized as the procedure of theology for Aureoli, we will see that it may 
still be a part of what they theologian presupposes, and therefore it may be an essential prerequisite for 
theology proper. See below p. 270. 
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principles is another opinion: an opinion which lacks both the evidence of genuine 
knowledge and the certainty that accompanies faith. This is slightly less clear in the case 
of the third sub-type. This procedure employs one probable principle and one believed 
principle.42 But even here, the resulting conclusion only acquires the strength of its 
weakest principle, thus the conclusion of this kind of reasoning leaves us with nothing 
more than a mere opinion. 
Having seen the four subtypes of the second main type of procedure that Aureoli 
recognized at the outset, we can finally turn to the third and last procedure he mentions, 
which he considers to be the proper method of theology. However, we must pause for a 
moment and ask: what possible procedure has Aureoli left for himself? He has ruled out 
all genuine demonstrations as not in any way germane to theology proper. At the same 
time, he has ruled out all procedures that proceed from purely believed propositions or 
purely probable propositions as well as any combination of known, believed, or probable 
propositions.  
Given the paucity of possibilities left, it is no surprise that this third type is rather 
idiosyncratic and unusual. Aureoli tries to distinguish this type from the reasoning unique 
to the pure habit of faith, but also tries to preserve in it an important connection to faith. It 
must go beyond faith, but must also supponit fidem. Aureoli provides the following 
description: 
In this third process, when, namely, we proceed to some proposition, 
about which what should be believed and what should be held by faith has 
 
42 As an aside: it is curious that Aureoli leaves out a fifth possibility, namely, a procedure involving one 
necessary/evident principle and one probable proposition. However, in this case, the end result would be 
the same as the end result for the third sub-type. 
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[already] been determined, but arguments are introduced for this [already 
determined] proposition, doubts are removed, and terms are explained, 
then a properly theological habit is acquired.43 
The result of this procedure is neither science, nor faith, nor opinion, but some kind of 
clarification or defense of what is already articulated and believed. However, the 
description begs for some explanation. First, why isn’t this procedure a science? The 
quotation does not indicate which kinds of reasons “are introduced.” If these were evident 
propositions, then we would have a genuine demonstration. Aureoli’s revised description 
of theology proper at the beginning of article three specifies the kind of reasons he has in 
mind. Here he speaks of theology employing “probable reasons taken from other 
sciences.”44 But this first clarification raises the need for a second. If theology employs 
probable reasons, then why isn’t this procedure the same as the fourth sub-type, wherein 
theology proceeds from two probable propositions to a reach a probable conclusion? This 
is precisely the question that will be a prime point of contention for ensuing thinkers.45 
However, Aureoli does think he can provide answer. His answer lies in recognizing the 
admittedly strange way that that faith is supposed (supponit) in this procedure. In this 
procedure, rather than proceeding from probable propositions to a new probable 
conclusion, Aureoli insists that the conclusion in question has already been articulated 
and assent has already been given. The assent is not the assent of knowledge or evidence, 
but of faith. In other words, unlike all the other procedures heretofore considered, 
 
43 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. I, a. 2 (Buytaert I:159, n. 91). “In tertio autem processu, dum 
scilicet proceditur ad propositionem aliquam, de qua determinatum est quid est credendum et tenendum per 
fidem, et tamen cum hoc inducuntur rationes ad illam solvuntur dubia et termini explicantur, acquiritur 
habitus proprie theologicus…” 
44 Ibid., I, prooem, sect. 1, a. 2 (Buytaert I:159, n. 92) .“…rationibus probabilibus sumptis ex aliis 
scientiis…” 
45 See Rimini’s concern below, p. 285.  
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theological discourse does not actually start with the principles of a syllogism, but from a 
conclusion already believed. Here we can see where and how the habit of faith and the 
different procedures of faith can become relevant.46 Faith in the articles of the creed or 
the more nuanced propositions already contained implicite in these initial articles can 
become starting points for theologians. Starting with these believed propositions, the 
theologian then looks outside of the habit of faith for probable propositions taken from 
the natural world that can generate support or clarification for what has already been 
believed. In this case, the reasoning process specific to the priest is extremely important 
and even necessary for the theologian. The theologian relies on the unfolding of faith 
implicita so that he or she knows for which believed propositions to begin building 
support, using naturally accessible probable reasons.  
As noted above, the sense in which Aureoli understands the phrase supponit fidem 
and the sense in which he thinks theology “starts from faith” are very important for his 
position. And here we can see that the reliance of faith he has in mind is quite peculiar. 
The syllogism formed by the theologian does not actually rely on faith for any of the 
principles it employs. The sense in which the theologian relies on faith is only to the 
extent that faith determines and articulates what ought to be believed (perhaps performed 
by the Church as represented by the priest) and thereby directs and orients the efforts of 
the theologian. Whether Aureoli’s description of theological method really requires the 
theologian to believe these pre-determined propositions is a lingering question.47  
 
46 See above, p. 270. 
47 For Ockham’s concern, see below p. 278; for Rimini’s similar concern see below p. 285. 
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It might be asked: why should the theologian’s procedure taken by itself not be 
said to produce mere opinion, regardless of the attitude one takes through another 
procedure? After all, it starts from probable propositions. For Aureoli, the conclusion has 
already been assented to through faith, and thus the probable propositions of the 
theologian’s syllogism do not denigrate this higher epistemic achievement. Still, the 
objector might respond: it is true that through the separate and distinct habit of faith this 
conclusion attains a higher status, but nevertheless the theological habit, as Aureoli has 
described it, has nothing to do with this separate act of belief.  
This concern leads us to pose one final question of clarification. In the above 
description of a proper theological method Aureoli suggests that among other things this 
procedure would assuage doubts. The question of clarification first asks: whose doubts? 
Could they be the doubts of the faithful theologian? This is highly unlikely given the fact 
that Aureoli insists that the theologian supponit fidem. The theologian’s conclusions do 
not result in mere opinion because he already believes and belief is distinguished from 
opinion by a lack of doubt. So perhaps it is the case that the theologian’s work is—at 
least when it comes to assuaging doubts—for the benefit of others who do not yet 
believe. But this raises another question: how could the theologian’s procedure of moving 
from probable reasons help to mitigate the doubts of those who do not yet believe? At the 
very least they could provide probable proofs that make the tenets of faith appear 
reasonable. However, by necessity of the theological procedure as Aureoli has described 
it, these proofs can only be probable and therefore result in opinion. Thus, doubts will 
always linger and will never be completely removed through theology.  The focus on 
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doubts once again draws us to an important conviction: the theologian provides “defense” 
and support against doubt. It is through this defense that the theologian distinguishes 
himself from the person of mere belief. The ability to appeal to natural reasons, though 
these reasons are only probable, and to use them to show the reasonability of faith is the 
distinguishing mark of the theologian. But the appeal to natural, universally recognizable 
reasons shows us that Aureoli has a very different understanding of “defense” compared 
to the internal defense against improper deduction that we saw in Augustinus and 
Prosper. For Aureoli this defensive task is not suited for nor required of everyone, not the 
simple believer nor even the priest. However someone in the academy must perform this 
task or religious truth runs the risk of floating away from its context within the larger 
body of truths to the point of becoming irrelevant and unimaginable. By sending out 
casting lines to other sciences, the theologian fights for the relevance of religious truth 
and defends the conceivability of this truth amidst everything else that is known to be 
true. To be sure, there is no attempt to demonstrably prove the necessity of the truths of 
faith, but the theologian is engaged in a process of showing the compatibility of Christian 
truths with the naturally acquired sciences.48 At the same time he wards off all attempts 
 
48 While throughout the corpus of Aquinas one can point to different procedures prescribed for theology, 
Aquinas’s description of his procedure, at the opening of the Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 9, shows some 
similarities with that of Aureoli. Distinctive of Aquinas’s position is two divide divine truths of theological 
truths into two – those that natural reason can reach and those that natural reason cannot. Of the second 
kind he writes: “Nevertheless, there are certain likely [probable] arguments that should be brought forth in 
order to make divine truth known” (trans. Pegis, I:77). Most interesting about what Aquinas says, however, 
is the fact that he does not think these probable arguments should be brought forth to convince his 
adversaries. Instead, they are for the “training and consolation” of the faithful. What is important here is 
how this procedure effectively consoles. Aquinas highlights that these probable arguments remind us that 
“natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith” (I:77). This is the similarity I see with what I have 
called Aureoli’s attempt to throw out “casting lines” to the other sciences in order to show that the revealed 
claims of faith are “reasonable” and not contrary to natural reason. Both Aquinas and Aureoli state that 
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by philosophy to oppose or challenge the reasonability of faith. To achieve this task, it is 
essential that probable principles be drawn from other naturally known sciences. To 
remain within the confines of faith, to support faith from faith, makes no progress 
towards demonstrating this compatibility with the wider body of truths. 
With Henry in the background, Aureoli insists that theology go beyond what is 
merely “received” and begin to “perceive” the truth of what is believed. This task is 
accomplished through the contextualization of religious truth within the landscape of 
natural science. But this stands in contrast to Giles of Rome and the Aegidian tradition, 
who shows little to no interest in this kind of contextualization. Where Aureoli insists on 
the appropriateness of probable reasons drawn from the natural light of reason for 
theology, Giles claims that the knowledge derived from any human science has no place 
in theology. This then is the remarkable difference between the Aegidio-Augustinian 
tradition and the version of Augustinianism that Henry and Aureoli purport to represent. 
Let us summarize the conclusions of this section. The name that Aureoli gives to 
his theological procedure is “declarative,” which Durandus of St. Pourçain described as 
primarily “defensive” in nature, even before Aureoli made the method famous.49 
Theology as “declarative” is characterized by beginning from probable principles (that is, 
likely but not self-evident principles) acquired through natural reason in the other 
 
these arguments will not convince the unbeliever, however they both believe that it is part of theology’s job 
to show the “reasonability” of faith-claims by appeal to natural but probable arguments.  
 Elsewhere, Aquinas discusses other types of procedures in theology that are somewhat at odds 
with with this particular description. We will consider those discussions below, see c. 7, p. 353-364. 
49 Durandus writes: “Secundo accipitur Theologia, pro habitu, quod fides, et ea quae in Sacra Scriptura 
traduntur, defenduntur, et declarantur, ex quibusdam principiis nobis notioribus . . . Ex quo satis apparet, 
quod ipse vocat scientiam theologiae habitum, quo fides et scriptura defenduntur, et declarantur…” (In 
Sententias commentaria, f. 2va). For a further description of declarative theology, see also: Brown, “Peter 
of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role.” 
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sciences. With these principles in hand, the theologian enlists those principles in the 
support of an already believed conclusion, the content of which has already been 
determined either by its evidence in Scripture or by a subsequent exposition and 
specification. To say, therefore, that “declarative” theology begins from probable 
opinions can be misleading; after all, theology selects the principles it employs by first 
viewing the previously determined conclusions that the theologian already believes and 
wants to support. In this way, theology “supposes faith” (supponit fidem). This is the 
method of theology proper according to Peter Aureoli. Though he is more than willing to 
recognize that other activities occur in the theology faculty, he simply wants to remind us 
that when the theologian performs these other activities, whether they be a metaphysical 
demonstration or a Scriptural exposition, he does not perform them qua theologian.  
III. Ockham on Aureoli 
Isolating Ockham’s discussion and description of “theological method” is not at 
first an easy affair. Questions I-II deal with the possibility of theological evidence in this 
life and the extent to which evident theological knowledge could qualify (in principle) as 
a science (that is, whether, theological knowledge in principle, all of it or even just parts 
of it, can be the result of demonstrative deduction from principles). Questions III-VI deal 
with the specific components of a scientific habit or demonstrative syllogism. It is in 
question VII, however, that we come closest to finding an explicit discussion of method 
specifically in this life. Given the importance of Aureoli’s position on the nature of 
proper theological discourse, it should come as no surprise that Ockham reviews 
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Aureoli’s position at length and articulates much of his own opinion in direct 
conversation with Aureoli. 
Question VII asks: “whether theology, which is had by the theologians about the 
common law is a science properly speaking.”50 He first surveys those who hold a positive 
position, affirming that this theology is in fact a science. He then lists the negative 
opinion and indicates that he also holds this position; that is, he believes theology is not a 
science, properly speaking. To establish this position, he states that he will do two things 
(both of which indirectly help reveal what Ockham sees as the method of theology). In 
the first place he says: “I will show that every habit, besides faith, which the faithful 
theologian acquires, the unbelieving theologian is also able to acquire.” And in the 
second place (more important for our present interest), he states: “it should be seen what 
sort of habit is acquired in theology besides faith.”51  
The latter question is nearly identical to the question which prompted Aureoli to 
identify the proper method of theology. As we have seen, the question is really just 
another way of asking how the theologian differs from the person of simple belief. How 
should we characterize the commonsense difference between the illiterate old woman 
(vetula) and the learned doctor of theology?  
In this second task, Ockham introduces the opinion of Aureoli. Assessing 
Ockham’s opinion of Aureoli is complicated. The interpreter must wrestle with the early 
 
50 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:183). “Utrum theologia quae de communi lege 
habetur a theologis sit scientia proprie dicta.” 
51 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:193). “Ideo circa istam opinionem primo ostendam quod omnem habitum, 
praeter fidem, quem adquirit theologus fidelis potest adquirere etiam infidelis; secundo est videndum qualis 
habitus acquiritur in theologo praeter fidem.” 
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and clear assertion by Ockham that “this opinion is false”52 alongside the later 
concessions, where he says: “that some other habit besides faith is acquired: this I 
concede,”53 and again: “I concede that [this habit] is able to be called declarative.”54 
Reaching a clear picture of Ockham’s opinion about Aureoli and the nature of theological 
discourse requires us to reconcile these competing claims. In short, we need to be precise 
about the manner of Ockham’s disagreement with Aureoli as well the nature of his 
agreement.  
Ockham states “this opinion is false, as it seems, because although some habit is 
acquired, nevertheless the habit is not a type of wisdom.”55 In the first place, this 
complaint foreshadows the concession that Ockham will make at the end of his 
discussion, namely, that some other habit is acquired through theology, which is distinct 
and separate from a habit of faith. In the second place, it shows that Ockham focuses his 
critique on the fact that Aureoli wants to call declarative theology a kind of “wisdom.”56 
This is important because, as of yet, Ockham is not disputing the description of the 
theological method that Aureoli has given, but simply the denomination of this habit as a 
“wisdom.” 
But why are we unable to characterize this declarative procedure as a type of 
“wisdom”? Of the three arguments given by Ockham, the first and third tell us something 
about method and where the practitioner of theology must begin. The third confirming 
 
52 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:195). “Sed ista opinio falsa est…”  
53 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:198). “Alia dua argumenta probant aliquis alius habitus fide adquiritur. Quod 
concedo.” 
54 Ibid. “Ad aliud, concedo quod potest vocari declarativus.” 
55 Ibid., I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:195).“Sed ista opinio falsa est, ut videtur, quia quamvis aliquis habitus 
acquiritur, tamen ille habitus non habet rationem sapientiae.” 
56 Cf. Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 3 (Buytaert I:166–171, nn. 117–129). 
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argument states that “wisdom does not stand with error about the same thing.”57 In 
pointing out this characteristic of wisdom, Ockham implies that possessing a declarative 
theological habit is compatible with error, and therefore it cannot be a kind of 
“wisdom”.58 The first argument illuminates the kind of error Ockham is referring to in his 
third argument. The former argument states:  
Every habit which is able to be acquired through this kind of study by the 
believer is also able to be acquired by the unbeliever through similar 
study. But it is obvious that the unbeliever does not have true wisdom 
about theological things.59 
Ockham’s real complaint against the label “wisdom” comes from his belief that Aureoli’s 
description of proper theological procedure is something achievable by the believer and 
unbeliever alike. And what is possible for both the believer and non-believer cannot be 
classified as wisdom, since the person without belief is clearly in error.  
Aureoli, of course, would not accept the terms of this critique. As we have seen, 
he would insist that the theologian cannot proceed in doing theology proper with 
“supposing” faith.  However, we also saw that the reason theology—as Aureoli described 
it—actually requires faith was ambiguous at best.  
As Ockham turns from his direct response to Aureoli to his positive opinion, he 
implicitly and rhetorically asks this same question. From the very outset he tries to 
demonstrate the independence of theology from the kind of conviction assumed in a habit 
of faith. He does this by pointing out the diverse psychological effects that the same 
 
57 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:196). “Confirmatur: quia sapientia non stat cum 
errore circa idem.” 
58 Ockham writes: “Sed iste habitus stat cum errore circa credibilia; igitur talis habitus non est sapientia” 
(Ibid.). 
59 Ibid. “Omnem habitum quem potest ex tali studio acquirere fidelis posset etiam adquirere ex consimili 
studio infidelis; sed manifestum est quod infidelis non habet de theologicis veram sapientiam; ergo etc.”  
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theological procedure can have, depending on the other psychological habits we have. 
(Today we might call these diverse “propositional attitudes.”)60 For example, Ockham 
says: 
When acquired faith precedes this study, the theologian augments the habit 
of acquired faith. But when [acquired faith] does not precede, then, if [the 
theologian] is a faithful person, he acquires acquired faith” (emphasis 
mine).61 
Here, I emphasize the conditional “when” to stress the fact that Ockham seems quite 
open to the possibility that genuine theologians can begin with diverse propositional 
attitudes towards the same conclusions. A person can proceed in his study, while already 
believing the conclusion they are attempting support.62 But another person, who appears 
 
60 McKay, Thomas and Nelson, Michael, "Propositional Attitude Reports," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/prop-attitude-reports/>. 
61 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:196–197). “Ideo dico ad istum articulum quod 
theologus respectu credibilium augmentat habitum fidei adquisitae quando fides adquisita praecedit 
studium suum; quando autem non praecedit tunc adquirit fidem adquisitam, si sit fidelis.” 
62 Some confusion exists here as Ockham begins to discuss the idea of acquired faith, which did not appear 
in Aureoli’s own account. In fact, as we saw earlier Työrinoja insisted that for Aureoli there was only an 
infused faith and that this faith could only vary with regards to how explicitly it was known. Nevertheless, 
the kind of pre-established commitment Ockham is pointing to correlates well with the sense of 
commitment conveyed by Aureoli.  However, Ockham’s reference to the person faithfully disposed but not 
yet having acquired faith, sounds more like the person who currently only possess an “infused” faith. These 
shifts in terminology are important as Rimini will identify theology with the actual acquisition of acquired 
faith. But this process of acquisition in Rimini presupposes a kind of pre-existing faith. While he doesn’t 
clearly identify this pre-existing faith as “infused” faith, it seems likely that this is what he has in mind. The 
meaning of “acquired faith,” however becomes even more confusing when we jump forward 200 years to 
the writing of John Mair (cf. Mair, In Primum Sententiarum, prol.). Mair is immersed in the sources of 
Aureoli and Rimini. Nevertheless, he will discuss the acquisition of acquired faith through probable reasons 
and pious affection. As we will see this is not a very Rimini-like position. Nevertheless, later Mair will 
explicitly argue against Aureoli’s view of theology and will adopt a picture of theological methodology 
very similar to that of Rimini. My attempt to makes sense of this confusion is to recognize that there could 
be diverse ways a conclusion could acquire assent. In one way, probable reasons and a pious affection 
might persuade us to give our assent to a proposition. But, in the manner Rimini will discuss acquired faith, 
it sounds more like someone is arriving at a conclusion from principles that have already been assented to 
with faith (presumably a kind of infused faith), though this is not a genuine demonstration since the 
principles are believed and not evident. But once they are granted, the conclusion does necessarily follow. 
Rimini will want to call the acquisition of this “necessary” conclusion “acquired faith.” We will see 
Rimini’s account of this below “Interlude” p. 306, and c. 7, pp. 318-338. 
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to engage in the exact same study may begin with doubt about the proposition in 
question. Ockham then adds a further condition that is initially somewhat odd. He says of 
the student who has begun with doubt about the conclusion in question: “if he is faithful,” 
then he will acquire “acquired faith.”  
What can Ockham mean when uses the word “faithful?” He cannot mean it in the 
same way as he spoke of the theologian, who already began with acquired faith in the 
propositions to be supported and “augmented.” He may mean something similar to the 
way we see John Mair use the phrase “pious affection” nearly 200 year later in his own 
prologue to the Sentences.63 Here Mair insists that in order to achieve “acquired faith,” 
probable reasons supporting the conclusions in question are important and essential; 
however, they are not sufficient. Combined with probable reasons, a “pious affection” is 
needed if assent is to occur.64 What he means by “pious affection” is simply a good 
disposition of the will which inclines one toward those things that are beneficial to true 
religion and shuns those things that are harmful.65 The possibility exists, therefore, that 
there are also people in the world who are not so piously affected and for whom no 
 
63 Ibid., prol., q. 1, f. 1rb–1vb. There appears to be some confusion here in the margin of both the 1510 and 
1519 edition of Mair’s work. In the margin, the position on “acquired” faith that Mair argues for (a middle 
position between two extremes) looks to be attributed to both Ockham and Rimini. R. Neil Wood in his 
1997 article on the topic does not question the veracity of these attributions (“John Mair: the human 
dimension of faith”). The argument of this chapter however will make clear that this attribution to Rimini 
cannot actually be correct (whether or not Mair or the editor of his text believes it to be true). 
 We can also note an identification between “affectio” and the required willful state prior to Mair, 
in the work of Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri. He writes, quoting Augustine, using “affectio” as a synonym for 
“voluntas”: “’Consequens est paululum quaerere, utrum voluntas’, id est affectio…” (Hugolinus de Urbe 
Veteri, Commentarius in Sententiarum, I, prol. q. 4, a. 1 (Eckermann I:125)).  
64 Mair, In Primum Sententiarum, prol., q. 1, f. 1va. “Quinta propositio: fides acquisita producitur a motivo 
[i.e. argumentum topicum] et pia affectione…”  
65 Ibid., prol., q. 1, f. 1va–b.“Pia affectio enim supponit pro actu voluntatis; connotando quod velit illud 
quod concernit religionem; et nolit illud quod ei adversatur.” See also my forthcoming article "Acquired 
Faith and Mair's Theological Project," in A Companion to the Theology of John Mair, eds. Jeffrey C. Witt 
and John T. Slotemaker, (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming 2013). 
Chapter 6: Theological Method | 281 
 
                                                
amount of probable reasons will be sufficiently persuasive. It could be that this is what 
Ockhan means when he says, “if he is faithful,” implying that if the person who takes up 
the discourse of theology, as Aureoli has described it, has the right disposition, then these 
reasons will be enough for that person to take the next step, consent, and acquire a new 
propositional attitude toward the conclusion in question. But if this is the case, we can see 
a departure from Aureoli. Aureoli insisted that theology can only happen if faith is 
already possessed and operative. Ockham’s reply is simply to say: no, Aureoli, the 
procedure, as you have described it, does not require this. On the contrary, anyone can 
engage in this discourse regardless of their current psychological state. 
Ockham supports this reading when he considers the person who neither already 
possesses acquired faith nor has a faithful disposition. He admits that, for this unfaithful 
person who puts into practice the method described by Aureoli, faith is neither acquired 
nor augmented. Despite the unambiguous status of unbelief, Ockham discusses this 
individual alongside the other two types without the slightest suggestion that he is not 
also doing theology. He says it this way: 
But beyond this habit [the habit of pure faith]…when a person studies in 
theology, whether they are faithful [here we must understand both a 
person already believing and a person well disposed to belief] or heretics 
or infidels, they acquire many sciential habits, which would be able to be 
acquired in other sciences. But besides this, they acquire many sciential 
habits of consequences, which pertain to no natural sciences.66 
 
66 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:197). “Praeter autem istum habitum et de facto in 
maiori parte studens in theologia, sive sit fidelis sive haereticus sive infidelis, adquirit multos habitus 
scientiales qui in aliis scientiis possent adquiri. Et praeter istos adquirit multos habitus scientiales 
consequentiarum quae ad nullas scientias naturales pertinent.” 
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Ockham’s predisposition here is to view theology as a bundle of multiple habits rather 
than one simple habit. Nevertheless, the method and mode of discourse is common to all 
practitioners regardless of the propositional attitude they begin with or the disposition of 
their will. That theology, as a habit, is indifferent to the various results that can be 
achieved through its procedure is a fact made possible by Ockham’s division between 
two classes of propositional attitudes or psychological states. Early on in his prologue, 
Ockham’s introduces a distinction between apprehensive habits and judicative habits.67 
An apprehensive habit results in an act of pure apprehension or comprehension. But a 
judicative habit results in an act of judgment about the truth value of a previously 
apprehended proposition. In the passage currently under consideration, where he is 
discussing the person with and without the habit of faith, Ockham relies on this 
distinction to account for the differences between practitioners of theology. He says: 
With respect of all of these things [i.e. the sciential habits acquired 
through a theological discourse] – whether they are complex or 
incomplex, and whether they are propositions or consequences, whether 
they are knowable or believable only – anyone studying in theology is able 
to acquire an apprehensive habit (emphasis mine).68 
At this point, Ockham has attempted to do justice to the impetus behind Aureoli’s 
position, while trying to avoid its problems. On the one hand, he recognizes that there is 
 
67 See Ockham, I, prol., q. 1, art. VI, (OTh 1:52ff)  
68 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:197). “Respectu autem omnium – sive sint 
complexa sive incomplexa, et hoc sive sint propositiones sive sint consequentiae quaecumque, sive sint 
scibilia sive credibilia tantum – quilibet studens in theologia potest adquirere habitum apprehensivum.” 
 Ockham’s insistence on the fact that theology is only an apprehensive habit and does not require 
faith to be practiced is an important corrective to Chenu assertion that the separation of faith from theology 
is pure eighteenth-century rationalist invention. Chenu claims: “A theology without faith? Some people 
have attempted to imagine something of the sort, but for our part we can only regard it as a vicious 
infiltration of eighteenth-century rationalism into theological method” (Chenu, Is Theology a Science?, 23). 
As evidence against the truth of this claim, Ockham is a witness to the fact that the intellectual discussion 
of the Middle Ages is much more varied than Chenu makes it seeem. Ockham shows that not ever 
theological innovation can be chalked up to the “modern rationalist spirit.” 
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something distinct about someone who engages in the “declarative” theological 
procedure, who really believes and has already committed themselves to the truths they 
set out to support. There is something distinctively different about what such a person 
gains from this exercise in comparison to the person who performs the same exercise, 
while not yet believing or even dead set against believing. On the other hand, Ockham is 
cognizant of the kinds of ambiguities we pointed to above, inherent in Aureoli’s 
description of declarative theology.69 Ockham is disturbed by Aureoli’s suggestion that 
only the person with the “propositional attitude” of belief can bring probable propositions 
in support of previously marked-out propositions. In contrast, he insists that the prior 
“propositional attitude” is irrelevant to one’s ability to perform this procedure; both the 
person well disposed to belief and the person dead said against belief are capable of 
acquiring the exact same apprehensive habit. But this prior “propositional attitude” is not 
irrelevant to the “judicative habit” that results. Ockham is ready to concede to Aureoli 
that the results of this identical apprehension vary according to the prior propositional 
attitudes and dispositions of the will proper to each student. The error in Aureoli’s 
position is that by failing to make such a distinction, he loses the ability to recognize the 
possibility common to the believer and un-believer. Ockham can recognize this 
possibility, while still acknowledging the impact of the student’s initial propositional 
attitude when engaging in a theological procedure. 
This leads us to the end of Ockham’s proper opinion, where he makes the 
concessions to Aureoli that we noted above. He concedes that the theological discourse 
 
69 See above p. 271. 
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does result in a habit different than and beyond faith. Though of course, we now know 
that Ockham thinks the direct result is only an apprehensive habit. And we also know that 
a variety of judicative habits are possible depending on the starting point of each 
practitioner.70  
He also concedes that this habit, which leads everyone to a common apprehensive 
act, can be called “declarative.”71 Ockham is never as precise as Aureoli about the proper 
method of genuine theology. However, despite his thorough critique of Aureoli’s 
position, he does not challenge the precise description of theological method given by 
Aureoli.72 In fact, his critique appears to presuppose the validity of this procedure. He is 
first and foremost opposed to Aureoli’s classification of this habit as “wisdom.” But this 
critique stems from Ockham’s more fundamental opposition to Aureoli’s insistence that 
only the person who already believes can bring probable opinions in support of a 
predetermined conclusion. For Ockham, everyone is capable of performing this 
procedure. And since this procedure can often result in the “apprehension” of probable 
consequences that pertain to no other natural science, they must belong to a genuine 
theology or risk becoming a habit that has no classification whatsoever. In sum, Ockham 
 
70 Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:198). 
71 Ibid. 
72 In Philotheus Boehner’s opinion, paraphrased by Courtenay, Ockham is eager to acknowledge the 
validity and value of bringing “probable reasons” to bear on revealed truths. “[On Boehner’s view, 
Ockham] maintained the importance of probable arguments” (Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval 
Religion,” 45–46). However one needs to acknowledge that Courtenay identifies another orientation to 
Ockham advanced by Moody: “Moody, on the other hand, believes that Ockham radically altered 
metaphysics. By adopting a strict definition of demonstration and by using an empiricist criterion from the 
evidence used in demonstration, the so-called demonstrations generally used in metaphysics and natural 
theology became un-scientific and only probable. Thus natural theology was eliminated in favor of a 
positive theology based on revelation and faith rather than reason . . .” (Ibid., 46). Despite Moody’s 
somewhat negative assessment, he still highlights for us the continued importance of probable reasons for 
Ockham. 
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is able to do justice to the difference between the believing and unbelieving practitioner 
of theology by insisting on the following: when it comes to judicative habits, the 
believing and unbelieving theologian do not share the same habit, but in terms of 
apprehension, each practitioner’s habit remains the same.   
IV. Rimini: Against Aureoli 
Rimini’s response to Aureoli’s description of a proper theological method shares 
some of the same concerns that Ockham raised, but ultimately goes in a very different 
direction. Rimini starts his critique of Aureoli with the claim that any discourse which 
begins from probable opinions (i.e. neither self-evident principles nor principles believed 
without doubt or hesitation) is only able to cause opinion: a conclusion which Rimini 
believes is in incongruous with Aureoli’s beliefs about the results of theology.73 He 
explains further: 
According to Aureoli no discourse from two evident and necessary 
propositions is properly theological, therefore the same follows for any 
discourse from two probable principles. The consequence is proved 
through what Aureoli himself says, since the reason why the first 
discourse is not theological is, as he says, because the habit resulting from 
that discourse ‘does not suppose faith (supponit fidem)’. But it is also true 
for Aureoli that opinion does not suppose faith (supponit fidem). Indeed 
they [opinion and faith] are not compatible, as he says in the same 
question, article 3 proposition 2; but from this discourse [what Aureoli 
calls theology proper] nothing except opinion is acquired, therefore, etc.74 
 
73 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:14). “Primam conclusionem probo primo sic: 
Nullus discursus ex se natus causare opinionem tantummodo de sua conclusione seu de significato suae 
conclusionis est theologicus proprie; sed omnis discursus ex mere probabilibus est huiusmodi; igitur etc.” 
74 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:15). “Secundo, istum doctorem nullus discursus ex ambabus evidentibus 
et necessariis est proprie theologicus, igitur nec aliquis ex ambabus probabilibus. Probatur consequentia per 
dicta eiusdem, quoniam ratio, quare primus non est theologicus, ut dicit, est quia habitus causatus ex eo 
‘non supponit fidem’; sed constat secundum eundem quod opinio non supponit fidem, immo nec eam 
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In this argument, we see Rimini pinpoint that phrase supponit fidem that was at once so 
important for Aureoli and also so ambiguous. For Aureoli it was essential that the 
theological discourse “suppose faith.” But both Ockham and Rimini are incredulous 
about the claim that the theological discourse as Aureoli has described really does 
“suppose faith.” 
Ockham and Rimini, however, depart ways at this point. Ockham’s response was 
to jettison this criterion and more or less preserve the methodology described by Aureoli. 
Rimini’s response is to keep the criterion and opt for a new method. Accordingly, when 
Rimini turns from his criticism of Aureoli to his own proper position, we find a different 
description of theological methodology: 
Therefore, I respond to the article that a properly theological discourse is 
that which begins (constat) from the sayings or propositions contained in 
Sacred Scripture or from those things which are deduced from latter…75 
We can acquire a sense of what Rimini has in mind here by recounting the three 
arguments he introduces to convince us that this is the true method of any genuine 
theology. These arguments are generally based on recognized theological authorities, and 
they appeal to the procedure followed by these authorities in their own work. 
To support his description of proper method, he first looks to a statement made by 
Pseudo-Dionysius in his work, On the Divine Names. Rimini paraphrases Ps-Dionysius, 
saying: “for the one not assenting to words of Sacred Scripture, the manuductio is not 
 
secum compatitur, ut in eadem quaestione articulo 3 propositione 2 ipse dicit, et ex tali discursu nonnisi 
opinio acquiritur. Igitur, etc.” 
75 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:18). “Respondeo igitur ad articulum quod discursus proprie theologicus 
est, qui constat ex dictis seu propositionibus in sacra scriptura contentis vel ex his quae deducuntur ex 
eis…” 
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able to become a theological science.”76 Rimini goes on to explain that by manuductio 
Ps-Dionysius is refering to a discourse or habit “which alone is properly called 
theological.” For Rimini, the authority of Ps-Dionysius provides evidence that prior 
assent to the truth of Scripture is necessary and cannot be sacrificed. Ockham has shown 
that he disagrees. And while Aureoli would probably insist that he agrees with Dionysius, 
Rimini does not think the discourse he has described as theology proper demands this 
prior assent. From the authority of Dionysius he then concludes: “no discourse not 
proceeding from the sayings of Sacred Scripture or from things which are deduced from 
Scripture is theological.”77 Like Giles, Rimini is opposed to identifying theology as a 
discipline that first looks outward to the sensible world to draw conclusions about God. 
Rimini’s second argument attempts to strengthen the consequence he has drawn 
from Ps-Dionysius. Here he begins from what he believes to be a “common conception of 
all people,” that is, what everyone would recognize as theology if they saw it. Everybody 
recognizes a proof as “theological” when it is proved from the sayings of Scripture.78 As 
an example, Rimini says: take the proposition, “God is eternal.” One might prove this 
from the eternity of motion as Aristotle does or one might prove this from what is written 
in John 1.79 In this example, we see a clear confirmation of what we discussed at the 
close of chapter two: that a genuinely theological proposition cannot be identified by 
 
76 Ibid. “Vult enim quod non assentienti eloquiis sacrae scripturae non potest manuductio fieri ad 
theologicam scientiam.” Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De div. nom. II, c. 2 (PG III:640a). 
77 Ibid. “Sequitur quod nullus discursus non procedens ex dictis sacrae scripturae vel ex his, quae 
deducuntur ex eis, est theologicus.” 
78  Ibid. “Secundo, idem probatur ex communi omnium conceptione. Nam omnes arbitrantur tunc solum 
theologice aliquid probare, cum ex dictis probant sacrae scripturae.” 
79 Ibid. “Unde, si verbi gratia quaeratur, utrum deus sit aeternus, et unus probet quod sic ex aeternitate 
motus, sicut processit Philosophus 12 Metaphysicae, alius autem probet ex eo qod scriptum 1 ‘in principio 
erat verbum etc’…” 
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content alone.80 What counts as a theological proposition has as much do with how one 
reaches it, as it does with what the proposition actually says. The content, however, may 
still in fact matter and one can certainly imagine that one could deduce all sorts of things 
from what is expressly contained in Scripture, which remain tangential to the body of 
knowledge defined as theological. Nevertheless, we learn in this example that content 
alone is not a sufficient condition to mark out a theological conclusion. Here, the same 
proposition is proved in metaphysics and in theology. For Rimini, the difference lies in 
method. The proposition “God is eternal” is proved theologically when one deduces and 
establishes it on the basis of other propositions found more explicitly in the biblical text.  
Especially important for us is where Rimini turns to find real examples of this 
procedure in action. Regarding the proposition that God is eternal, he points to how this 
could be derived from the prologue to John’s Gospel, but he finishes by saying: “just as 
Augustine does in De fide ad Petrum…”81 Rimini chooses another question, “whether 
God is in some way changeable.”82 He points first to the fact that Aristotle answers this 
question by analyzing the nature of motion in the Physics, but then he turns back to 
Augustine, who he believes answers this question by deducing an answer from the 
 
80 See above c. 2, p. 141. 
81 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:18). “…alius autem probet ex eo quod 
scriptum est Iohannis 1 ‘In principio erat verbum etc’, sicut probat Augustinus De fide ad Petrum capitulo 
6.” While Rimini clearly believes this work (De fide ad Petrum) to be by Augustine, the Patrologia notes 
that the real author of this particular work is uncertain. It is suggested that the author might be Fulgentius 
Ruspensis, but the PL remains hesitant (PL 40, 753-780). 
82 For a point of comparison one might look at Wodeham d. 8 of the Ordinatio, where he considers this 
precise question. One could examine this method in actual practice and compare it to Rimini’s description 
of theology in theory. If it turns out that Rimini considers this question explicitly, one could consider 
Rimini’s method in practice as well. 
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Psalms or from the Apostle Paul.83 Augustine is clearly the representative example for 
Rimini of a proper theological procedure. And, as these examples show, such a procedure 
begins from something explicitly contained in Scripture and then attempts to move to a 
conclusion not explicitly contained in Scripture. 
Rimini’s third example only makes his reliance on Augustine starker. This time, 
he points first to a specific passage in Aureoli’s prologue, where Aureoli makes an appeal 
to the authority of Augustine as an example of the kind of procedure he is advocating. 
Rimini responds with a strong challenge to Aureoli’s reading of Augustine.84 When 
Aureoli tries to suggest that Augustine’s treatment of the Trinity is an example of his 
methodology, Rimini asks rhetorically:  
 
83 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:18–19).“Vel, si quaeratur, utrum Deus sit 
aliquo modo mutabilis, et probet aliquis quod non per rationem sumptam ex motu, sicut incessit 
Philosophus 8 Physicorum, alius vero per illud quod scriptum est Exodi 3 ‘Ego sum qui sum’ et in Psalmo 
‘Tu autem idem ipse es’, sicut probat Augustinus 5 De Trinitate capitulo 2 et De fide ad Petrum capitulo 7, 
aut per illud Apostoli 1 Ad timotheum 6 ‘Qui solus habet immortalitatem’, sicut idem Augustinus probat 
contra Maximinum libro 3, non est dubium quod omnes consentient primas utriusque quaestionis 
probationes non esse theologicas et similiter quaslibet alias, quae ex propositionibus sumptis ex humanis 
scientiis procederent, reliquas vero et similes quascumque dicerent essent theologicas.”  
 The last part of this quotation should be emphasized. Here Rimini explicitly denies the label 
“theology” to any discourse that “proceeds from propositions taken from human sciences.” This is almost 
exactly the statement Giles makes to distinguish theology from metaphysics and the other sciences (cf. 
above, c. 1, pp. 84-90).  
84 Cf. Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, q. 1 (Buytaert I:139, n. 25). “Praeterea, ex studio libri 
De Trinitate compositi ab Augustino acquiritur theologicus habitus; sed certum est quod ipse in toto libro 
procedit ad declarandum istum articulum: Deus est trinus et unus, sicut ipsemet dicit primo De Trinitate, 
capitulo 4o, quod ‘omnes, qui ante’ ipsum ‘scripserant de Trinitate; quae Deus est, divinorum librorum 
veterum et novorum catholoci tractatores hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater, Filius et 
Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdem substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem;’ ergo 
habitus theologicus ex articulis fidei tamquam ex principiis non procedit, sed magis ipsos declarare 
intendit.” 
 To anticipate what we will discuss a little later, we can note here that Rimini and Aureoli can at 
times be arguing at cross purposes. Aureoli uses this quote to show that Augustine argues towards the 
conclusion that God is three and one, and therefore the article of the creed does not function as a principle 
but as a conclusion. Rimini’s focus is on the fact that Augustine does not argue towards this conclusion 
from “probable” principles, but from what is explicitly written in the Scriptures. As we will see 
(“Interlude,” pp. 306-317), it is Rimini insistence on the fact that theology begins from Scripture and not 
necessarily from the articles of the creed that allows him both to critique Aureoli’s reading of Augustine 
and still acknowledge that Augustine argues towards the conclusion that ‘God is three and one’ (a manifest 
article of the creed). 
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Where in the aforementioned books did Augustine prove the 
aforementioned truths from probable propositions or from other things 
taken from worldly teachings? I think that he will not be able to find [such 
a place], but he will find only this: that he has proved [these things] from 
the authority of Scripture.85 
 To counter Aureoli, Rimini cites a passage from De Trinitate, where Augustine states his 
own method and the method of his own authorities.86 The quotation as it stands in 
Rimini’s text reads: 
Everyone who I have been able to read, who wrote before me regarding 
the Trinity which God is, as Catholics discussing the divine books of the 
Old and the New Testament, intended to teach according to the Scriptures 
that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit of one equal inseparable 
substance create one unity.”87 
Everything Augustine has read about the Trinity in the works of other theologians has its 
source in the Old and New Testaments. The teaching of theologians on the Trinity, 
therefore, is only intended to be an extension (or should we say deduction?) of what can 
be found in these books.  
In sum, Rimini’s picture of theological knowledge claims to begin not from 
probable propositions, but from things contained in Scripture and/or deduced from what 
 
85 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:19). “Ubi in praedictis libris praedictas 
veritates probavit Augustinus ex propositionibus probabilibus aut aliis qualibuscumque ex mundanis 
sumptis doctrinis? Puto quod invenire non poterit, sed hoc solum inveniet quod ex auctoritatibus probavit 
scripturae.”  
86 In this challenge to “return to the sources,” shows his penchant for historical accuracy and accurate 
citations, something which Damasus Trapp notes to be distinctive about Rimini’s work as a whole (Cf. 
“Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century”). See also Stephen Brown’s discussion of this passage 
in “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role.” 
87 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:19). “Omnes quos legere potui qui ante me 
scripserunt de trinitate quae deus est, divinorum librorum veterum et novorum catholici tractatores, hoc 
intenderunt secundum scripturas docere quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus eiusdemque substantiae 
inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem.”; cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, I, 2, n. 7, “The purpose 
of all Catholic commentators I have been able to read on the divine books of both testaments, who have 
written before me on the trinity which is God, has been to teach that according to the scriptures Father and 
Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity” (trans. Hill, p. 69). 
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the scriptural authors expressed. In contrast to Aureoli, probable reasons taken from other 
human and naturally known sciences have no place. Besides this difference, the 
orientation of a properly theological procedure seems to differ dramatically. For Aureoli, 
the articles of the creed (those previoulsy detemined beliefs) function as the conclusions 
of a theological procedure. But despite being conclusions, they are the real starting place, 
since probable principles are sought in support of these predetermined conclusions. But 
for Rimini, the theological procedure actually leads us toward the articles of the creed. 
That is, reading Scripture and making subsequent deductions is constructive of those 
articles that are not explicitly stated in Scripture. Because this concern with the explicit 
contents of Scripture instead of the articles of the creed represents a slight departure from 
the traditional way of identifying the principles of theology, we will look at this more 
closely in the next section.88 But for now, suffice it to say that from those things 
contained expressly in Scripture one draws out further conclusions and can then draw out 
even further conclusions from these first conclusions. In this way the content of faith is 
expanded while never going beyond what was originally given. For Aureoli this 
expansion of the particulars of belief has no place in his vision of theology proper. On the 
contrary, the theologian’s job was to take those conclusions as given and to find support 
for them from sources other than their scriptural foundation. Earlier we identified this as 
Aureoli’s vision of how theology ought to defend and protect a space for faith among all 
the other classes of truth and science.89 The appeal to probable reasons is an attempt to 
garner respect for religious truth, by establishing the reasonability of faith claims. 
 
88 See “Interlude” pp. 296-317 
89 See above p. 272. 
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Rimini’s procedure shows little concern for this task, and it is undoubtedly the point at 
which Aureoli would try to stage a counter attack. 
Finally, we can still ask the question: how does Rimini answer the concern of 
Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli, who insist that the theologian must acquire something 
that truly distinguishes himself from the simple believer.90 Aureoli of course does not 
deny the validity or importance of the kind of procedure Rimini describes. In his 
discussion of the “exposition” and “specification” of faith he openly recognizes the 
possibility of the kind of procedure Rimini has described. We may recall that this process 
of specification was exemplified in the profession of the priest who was contrasted with 
the vetula: the simple believer who retained a general faith, but lacked any awareness of 
the specific implications and consequences of that general faith. 
Aureoli’s fundamental objection to calling this process of “exposition” and 
“specification” theology is that he does not think it produces anything other than faith. 
The difficulties of identifying this as theology consisted in the fact that, if this process of 
specification were identified as a separate habit then it was assumed that the simple 
believer and the priest would actually believe different things and not share the same 
habit of faith.  
But this argument depends on some important prior convictions. (1) First as 
Työrinoja implied, Aureoli only acknowledges a single habit of infused faith, which is 
shared by all believers. Little use is made of a notion of acquired faith, where it might be 
 
90 This question continues to be recognized, even by the immediate predecessor of Rimini at Paris, Thomas 
of Strasbourg, who lists as an opening argument for why theology should be a science: “If theology were 
not a science, then those studying theology would labor in vain . . .” / “Si theologia non esset scientia, tunc 
frustra laborarent studentes in ea: sed consequens est inconveniens, et consequentia patet” (Thomas ab 
Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 5rb).  
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possible for the priest to share infused faith with the simple believer, but differ from the 
simple believer when it comes to acquired faith. (2) In the second place, Aureoli remains 
adamantly committed to the fact that theology and faith are not and cannot be of the same 
habit. Thus, were a difference identified between infused and acquired faith, theology 
could never be included in either. The reason for this commitments stems from a third 
assumption. (3) Aureoli is convinced (as our chapter on the purpose of theology showed) 
that the theologian is primarily charged with the job of defending the place of revealed 
truth and faith amidst the other sciences and other truths known by human beings. This is 
not a task that he thinks can be accomplished by any pure habit of faith. Any discourse 
that relies solely on revealed premises has already sequestered itself from these 
disciplines that, without faith, do not recognize the claims of belief.  Thus, for Aureoli, 
denying that faith and theology are different entails the unacceptable consequence that 
theologian possess nothing substantially different from the person of simple belief. 
But Augustinus of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio are both witnesses to the 
possibility of an alternative understanding of defense that is inward focused and begins 
from the assumption that its opponents accept the starting points of faith. Augustinus, in 
particular, thought that he could recognize this special habit of “expression” and 
“exposition” within the habit of faith alone, and when we look to Rimini, we see 
something very similar. Rimini acknowledges this objection of Aureoli directly91 and 
delivers a short and blunt reply: “I concede that theology is faith in the sense which will 
 
91 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Quarto, quia sicut supra tactum est in 
recitando opinionem sequeretur quod theologia esset fides vel opinio; et utrumque est falsum.” 
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be explained in the fourth article of this question.”92 To say much more would be to jump 
ahead to our final chapter and Rimini’s discussion of why a theological discourse 
compels assent in the manner of a science, but nevertheless cannot be classified as a 
science.93 At the moment, the most important thing to note is that Rimini recognizes two 
distinct ways of having the single habit of faith. The theologian distinguishes himself 
through the possession of acquired faith, which the simple believer does not have. This 
label then identifies that distinctive deductive skill that both Augustinus and Prosper 
recognized. It also closely correlates with Aureoli’s understanding of the expository skill 
of the priests and the notion of fides explicita. But unlike Aureoli, Rimini believes this 
expository skill can still fulfill the defensive function mandated by Augustine. The 
defense, however, must be understood in a different way than Aureoli understands it.  
Auspiciously, at the close of his “proper response,” Rimini discusses the defensive nature 
of theology and challenges Aureoli’s conception of it. He writes:  
This description [Rimini’s description of theology] agrees with the 
teaching of the Magister [Lombard], which even this doctor [Aureoli] 
claims for himself; for the Magister says in his prologue that he intends to 
‘fortify our faith with the shield of the Davidic Tower’. 
And then follows the challenge to Aureoli’s understanding of “defense.” 
But by ‘shield of the Davidic Tower’ he surely does not understand 
probable propositions or even propositions proved in other disciplines, but 
rather the authorities of Sacred Scripture.94 
 
92 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:23). “Ad quartum concedo quod theologia est fides in sensu, qui dabitur 
articulo quarto huius quaestionis, ubi etiam respondebitur ad auctoritatem Augustini, quae adducta est in 
contrarium.” 
93 See chapter 7. 
94 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:19). “Huc accedit illud dictum Magistri, quod 
etiam iste doctor pro se allegat; ait enim Magister in prologo se intendere ‘fidem nostram Davidicae turris 
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Here is a clear witness to the deep but unstated disagreement between Aureoli and 
Rimini over what Augustine means by “defense.” Each agree that the ability to “defend” 
is a distinctive ability that separates the simple believer from the professional theologian. 
But they disagree about what it means “to defend.” And in turn their respective methods 
of theological discourse reflect their commitments to this more fundamental definition. 
 
clypeis communire.’ Sed numquid per clypeos turris Davidicae intelligit propositiones probabiles aut etiam 
in aliis doctrinis probatas, et non potius auctoritates sacrae Scripturae?” 
 It is important to note however that Rimini’s conception of “defense” and its epistemological 
requirements was subsequently criticized by Hugolinus of Orvieto. He writes: “Item contra Gregorium: 
Nullus est doctior alio quoad optime solvendas rationes acutas contra trinitatem personarum, nisi sit 
intelligentior respectu veritatis de ‘sic esse’. Et ipsum intelligere ‘sic esse’, est in theologo assentire. Igitur 
perfectiorem habet notitiam et assensum” (Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, I, prol., q. 2, a. 2 (Eckermann I:100)).  
 Here, Hugolinus stats that the ability to defend requires a greater or deeper understanding of 
Scripture, not simply a knowledge of what can be deduced from Scripture. As an alternative, Hugolinus 
look back to Henry Ghent and asserts the need for special perceptive knowledge that allows the theologian 
“to defend” the faith (see above p. 250, n. 4).  
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I. Gerard of Senis on the “Virtual Habit” of Theology and the Principles of 
Theology 
As we have been looking for continuities and discontinuities between Rimini and 
the multi-faceted traditions that preceded him, it is notable that we cannot find a 
precedent for this fundamental disagreement with Aureoli in Ockham. While Ockham’s 
influence and quick adoption by Rimini have been obvious in many places, we do not 
find the same level of influence on this point. On the contrary, the important and decisive 
distinction between the habit of faith and the habit of theology is something Ockham 
shares with Aureoli.1 Therefore, instead of following Ockham, we find Rimini holding 
fast to a prior conviction or alternative influence against the influence of Ockham. But if 
Ockham does not set a precedent for Rimini here, what influences and sources can we 
find for this decisive tradition? 
 At least one member of the Parisian Aegidio-Augustinian tradition offers us a 
clear precedent for Rimini’s stand against Aureoli. Gerard of Senis lectured on the 
Sentences about 1325 only a short time after Aureoli, and Gerard died in 1336.2  Besides 
being of the same order as Rimini, Gerard shared his deep-seated opposition to Aureoli. 
 
1 See above, c. 6, pp. 275-285. 
2 Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 35–36. For more 
biographical information, see also Schabel, Theology at Paris, 184. And also Vecchio, “Gerardo da Siena” 
URL = http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/gerardo-da-siena_(Dizionario-Biografico)/.  
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But Gerard also saw himself as closely following the teaching of Giles, and he was active 
in defending Aegidian positions.3 For these reasons, he is an important source that 
represents an early response to Aureoli by a self-identified member of an Aegidio-
Augustinian tradition. 
What Gerard has to say that is relevant for us is found in a discussion more 
directly connected to our earlier chapter on the end of theology, namely whether theology 
is practical or speculative. But here, in the face of a particular objection, Gerard remarks 
about the distinction (or lack thereof) between the habit of faith and the habit of theology. 
The objection—common to the Aegidian position and everyone who insists that 
the end of the theological habit is love—goes like this: 
If the love of God was the end of theology, no one would be able to love 
God, unless through the habit of theology, which is false. The 
consequence is proved, since the proper end of one habit is not able to be 
had as the end in another habit, otherwise it would not be proper.4 
Gerard responds to this objection by denying any fundamental distinction between faith 
and theology. On the contrary, he affirms that the simplest believer, in a way, possesses 
the habit of theology, and it follows that the most astute theologian never goes on to 
possess something specifically different that the habit of faith with which he began. He 
writes: 
 
3 Zumkeller writes: “In his theological views, too, he shows himself to be a faithful, and not very 
independent disciple of Giles, whom he calls ‘doctor fundamentalis’ and again and again defends against 
Duns Scotus and Peter Aureoli” (Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 35). 
In the same vein Schabel writes: “Gerard’s main opponent generally was Auriol, through whom he also 
attacked Scotus. Gerard often supported Giles of Rome, calling him ‘Doctor Noster’” (Theology at Paris, 
184). For the source relied on by both Zumkeller and Schabel see Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 
Fourteenth Century,” 161–164 and 170–173. 
4 Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, prol., q. 5, a. 5, p. 73a. “Si dilectio Dei esset finis 
Theologiae nullus posset diligere Deum nisi per habitum Theologiae, quod est falsum. Consequentia 
probatur, quia finis proprius alicuius habitus non potest haberi fine tali habitu, alioquin non esset proprius.” 
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Moreover we are able to admit that the one loving God has the habit of the 
theology, if indeed he has faith, which contains the principles of theology 
and, as a consequence, contains the whole theology virtually. And because 
no one loves God without charity, unless they have faith, it therefore 
follows that no one loves God in the mode we speak of unless they have 
the habit of theology in some way (emphasis mine).5 
The Aegidian tradition portrayed by Gerard has taken the “faith-knowledge” of 
the simple believer and included this knowledge within the category of strictly 
theological knowledge. Faith-knowledge and theological knowledge are not specifically 
distinct.6 Nevertheless, as we saw in Rimini (and Augustinus and Prosper), a difference 
can still be recognized with respect to ability. For Gerard, the simple believer assents to 
the principles of theology and thus knows everything the theologian knows in a virtual 
way. But the theologian knows everything that flows from these principles in an actual or 
explicit way.  
 In the previous chapter, we saw that Rimini was beginning to identify the 
principles of theology with the “explicit contents of Scripture” rather than the articles of 
the creed (though, of course, some of the articles of the creed can be counted as explicit 
propositions of Scripture as well). Thus we are eager to see if precedent can be found for 
this as well.  
 
5 Ibid., I, prol., q. 5, a. 5, p. 74b. “Possemus etiam concedere, quod diligens Deum habeat habitum 
Theologiae, si quidem habet fidem quae continet principia Theologiae, et per consequens totam 
Theologiam virtualiter. Et quia nullus diligit Deum cum charitate, nisi habens fidem, idcirco sequitur, quod 
nullus diligat Deum hoc modo, quo loquimur nisi habeat aliquo modo Theologiae habitu.” 
6 We can see further evidence of this from Gerard in the second article of his fourth question. There he 
responds to an objection against the assumption that the theologians operates in the light of faith alone, 
since this does not allow for a distinction between the simple believer and the theologian. Gerard writes: 
“Tertio ponit praefata opinio, quod in lumine Fidei solo non possit haberi maior notitia de credibilibus illa, 
quam habet simplex fidelis, quod est falsum: non enim oportet quod omnes, qui conveniunt in uno lumine, 
habeant aequalem notitiam de his, quae possunt cognosci in tali lumine; nam videmus, quod omnes 
conveniunt in lumine naturali, et tamen non habent aequalem notitiam de his, quae possunt cognosci 
naturaliter: similiter constat, quod omnes beat conveniunt in lumine gloriae, et tamen non omnes vident 
aequaliter illud obiectum beatificum” (Ibid., I, prol., q. 4, a. 2, p. 50b). 
Interlude: Post-Aureolian, Augustinian Precedents and a Gregorian Novelty on Theology 
and Its Principles | 299 
 
                                                
In general, Gerard’s position is that the “articles of the creed” are indeed the 
principles of theology.7 Gerard’s insistence, however, that the theologian begins from the 
“articles of the creed” faces a major Aureolian objection: namely, no science defends its 
own principles, but theology defends the articles of the creed, therefore, etc. Further, 
Aureoli and Rimini both considered the passage from De Trinitate where Augustine 
discussed his defense of the claim that “God is three and one.”8 While they disagreed 
about how Augustine defended this claim, they did not disagree that this important article 
of the creed was functioning as a conclusion. 9 Thus even Rimini is willing to 
acknowledge that the articles of faith are sometimes conclusions. 
Gerard has four responses to the Aureolian objection, all of which generally hold 
to a recognizably Agedian position. He insists that the starting point of faith contains all 
the truths of theology, or in other words no conclusion falls under the title of theology 
that is not derived from what has first been give through faith.10 He also maintains that all 
the truths of this discipline are judged by their harmony with the articles of the creed and 
that the truths of theology can all be resolved or traced back to the articles of the creed, 
 
7 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 31a. “Utrum articuli Fidei sint principia theologiae?”  
 In defending the affirmative, Gerard holds a traditional position that has a clear pedigree as far 
back as Thomas Aquinas and his statement in Summa Theologica I, q. 1, a. 2, that “sacred doctrine is a 
science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science” (trans. Benziger 
Bros, 1947). But we should note that this complicates Aquinas’s own view of theology proper, who 
elsewhere advocates a “declarative” type theology that employs probable reasons in attempt to show the 
reasonability of the claims of faith. See Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 9 and above c. 6, p. 273, n. 273. 
8 For this discussion see above, c. 6, p. 289, esp. n. 84. 
9 For Gerard’s review of the Aureoli position see Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, 
prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 31a–b.  
10 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 32a. “Secundo, illa sunt principia in aliqua scientia, quae suo ambitu includunt 
omnes veritates pertinentes ad scientiam, et omnes non pertinentes excludunt; sed articuli fidei sunt 
huiusmodi, ergo.” 
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thus they are the true principles of theology.11 He also claims that principles are those 
things that are not proved through anything else, but the articles of the creed are of this 
type.12 Once again, he insists that theology uniquely begins from faith and can be derived 
from no other source without ceasing to be theology. 
However, Gerard makes an interesting remark at the end of text, which identifies 
a strange dynamic between the scriptural text and the articles of the creed. He notes that 
sometimes a kind of “declaration of the article” can take place. He does not say much 
about what this declaration involves, except that this declaration of the article is judged 
according to “its general truth, according to which the proposed things is known to us 
through Scriptures.”13  He goes on to say:  
When we want to certify whether an explication of a particular article is 
true, we immediately look to the truth of the article proposed to us in 
general through Sacred Scriptures. And if the explication is in agreement, 
we judge it to be true. But if it is not true, we oppose this declaration 
(emphasis mine)14 
There is not much here to go on, but at the very least, Gerard speaks of a kind of an 
explanation or clarification of articles of the creed which are judged by the general truth 
of the article as it is known directly through Scripture. The definitive meaning or truth of 
the article, by which its special or specific formulation is judged, is dependent on the 
 
11 Ibid. “Tertio illa, per quae regulatur, et mensuratur tota consideratio scientiae, sunt principia in illa, sed 
per articulos fidei tota consideratio Theologia mensuratur, ergo etc.…Quarto illa, ad quae stat ultima 
resolutio totius considerationis Theologicae, sunt eius principia; articuli fidei sunt huiusmodi ergo etc.” 
12 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 31b. “Primo: illae propositiones, quae formantur de subiecto alicuius scientiae, 
et non possunt probari per alias propositiones a priori.” 
13 Ibid., I, prol., q. 3, a. 1, p. 33a. “Intelligendum tamen, quod in tali discursu, qui fit, ipse Articulus semper 
est principium, nam quamvis aliqua assumantur ad declarationem articuli, veritas tamen eius in generali, 
secundum quod est nobis proposita per sacras scripturas, tamquam regula, et mensura permanet.” 
14 Ibid., “…quando volumus certificari, an explicatio facta de aliquo articulo in speciali sit vera, statim 
aspicimus ad veritatem articuli propositam nobis in generali per sacram scripturam, quae si concordat, 
apprehendimus tanquam veram; sin autem non, illam declarationem reprobamus.” 
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reading of Scripture. This dependence or reliance on Scripture makes for an uneasy 
compatibility with Gerard’s early argument that the principles of theology are those 
propositions which are not proved through anything else. One can look, then, to Rimini’s 
transition from the articles of the creed as the principles of theology to those propositions 
which are “explicitly contained in Scripture” as an attempt to smooth out this tension. 
II. Thomas of Strasbourg on the Principles of Theology 
We can find a similar precedent for Rimini’s approach to theological knowledge 
as a whole in his immediate predecessor at Paris and fellow Augustinian, Thomas of 
Strasbourg. Strasbourg lectured on the Sentences in 1335/1337 and was promoted to the 
rank of Master in 1337.15 Of Strasbourg’s connection to Giles and the Aegidian tradition, 
Zumkeller writes:  
He is possibly the most important representative of the older Egidian 
direction in the Order. He often defends the “doctor illustrissimus,” as he 
once calls Giles, against the objections of his opponents . . . Although 
Thomas does not yet use the expression “schola nostra,” the awareness of 
forming a common front with other theologians of his Order following 
Giles repeatedly finds clear expression in his work.16 
Thomas of Strasbourg opens his question on whether theology is a science with a 
concern very near and dear to Aureoli’s heart. The concern (attributed to Aureoli in the 
margin, though not actually representative of Aureoli’s opinion, since Aureoli identifies 
theology as a “wisdom” and not a “science”) is that if theology is not a science then those 
 
15 For a full biography see Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, 
37–39. 
16 Ibid., 38. 
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students who labor in theology, do so in vain.17 Strasbourg offers a now recognizably 
Aegidian response. 
The Sed Contra pinpoints the Aristotelian meaning definition of “science” as the 
main problem, just as we saw in Augustinus of Ancona:18 
It is not valid [that theology is a science], because when speaking about ‘to 
know’ properly speaking . . . ‘to know’ is to investigate the thing through 
its cause, and again, ‘we think we know something when we know its 
cause, and that this is the cause of this and that it is impossible to be 
otherwise.’19 
To this definition, Strasbourg replies: “But we are not able to know the cause of God or 
of the divine things.”20 In short, theology begins from authorities. It is not able to trace its 
knowledge of God back to first and evident principles.21  
 However, Strasbourg is also attentive to the Aureolian objection, and he notes that 
this does not mean the study of theology is in vain; the theologian does acquire 
something that distinguishes him from the simple believer. He is even willing to call this 
acquisition a “science” in qualified sense.22 Discussing the meaning of a demonstration, 
 
17 Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 5rb. “Si theologia non esset scientia, tunc 
frustra laborarent studentes in ea: sed consequens est inconveniens, et consequentia patet.” 
18 See above c. 5, esp. 236. 
19  Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 5va. “Sed illud non valet, quia loquendo de 
scire proprie dicto, de quo isti intendunt loqui, tunc sic diffinitur I Poster: Scire est per causam rem 
investigare, et ibidem, Tunc opinamur scire unumquodque, cum causam eius cognoscimus, et quoniam 
illius est causa, et impossibile est aliter se habere.” Knowing the cause and that the proposition cannot be 
otherwise is a near verbatim line from Posterior Analytics I, c. 2. 
20 Ibid. “Dei autem, et divinorum nulla poterit esse causa, ergo, etc.” 
21 Making this explicit, Strasbourg singles out “evidence” as that criterion that theology lacks: “quod 
studens talis acquirit habitum nobilissimum non nobilitate scientificae evidentiae, sed nobilitate subiecti” 
(Ibid.). 
22 Therefore like Prosper and unlike Augustinus he is willing to discuss theology as a separate habit from 
faith. However, again like Prosper, we will see that this distinction is contingent on re-defining scientia as a 
deductive power. 
 In his proper opinion he writes: “Dico, quod theologia viatoris est vere scientia, non tamen sicut 
natura rei scibilis patitur, sed sicut natura scientis patitur” (Ibid., I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 6vb). 
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Strasbourg claims that this can be understood two ways: “either as the most perfect 
demonstration, and thus only mathematics would be a science…or as a syllogism 
effectively leading to a conclusion, although it proceeds from suppositions and not first 
principles.”23 Strasbourg does more than anyone else we have seen to bring theology on 
par with the other sciences by noting that few if any sciences really meet the exacting 
standards of a scientific demonstration.24 However, more important for us is the the 
looser sense of a demonstration he provides. Here the criteria of evidence and first 
principles have been removed, and now we see, just as we saw in Propser’s re-definition, 
that “science” is defined as merely a deductive power, moving from premises to 
conclusion.25  
 Having shown that theology cannot provide a natural and properly scientific 
demonstration of its conclusion, Strasbourg’s last step in defining theology proper is to 
identify the principles from which the deductive practice of theology proceeds. This is a 
critical step because we have seen that Aureoli and Rimini also do not think theology is a 
strict science, yet their disagreement about the principles of theology yields very different 
 
23 Ibid., I, prol., q. 2, a. 1, f. 6va–b. “Aut per demonstrationem intelligis potissimam demonstrationem, et 
sic solum mathematica esset scientia, quia ipsa sola potissime demonstrat, et est in primo gradu certitudinis, 
ut patet per Averroes. Aut intelligis per demonstrationem syllogismum efficaciter concludentem, quamvis 
procedat ex aliquibus suppositis, et non omnino ex primis; sic rationes theologicae possunt dici 
demonstrationes.” 
24 But this is actually a growing belief which is visible in his later and fellow Augustinian Hugolinus de 
Urbe Veteri (1348-1349) and even later in the Sentences Commentary of Peter Plaoul. Hugolinus writes: 
“…Tamen illa probatio demonstrativa non cogit sic, quin sit possibile oppositum apparere. Iam Academicis 
videbatur, quod nihil esset evidens esse verum. Nec est alicui evidens, quod impossibile sit falsum ita 
viatori apparere verum illud verum et econtrario” (Commentarius in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, I, prol., 
q. 2, a. 2 (Eckermann I:99)). And Plaoul writes much later: “Secundo notanda est…quod materiae debent 
recipi secundum quod sutn, ita quod evidentia mathematica in alio genere quam evidentia theologica vel 
moralis” (Commentarius in Libris Sententiarum, I, lectio 29, d. 3, a. 5, n. 41 (Witt, ed. 0.2 
<jeffreycwitt.com/plaoul>)). 
25 See above, c. 5, p. 242. 
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pictures of proper theological method. Strasbourg must grasp this connection because his 
very next question is to ask “whether the articles of the creed are the principles of 
theology.”26 
 Like Gerard, Strasbourg wants to defend the affirmative and fairly traditional 
position, but he faces a number of Aureoli-inspired objections. The objections center 
around the idea that no science proves, asks questions about, or defends its principles, but 
theology performs these tasks regarding the articles of the creed; therefore these cannot 
be the principles of theology. Notable among these arguments are two passages from 
Augustine. One is the familiar passage from De Trinitate XIV, c. 1 which is used to 
suggest that the theologian’s primary job is to “defend” the principles of faith as 
conclusions.27 The other passage is from De Trinitate I, c. 2, and it is the passage that 
Aureoli invoked to show that Augustine follows his method: an interpretation which 
Rimini in turn harshly criticized.28 
 Strasbourg is not daunted by these objections and holds that the articles of faith 
are in fact the principles of theology. In response, he insists that the objections are 
misguided because, contrary to the assumption of the objection, a science can prove and 
defend its principles.29 Our interest, then, is in how these principles are defended. What 
kind of defense does he have in mind? And how does this method fit into the larger habit 
of theology? 
 
26 Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 2, f. 7rb. “Utrum in scientia theologiae articuli fidei 
sint principia?” 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. See above c. 6, p. 289, esp. n. 84. 
29 Ibid., I, prol., q. 2, a. 2, f. 7va. “Sed illa non concludunt, igitur ad primum dicendum, quod maior est 
falsa, metaphysicus enim IV Metaphysicae probat principia sua.”  
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 In his response to the second Aureoli-inspired argument, drawing on Aristotle’s 
Topics, he states that we can “seek” or “ask” (quaerere) about something in two different 
ways. In one way, we ask about something that is in doubt. But he insists that this is not 
the way we ask about theological principles. The other way is to ask about something 
which is not in doubt in and of itself, but whose application in a special or specific matter 
is in doubt.30 Here we see a parallel to the distinction between an article’s “general truth” 
and the article in speciali employed by Gerard. Strasbourg, like Gerard, is not precise 
about how the special application of the article is clarified. Unlike Gerard, he does not 
mention an appeal to Scripture. However, he does mention who this kind of clarification 
is for, or for whom this clarification is necessary. He writes, “In the second mode it is 
necessary to seek (quaerere) about these [articles], so that heretics, who take up these 
principles and syllogize falsely, will not make false applications in particular matters.” 
The concern with “heresy” is suggestive. It echoes the alternative kind of understanding 
of “defense” that we have seen underlie the fundamental disagreement between Aureoli 
and Rimini. For Strasbourg, the clarification, “proof,” or even “defense” of the articles of 
the creed is not aimed at combating “unbelief” in general or making the truths of faith 
appear “reasonable.” On the contrary, he is concerned with a very specific type of 
“unbelief” or “impiety.” His “defense” is aimed at those who claim to accept to the truth 
of Scripture and the articles of the creed, but draw incorrect conclusions or “syllogize 
falsely.” 
 
30 While Strasbourg indicates that he is drawing from the Aristotle, Topics, I cannot, at the present, find the 
explict passage he has in mind. 
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 In the end, both Gerard and Strasbourg hold on to the idea that the articles of the 
faith are the principles of theology, but they both make concessions about the need to 
clarify and defend them. This creates a kind of ambiguity about their status as principles. 
Rimini, I suggest, attempts to stand in concord with the overall impetus of these 
traditional positions, but turns his attention to the “explicit contents of Scripture” rather 
than “the articles of the creed” to give the tradition more precision and to avoid the oft 
repeated Aureolian critique that “sciences do not defend their principles.”31 We can close 
by looking at how Rimini explains our assent to the first principles of theology, and in the 
process we can show once and for all that Rimini really does identify the “explicit 
contents of Scripture” as the principles of theology instead of the “articles of faith.” 
III. Gregory of Rimini on the Principles of Theology 
Rimini’s fullest articulation of the nature of theological principles comes in an 
objection to his overall description of the theological method. The objection comes in his 
final list of objections after he has given his proper opinion. The first of the four 
objections begins from a statement made by Aristotle in the Topics: “principles are 
‘things that have faith [assent], not through other things, but through themselves.”32 The 
objection then invokes this authority to oppose Rimini’s position that the explicit contents 
 
31 At the very least, it is notable that Rimini never has to ask the question that both Gerard and Strassbourg 
feel compelled to ask (viz. Whether the articles of the creed are the principles of theology?) Rimini appears 
to have abandoned this line of thinking, and therefore never has to face Aureoli’s objection that theology 
defends the articles of the creed. Beginning from the explicit contents of Scripture, Rimini can 
acknowledge that theology “defends” many of the articles of the creed without having to concede to 
Aureoli that theology begins from probable propositions drawn from other natural sciences. 
32 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:20). “Sed contra hoc, quod dictum est de 
principiis theologiae, potest argui, quia, ut dicitur 1 Topicorum, principia sunt ‘quae non per alia, sed per se 
ipsa habent fidem.’” Cf. Aristotle, Topics I, c. 1 100a30-b19, “Things are true and primary which command 
belief through themselvse and not through anything else” (trans. E. S. Forster, p. 273). 
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of Scripture can function as the principles of theology proper.33 The objection reads: “but 
those authorities contained in the Sacred Canon do not have faith (assent) through 
themselves, but through other things.”34 The objection then provides an example: 
Consider the authority of the church, about which Augustine wrote…‘I 
would not believe the Gospel, except on account of the fact that the 
authority of the Catholic Church moves me to do so’ and later, ‘I believed 
the Gospel on account of Catholics, who teach.35 
The objector is wary of the idea that core claims of faith can function as principles 
because it assumes that the assent of faith is the result of a procedure relying on a prior 
reasons, but Aristotle’s definition of principles states that principles must be assented to 
for their own sake, not on account of the truth of something else. Rimini’s reply begins 
with a qualification of the major premise and the operating interpretation of the 
Aristotelian quote. “It should not be understood,” he writes, “that the sense in which 
Aristotle says principles do not have faith (assent) ‘through another’ means that nothing 
other than the principles themselves can be the cause of our assenting to them.”36 On the 
contrary, what Aristotle means is that these principles “do not have faith (assent) through 
other principles, from which the principles in question would be demonstrated.”37 Rimini 
believes Aristotle must be understood this way because he thinks that, even in regular 
 
33 For Rimini express identification of the principles of theology as the “explicit contents of Scripture” see 
below, n. 51. 
34 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:20).p. 20, “Sed auctoritates contentae in sacro 
canone non per se ipsas, sed per alia habent fidem…” 
35 Ibid. “Puta per auctoritatem ecclesiae, iuxta illud Augustini Contra Epistolam fundamenti capitulo 2: 
‘Ego evangelio non crederem, nisi me ecclesiae catholicae commoveret auctoritas’ et infra: Catholicis 
‘praecipientibus evangelio credidi’; et ibidem plura similia dicit.” 
36 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Ad primum dico ad maiorem quod non est intelligendum quod 
principia non habent fidem per alia, sic quod nihil aliud ab ipsis principiis sit causa assentiendi eis.” 
37 Ibid. “Sed intelligendum est quod non habent fidem per alia, supple,  principia, ex quibus ipsa 
demonstrentur, ita quod assensus illorum aliorum sit per se causa assensus circa ipsa.” 
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sciences, we assent to principles on account of “external” motivations, which at the same 
time are not higher principles. Rimini has in mind here the fact that individual 
“experience” (rather than the self-evidence of the proposition) is a common motivation 
for assent to principles.38 He points to Aristotle’s notion of epagogē or induction from 
Posterior Analytics B19 to support this interpretation.39 It is through our repeated 
experience with a given singular that eventually causes our assent to the general principle 
in question. In this case, it is neither self-evidence nor a higher proposition that compels 
assent. 
Rimini employs this subtle distinction between “assent through something else” 
and “assent through another principle” to explain Augustine’s reliance on the Church for 
belief in the truth of Scripture. When Augustine says he believes the Gospel or the truth 
of the Scripture on account of the Church, he is not saying he believes the truth of the 
Gospel text because he has deduced this truth from higher principles.40 On the contrary, 
for Augustine, the authority of the Church functions as cause of assent inasmuch as it is 
 
38 Ibid. “Nam hoc est falsum, sicut patet in principiis, quae sumuntur ex experientiis singularium, quorum 
assensus causa est experimentum, cuius causae etiam fuerunt experientiae multae singularium, ut dicitur 2 
Posteriorum in fine…” 
 We should highlight that is another likely debt to Ockham. In Ockham, “indubitable expertience” 
became an increasingly legitimate starting point for science alongside the “self-evidence” of principles and 
what can be deduced from them. Rondo Keele provides the following helpful explanation of the growing 
importance of “indubitable experience” for Ockham: “If, as per (a), we should trust conclusions drawn 
from premises based on indubitable experience, quite obviously we should also trust indubitable experience 
itself. This clause shows clearly how negligibly philosophical skepticism shaped Ockham’s intellectual 
temperament. Modern philosophers might object that no philosophical distinction should be held to such a 
standard, since no experience is indubitable, and that the best we can do is to build a reasonable and 
coherent theory of our (always doubtable) experiences. But this level of anxiety about skepticism is alien to 
Ockham’s mind” (Ockham Explained: From Razor to Rebellion, 95–98, esp. 97). 
39 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, B19. 
40 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Nec auctoritas Augustini est contra, 
quoniam Augustinus non dicit se credere evangelio propter assensum, quem habeat ad aliquod aliud 
principium, ex quo evangelium demonstretur vel syllogistice probetur esse verum…” 
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“moving (movente) him toward faith in the Gospel.”41 What is the difference between 
this type of “moving” and the kind of impetus provided by a syllogism? Rimini poses a 
rephrasing of the original Augustinian quotation so as to illustrate the difference. The 
rephrasing connotes the sense of “inspiring” rather than the notion of “compelling” or 
“persuading” that might accompany syllogistic reasoning. He writes: “I would not believe 
except for the fact that the sanctity of the church jolts /awakens/stirs (commoveret) me.”42 
This is as close as we get to a discussion of “infused” faith in Rimini’s prologue. This 
consent to the truth of Scripture and the Gospel is the precondition for all theological 
activity and the process of specification and exposition that follows. It therefore must be 
clearly distinguished from the “acquired faith” which separates the theologian from the 
simple believer. Thus, the explicit contents of Scripture can function as first principles 
even though they are believed on account of something other than their self-evidence. 
To this initial response, another objection is proposed, wherein we see two 
possible processes of reasoning emerge. These two processes can help us to further 
clarify the distinction between the person of simple belief and the theologian in Rimini’s 
schema rather than Aureoli’s. To Rimini’s initial response, the rebuttal attempts to 
identify a plausible line of syllogistic reasoning that could lie behind Augustine’s claim 
to believe in the truth of the Gospel. The argument asks us to imagine the following 
syllogism:  
P1) Everything that the Church obligates us to believe, should be believed 
and is true 
 
41 Ibid. “…sed solum ex auctoritate ecclesiae tamquam ex causa movente ipsum ad fidem evangelii.” 
42 Ibid. “Et est quasi simile huic dicto, quod iste vel alius dicere potuisset; Non crederem evangelio, nisi me 
ecclesiae sanctitas commoveret…” 
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P2) The Church obligates us to believe the Gospel 
C) Therefore, The Gospel is true 
The objection ends by asserting that this same procedure could be used to establish the 
truth of propositions contained in other parts of Scripture.43 
Rimini’s response is noteworthy because he does not begin by challenging the 
possibility or legitimacy of this kind of reasoning. On the contrary, he begins by 
conceding the hypothetical. Assuming this is what Augustine actually meant (though 
Rimini does not think this is what Augustine meant), he still insists: “it still does not 
follow that this [P1] was in him as a theological principle per se, such that the theological 
assent acquired by him through a theological discursus would ultimately be reduced into 
this proposition per se.”44 In short, Rimini accepts the above syllogism as a possible 
process of reasoning, but he does not think it can be classified as a “theological” 
discursus. He gives two reasons, the second of which is the most important for us.  
 The second argument against this rebuttal is a reductio ad absurdum based on the 
unacceptable consequence that would seem to follow if the above reasoning was accepted 
as a genuinely theological procedure. Rimini explains: 
If this were a per se principle of a theological discourse, then it would 
follow that any article of faith could be concluded by arguing: ‘everything 
that the Church obligates us to believe, etc’, but the Church obligates us to 
 
43 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:22). “Dices: Immo, scilicet istud ‘Omne quod ecclesia iubet esse 
credendum est credendum et verum’; et ex isto principio, cum minore illa habita per experientiam 
‘Evangelium iubet ecclesia esse credendum’, concluditur evangelium esse verum et ita esse, sicut ipsum 
enuntiat, et simili modo probatur de qualibet parte scripturae.” 
44 Ibid. “Posito tamen quod ita fuerit, adhuc non sequitur quod illud fuerit in eo per se principium 
theologicum, ita quod assensus theologicus acquisitus in eo per aliquem theologicum discursum reduceretur 
ultimate in ipsum per se.” 
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believe this article, for example, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the father 
and the son,’ therefore, etc.45 
Rimini then notes, while the form of this deduction is sound as far as syllogisms go, it is 
not theological reasoning.46 He qualifies this slightly: this could count as theological if 
P1 were actually the conclusion of another theological discourse and therefore only 
functions as a principle in a derivative way. However, to insist that, before P1 became a 
principle, it was a conclusion of a genuine theological discourse it would have to be 
derived from Sacred Scripture.47 Thus the belief that “everything the Church obligates us 
to believe should be believed” is actually a theological conclusion, able to be derived 
from the prior conviction in the truth of Holy Writ. The notion that the above syllogism 
by itself represents a genuine theological procedure is dismissed as absurd in the 
following reductio: 
Any faithful person, who is a newly baptized adult and has never read or 
heard the Sacred Scripture, but receives the symbols to be believed by the 
Church, and holds to this principle [P1], would be able to conclude 
theologically any article of faith, and thus without study and knowledge of 
the Sacred Scripture, he would be a theologian, which no one, who is 
wise, would say.”48 
Rimini’s reductio ad absurdum hangs on the common sense observation that there 
is something different about the person who studies sacred text diligently and the person 
 
45 Ibid. “Secundo, quia, si illud esset per se principium discursus theologici, sequeretur quod quilibet 
articulus fidei concluderetur sic arguendo: ‘omne quod ecclesia iubet etc’; sed hunc articulum, verbi gratia 
‘spritus sanctus procedit a patre a filio’, ecclesia iubet esse credendum; ergo etc.” 
46 Ibid. “Sed constat quod, quamvis vere et bene concludatur, non tamen theologice.” 
47 Ibid. “…nisi illa maior sumatur tamquam conclusio alterius theologici discursus, quo scilicet ipsa ex 
sacra scriptura sit deducta.” 
48 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:22–23). “. . . alioquin quilibet fidelis et noviter baptizatus adultus et qui 
numquam legit vel audivit sacram scripturam recipiens symbolum credendum ab ecclesia et habens illud 
principium, theologice posset concludere quemlibet articulum fide, et sic absque studio et notitia sacrae 
scripturae foret theologus, quod nullus sapiens diceret, sicut puto.” 
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who merely believes the articles of faith are true including the fact that Scripture is true. 
Even if at the end of the day they both believe the same thing, the theologian knows it in 
a different way despite never finding external justification or evidence for that belief.  
This absurdity also teaches us something else about the way the simple believer 
possesses his or her knowledge of the articles of faith. Gerard of Senis said that the 
simple believer, who is also an inchoate theologian, possesses the principles of theology 
and therefore contains “the whole of theology virtually.”49 But we can now see that 
Rimini would in a way agree with this and in a way not. The newly baptized does possess 
by faith many of those propositions which Rimini sees as “expressly contained” in 
Scripture. However, the above example suggests that the simple illiterate believer possess 
these propositions as conclusions rather than as theological principles. In fact, they 
appear to hold these propositions in a jumbled and un-ordered way. The above example 
shows that the illiterate believer draws the conclusion that “Scripture is true” from their 
principal belief that “what the Church says is true, is true.” Rimini’s theologian, in 
contrast, can show why the Church should be believed from the truth of Scripture.50  
While the simple believer relies on the authority of the Church for the content of his or 
her faith, the theologian is distinctive for his or her ability to see why theological truths 
are obligated. However, this why does not trace the conclusion back to evident reasons, 
but instead back to the “explicit contents of Scripture.” It is true to say that both that 
illiterate believer and theologian begin with infused faith. But the theologian stands apart 
 
49 See above, p. 298, n. 5. 
50 On this point, we anticipate the discussion in the next chapter where Rimini indicates that the miracles of 
Christ and the Apostles do not actually give us evidence or motivate us to believe because we believe in 
those miracles is predicated on our trust in the veracity of Scriptures. See chapter 7, p. 348. 
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because he is able to arrange these infused beliefs into their proper dependent order, 
while the simple believer holds them together in confused kind of jumble. 
Finally, it is notable that Rimini chooses as his example (quoted above) the article 
of faith that “the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.” This example is 
telling because, as the source of much controversy between the East and West, this article 
is well known for not being expressly contained in Scripture. Accordingly, it only 
became an article of faith as this proposition came to be viewed as a necessary 
consequence of what was “expressly contained in Scripture.” Therefore, just because the 
simple believer through infused faith assents to this proposition does not mean that he is 
necessarily holding a true theological principle. In this way, Rimini further qualifies the 
position of Gerard of Senis.  
All of this is confirmed when we look at Rimini’s explicit discussion of principles 
and conclusions at the end of his main response in article 2. There he writes: 
It is clear that the principles of theology…are the truths of the Sacred 
Canon, since to these stands the ultimate resolution of all theological 
discourse and from this all theological conclusions are first deduced. But 
theological conclusions—by distinguishing conclusions against 
principles—I say are all the truths not formally contained in Sacred 
Scripture, but which follow necessarily from those things contained in 
Scripture, and this can be either the articles of faith or not, or even things 
knowable or known through other sciences or not, or things determined by 
the church or not. But of all other truths, namely those not following from 
what is said in Sacred Scripture, I say that none of these are theological 
conclusions (emphasis mine).51 
 
51 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:20). “Ex hoc ulterius patet quod principia 
theologiae sic sumptae, quae scilicet per theologicos discursus acquiritur, sunt ipsae sacri canonis veritates, 
quoniam ad ipsas stat ultimata resolutio totius discursus theologici et ex eis primo cunctae conclusiones 
theologicae deducuntur. Conclusiones autem theologicas – distinguendo conclusiones contra principia – 
dico omnes veritates non secundum se formaliter in sacra scriptura contentas, sed ex contentis in ipsa de 
necessitate sequentes, et hoc sive sint articuli fidei sive non, sive etiam sint scibiles vel scitae per scientiam 
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What I have emphasized in the above quotation is the explicit evidence that, for 
Rimini, the articles of faith and the principles of theology cannot be identified in all 
cases, though it may often be the case that the two are identical. Nevertheless, the 
distinction here should set Rimini apart from other similar descriptions of theology. 
Besides Aureoli’s “declarative” methodology, as far back as Durandus a competing 
methodology, called “deductive theology” was identified. Deductive theology claimed to 
proceed from the articles of faith as principles and to deduce the consequences that 
follow. We saw something similar to this in both the work of Gerard and Strasbourg. 
However, Rimini distinguishes himself from earlier descriptions of “deductive theology” 
on account of his repeated focus on what is “expressly (or formally) contained in 
Scripture.” Because of this insistence on the primacy of Scripture, some articles of faith 
must be properly identified as theological conclusions rather than principles. In short, the 
older model that identifies the principles of theology with the articles of faith relies on a 
prior Magisterial work to define and articulate these articles of faith in much the same 
way that Aureoli’s “declarative theology” relied on this earlier predetermination so that 
theologians would know what conclusions to support with probable reasons. In contrast, 
Rimini’s vision of the theologian and proper theological procedure can be removed from 
any dependence on a prior determination of the articles of the creed. In fact, in light of his 
method’s immediate orientation to the express words of Scripture, the theologian can 
easily be seen as taking part in the otherwise Magisterial work of defining the articles of 
faith. Very little about Rimini’s proposed methodology suggests a reliance on the decrees 
 
aliam sive non, sive etiam sint determinatae per ecclesiam sive non; ceterarum autem veritatum, scilicet 
non sequentium ex dictis sacrae scripturae, nullam dico esse conclusionem theologicam.” 
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of the Church. If anything, the theologian’s job is never to start from them, but to always 
trace them back to their roots in what is “expressly contained in Scripture.”52 
Finally, we cannot turn away from the above quotation without noting its 
significant Aegidian ending. In the final line of the quotation, Rimini excludes from the 
category of theology any truth which is not derived from Scripture as a necessary 
consequence. In other words, the explicit and implicit content of Scripture do not just 
define a part of theology, but they constitute the whole of it. This stands in contrast to any 
view which suggests that, while Scripture teaches us about what is necessary for 
salvation, theology itself contains much more that any eager theologian can now pursue 
and which all beatified Saints will eventually enjoy. Thus, in a good Aegidian fashion, 
theology remains limited to a contracted field of truths. Not everything that could 
possibly be said or known about God can be included in theology. Only those things that 
 
52 Here one should consider the work, O’Malley, “A Note on Gregory of Rimini.” (1965). This work begins 
by acknowledging the unprecedented importance Rimini puts on Scripture as the principle starting point of 
theology in comparison to other scholastic thinkers. O’Malley writes: “In the Prologue Gregory puts an 
extremely heavy emphasis upon the role of Scripture in theology. Theology is understood in terms of 
Scripture alone. The principles of theological reasoning are ipsae sacri canonis veritates, and its 
conclusions are omnes veritates non secundum se formaliter in sacra scriptura contentas, sed ex contentis 
in ipsa de necessitate sequentes” (Ibid., 366). Here we see O’Malley citing the key passages we have just 
looked at. However, the main thrust of O’Malley’s essay is to note that in practice Gregory continues to 
appeal to tradition as an aid in the interpretation of Scripture. Thus O’Malley writes: “The fact that already 
in the Prologue Gregory speaks of the determinatio ecclesiae indicates that, no matter how extensive his 
claims for Scripture may seem to be, he means to interpret it in the light of “tradition,” i.e. in the light of 
the great stream of orthodox Christian thought, identified in a general way with the Church” (Ibid., 368). 
 With respect to his article, a few remarks are in order. First, our primary purpose is to look at 
Rimini’s theory of method. This should be kept distinct from his actual practice. If he ever contradicts that 
theory in practice, this does not change what he said from at theoretical point of view. But secondly, and 
more importantly, the question of how to interpret Scripture is a different question from the one we are now 
considering. The main methodological point Rimini is arguing for is not “sola scriptura” or “scriptura per 
traditionem.” On the contrary, his target is the “declarative” approach of Aureoli and its reliance on 
probable natural reasons. It is Rimini’s re-orientation of the theological project back to articulating the 
consequences of Scripture that throws into sharp relief the further question about how to interpret Scripture. 
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are explicitly found in Scripture or necessarily follow from these scriptural principles can 
be granted the name “theological knowledge.”
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I. Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, we move from the proper method in theological 
reasoning to the “epistemic status” of the results of this discursus. This primarily means: 
what kind of certainty can be ascribed to the achievement of this discipline? Is it possible 
for doubt to linger? Is the mind at liberty to assent or dissent from its conclusions?  
The main burden of this chapter will be to resolve two paradoxical claims. The 
first is that Rimini thinks theology is not a science because it lacks the kind of evidence 
one needs to reach a scientific conclusion: a conclusion which compels the mind’s assent. 
Instead of evidence, Rimini argues that theology begins from a primary act of faith and, 
as the previous chapters hinted, results in “acquired faith.”1 The epistemic status of 
theology’s conclusions therefore will never go beyond the level of pure belief. The 
paradox lies in the second claim that this process of reasoning performed by the 
practitioner of theology still compels the mind to assent to the conclusion (as is the case 
in a scientific procedure and as is not the case in reasoning that begins from mere 
opinion). How theology can compel or force the mind to assent without evidence is the 
knot that we must untie. 
 
1 See above, c. 6, p. 285. 
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This chapter is structured around these two claims. First, we look at why Rimini 
thinks theology, as a discourse embedded in the habit of faith, compels assent. Then, 
secondly, we look at why this compulsion cannot be described as scientific in any way.  
II. Claim I: Theology Compels Assent 
A. A Rebuttal from Ockham 
Let us consider, first, a potential Ockhamist complaint that could be leveled at 
Rimini’s position. The complaint facing Rimini is a version of the same complaint 
Ockham raised against Aureoli. Against Aureoli (who insisted that theologian must begin 
with faith in what he intends to prove in order to actually acquire the habit of theology), 
Ockham asked why faith was actually necessary. After all, cannot anyone attempt to 
bring probable opinions in support of a predetermined proposition, regardless of where 
they stand on the truth of that proposition? In light of this question, Ockham 
distinguished between an apprehensive habit and judicative habit, asserting that theology 
proper is an entirely apprehensive habit, while the nature of the judicative habits that 
succeed this apprehension are determined by factors external to theology and its 
methodological procedure.  
In light of the new procedure Rimini describes, it is still reasonable to wonder if 
the same criticism could be aimed at Rimini. Is it only the true believer who can read the 
words of Scripture and identify the claims made therein? And is it only the person who 
truly believes that can trace the logical consequences that follow from the contents of 
Scripture? What difference does our judicative attitude make to the simple task of reading 
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what the Scriptural text says and deducing those things that would follow from it, if it 
were true? We have actually already encountered this question in a different form. In our 
treatment of Prosper of Reggio, we pointed to the critical question that followed his 
position on theological method. The question was: doesn’t this just make theology a 
“science of consequents?”2 That is, isn’t this is a knowledge of the logical consequences 
that follow from any given proposition, but not a knowledge of how reality actually is? 
Rimini has an answer to this, but it is somewhat involved, and it will momentarily 
draw us back into a discussion of the distinction of apprehension and judgment. At the 
heart of the disagreement is the fact that Ockham and Adam Wodeham believe that the 
procedure described by Rimini merely results in an apprehension, while the judicative 
attitudes one begins with and ends with may differ. But Rimini uniquely believes that 
apprehension and judgment are concomitant phenomena, both in normal scientific 
procedures as well as in theological ones, and thus to differ in one’s judicative attitudes is 
to also diverge at the level of apprehension.  
To go deeper here we need to look at this distinction and the phenomenological 
reasons offered on its behalf. Then we can turn to (1) why Rimini thinks this distinction 
is problematic, (2) how he explains the problematic phenomena, and (3) how all of this 
impacts his conception of a theological procedure or discursus.  
Rather than focus on Ockham, we turn our attention to his disciple Adam 
Wodeham, who vigorously defends the distinction between apprehension and judgment, 
because it is with Wodeham that Rimini directly engages. However, to understand 
 
2 See above, c. 5, p. 246. 
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Wodeham’s position, the first thing we need to recognize is that Wodeham shares a 
fundamental position with Ockham about the formation of mental propositions (actus 
enuntiandi), i.e. apprehension. The shared belief is that mental apprehensions are 
complex constructive acts. This means that they are complex ideas not directly caused by 
some inherently “complex reality” but constructions from our simple knowledge of 
simple things.3  
Ockham explains this construction and joining act of simple acts of knowledge in 
the following way—not as an act of the intellect, but as a choice of the will: 
An act of the will contributes to cause the act by which a proposition is 
apprehended and that which we call composition – whether the intellect is 
active or not. Because incomplex notions (notitiae/concepts) of terms and 
the intellect (if it is active) are agents naturally, they are also not inclined 
to form a true or false proposition, affirmative or negative. And thus, they 
either form no proposition or both at the same time, which is contrary to 
experience, though formally it is not a contradiction to form both because 
it is not repugnant to apprehend contradictory things at the same time; to 
assent at one and the same time to contradictories is a contradiction on 
account of the repugnance between those assents (…). Therefore I say that 
the reason that a proposition is formed as true or false, affirmative or 
negative is the will, because the will wishes to form one and not the other. 
And therefore the act by which a complex is apprehended in the first place 
is caused by the incomplex knowledge of the terms of the proposition and 
from the act of the will and this happens naturally. Since, when the act of 
the will is posited, by which the will wishes to form such a complex and 
with the posited incomplex knowledge of the terms of that complex, an act 
of apprehension or formation of that complex necessarily follows, just as 
an effect follows necessarily from its cause.4 
 
3 It is important to note that Ockham and Wodeham disagree very much about whether “knowledge” ends 
up being about the mental propositions itself or some “complex” reality. Wodeham with Rimini affirms 
that such “complex realities” do exist, while Ockham denies such a notion. However, despite this, 
Wodeham follows Ockham by insisting that our complex ideas are caused by complex conjoining acts of 
the mind. But Wodeham will go further to say that this mental utterance actually signifies a quasi-reality 
that is only signifiable in a complex way. 
4 Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q. 5, (OTh VIII, p. 169-170: “Ad causandum tantum actum quo 
apprehenditur complexum, qui dicitur compositio, concurrit actus voluntatis—sive intellectus sit activus 
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In a qualified way, Wodeham also shares this view of the constructed nature of mental 
propositions from simple apprehensions.5 He says: “I call an evident proposition, that 
which is composed from simple apprehensions…”6 It is because of the constructed nature 
of our mental propositions that Wodeham thinks they require approval.7 So he writes:  
No complex judgment has intrinsic evidence and no complex judgment is 
an apprehension. But such a judgment is only a certain approval (adnutio 
quaedam) through the mind agrees that something is just as the 
proposition or propositions signify, without this acquiescence it is only an 
 
sive non. Quia notitiae incomplexae terminorum et intellectus, si sit activus, sunt naturaliter agentia, et non 
plus inclinant ad formandum propositionem veram quam falsam, affirmativam quam negativam. Et ita vel 
formarent neutram vel utramque simul quod est contra cxperientiam. Qui homo experitur quod simul 
formet utramque partem contradictionis, licet formaliter non sit contradictio simul formare utramque, quia 
non est repugnantia simul apprehendere contradictoria, tamen simul et semel assentire contradictoriis est 
contradictio propter repugnantiam inter illos assensus (…). Ideo dico quod causa quare plus formatur 
propositio vera quam falsa affirmativa quam negativa est voluntas quia voluntas vult unam formare et aliam 
non. Et ideo actus quo apprehenditur primo complexum causatur a notitiis incomplexis terminorum illius 
propositionis et ab actu voluntatis et hoc naturaliter. Quia posito actu voluntatis quo voluntas vult tale 
complexum formare et positis notitiis incomplexis terminorum illius complexi necessario sequitur actus 
apprehendendi sive formandi illud complexum sicut effectus sequitur necessario et naturaliter ad causam 
suam” (qtd. in Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 309). 
5 Katherine Tachau writes: “Wodeham’s response tacitly assumes that, while sense experience is—as 
earlier maintained—the basis for evident assent, no single simple apprehension sufficies for such assent” 
(Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, 307). 
 We have to say “in a qualified way” because elsewhere Wodeham appears to suggest that the 
“total significate” of a proposition is a co-cause in the apprehension. He writes: “Vel generaliter loquendo, 
eius obiectum immediatum totale est obiectum totale seu significatum totale propositionis immediate sibi 
conformis, concausantis illum et necessario sibi praesuppositae.…” (Adam De Wodeham, Lectura 
Secunda, I, d. 1, q. 1 (Wood I:192)). 
6 Ibid., I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:163). “Illam propositionem voco evidentem suo modo quae ex talibus 
componitur simplicibus apprehensionibus…” Wodeham is in the midst of describing of the first of three 
types of “evident propositions/apprehensions” which are all distinguished from “evident judgments.” And 
in describing these evident apprehensions, he indicates that they are “composed” from simple 
apprehensions. 
7 Tachau writes further: “Part, then, of what makes the object of scientific knowledge, or assent, what is 
expressible (enuntiabile) but only complexly signifiable is that, contrary to Chatton, the signification of a 
mental proposition is not identical to the signification of its subject term” (Ibid.).  
 The central point here (and the reason why the divide between apprehension and judgment is even 
greater for Wodeham than it is for Ockham) is that Wodeham does not think the object of assent is identical 
with the terms of the proposition: terms and simple concepts which were derived from sense experience 
and constructed into propositions. This “inadequacy” between the simple parts and the apprehension of the 
signficate of the concluding proposition is what requires a separate validating act of judgment. Ockham 
does not acknowledge this inadequacy. While Rimini sides with Wodeham on the questions of a complexe 
significabile and the inadequacy of the simple parts to the total significate, Rimini will focus on the mind’s 
simple and direct access to the total signficate, which allows him to distance himself from Wodeham’s 
position. See below. 
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apprehension that this is so.  And this is a mental concession or negation 
always pre-required by nature and also co-requiring a complex 
apprehension, which when posited one is able to acquiesce or to not 
acquiesce, as if mentally saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or ‘hesitate’. And according 
to this line of argumentation, one such act will be an act of the soul more 
in conformity with an act of desire (actui appetendi) than with an act of 
apprehending. And so, it becomes necessary to distinguish apprehensive 
acts, and judicative and appetitive acts.8  
For Ockham and Wodeham, the process goes a little like this. From the knowledge of two 
simple realities, the will can decide to join them into a complex proposition. This is the 
formation of mental proposition, and this is what they mean by apprehension. So from 
“this man” and “animal” (a genus term connoting an individual with certain, in this case, 
essential characteristics), the proposition “this man is an animal” can be constructed. But 
while this is an affirmative statement, Wodeham believes the knower still needs to affirm 
it because, at the present, it has only been formed by the mind. As Tachau says: 
“Wodeham recognizes that without any introspective means of distinguishing erroneous 
and veridical apprehensions, …sensory illusions would ineluctably result in intellectual 
 
8 Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6, a. 3 (Wood I:173, sect. 18). “Hic respondeo, sine 
praeiudicio, quod nullum iudicium complexum aequivalenter habet evidentiam intrinsecam, nec est 
apprehensio. Sed est tantum adnutio quaedam qua mens adnuit sic esse sicut propositio vel propositiones 
significant, absque hoc quod illa adnuitio sit apprehensio aliqua de sic essendo. Et est quaedam mentalis 
concessio vel negatio semper per naturam praeexigens et etiam coexigens apprehensionem complexam, qua 
posita potest anduere vel non adnuere, quasi mentaliter dicendo ‘sic’ vel ‘non’ vel haesitando. Et secundum 
hoc talis actus esset quidam animae conformior actui appetendi quam actui apprehendendi. et tunc essent 
actus animae imprimis distinguendi in apprehensivos, iudicativos et appetitivos” (qtd. in Bermon, 
L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 314–315). 
 This appetitive element in judgment, which is absent in Rimini’s account, is the reason why 
Bermon characterizes Ockham and Wodeham’s accounts of judgment as “volitional” in contrast to 
Rimini’s “intellectualist” account of judgment. The key difference is that in a “volitional” account, error is 
attributed to will. The will is faulted for assenting to what the evidence does not warrant. This is an account 
of error that Bermon identifies as forerunner to Cartesian accounts of intellectual error. In the intellectulist 
account, the error of judgment lies in the apprehension, whether sensitive or intellectual.  
 Bermon writes: “Le présent chapitre enquête précisément sur le rôle de la volonté dans 
l'assentiment chez trois théologiens philosophes du XIve siècle: Ockham, Wodeham et Grégoire de Rimini. 
On découvrira dans les deux premiers des partisans, pré-cartésiens, d'une intervention de la volonté dans 
l'assentiment. Par contraste, Grégoire de Rimini apparaîtra comme un tenant du caractère intellectuel de 
l'assentiment” (Ibid., 309). 
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errors.”9And at this level, as we saw in the Ockham quotation above, it is also possible to 
construct the contrary proposition (“this man is not animal”) without a contradiction. 
Thus, Wodeham thinks another step is necessary, whereby the mind says yes or no to the 
adequacy of what has been constructed to reality. Here we should not think of another 
term added to proposition, but of mental “nods” or “shakes” given to each formulated 
proposition:   +(“This man is an animal”) and ~(“this man is not an animal”).  
Rimini is critical of this conception of apprehension or mental utterance (enuntio), 
and through his revisions, he points out that the mental “nod” and “shake” become 
redundant. His critique can be found in a section of q. 1, a. 3 titled “A doubt about mental 
enunciation (apprehension),” and it comes after his solution built around the denial of a 
distinction between apprehension and judgment. The doubt asks whether mental 
utterances or apprehensions are composite acts built from partial knowledge of simple 
things or a simple act not constituted from parts.10 The implication is that if the act were 
a composite, then the distinction between apprehension and judgment would be 
necessary.  
In response to the doubt, Rimini denies that mental propositions are the result of 
complex acts of the mind. Pascale Bermon states: “Concerning the formation of 
 
9 Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, 306. 
10 Rimini, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:33) “Sed posset moveri dubium utrum ipsa enuntiatio mentalis sit 
essentialiter composita ex partialibus notitiis quibusdam simplicibus, quarum unam sit subiectum et alia 
praedicatum, an vero sit actus non ex talibus partibus constitutus.” 
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propositions, Gregory of Rimini holds one thesis very strongly. For him, the proposition 
is not an act composed in the mind.”11 In his own concluding words, he states: 
The affirmation and the negation in the intellect are not truly acts 
composed and complexes in a strict sense whereby they would be 
composed of partially distinct knowledge acts, such that one would be the 
subject and the other the predicate, as many believe.12 
But what are his concerns? His main complaint can be summarized as a lack of sufficient 
reason to explain the conjoining of two simples. For instance, he writes: “Why will one 
part be the subject or predicate over the other and vice versa?”13 There seems to be no 
“cause” that assigns one to the position of subject and one to the position of predicate.14   
 As an alternative, Rimini thinks that despite the complex nature of a proposition, 
the mind’s utterance of that proposition is a simple rather than a complex act. Bermon, 
who has done extensive work on this issue, provides a helpful explanation: 
The intellect understands the composition-division in beings without itself 
performing the act of division or composition. It remains simple in its acts, 
to the point that in one passage, Gregory of Rimini states that the 
judicative act is also essentially simple, as the act of “simple 
understanding.15  
 
11 Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 319. “Concernant la formation des 
propositions, Grégoire de Rimini soutient une thèse forte. Pour lui, elle n'est pas un acte composé dans 
l'esprit.” 
12 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:35). “Ex istis patet quod affirmatio et negatio 
in intellectu non dicuntur actus compositi vel complexi in vero sensu, quia sint compositi essentialiter ex 
talibus notitiis partialibus distinctis, quarum una sit subiectum et reliqua praedicatum, ut multi putant…” 
13 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:34). “Praeterea, cur una pars erit subiectum vel praedicatum potius quam 
alia vel econverso?” 
14 Ibid. “Certe non videtur posse assignari causa, cum sint in eodem subiecto primo et aequaliter natae sint 
subici et praedicari, supposito quod sint.” 
15 Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 319–320. 
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The exact quote from Gregory states: “the act is essentially simple and only objectively 
complex.”16 Bermon continues: 
Rimini maintains the distinction between two types of acts: “simple 
understanding” which Arabic-Latin philosophy called, since the 
translations of Avicenna, formatio and the complex understanding called 
fides [assent]. But this distinction is not found in the essence of the 
intellect, which is always simple; it comes from the object. [Therefore] if 
the intellect relates to an incomplex thing, it is an act of simple 
intelligence; if relates to an “enuntiable,” then it judges.17 
This final remark about the intellect relating to an “enuntiable” begs a few questions. 
Gregory and Bermon’s reference to the “enuntiable” is a reference to a kind of quasi-
ontological entity that Rimini adopts from Wodeham, but which Ockham does not 
recognize. This ontological entity has been the subject of large body of secondary 
literature.18 Wodeham and Rimini recognize independent realities that can only be 
signified complexly, that is, through a proposition. What is commonly known as the 
complexe significable or the “enuntiable” is akin to what modern discourse often refers to 
as a state-of-affairs.  
 One of the best ways to understanding the impetus behind positing such quasi-
entities is considering some of the unsavory consequences that might follow if we 
asserted that the truth of all propositions was dependent on simple things alone (the 
 
16 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 4, a. 1 (Trapp I:134). “Sed, si propositio huiusmodi mentalis 
non sit ex talibus diversis partibus composita, sed sit secundum se aeque simplex, sicut actus intellectus, 
qui non est affirmatio vel negatio, et dicitur simplex intelligentia, quamvis sit de obiecto complexe 
enuntiabili enuntiatione vocali vocali vel scripta…” Cf. Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire 
de Rimini, 320. 
17 Ibid. “Il maintient certes la distinction entre deux types d'actes: l'intelligence simple que la philosophie 
Arabo-Latine appelle, depuis les traductions d'Avicenne, formatio et l'intelligence complexe appelée fides. 
Mais cette distinction ne repose pas sur l'essence de l'intellect, qui est toujours simple, elle provient de 
l'objet. Si l'intellect se rapporte à une chose incomplexe, son acte est de simple intelligence; s'il se rapporte 
à un énontiable, il en juge.” 
18 See my article “Adam Wodeham,” Standford Encyclopedia, forthcoming, for a survey of this literature. 
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position of Walter Chatton) or dependent on the existence of a knowing mind 
contemplating simple terms (the position of William of Ockham). If we supposed that 
nothing exists, we might wonder if it is still true to say that “nothing exists.” From the 
perspective of Walter Chatton, it might be difficult to explain why this proposition is true, 
since there is no thing to which this proposition could refer. Ockham might still have a 
chance at rebuttal if he were to contend that God still exists, and he is actively aware of 
the mental utterance “nothing exists.” Because knowledge is about the truth or adequacy 
of this linguistic phrase, not its direct correspondence to the world of being, Ockham 
might still find a way to escape. But if it were supposed—per impossible—that even God 
did not exist, and there were no one to be aware of the mental utterance “nothing exists”, 
Wodeham and Rimini still want to assert the truth of this proposition. They can assure 
this truth by pointing to the quasi-realities which are only able to be signified through a 
complex utterance. These signified realities retain a kind of ontological weight even 
when no real thing (substance or accident) exists. 
 Despite sharing the same conviction about the complexe significabile, Wodeham 
does not put it to the same use as Rimini. In order to signify what can only be signified 
complexly, Wodeham believes the mind must compose a mental proposition, and he 
further believes that the adequacy of this formation must be independently verified. 
Rimini, in contrast, thinks in terms of the mind’s direct and simple relation to an 
“enuntiable” or the actual state-of-affairs. To relate to reality in this way, rather than to its 
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simple parts, is what it means to judge.19 As an example: one might think of a situation 
where one enters a room to find that: “a cat is on the mat.” For Rimini, to be in this 
reality and to relate to this state-of-affairs is at once to perceive and judge that the cat is 
on the mat. Any reflection about the accuracy of this judging-perception comes 
subsequent to the judgment that has been made. In contrast, for Wodeham, one enters the 
room, sees cat and mat, and then decides to put them together. After performing this 
conjoining act, one must reflect on its adequacy to the state-of-affairs and then make a 
judgment. Here the reflective act breaks up the apprehensive and judicative act.  
This difference in opinion about how the intellect relates to a given state-of-affairs 
is significant for Rimini, in that he thinks it makes Wodeham’s appeal to a judicative 
“nod” or “shake” redundant. Because the intellect’s perception of the state of affairs is 
already an affirmation, it is a redundant move to then subsequently affirm what has 
already been affirmed.  
With this essential difference in place, we can turn to see the phenomenological 
cases Wodeham uses to support his position. For him, these are all too common 
experiences that make Rimini’s position untenable. In Rimini’s response, we will not 
only see how his position can makes sense of these common experiences, but also why a 
true theological procedure must begin and end, not merely in apprehension, but in an 
apprehensive judgment. 
 
19 Interestingly, Bermon points out that Rimini’s position here is preceded by Waltor Chatton, the infamous 
nemesis of Ockham and Wodeham. Bermon writes: “In the 6th question of his Prologue, Wodeham cites the 
objects of Walter Chatton, who prefigures in many ways the position of Gregory of Rimini. For Chatton, 
the intellect does not form the propositions, it receives them. ‘It is not in the power of the intellect to 
compose thing together’ (Chatton, in Wodeham, Lectura Secunda t. 1, p. 159 (Prol., q. 6, a. 2 section 11)). 
Every proposition is a certain appearance that it is so in reality as it the proposition signifies it to be” 
(Bermon, L’assentiment et son objet chez Gregoire de Rimini, 315). 
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B. The Distinction between Actus Enuntiandi and Actus Sciendi: the Phenomenological 
Reasons of Adam Wodeham 
Rimini reviews nine arguments in favor of the distinction between apprehension 
and judgment, seven of which he takes verbatim from the prologue Wodeham’s Lectura 
Secunda, q. 6. I will focus on just a couple of pairs of arguments. The first pair gives us a 
good example of the kinds of normal experiences that might prompt us toward the 
common sense belief that apprehension and judgment are distinct. The second pair nicely 
illustrates the kind of position on theology and faith that one appears committed to by 
upholding this distinction. 
The sixth and seventh arguments listed by Rimini, but taken from Wodeham, are 
closely related. The seventh is a concrete example of the general reasoning of the sixth. 
First Wodeham argues: we know that apprehended propositions are distinct from assent 
because a demonstrative proof can cause us to assent to a new proposition, which stands 
in opposition to a previously believed proposition. Yet this earlier apprehended 
proposition can remain in the mind, even though the assent does not. If this were not the 
case, we would have both assenting and dissenting propositional attitudes about the same 
thing, at the same time.20 
 The concrete example of this argument, found in the seventh argument, goes as 
follows: imagine a scenario in which we first judge a stick to be broken when it is 
partially submerged in water, but then, after a demonstrative proof, no longer agree (or 
 
20 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp 1:26). “Probo, quia demonstrativa probatio 
oppositi causat vel causare potest dissensum sic esse illis stantibus in mente, igitur illae manente, et non 
manet assensus per eas causatus, quia tunc simul homo assentiret et dissentiret sic esse; quod est 
impossibile.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:176, sect. 20). 
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assent to the fact) that the stick is broken. Wodeham notes that the original proposition 
may remain in the mind, even though we no longer assent to it. But if our apprehension 
of a given state-of-affairs was at the same time a kind of judgment about that very same 
state of affairs, it would not be possible for this mental proposition to linger.21 If Rimini 
is going to reject the distinction between apprehension and judgment, he is going to have 
to provide some explanation of this all too recognizable experience. 
The eighth and ninth reasons illustrate the theological position Rimini would like 
to avoid. The eighth argument claims, as Ockham did, that the believer and the non-
believer are able to have the same simple acts of knowing, and as a consequence are able 
to form propositions from those acts of the same kind (ratio) (meaning they would fall 
under the same genus of acts). Nevertheless, only one of them assents to the formed 
proposition while the other does not assent.22 Thus it seems clear to Wodeham that the 
formation and apprehension of the proposition in question is something different from 
our assent to it.  
 The closely related ninth argument states: if the acts were not distinct, then the 
faithful would have to assent to a proposition even if he or she did not want to.23 Drawing 
 
21 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp 1:26). “Sicut patet de illo, qui videns baculum, 
cuius pars est in aqua, format hanc propositionem, ‘ille baculus est fractus’ et iudicat sic esse.’ Quod enim 
ipsa non sit talis assensus probatur, quia postquam est certificatus per tactum vel per demonstrationem aut 
alio modo quod ille non est fractus, adhuc habet eandem propositionem in mente, nec tamen assentit, alias 
simul assentire et dissentiret.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:176, sect. 
20).  
22 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:26). “Fidelis et infidelis in omni actu simplici 
cognoscendi convenire possunt et per consequens formare possunt propositiones ex illis eiusdem rationis, 
et tamen unus assentit ei quam format, et alius non assentit alii quam format eiusdem rationis, igitur neutra 
est assensus fidei.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:177, sect. 20). 
23 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:26). “Non ‘quamcumque propositionem 
formet fidelis, nisi velit, non assentiet; si autem assensus esset aliqua illarum propositionum vel multae 
propositiones, vellet nollet, assentire’, igitur assensus fide non est propositio, cui assentitur, et eadem 
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on the implied absurdity of this conclusion, we can conclude that Wodeham assumes that 
theology is not productive of a judicative habit of any sort. He further assumes that the 
will determines assent, independent of the theological discursus. This, of course, speaks 
to the motivating paradox of this chapter, namely, how can Rimini really hold that 
theology compels assent and yet still results in a kind of faith? Wodeham clearly finds 
this absurd and can consequently appeal to this absurdity in order to argue for a 
distinction between apprehensive and judicative acts.24 It turns out, however, that Rimini 
does not believe this paradox is as absurd as Wodeham thinks, and therefore the 
distinction between apprehension and judgment is not required. 
C. Rimini: Against a Distinction between Apprehension and Judgment 
In order to solve the problems Wodeham creates, Rimini turns to a distinction 
between two kinds of mental propositions, a precedent for which he finds in Augustine. 
He directs us to De Trinitate Book XV, where we find Augustine speaking of two sets of 
utterances:  
So thoughts are a kind of utterance of the heart, which also has its mouth . 
. . One sentence includes the two sorts of mouths a man has, one of the 
body, the other of the heart.25 
Of these utterances Augustine identifies the utterance of the heart with an inner mental 
language which corresponds to no human language. These are what Rimini calls natural 
 
ratione nec assensus scientiae.” Cf. Adam De Wodeham, Lectura Secunda, I, prol., q. 6 (Wood I:177, sect. 
20). 
24 Here we should be reminded of Ockham’s belief that the while the theological habit is the same (of the 
same ratio) for all practitioners, the initial and independent judicative act is decisive for the kind of 
judicative habit that will result. This kind of independence, however, is impossible if apprehension and 
judgment are not sharply distinguished. See above, c. 6, pp. 275-285. 
25 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 3, 18 (Hill, 408). Cf. Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 
(Trapp 1:30). 
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signs, and they are the immediate effects of the intellect’s encounter with “objectively 
complex” realities. The utterances of the mouth, on the other hand, are the conventional 
signs of ordinary human language which we use when we want to express ourselves 
either audibly or through the written word. Augustine goes on to say one more thing that 
is of importance to Rimini. He states that we can often think silently using only the 
conventional signs of human language. Augustine writes:  
…do not look at that word of ours which sounds in the ears, neither when 
it is uttered vocally nor when it is thought of silently. The words of all 
spoken language are thought of silently, and people run over songs in their 
minds while their mouths remain silent…26 (emphasis mine). 
With this emphasis on our ability to think silently using conventional (or spoken) 
language, Rimini makes a key distinction between two kinds of mental propositions. The 
first kind of propositions he identifies are those which are images or likenesses in the soul 
of written or spoken propositions. While these are propositions that employ conventional 
language designed for interpersonal communication, Augustine notes that sometimes our 
mind runs over these conventional signs silently and privately.27 What is critical for 
Rimini about these first kinds of expressions is that they are not genuine expressions of 
understanding, but copies or imitations of thought.28 That is, they do not represent an 
immediate and simple encounter with a given state-of-affairs. In the context of his 
discussion of these spoken conventional utterances, Augustine quotes Matthew 15:16: 
“Are you still without understanding? Do you not understand that everything that goes 
 
26 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 3, 20 (Hill, 410). 
27 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp 1:30). “Quoddam enim est earum, quae sunt 
vocalium enuntiationum imagines vel similitudines ab exterioribus vocibus in animam derivatae . . .” 
28 Rimini even describes these as akin to those “fictae” that the mind creates when the mind creates 
concepts of things that do not actually exist (Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:30)).  
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into the mouth passes into the belly and is got rid of in the privy?” And then Augustine 
explains the verse: “Here, certainly, [Jesus] was obviously alluding to the mouth of the 
body.”29 In other words, these spoken utterances do not indicate understanding or 
genuine apprehension, but represent lip-service and imitation. Gabriel Nuchelmans 
describes the signification of these images of vocal words as signifying in a “non-
ultimate way” meaning that “they are not something in which the cognitive process 
comes to a stand still, but rather a means to a further end.”30 We do not understand the 
ultimate reality itself until we think it through all the way and then utter that 
understanding from the heart.  
In contrast to this first kind of utterance, Rimini identifies the formation of a 
second kind of mental proposition that imitates no spoken language, but precedes all 
conventional signs.31 Included under these kinds of propositions are all manner of first 
principles and first impressions, but only when they are genuinely understood. The idea 
of first principles highlights what is important about these mental propositions for 
Rimini. When the mind relates to the “objectively complex” reality, the mind’s 
apprehension is also a judgment.  
But under this same category of mental propositions, Rimini also includes the 
conclusions of demonstrations. He writes: these are the kinds of propositions someone 
 
29 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 3, 18 (Hill, p. 408). 
30 Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, 16. Nuchelmans also gives the 
following summary of what late-scholastics generally thought these kinds of mental images signified: 
“What the mental images of written and spoken propositions signify in a formal, natural, and non-ultimate 
way is the written and spoken propositions of which they are the likeness” (Ibid., 17). 
31 Rimini writes: “Quoddam vero est genus enuntiationum mentalium, quae nullarum sunt similitudines 
vocum, nec secundum illarum diversitatem in hominibus diversificantur, sed eaedem sunt secundum 
speciem apud omnes, id ipsum naturaliter significantes quod vocales eis subordinatae ad significandum ad 
placitum et per institutionem significant. Et istae sunt illa verba, quae nullius linguae sunt” (Lectura, I, 
prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:31)). 
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forms, when they demonstrate some truth.32 If someone genuinely apprehends a 
conclusion as a conclusion—rather than simply as a free-floating string of words—then 
its formulation is at the same time an assertion of its truth. Apprehended within the 
context of a syllogism, it is also an act of assent. The formulation of the concluding 
proposition, in Rimini’s mind, is not a neutral combination of words to be judged later, 
but rather a kind of declarative assertion: “Socrates is a man” (emphasis on the “is”). 
 Furthermore, the same connectivity between genuine expression and judicative 
attitudes applies for propositions that result from processes of reasoning other than purely 
demonstrative syllogisms. This is particularly important for us in our effort to not only 
understand scientific assent in general, but also the kind of assent proper to theology. 
Under the same category of mental proposition—i.e. those which are uttered from the 
heart and indicate a genuine apprehension—Rimini includes both the attitudes of opinion 
and belief. He writes: 
Indeed some of these propositions [employing natural language, “uttered 
from the heart”] are not caused in one of the aforesaid ways: from the 
primary type of knowledge of such realities. Propositions of this type are 
those in which someone forms a proposition (enuntiat) in their mind and 
judges that it is so or is not so, while not knowing (cognoscens) intuitively 
or by another prime knowledge or by something derived from intuitive 
knowledge that it is so or that it is not so, just as it is formed in the mind. 
This happens when a person believes or has an opinion.33 
 
32 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I: 31). “Huiusmodi sunt enuntiationes illae, quas quis absque prolatione 
exteriori enuntiationum vocalium et interiori etiam formatione illis similium format, dum aliquam veritatem 
demonstrat.”  
33 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:31). “Quaedam vero sunt, quae non ex rerum talibus primis notitiis 
aliquo praedictorum modorum causantur. Cuiusmodi sunt enuntiationes, quibus quis enuntiat mente et 
iudicat sic vel sic esse aut non esse non cognoscens tamen intuitive aut alia notitia prima vel ex intuitiva 
derivata quod sic sit vel non sit, sicut enuntiat in mente quis, dum credit vel opinatur.” 
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At this point, there is not much more to say about the kinds of mental propositions 
Rimini recognizes and which ones count as genuine apprehensions or an enuntiones.  If 
there is an articulation born of genuine understanding, then it cannot be divorced from an 
awareness of what the proposition signifies. But, for Rimini, to form such a proposition 
as the product of reasoning is also to immediately make a claim about reality.34 He is, of 
course, willing to acknowledge that we can hold some propositions in our mind to which 
we do not give assent or for that matter take any propositional attitude. But he insists that 
these can only be propositions of the first type (propositions formed from conventional 
language). Such propositions are fundamentally different in nature and are more similar 
to the kind of imitation seen in parrots than acts of genuine reasoning.35 In short, they are 
not real acts of thought, but only imitate genuine thinking according to the conventional 
rules of grammar.  
With this distinction in place, we can turn to observe how Rimini uses it to 
explain the kinds of experiential phenomena that Wodeham put forward as evidence of a 
necessary distinction between apprehension and judgment. Rimini’s answers to 
Wodeham’s stated concerns are fairly straightforward and predictable. The basic strategy 
is the same in all cases. Where Wodeham thinks he identifies a case of genuine 
apprehension without assent, which would threaten a contradiction if assent were 
 
34 Rimini’s unique position on apprehension and judgment is not with a legacy. We find the Augustinian 
Peter Gracilis (a contemporary of Peter D’Ailly) employing this position to defend a similar point about the 
importance of faith for doing genuine theology. For instance he writes: “licet assensus theologicus a 
propositione theologica non sit distinctus…” (ms. Royal 10 A I, f. 12v) and “si ponatur qoud fideles foret 
illam propositionem ‘Christus est passus’ et infidelis etiam eadem quoad terminos, tunc sic fideles assentit 
significato propositionis per eum formante et infideles non assentit, ergo specie distinguitur” (f. 12v). 
35 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura., I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:32), “Ulterius sequitur ex istis quod non 
omnis mentalis enuntiatio est assensus, licet omnis assensus sit mentalis enuntiatio.” 
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concomitant with it, Rimini remarks that we are not talking about a proposition of natural 
signs and “uttered in the heart.” In other words, it is not a case of genuine thinking, but 
imitation. A further action would be required for these conventional signs to be 
understood as natural signs and therefore to be genuine representatives of some object in 
an ultimate way.  
 We can see this general reply at work if we look once more at the example of the 
stick appearing to be broken in the water. When I first apprehend this as the result of 
some form of reasoning and believed it to be genuinely broken, my apprehension is at 
once an understanding of the significance of what my natural language signifies and at 
the same time an assertion about the truth of that signification. I do not simply think: 
“stick+is+broken,” but I think: “there is a stick in reality which is in fact broken.” 
However, when I come to demonstrate that the stick is not broken, it is not the case that I 
retain this same proposition, but lose a corresponding propositional attitude. On the 
contrary, the former proposition remains in my mind only as a shadow of its old self, 
presumably as a kind of memory of something once possessed, which is now lost. The 
proposition no longer exists in my mind as an apprehension of genuine thought. Rimini 
states the case as follows: 
I say that the proposition, by which one first judges that the stick is broken 
does not remain in the mind after the opposite has been proved. But if one 
forms a proposition afterwards or even if some proposition remains, which 
one formed before declaring that the stick is broken, this is not the same 
proposition by which one earlier judged formally that the stick was 
broken. It is different both individually [different in number] and in 
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species. For it is now a mental proposition of the first type, none of which, 
as it was said, are a form of assent or dissent.36 
From this basic response, we can see how Rimini responds to the argument Wodeham 
makes from his presuppositions about the nature of theological reasoning. Once again, 
Wodeham’s argument proceeds from the Ockhamist belief that the unbeliever and the 
believer can perform the same reasoning while they hold contrary judicative attitudes. 
Rimini counters by asserting that, despite the similarity of appearances in the respective 
reasoning processes, the believer and unbeliever are actually constructing different 
arguments from diverse apprehensions.  
 This can be illustrated by looking at an example of a simple syllogism that Rimini 
would recognize as “theological.”37 
P1) Christ had human flesh 
P2) Everything with human flesh is a human being 
C) Christ was a human being 
When the person without belief “appears” to take P1 from Scripture, Rimini insists that 
they are actually playing with the logical relationship between conventional signs. When 
they deduce C from P1 and P2 they are apprehending and assenting to a conclusion about 
predicates and subjects. Not only do they not assent to the conclusion that “Christ was a 
 
36 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:38). “Dico quod illa propositio, qua primo 
iudicat baculum esse fractum, non manet in mente, postquam certificatus est de opposito, sed, si postea 
aliquam formet vel etiam si qua remaneat, quam prius formasset enuntians baculum esse fractum, non est 
illa, qua formaliter iudicavit prius ipsum esse fractum, sed alia et secundum individuum et secundum 
speciem; est enim de prima maniere mentalium, quarum nulla, ut saepe dictum est, est assensus vel 
dissensus.” 
37 The following syllogism can actually be found in the work of John Mair who identifies it as an example 
of a true theological argument. Mair’s own account of proper theological method mirrors Rimini’s and thus 
his own example provides us with a trustworthy example with which to work. The example reads: 
“Secundo patet quod conclusiones proprie theologicae (distinguendo conclusiones contra principia) sunt 
veritates non contentae expresse in Sacro canone, sed ex eis deducuntur: ut ‘Christus habet nervos’, ex hac 
deducitur ‘Christus est homo’” (Mair, In Primum Sententiarum, prol., q. 4 (1519, f. 11ra)). 
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human being,” but neither do they actually apprehend it. For those who begin without 
belief, the words in this syllogism function as variables. What we really have is the 
following: 
P1) if x exists, then P(x) (where “Christ” functions as variable x and flesh 
as predicate P) 
P2) for every x, P(x) = H (where “human being” functions as H does) 
C) x = H 
The conclusion “Christ is a human being” is, in the case of the person who begins 
without belief, equivalent to x = H. If the practitioner in question is doing more than 
simply mouthing words he heard someone else say, then Rimini would likely accept that 
there is some “judgment” taking place. But he is assenting to the fact that, granted the 
condition of P1, then logic and intelligibility demand that x = H. This assent, therefore, is 
a statement about possibility, not about an actual state-of-affairs. The unbeliever who 
performs this logical syllogism using the variables taken from Scripture is simply not 
performing the same reasoning process, nor apprehending the same things as the 
theologian, despite the fact that from an external perspective the syllogisms look 
identical. The unbeliever apprehends something about the way conditionals work and the 
consequents that follow when variables align in certain ways. This is something quite 
different from beginning from the claim that it is true that there actually was a historical 
person named Christ who had human flesh.  
From Rimini’s more general rebuttal to the Ockhamist argument that the 
reasoning, and therefore apprehension, of the believer and non-believer is identical, we 
must pass to what this means for faith. Without the proposed Ockhamist distinction, it 
appeared quite clearly to Wodeham that a given apprehension necessarily determines 
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assent. Accordingly, in the process of a theological syllogism there is no room for any 
volitional component to influence the judicative attitude one takes toward that 
conclusion. This was unacceptable for Wodeham, who began from the assumption that 
faithful assent was a separate choice: a product of an independent judicative habit. Yet as 
we have seen, Rimini rejects this independence and declares that a true theological 
discursus is inseparable from judgment. This is what leads us to our paradox. Despite the 
fact that theology compels assent as a scientific demonstration does, Rimini continues to 
insist that theology also results in faith. To see why the “compelling” reasoning of the 
theologian still only results in faith and can therefore be distinguished from science, we 
must move forward toward Rimini’s final declaration of why theology is not a science. 
III. Claim II: Theology is not a Science 
A. Acquired Faith and Its Principles 
In the fourth and final conclusion of the final article of question one (thus the 
culminating moment of all the effort put into question one), Rimini declares: “a kind of 
faith is acquired through theology, and therefore it is clear that the habit of theology is a 
‘creditive’ habit and a certain ‘acquired faith.’38 Critical is the affirmation that creates our 
present problem: the procedure of theology results in a kind of faith—not science—but 
again we know that this assent cannot be distinguished from the apprehension of 
theological conclusions as conclusions. Thus this act of faith appears to be compelled.  
 
38 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:53)., “Quarta, quod acquiritur fides quaedam; 
ex quo patebit quod habitus theologiae, qui consequenter acquiritur, est quidam habitus creditivus et fides 
quaedam acquisita.” 
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In the defense of this fourth conclusion we can see how Rimini answers our 
fundamental problem. Here, he gives us a definition of what he means by “acquired 
faith,”39 which we can contrast with his account of how scientific assent is acquired, 
provided in his first conclusion of this final section. 
First, let us note his declaration about acquired faith: “Every assent without 
evidence and doubt (formidine) is faith.”40 The key is to keep in mind that such an assent 
cannot be divorced from the manner of its apprehension as a theological conclusion. The 
distinctive feature of this faith is that its apprehension comes from a syllogism that begins 
without evidence, and yet its conclusion is believed without any hesitation our doubt. 
This differs from Rimini’s definition of scientific assent provided just prior to this 
definition of acquired faith: 
Every discourse, through which science is acquired per se, is from first 
and immediate propositions or from those things, which are known 
immediately or mediately through these first and immediate 
propositions.41 
The lack of evidence characteristic of acquired faith stands in contrast to the requirement 
that scientific knowledge begin from first principles and immediately known 
propositions. To begin from such propositions was generally understood in scholastic 
 
39 In the context of his fourth conclusion he mostly talks about faith simply as “faith,” not “acquired faith.” 
Nevertheless, the original articulation of the conclusion in terms of “acquired faith” must indicate to us that 
he has “acquired faith” in mind. 
40 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:55). “Omnis assensus absque evidentia et 
formidine est fides.” 
 As we will see below this is a combination Francis of Marchia will explicitly challenge. For 
evidence is the condition of the absence of doubt, thus it is impossible to be without doubt when one lacks 
evidence. See below p. 346. 
41 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:53). “Omnis discursus, per quem per se acquiritur scientia, est ex 
propositionibus primis et immediatis vel ex his, quae per tales mediate vel immediate notae sunt.” 
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terminology to be beginning from evidence.42 The proposition is known immediately 
because the truth of the proposition is self-evident and relies on no other proposition for 
support. But Rimini’s consideration of method has already shown us that theology, 
inasmuch as it is theology proper, does not begin from such evident propositions. In 
supporting his conclusion that theology does not meet the criteria of science, Rimini 
appeals directly to his earlier discussion of method: “but theological discourse does not 
begin from such principles, since it begins from believed things, as was made clear in 
article two.”43 
It is possible to become confused at this moment: confused, that is, about how an 
already believed proposition can be invoked to explain how faithful assent is acquired in 
the first place. The matter seems circular; how do we acquire faithful assent? Answer: by 
proceeding from already “believed” propositions.  
Our suspicions of circular reasoning are justified when we recognize that Francis 
of Marchia raised this precise objection against the kind of position Rimini is putting 
forward. Rimini is aware of Marchia’s concern and provides an explicit rebuttal. As 
paraphrased by Rimini, Marchia argues:  
‘Since one cannot proceed in believed things into infinity, it is necessary’ 
to reach one or many first beliefs. Then concerning this first belief, I ask: 
Why do you assent to it? For either you assent to it ‘on account of itself or 
on account of some other’ believed thing ‘or on account of some other 
thing known per se. It cannot be on account of some other believed thing,’ 
because then this would be the first belief. If on account of itself, then this 
is known through itself, ‘since no object of inferior order is able to cause 
assent to an object of superior order, but the object known through itself 
 
42 See our earlier discussion, c. 5, p. 236. 
43 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:53). “Sed discursus theologicus non est ex 
talibus, cum sit ex creditis, ut patet ex articulo secundo.” 
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is’ the supreme object ‘in the class of knowable things’…If one assents to 
it on account of something else known per se, then it has been deduced 
from something known per se.44 
Marchia’s argument is designed to support his own claim that theology as Rimini has 
described it (viz. a theology which deduces things from the explicit contents of Scripture) 
can still be considered a science. We will consider Rimini’s larger refutation of Marchia 
below. But for now, understanding Rimini’s response to this specific charge of circularity 
is necessary for understanding his positive position. The answer he gives is an 
abbreviated presentation of an important point he made more fully in article two in his 
discussion of method, which we considered in the last section.45 
He first concedes the major premise of Marchia’s rebuttal. Francis is correct, there 
is, in fact, some “first believed thing” which one adheres to on account of itself, or, in 
other words, not on account of some other believed proposition.46 On Marchia’s 
reasoning, this concession mandates that the proposition in question be self-evident or 
per se nota; it must be known to be true by the evidence it presents immediately to the 
mind. Further, any procedure that begins from such an evident premise must result in 
 
44 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:41–42). “‘Cum in creditis non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet’ 
devenire ad aliquid unum vel plura primo credita. Tunc de primo credito quaero: Cur sibi assentis? Aut 
enim assentis ei ‘propter se aut propter aliud’ creditum ‘aut propter aliud per se notum. Non propter aliud 
creditum’, quia ipsum ponitur primum creditum. Si propter se, igitur est per se notum, ‘quia nullum 
obiectum inferioris ordinis potest causare assensum obiecti superioris  ordinis, sed obiectum per se notum 
est’ supremum obiectum ‘in genere cognoscibilium’, et proprius modus assentiendi sibi est assentire ei 
propter se, igitur nullum non per se notum, quod est inferioris ordinis, poterit causare assensum propter se, 
igitur omne, quod potest causare assensum propter se, est per se notum, et sic primum creditum erit per se 
notum. Si vero ei assentiatur propter aliud per se notum, igitur ipsum est deductum ex per se noto.” Cf. 
Franciscus de Marchia, Commentarius, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 22–25 (Mariani, 451–452). 
45 See above “Interlude,” pp. 306-317. 
46 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:48). “Ad quartum concedo quod est aliquid 
primo creditum, cui adhaereo propter se, idem est non propter aliud creditum.” 
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scientific knowledge, not mere faith, as Rimini himself would admit. But Rimini denies 
this consequence for reasons that should already be clear to us. 
In our earlier discussion, we saw that Rimini, speaking of the merely believed 
principles, made the following assertion: it should not be thought that principles do not 
receive the assent of faith on account of something else, so that nothing besides the 
principle itself is the cause of assenting to it.47 Such an assertion appears to be in 
contradiction to the concession he later makes to Marchia. But Rimini avoids the 
contradiction by distinguishing between [1] believing on account of some other believed 
premise and [2] believing a premise for some other reason besides the evidence of the 
proposition itself. This is a distinction Marchia does not recognize. As we discussed 
previously, Rimini employs this distinction in his interpretation of the Augustinian 
quotation whereby Augustine claims fidelity to the Gospel because of the authority of the 
Church. Two interpretations of this authoritative text were given. On the one hand, it 
could mean Augustine has performed a syllogism leading him to assent to the truth of the 
Gospel. 
P1) Whatever the Church says is true, is true  
P2) The Church says the Gospel is true 
C) Therefore, the Gospel is true and ought to be believed. 
For Rimini, this is an example of believing something on account of some other thing 
believed (propter aliud creditum).48  
  On the other hand, Rimini notes that Augustine’s famous statement can be 
interpreted as a proposition assented to, not because of some other believed proposition, 
 
47 See above “Interlude,” p. 307 n. 37. 
48 Ibid. 
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but because of a unique and mysterious compulsion. In a normal scientific procedure, this 
compulsion is achieved by self-evidence and is generally what we mean when we say 
something is per se nota. But in this case, Rimini claims that something other than the 
internal evidence of the proposition prompts us to make this movement of assent. This is 
also a fundamentally different kind of assent than that which accompanies the conclusion 
of a theological procedure. This assent does not occur as a deduction from prior beliefs, 
but is more akin to the irresistible compulsion usually associated with an “indubitable” 
experience. As Rimini interprets the Augustinian quotation, it was the sanctity of the 
Church that stirred a person to this initial assent.49 
However, despite this difference, there remains a fundamental similarity between 
the type of assent given to believed principles and theological conclusions. This 
similarity comes from the fact that neither proposition enjoys “evidence” derived either 
from itself or from evident premises. But likewise neither can be classified as mere 
opinion, since the knower adheres to both propositions without doubt or hesitation (sine 
formidine). On account of this similarity, both types of assent must be classified as faith. 
Rimini identifies the assent given to theological conclusions as “acquired faith.”50 
However, due to the difference between these conclusions which are believed propter 
aliud creditum and those premises which are not believed propter aliud creditum, but 
only propter aliud, this latter type of assent to believed-principles cannot also be 
 
49 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2 (Trapp I:21). “Nec auctoritas Augustini est contra, quoniam Augustinus non dicit 
se credere evangelio propter assensum, quem habeat ad aliquod aliud principium, ex quo evangelium 
demonstretur vel syllogistice probetur esse verum, sed solum ex auctoritate ecclesiae tamquam ex causa 
movente ipsum ad fidem evangelii; et est quasi simile huic dicto, quod iste vel alius dicere potuisset: Non 
crederem evangelio, nisi me ecclesiae sanctitas commoveret…” 
50 See above, p. 338. 
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classified as “acquired faith.” The only alternative to “acquired faith” available in 
scholastic parlance is “infused faith,” and although Rimini does not explicitly identify 
this kind of faith as such, it is hard to know what else he could have in mind. The idea of 
“infusion” fits well with his notion of a mystical compulsion that prompts us to assent 
even though no other proposition or evidence mandates this assent.  
In sum, we can construct an analog between the types of assent used in a 
theological procedure and the types of assent employed in a scientific demonstration.  
 Principles  Conclusions 
Scientific Demonstration Nous, intellectus, pure 
understanding, evidence, per 
se nota 
epistēmē, scientia, scientific 
knowledge, assent compelled 
by evidence of principles 
Theological Syllogism infused faith, believed 
proposition, not caused by 
another believed proposition, 
not-caused by evidence  
acquired faith, conclusion of a 
theological syllogism, assent 
compelled by assent to 
believed principles  
 
The mark of scientific knowledge is the uniqueness of the premises from which it 
begins. These are premises truly known per se, which are assented to on account of the 
evidence they have within themselves. In a similar way, acquired faith is distinctive 
because of the kinds of premises from which it proceeds. These premises are neither 
evident premises nor premises believed on account of other premises; they are premises 
that a person has been “moved” to give assent to, though no deduction from prior beliefs 
has occurred. And just as it was in the case of what is known through evidence, the 
epistemic status of these believed premises gives a unique epistemic status to the 
conclusions reached from them. The knower does not reach scientific knowledge, but 
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acquired faith. However, acquired faith shares with scientific knowledge the status of a 
necessary consequence; that is, given the prior assent to the premises, the mind is 
compelled by the discursus to assent to the conclusions that follow.  
Here, finally, we can see the answer to our original concern with Rimini’s 
paradoxical position, viz. that the conclusions of theology are believed by faith, even 
though the internal logic of the method compells assent. The answer lies in the nature of 
the assent given to the first premises. Acquired faith proceeds only from premises that are 
adhered to without evidence. Infused faith is the distinctive kind of assent given to these 
premises. Acquired faith is the required assent for anyone who already has this habit of 
“infused faith” and is able to see the consequences to which their “infused faith” commits 
them. 
B. Marchia’s Attempt to Save the Scientific Status of Theology 
Francis of Marchia was a Franciscan Friar, who flourished at Paris between the 
heyday of Aureoli and the arrival of Gregory of Rimini. He gave his Parisian lectures 
during the academic year of 1319/1320.51 For much of the twentieth century, scholarship 
was content to label Marchia as a simple transmitter of the doctrine of Duns Scotus. But 
in recent years there has been a boom in Marchia studies the results of which suggest 
“that Francis of Marchia was not a faithful Scotist.”52 Nevertheless, as Schabel states, 
“Scotus forms much of the backdrop for Marchia’s theology.”53 Perhaps most important 
 
51 Schabel, “Francis of Marchia,” sect. 1. 
52 Ibid., sect. 2. 
53 Ibid. 
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for us is the fact that the other dominant influence on Marchia was Peter Aureoli, of 
whom he was frequently critical.  
Marchia’s position on the scientific status of theology, according to Rimini, is 
characterized by three distinctive features. (1) The first, is that, as we have already seen, 
Marchia thinks the articles of faith and those things which are “expressly contained” in 
Scripture are not only believed, but acquire demonstrative evidence from prior evident 
principles. From this claim, our analogy between theological and scientific discourses 
above explains Marchia’s second claim, which is: (2) through theology, the practitioner 
acquires a genuine science. (3) The third characterization of Marchia’s position is that, 
despite the above conditions, faith is still necessary for our assent.54  
Rimini would readily acknowledge that a discourse that begins from evident and 
“understood” principles results in genuinely scientific knowledge. The real point of 
disagreement, however, turns on two points: (1) how can those things expressly contained 
in Scripture be known and assented to with demonstrative evidence derived from self-
evident principles, and (2) why would faith still be necessary if one began with such 
evidence in the first place?  
The main force behind Marchia’s first claim comes from his belief that theology 
must produce results that are held sine formidine or indubitably. For Marchia, the total 
 
54 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 (Trapp I:40). “Et est una opinio, quae circa hoc tria 
dicit: Primum est quod articuli fidei et eadem ratione ea, quae continentur in sacra scriptura, ex quibus velut 
principiis constant discursus theologici, non tantum sunt nobis credita, sed etiam evidentia et intellecta. 
Secundum, quod theologia per huiusmodi discursus acquisita est scientia proprie dicta. Tertium, quod his 
non obstantibus adhuc fides est nobis propter assensum necessaria.” Cf. Franciscus de Marchia, 
Commentarius, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, nn. 5–53 (Mariani, 447–460). Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 52 (Mariani, 
460). “Ex quo patet quod, non obstante quod habitus theologicus sit ex principiis per se notis, adhuc tamen 
salvatur quod fides est de non per se notis nec evidentibus…” 
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absence of doubt requires principles that are either per se nota (that is, evident) or 
deduced from what is per se nota.55 The fourth and final argument in support of this 
claim is the argument regarding the perceived circularity of Rimini’s account, which 
Rimini proposed to answer by distinguishing acquired faith from the kind of faith one has 
about the first premises of a theological discourse. 
As noted, Marchia’s second claim appears to logically follow. In contrast, his 
third claim stands out as disconcerting and fundamentally opposed to the logic of 
Rimini’s argument: if a person begins with evident and per se nota premises, then it is 
not all clear why faith (which for Rimini is defined precisely by the absence of evidence) 
should still be needed for someone to give assent to the conclusion of theological 
reasoning.  
However, when we look at the reasoning behind Marchia’s third claim, we can 
see that we cannot so easily pass over his second point; his argument for why faith is still 
necessary, even with evident principles, rests on the reasoning behind his claim for the 
scientific status of theology.  
Everything rests on the claim that a prior syllogism precedes and justifies the 
propositions that Rimini identifies as the proper principles of theology. 
The prefatory syllogism is stated by Marchia to be:  
P1) Everything revealed by God is true 
 
55 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 12 (Mariani 449). “Contra hoc arguo, primo, sic; nullus tenetur indubitanter 
credere et inconcusse illud quod sibi non proponitur sicut per se notum nec deductum ex aliquo per se noto; 
set quilibet fidelis tenetur indubitanter et inconcusse credere articulos fidei; ergo vel illi sunt per se noti vel 
deducti ex aliis per se notis. Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:40). “Nullus tenetur 
indubitanter credere aliquid, quod non est sibi per se notum vel ex per se notis sibi deductum; sed 
catholicus tenetur indubitanter credere articulos fidei…” 
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P2) Everything contained in Scripture is revealed by God 
C) {supply proposition contained in Scripture/article of the creed}56 
In Rimini’s stated methodology, C is really P1, and the theologian does not assent to C on 
account of any other proposition (believed or otherwise), but simply because he is 
mysteriously moved to do so.  
The question still lingers as to how Marchia can identify P1 and P2 as evident 
(evidens) and understood (intellecta) propositions. But he has an answer for this. 
Regarding P1, he thinks this really is uncontroversial and self-evident. Regarding P2 he 
claims that what was revealed in Scripture was accompanied by supernatural miracles, 
and the presence of these supernatural effects necessitates a supernatural cause.57 
Oddly, Marchia and Rimini come close to agreement on what initially motivates 
our assent to those things expressly contained in Scripture. Both appeal to the miracles of 
Christ and or miraculous sanctity of the Church to get the ball rolling. However, they 
strongly disagree about how this works psychologically.58  For Marchia, the existence of 
miracles is sufficient to provide a natural, scientific, and universal justification of the 
truth of Scripture, rendering P2 – “everything contained in Scripture is revealed by God” 
 
56 Franciscus de Marchia, Commentarius, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 53 (Mariani, 460). “Dico ergo breviter quod 
habitus theologicus procedit ex principiis per se notis, puta ex istis: omne revelatum a Deo est determinate 
verum; sed omnia contenta in canone sunt revelata ab ipso; ergo etc.” 
57 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, n. 54 (Mariani, 461). “Sed dices; quomodo est notum vel constat quod ista sint 
revelata a Deo? Dico quod ex aliquibus per se notis, puta per signa supernaturalia per se nota et certa, 
saltem secundo genere certitudinis, qualiter sunt nota et certa principia philosophica vel moralia, licet non 
tant certitudine quanta est in mathematicis,…per se enim notum est cuicumque, etiam philosopho, signa 
excedentia limites et facultatem totius naturae, qualia sunt resurrectio mortuorum et miracula alia quae sunt 
visa pluries, oportere reduci in causam primam, limites totius naturae excedentem.” Gregorius Ariminensis, 
Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:42). “Et hoc probatur, quia revelatum est ab illo, qui faciebat opera 
supernaturalia, quae necessario arguebant causam supernaturalem, sicut effectus naturales arguunt causam 
naturalem; causa autem supernaturalis deus est; igitur omne contentum in sacra scriptura est verum.” 
58 The role of miracles becomes even more interesting when remember that, for Augustinus of Ancona, it 
was precisely through Christ’s miracles that the Apostles were originally taught theology. See above, c. 5, 
pp. 228-233. 
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– perfectly evident and allowing theology to take its place as a rightful science among all 
the other sciences, capable of being recognized by other sciences as a legitimate 
universally accessible knowledge. 
Rimini disagrees; he thinks that the motivation to assent caused by miracles or 
sanctity is not the result of evidence, but is part of a mysterious “moving” or “prompting” 
that we have labeled “infused faith.” We can speculate here whether Marchia, though 
critical of Aureoli in many ways, is still trying to preserve the identity of theology as a 
common science, which can demand respect from the other sciences and can argue for its 
credibility with universally recognizable arguments. If so, then there is a common thread 
between Rimini’s criticism of both Aureoli and of Marchia; namely, theology is not a 
public or universal discourse. Its arguments do not demand respect outside of a particular 
community: a community whose membership presupposes that certain epistemic 
conditions have been met. Specifically, membership assumes assent to the principles of 
theology via infused faith, not acquired faith. 
A large part of the reason Rimini rejects the strength of miracles to be universally 
persuasive is that Rimini finds considerable epistemic uncertainty in each of the premises 
that Marchia believes to be evident. Regarding P1, Rimini points out that many 
theologians erroneously believe that God can reveal something false. And while they err 
in this respect, the very ability to err nevertheless shows that such a position is not per se 
nota and is open to doubt.59 With respect to P2, Rimini once again doubts the certainty 
 
59 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4, (Trapp I:45). “Non enim maior; constat enim quod 
ipsam negasset Philosophus, cum ipsa implicet unum, quod etiam Philosophus falsum reputat scilicet deum 
intelligere aliquid extra se. Non est igitur per se nota. Praeterea multi theologi tenent, quamvis non recte, ut 
infra probabitur, quod deus posset revelare falsum; igitur illa non est per se nota.” 
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assumed by Marchia. Reasoning from miracles, Rimini remarks, faces the problem that 
we have no way of knowing for sure that what is contained in Scripture was really 
revealed by Christ. We can only believe this.60 Likewise, he says a little later, “it is not 
knowable per se that this was God or that he made these miracles, and therefore the 
minor [P2] remains merely believed.”61 Noteworthy here is that while disparaging any 
kind of certainty one can derive from miracles, whether revealed in Scripture or even ex 
hypothesi observable today, Rimini still thinks these events have a role to play in 
motivating assent. However, this motivation does not make the veracity of Scripture 
evident, but is part of a more complex and mysterious process whereby we assent to the 
truths of Scripture despite a lack of evidence.  
The most daunting question for Marchia, however, still lingers; namely, why he 
thinks faith is still necessary, if P1 and P2 are per se nota. Marchia’s argument is based 
on a unique relationship between the demonstrating premises and the resulting 
conclusion. He first points to the fact that demonstrating principles can be of two types. 
Some premises are intrinsic to the subject and predicate terms of the proposition.  But 
there are also other propositions, which are extrinsic, meaning the necessity of the 
proposition cannot be derived from the terms of the proposition. The premises that 
Marchia has in mind are of the latter type. The truth of the fact that “God is three and 
 
60 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:45). “Minor etiam non est per se nota nec certe deducibilis ex per se 
notis, nam mere creditum est quod contenta in sacra scriptura fuerint a Christo revelata.” 
61 Ibid., I, prol., q. 1, a. 4, (Trapp I:45). “Item, non est nobis per se notum nec per se nota notificabile quod 
ipse fuerit Deus aut etiam quod ipse fecerit miracula illa, et ideo minor illa remanet nobis mere credita.” 
Chapter 7: Scientific Acts and Faith: The Epistemic Achievement of Acquired Faith | 351 
 
                                                
one” cannot be derived from the terms of the proposition “God has revealed that God is 
three and one.”62 Rimini’s paraphrases the argument this way: 
This premise (medium), though it is necessary, nevertheless, because it is 
extraneous and not taken from either the subject or predicate but from the 
condition of the agent, namely of God who is revealing [this truth], though 
it necessarily makes us assent to the conclusion, it does not make 
sufficient evidence about the conclusion.63 
Oddly, Marchia’s solution seems to reorder the usual connection between necessity and 
doubt. Usually, when something follows necessarily, it also follows that it cannot be 
doubted. But in this case, it appears that, while the conclusion is necessary, the extrinsic 
nature of the premises leaves the necessary conclusion still open to doubt. Thus, once the 
theologian reaches the conclusion, he still needs faith in order to remove these lingering 
hesitations. 
Rimini’s response drives right to heart of Marchia’s creative solution by pointing 
to a subtle distinction employed in this reasoning. Marchia is attempting to use a 
distinction between apprehending the truth of an article of faith and simply knowing the 
proposition itself, i.e. that P is said of S. On Marchia’s reasoning, the evident premises 
 
62 Franciscus de Marchia, Commentarius, I, prol., q. 1, a. 1, nn. 58–59 (Mariani 462). “Respondeo, et dico 
quod medium per se notum est in duplici differentia; quoddam enim est proprium, quod videlicet est ex 
natura terminorum; aliud autem est ab extrinseco; medium proprium facit evidentiam, non tantum de 
veritate propositionis in se, sed primo et immediate de connexione terminorum propositionis inter se; tale 
enim medium est subiecto intrinsecum et causa neccessaria inhaerentiae praedicati; medium autem 
extrinsecum, licet possit facere evidentiam de veritate propositionis, non tamen de connexione terminorum; 
est enim subiecto extraneum et, per consequens, non est causa neccessaria inhaerentiae praedicati; tale 
autem est medium habitus theologiae.” 
 “Medium enim ad probandum veritates theologicas est esse revelatum a Deo, ideo tale, etsi facit 
certitudinem de veritate propositionum, ut quod ‘Deus est trinus et unus’, et quod ‘Virgo peperit’ etc., non 
tamen de connexione terminorum, et ideo, ratione talis inevidentiae, neccessaria est fides ad assentiendum 
connexioni terminorum, et ideo infidelis, fide carens, non assentit.” 
63 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:43). “Istud autem medium, licet sit 
necessarium, quia tamen est extraneum nec sumptum ex natura subiecti vel praedicati, sed ex condicione 
agentis, scilicet Dei revelantis, licet faciat necessario assentire conclusioni, non tamen facit ‘sufficientem 
evidentiam de conclusione’.” 
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are capable of giving us scientific knowledge that “the proposition ‘S is P’ is true,” while 
we remain ignorant of the intrinsic reasons why “S is P.”64 In calling our attention to this 
distinction, Rimini builds on his earlier conviction that the apprehension of “S is P” 
cannot be separated from the judgment “that ‘S is P’ is true.” In other words, Rimini 
argues that knowing (C) that “the proposition ‘S is P’ is true” from the presumed evident 
principles (1) that God has revealed this proposition and (2) that what God reveals is 
always true, is not distinguishable from knowing that “S is P.” By knowing this truth, one 
knows that “S is P.”65 
Rimini explains this in following way:  
If someone knows that a proposition attributing (enuntiantem) a predicate 
to a subject is true, then he knows that this [P] is in the thing, just as the 
proposition signifies, since for the proposition to be true signifies nothing 
other than the fact that, what is, is . . .66 
With this conviction in mind, Rimini points to the words of Marchia himself, who 
acknowledges that if a person knows something to be in a thing, then he knows the 
 
64 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:44). “Tertia conclusio, quod, si propositio 
enuntians veritatem de articulo aut alia veritate sacrae scripturae esset scita, etiam ipse articulus esset scitus 
vel faciliter posset sciri. Et ex hoc inferam quod, si talis propositio enuntians veritatem de articulo aut alia 
veritate scripturae esset scita, non esset necessaria fides propter assensum illius. In toto autem isto 
processu, cum dico propositionem aliquam esse scitam vel creditam, intelligo iuxta sensum datum supra in 
articulo primo.” 
65 It is interesting to note how similar Marchia sounds here to Henry of Ghent’s description of our 
knowledge through the lumen medium. It was Henry’s opinion that we are able to acquire evident 
knowledge of propositions without distinct knowledge of the individual terms. Rimini’s critique of Marchia 
therefore is on par with Aureoli’s similar criticism of Henry, viz. distinct or evident knowledge of a 
proposition mandates distinct or evident knowledge of the terms/realities involved. For the discussion 
between Henry and Aureoli see above c. 6, p. 254. 
66 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:46). “Sed, si aliquis scit propositionem 
enuntiantem passionem de subiecto esse veram, ipse scit sic esse in re, sicut talis propositio significat, 
quoniam nihil aliud est propositionem esse veram quam significare esse, quod est, si est affirmativa, vel 
non esse, quod non est, si est negativa.” 
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predicate of a subject.67 For Rimini, this also means that: “If anyone knows that a 
proposition attributing a predicate to a subject is true, he also knows the predicate 
attributed to the subject.”68 In short, Marchia tries to find room for faith, even while 
evident premises are in use, by using the Ockhamist distinction between apprehension 
and judgment in the reverse way that Ockham and Wodeham did. Marchia thinks that we 
can reach a scientific judgment about the truth of a given proposition without fully 
apprehending it. And because of this lack of genuine apprehension, Marchia thinks we 
are prone to doubt what we scientifically know to be true! Faith is required to steady us 
against this oncoming doubt. For Rimini, this paradox is intolerable. We either know the 
proposition scientifically or we do not. If we know it, there is no place for doubt and no 
need for faith. Rimini, therefore, makes the concession that if the premises Marchia 
identified really were evident, then we could have scientific knowledge of these articles 
of faith and everything expressly contained in Scripture. But Rimini’s argument is that 
these premises, P1 and P2, are not actually evident and there is much to doubt about 
them. The most they can do is contribute to the background context in which God infuses 
the initial assent of faith. It is only after this initial moment of faith takes place that 
theology can go further and produce a very specific kind of faith, not infused faith in the 
believed premises, but acquired faith in theological conclusions. 
 
67 Ibid. “Si aliquis scit sic esse in re, sicut significat propositio enuntians passionem de subiecto, scit 
passionem de subiecto loquendo more illius opinionis.”  
68 Ibid. “Igitur, si aliquis scit propositionem enuntiantem passionem de subiecto esse veram, ipse utique scit 
passionem illam de subiecto, et per consequens, si propositio enuntians veritatem de articulo aut alia 
propositione sacrae scripturae est scita, etiam ipsa propositio, de quae enuntiatur, est scita.” 
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C. The Thomist Position and Gregory of Rimini 
After considering the position of Marchia, Rimini turns to a well known position 
first introduced by Thomas Aquinas and frequently discussed for many years to come. 
Considering Aquinas’s position Rimini’s response is an effective way to bring this 
chapter to a close from a couple of reasons. The first is that few new conceptual pieces 
are needed in order to understand Rimini’s response. Thus, his answer to Aquinas 
functions as an effective review of all that we have seen so far. But second, we can also 
glimpse Rimini’s response within the context of the Aegidian tradition. Giles himself 
qualifies the Thomistic position, but Rimini takes this even further and fundamentally 
cuts off theology from any designation as a science, whether in a strict or qualified way. 
The central texts for the Thomistic position are the prologue to his Commentary 
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1254-6), the opening questions of his commentary on 
the De Trinitate of Boethius (1255-1259), and in his Summa Theologiae (1267-73). In 
these contexts, Aquinas repeatedly faces the question that Rimini is considering; is 
theology a science, meaning, is theology demonstrative in an Aristotelian sense? 
Aquinas’s answer is complicated by his identification of two senses in which we can 
speak of theology: a distinction made clearly in the commentary on the De Trinitate of 
Boethius. 
Here Aquinas distinguishes between a theology which begins from “our way of 
knowing” and proceeds from sensible things towards God. But a second way of knowing 
exists which proceeds from the first truth and divine realities themselves. The former way 
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is characterized by its movement upwards, and the latter way is characterized by its 
downward movement. Aquinas writes: 
Now the knowledge of divine things can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
from our standpoint, and then they are knowable to us only through 
creatures, the knowledge of which we derive from the senses. Second, 
from the nature of divine realities themselves. In this way they are 
eminently knowable of themselves.69 
Aquinas is quick to point out that, while strictly speaking the latter sense of theology is 
not available to us in this life, there is a way we might still participate in this type of 
theology. Faith makes this participation possible. Aquinas speaks of a participation and 
assimilation with the divine through a faith “infused” in us.70 Through our belief in the 
articles of faith, Aquinas says, we grasp the primary truth and are able to come to know 
other things, “namely by drawing conclusions from principles.”71 This procedure is not a 
new method for us. It actually fits very well with description of theology given by Gerard 
of Siena and Thomas of Strasbourg, where the articles of faith function as the true 
principles of the theology proper.72 
 
69 Aquinas, Super De Trinitate in Boethium, q. 2, a. 2 (trans. Maurer, Faith, reason, and theology, p. 41); 
“Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur. Una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium 
principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam 
primam scientiam divinam dicentes. Alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum 
se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae 
quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis 
infusam inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam.”  
70 Ibid. 
71 Aquinas, Super De Trinitate in Boethium, q. 2, a. 2 (trans. Maurer, Faith, reason, and theology, p. 42). 
72 From these two senses of “theology” Aquinas goes on to discuss three ways that philosophy (and natural 
reason) is helpful to theology. All three of which function in a supportive role leading up to (but never 
replacing) the deductive procedure of theology proper.  
 The first way that philosophy or natural/common reason is a part of theology (broadly conceived) 
is in the sense that theology can demonstrate the preambles of faith—not the articles of the faith per se, but 
those beliefs that would appear to a precondition for faith in the articles of the creed. Common reason is 
operating here in the first genre of theology, which moves from sensible things according to our way of 
knowing.  
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 In Aquinas’s later works, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologica, 
he reiterates this distinction between theology proper and what is included under the 
umbrella of theology because of its auxiliary role. When it comes to theology proper, 
Aquinas continues to insist on the deductive methodology from believed principles that 
we see in his early commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius.73 
However, Aquinas is eager to avoid denigrating the certainty of the second type of 
theology and to preserve its respect among the other sciences, despite the fact that it 
begins from inevident premises. In his attempt to ground theology within a scientific 
context, without self-evident principles, Aquinas uses as a model the kind of 
subordination that music enjoys with respect to arithmetic or that optics (perspectiva) 
enjoys with respect to geometry.74 In the case of both music and optics, Aquinas assumes 
 
 The second way philosophy is said to be involved is through “throwing light on the contents of 
faith by analogies.” Again, we should note that there is no place for this procedure in the second type of 
theology described as downward movement from articles to conclusions. Like the demonstration of 
preambles, this philosophical task is propaedeutic to theology proper.  
 The third function for philosophy and common reason is for theology is to refute assertions 
contrary to faith. Our previous considerations of the notion of “defense” should alert us to the fact that there 
is some ambiguity here since Aquinas’s second definition of theology could be construed as a kind of 
defense within the believing community: a defense of proper self-description. However, his appeal to 
philosophy as something external suggest that he is working with a definition of “defense” similar to that of 
Petrus Aureoli. (For these three ways see Super De Trinitate in Boethium, q. 2, a. 3 (trans. Maurer, p. 49).) 
73 See for instance Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 3, “There are certain truths about God that totally surpass 
man’s ability appears with the greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the 
reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to 
Aristotle ‘what a thing is’ is the principle of demonstration), it is necessary that the way in which we 
understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the 
human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no 
intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not 
happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine 
substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the 
intellect depends on the sense of for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the 
senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from 
sensible things…” (trans. Anton C. Pegis I:64 ). 
74 Aquinas, S.T. I, q. 1, a. 2. “Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali 
intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis 
notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et 
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that the practitioner begins where the mathematician or geometer leaves off. That is, the 
science of music or optics takes as its first principles what are conclusions of 
mathematics or geometry. It does not know its principles as self-evident nor as the 
product of a demonstration (in Aristotleian terminology, there is neither nous nor 
epistēmē of the subalternated principles). Rather, it takes them on a kind of faith or 
hypothesis and begins from this point. The reason that they can still be sciences, albeit a 
subalternated sciences, is because they are imbedded in a context where evidence could 
be provided for the principles at work. It is simply the case that the practitioner of optics 
and music does not provide this evidence for herself.  
 When it comes to the theology of the second and proper type, Aquinas thinks the 
process of reasoning works in a similar way. The theologian begins from articles of faith 
that are neither self-evident nor concluded through a prior demonstration. (Aquinas 
would, therefore, share Rimini’s criticisms of Marchia’s attempt to ground the articles of 
faith in a prior demonstration.) The theologian really does begin with mere belief in these 
articles. The subsequent task is to deduce consequences that follow from these believed 
articles. Despite the strictly inevident nature of these principles, Aquinas identifies 
theology as a subalternated science because he thinks these articles of faith are genuine 
conclusions known with evidence and certainty by God and the Blessed. The only 
difference, then, between optics and theology is that in the case of optics it is possible for 
other human beings to know the principles of optics even if the practitioner of optics does 
 
musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex 
principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica 
credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.” See 
Rimini’s paraphrase of this position, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:49). 
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not. Such a subordinated scientist can always fall back on the claim: “I could always go 
back and prove to myself that these principles are true, if I wanted to take the time to do 
it.” This is a privilege not available to theologian. While the principles are known 
scientifically by God and the Blessed, it is not possible for any human being in this life to 
establish these principles on their own. Therefore, instead of receiving this principle from 
other scientists, the theologian must receive them from a supernatural source, namely the 
special revelation of God.  
This subtle difference between the subalternation of human sciences and the 
subalternation of theology to the divine science did not go unrecognized by the Aegidian 
tradition, which on the whole was open to the Thomistic position, but felt the need to 
qualify it. This is most clearly seen in the treatment of Thomas of Strasbourg, who, in 
offering his own position, makes an explicit appeal to what Giles of Rome had to say on 
the subject. 
Taking up the question immediately after establishing that the articles of faith 
were indeed the principles of theology, Strasbourg asks whether theology is a 
subalternated science.75 His first reply gives the impression of a general agreement with 
Aquinas: “theology loosely speaking is able to be called a subalternated science, since it 
does not reduce into things known in themselves (per se nota), but presupposes its 
principles as if they were perfectly known in the science of God and the Blessed…”76 But 
Strasbourg follows this up by saying: “But strictly speaking, theology is not a 
 
75 Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, prol., q. 2, a. 3, f. 7vb. “Quantum ad tertium huius quaestionis 
articulum, utrum theologia sit scientia subalterna?” 
76 Ibid. “Patet ex iam dictis, quod theologia large loquendo, potest dici scientia subalterna; cum non reducat 
in per se nota, sed praesupponat sua principia tanquam notissima in scientia Dei, et beatorum, quae 
principia Deus, cum voluerit, poterit revelare.” 
Chapter 7: Scientific Acts and Faith: The Epistemic Achievement of Acquired Faith | 359 
 
                                                
subalternated science.”77 The reason for this qualification comes from his identification 
of the difference between subalternated human sciences and theology identified above. 
He says it this way:  
Whenever one science is subalternated to another science, the evidence of 
its principles is clear in the subalternating science. Therefore, anyone who 
has the subalternated science is naturally able to attain to the 
subalternating science, so that the evidence for the principles of the 
subalternated science becomes clear. But the one having the science of 
theology is not naturally able to attain to the science of God and the 
Blessed, therefore, etc (emphasis mine).78 
With this distinction between “loose” and “strict,” Strasbourg thinks he is once and for all 
solving the debate between the two extremes: between those who say that it is a 
subalternated science and those who say it is not. Those who say it is are using the loose 
sense. Those who say it is not are employing the strict sense.79 More interesting than 
anything else is Strasbourg’s noted inspiration for this solution: he points to Giles of 
Rome as the real authority behind the position that “strictly speaking” theology is not a 
subalternate science.80 
 
77 Ibid. “Nota tamen, illa scientia proprie non est subalterna.” 
78 Ibid. “…quia quandocumque una scientia subalternatur alteri scientiae, ex hoc, quod causa evidentiae, 
suorum principiorum patet in scientia subalternante, tunc quicunque habet scientiam subalternam, ille 
naturaliter potest attingere scientiam subalternantem, inquantum evidentia suorum principiorum patet in 
subalternante, sed habens scientiam theologiae non potest naturaliter attingere scientiam Dei, et beatorum, 
ergo etc.” 
79 Ibid. “Ista ergo distinctione bene intellecta, cessare poterit murmur argumentorum duarum opinionum, 
quarum prima dicit, quod scientia theologiae sit subalterna; alia econtra negat. Rationes primae opinionis 
verum concludunt quod ad similitudinem, quam habet cum scientia subalterna. Rationes secundae verum 
concludunt, quo ad proprietatem subalternationis; quia non est proprie subalterna…” 
 In the margin, the two opposing positions that Strasbourg claims to reconcile are that of Thomas 
Aquinas and Peter Aureoli. It is unclear, however, whether we can ascribe these citations to Strasbourg 
himself or the editor of the text. 
80 Ibid. “…sicut sufficienter ostendit doctor noster frater Aegidius in scripto super prologo primi 
Sententiarum.” 
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 A quick look at the Giles’s prologue confirms this Aegidian attribution. Giles’s 
main response begins with a repetition of one of his central claims about theology: Sacra 
Pagina does not begin from principles known per se, but operates in the light of faith 
alone. (Here he actually says “[it] begins from the articles of faith”.)81  Given this 
method, two possible classifications follow: “either theology is not a science, or its 
principles are manifest in a superior science.”82 Giles solves this disjunctive argument by 
appealing to Augustine (notably, not Aristotle). Augustine says that theology is a science, 
therefore the latter alternative must be true. But the only science higher than our theology 
is the science of God and the Blessed (a point Giles believes he made in the previous 
article).83 The qualification that Strasbourg relies on comes next in the following lines: 
“if it is asked in what mode this science is subalternated to the divine science or the 
science of the Blessed, it should be said that no mode that we see in human sciences is 
suitable to this kind of subalternation.”84 Like Strasbourg, Giles qualifies the Thomistic 
position by stressing that if we want to say theology is subalternated to God’s knowledge 
and the Blessed, this is fine, but we must recognize that there is something fundamentally 
 
81 Aegidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, prol., pars 2, q. 1, a. 2, f. 4va. “Illa autem in qua illa principia 
declarantur est subalternans, et quia scientia theologiae utitur principiis ut articulis fidei quae non apparent 
nobis per se nota…” 
 One minor observation can be added here. Damasus Trapp in a footnote to his edition of Rimini’s 
text points us to Giles’s treatment of subalternation in the Venice 1521 printing. However, while referring 
us to right part and question of the prologue, he also refers us to folio 7, when the discussion actually 
begins on 4rb and ends on 4va (See Trapp I:49). 
82 Ibid. “Vel oportet dicere quod theologia non sit scientia; vel quod illa principia sint in superiori scientia 
manifesta.” 
83 Ibid. “Sed quia theologia sive cognitio de divinis scientia dici potest, ut dicitur 13o De Trinitate ca. 19, 
oportet quod articuli fidei in superiori scientia noti sint. Superior autem theologia non est nisi scientia Dei 
vel scientia beatorum. Subalternabitur igitur theologia divinae scientiae, vel scientiae beatorum.”  
84 Ibid. “Quae autem modo subalternationis eis subalternetur, si quaeritur, dicendum quod nullus modus qui 
conspicitur in humanis scientiis isti subalternationi competit.” 
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different going on here than in any of the analogous types of subalternation found among 
the human sciences.85 
Peter Aureoli’s dominant reply to the Thomistic position alerts us to where the 
more fundamental disagreement lies. He remarks first: “In this position, [Aquinas] says 
that the articles of faith are principles of our theology.” Then, he accuses Aquinas’s 
theory of being inconsistent with his practice.86 He writes:  
[The position of Aquinas] cannot stand, for no science attempts to prove 
its principles, but rather concludes things from them. But it is certain that 
this doctor, in his Summa, and universally all doctors of theology, form 
questions about articles of the faith and they attempt to solve, declare, and 
conclude these articles.87 
This is the first of the four objections. But the remaining three have a lot more to do with 
whether a discourse that takes its principles from others should receive the name 
 
85 We should note that here that, Gerard of Senia’s opposition to the classification of theology as 
subalternation is much stronger than what we see in Giles or Strasbourg. His opposition is notable 
considering that he is typically described as an all too faithful follower of Giles. But here he appears to 
show some independence. See Gerardus Senensis, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, I, q. 3, a. 2, pp. 33–36. 
Strasbourg himself discusses Gerard’s opinion and replies to it, see Thomas ab Argentina, Commentaria, I, 
prol, q. 2, a. 3, f. 7vb–8ra. 
 We can add this final note: Besides the qualification to Thomas’s notion of subalternation, there at 
least two other important thing for us to take away from this account. One is that Giles, with Thomas, 
continues to insist that theology proper begins from the articles of faith and proceeds downward, 
deductively. The second important feature is that Giles, with Thomas, rejects any attempt to make these 
articles of faith somehow evident. Both acknowledge that these are “inevident” principles, only known 
through faith. Furthermore, Giles shows us from where the real impotence comes to continue to calling 
theology a “science”. While he fully acknowledges that theology does not meet the true conditions of an 
Aristotelian science, he is too aware of Augustine’s designation of theology as a science to let the name go. 
Therefore, by calling theology a subalternate science, Giles and Thomas preserve all the features of 
theology that distinguish it from a common and universally accessible science, while still providing 
themselves with the linguistic space to call theology a unique kind of science. 
86 Accounting for the inconsistencies that Aureoli appeals to in Thomas corpus can undoubtedly be 
explained by the fact that Thomas recognizes multiple possible theological procedures, but means to call 
only the explicitly deductive procedure of theology a subalternated science. Thus, when Thomas asks a 
question about a particular article of the creed, like whether God is one, it may be that this is a question for 
a different kind of theological procedure, a distinction which Aureoli does not appear to recognize. 
87 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum, I, prooem., sect. 1, a. 1 (Buytaert I:139, n. 24). “Nulla enim scientia procedit 
ad principia concludenda, sed potius concludit ex ipsis. Sed certum est quod iste Doctor, in Summa sua, et 
universaliter omnes doctores theologi, formant quaestiones de articulis fidei, et ad eas dissolvendum, 
declarandum et concludendum, procedunt.” 
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“science,” whether it is subalternate or not. These arguments take it for granted that 
theology does begin from articles of faith. 
But as we can see, Aureoli’s first critique questions this assumption entirely, and 
therefore disagrees with Aquinas for a fundamentally different reason. He disagrees with 
Aquinas not because a discourse that begins from believed principles should in no way be 
called a science, but rather because Aureoli does not think theology begins from articles 
of faith at all. This, we have already seen.  
William of Ockham also responds to the Thomistic position, but his response is 
far more abbreviated than that of Aureoli. It focuses on the fact that it is impossible to 
know a conclusion better than one knows the principles. His point is: there is no way you 
could move from principles known either by faith or opinion and end up with certain and 
evidently known conclusions.88 
However, to this we must also add what we know about Ockham’s perception of 
proper theological method. As we saw above, he never distances himself from the 
procedure that Aureoli defines as “declarative.” In fact, at the end of his discussion, he 
explicitly states that “theology is declarative as Aureoli states.”89 He only distinguishes 
his position from Aureoli’s by pointing out that a prior faith is not required to perform 
this theological procedure. The resulting judicative habit is a product of one’s prior 
disposition to believe or not believe.  Therefore in opposing Aquinas’s position, his 
 
88 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, prol., q. 7 (OTh I:199). “Dico quod quamvis hoc sit verum in 
scientia subalternata, tamen nunquam aliquis scit illas conclusiones evidenter nisi sciat eas per 
experientiam vel per aliquas praemissas evidenter notas. Unde nihil est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones 
aliquas, quia tu scis principia quibus ego credo, quia tu dicis ea. Et eodem modo puerile est dicere quod ego 
scio conclusiones theologiae, quia deus scit principia quibus ego credo, quia ipse revelat ea.” 
89 See above, c. 6, p. 277, n. 54. 
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primary concern is to point out that theology is an entirely apprehensive habit and does 
not cause assent. Therefore it should not be classified as any type of science, whether 
subalternated or not.  
Finally, we can turn to Rimini. He presents two central arguments, and 
predictably none of them express any doubt about the kind of principles with which one 
begins, as is the case with Aureoli. Instead both arguments have something to say about 
the nature of true scientific principles. 
The first argument focuses on the fact that to have a genuine science one must 
naturally know the principles of the demonstration. But taking the “explicit contents of 
Scripture” as our authority, we do not have any evidence about these principles. Thus 
theology cannot be classified as a science.90 The second argument shares the same focus; 
it points out that if a “subalternated” science could be called a science while the 
practitioner only believes its principles, then nothing is to stop us from attributing 
scientific knowledge to anyone who merely believes the principles of their intellectual 
habit. 
 The obvious rebuttal to Rimini’s second argument is to point out that his concern 
would only be a problem if we called these habit “sciences” in an unqualified way. But 
we don’t speak of them in an unqualified way; thus there is nothing wrong with calling 
these habits that begin from believed principles “subalternated sciences.” Rimini’s 
response to this rebuttal is more extreme than what we have seen in either Giles or 
 
90 The heart of the argument is this: “. . . non sufficit principia esse alteri nota, ut ego scientiam habeam de 
conclusione, quoniam per nullam notitiam existentem in alio causari potest immediate et naturaliter aliqua 
scientia in mente mea. Cum igitur principia theologiae non sint neque fuerint nobis nota, ut isti concedunt, 
theologia, quae acquiritur de communi lege in theologis, de qua etiam nunc est sermo” (Gregorius 
Ariminensis, Lectura, I, prol., q. 1, a. 4 (Trapp I:51)). 
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Strasbourg. Instead of distinguishing the uniqueness of theology from these other types of 
subalternation, he simply denies that the musician or the practitioner of optics really has 
any kind of science, assuming they have not derived their principles from mathematics 
and geometry for themselves. Thus, for Rimini, it is not just that theology is subalterated 
in a “loose” sense. Rather he rejects the idea of subalternated sciences altogether, whether 
they be human or divine.91  
IV. Conclusion 
With this last rebuttal, we can see that Rimini carries forward a line begun by 
Giles to sharply distinguish theology from scientific knowledge. But he also goes further 
than either Giles or Strasbourg and completely breaks the connection between theology 
and evidence. Theological knowledge begins in faith and stays in faith. It cannot even 
claim a kind of certainty from a higher science performed by someone else. Therefore, 
and in conclusion, the knowledge and certainty proper to this habit of reasoning is 
entirely internal. It is a process of reasoning that parallels a scientific discourse, in that it 
proceeds from premises and leads to conclusions. Likewise, when done properly, it 
compels us to assent. But all of this takes place within a specific community rather than 
within the universal community. Those within the community of belief can recognize the 
theologian as someone who “knows” what many within the community do not know. But 
 
91 Ibid., “Ad probationem de musica respect arithmeticae dico quod nullus ignorans arithmetican, nisi 
principia musicae per experientiam aut aliam viam nosset, sed tantummodo crederet, acquireret musicam, 
quae est scientia, sed tantummodo quendam habitum creditivum et quandam fidem, quam, si vellemus, 
possemus appellare musicam creditivam.” 
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to those outside the community who do not begin from belief, the claim to knowledge is 
specious.  
This chapter began by labeling Rimini’s position on the scientific nature of 
theology as paradoxical, yet internally coherent. The position was that the “knowledge” 
produced through theological discourse was both an “inevident” knowledge and a 
“compelled” knowledge. Thus it contains features of both faith and science. It can be 
called faith because it is inevident and not universally recognizable. To perform the 
theological syllogism in a meaningful way and to reach the result of acquired faith, one 
must have the benefit of a previous “stirring” or “moving of the heart.” Theology is 
therefore a discourse for a particular community somehow initiated into a body of truths, 
which are neither self-evident nor argued for. These are for Rimini the first principles of 
theology. But theology is also like science because, for those initiated, into this particular 
discourse, the method of theology is deductive and becomes demonstrative, compelling 
the mind’s assent. That is, the conclusions of theology, qua conclusions, go beyond mere 
apprehension to produce a compelled judicative attitude. Assent to such conclusions 
requires neither a supernatural act of infused faith nor a choice to assent on a part of the 
agent, but only a valid syllogism. The kind of assent that accompanies this valid 
syllogism which begins from believed principles is what Rimini calls acquired faith. The 
possession of this kind of assent is what he thinks separates the theologian from the 
simple believer, and this is what constitutes the essence of properly theological 
knowledge. 
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While this study has been primarily a work of exposition guided by the 
discussions and debates that occur in the primary texts, I close by offering some thoughts 
about how the results of this exposition contribute to a larger story about the history of 
philosophy, the development of the wegesstreit of the fifteenth century, the reformation, 
and early modern philosophy. This is a story that still cannot be told in full; lack of 
research and inaccessibility to texts place a cloud over our understanding of the 
intellectual milieu from the mid-fourteenth century to the end of sixteenth century. As 
such, I offer a few suggestions about how Rimini’s position on theological knowledge 
(vis-à-vis Giles, Aureoli, Ockham, et al.) fits with the few other pieces of the puzzle we 
possess.  
I. Via Buridensis 
Running parallel to Rimini’s description of the theological profession as a 
discipline of self-description rather than self-justification, a related development emerged 
in the arts faculty at Paris around the same time.  
This development is intimately tied to the long teaching career of John Buridan, a 
secular who chose to remain in the arts faculty rather than move on to the theology 
faculty. Buridan received his license to teach in the arts faculty around the mid-1320’s 
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and died sometime before 1361.1 An important study on Buridan by Jack Zupko, written 
in 2003, provides some helpful details. At the close of his book, Zupko writes: 
Buridan never says why he remained a career arts master, but beneath the 
official posture of deference to the theologians was someone who felt very 
passionately about the independence and autonomy of his faculty, who 
believed that philosophy as a properly practiced belonged to the faculty of 
arts, not to theology, or law, or medicine. It is not difficult to see how such 
an idea might lead to the secularization of philosophical practice, which of 
course is one of the features distinguishing later medieval philosophy from 
that of the early modern period. Whether or not Buridan’s teachings 
played any discernible role in this development remains to be seen. But he 
would have approved of it, I think, since it was in this newer, secular 
space that he exercised his own philosophical genius (emphasis mine).2 
I quote Zupko here to emphasize what he calls the “growing secularity” of philosophical 
practice within the arts faculty. This means that at the same time that Rimini emphasized 
that theology’s sphere of practice should be limited only to what can be deduced from 
Scripture, Buridan warned the arts faculty about meddling in matters that go beyond the 
purview of natural reason. At the same time that the Aegidian tradition honed its 
definition of theology proper as restricted in subject matter and set a part by method, 
Buridan inversely distinguished the proper activity of philosophy in the arts faculty.3  
Zupko continues to develop his discussion in chapter ten of his book and 
introduces a critical passage of the Buridanian corpus. Here Buridan highlights the 
 
1 Zupko, Jack, "John Buridan," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/buridan/> 
2 Zupko, John Buridan, 274. 
3 Consider also what Zenon Kaluza says about the Buridan school: “From the beginning then Burdanism 
existed without a clearly determined following in Theology, if not an outright rupture with the superior 
faculty / Dès le début donc le buridanisme s'activait sans une suite clairement déterminée en théologie, 
sinon dans une rupture avec la faculté supérieure” (Kaluza, “Les débuts de l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et 
Cologne),” 218).  
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defining difference between theology and metaphysics (and why they are often 
confused). 
It should be noted that [when we ask whether metaphysics is the same as 
wisdom,] we are not comparing metaphysics to theology, which proceeds 
from beliefs that are not known, because although these beliefs are not 
known per se and most evident, we hold without doubt that theology is the 
more principal discipline and that it is wisdom most properly speaking. In 
this question, however, we are merely asking about intellectual habits 
based on human reason, [i.e.,] those discovered by the process of 
reasoning, which are deduced from what is evident to us. For it is in this 
sense that Aristotle calls metaphysics ‘theology’ and ‘the divine science’. 
Accordingly, metaphysics differs from theology in the fact that although 
each considers God and those things that pertain to divinity, metaphysics 
only considers them as regards what can be proved and implied, or 
inductively inferred, by demonstrative reason. But theology has for its 
principles articles [of faith], which are believed quite apart from their 
evidentness, and further, considers whatever can be deduced from articles 
of this kind.4  
It is this kind of understanding that leads Buridan—a thinker acutely aware of his status 
as a philosopher and not a theologian—to be continually wary of transgressing the 
bounds of philosophy and to be critical of theologians who make forays into 
philosophical matters. So Zupko writes: 
Just as Buridan is loathe to pursue the consequences of intellectual 
memory for post mortem existence, since he would then be an arts mater 
teaching theology, so a theologian would have no business making 
pronouncements about Aristotle’s account of memory, since he would 
then be a theologian teaching arts. As we shall see . . . Buridan reserves 
some his harshest criticisms for Nicholas of Autrecourt, a theologian who 
dared to interpret Aristotle . . .”5 
The result of these two forces—[1] of Rimini’s critique of Aueroli and Marchia’s 
attempts to justify theological knowledge in the eyes of the other sciences and [2] of 
 
4 Qtd. in Zupko, John Buridan, 141. Cf. Johannes Buridan, Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo 
Physicorum libros Aristotelis, (Paris, 1509), f. 4ra-4rb.  
5 Ibid., 140. 
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Buridan’s continued vigilance never to transgress the bounds of philosophy and speculate 
about what only faith can teach—is an easy contentment among the faculties to leave one 
another alone. This was a contentment that we can document into the twilight of the 
fourteenth century. But it is also a contentment that becomes radically challenged at the 
turn of the century. Therefore understanding both the positions and influences of Rimini 
and Buridan is essential for understanding this later story. Our exposition of Rimini’s 
position can contribute to this foundational understanding and thereby illuminate what is 
still to come.  
II. Rimini, Oyta, and Gerson 
In order to point out Rimini’s lasting influence on the topic of theological 
knowledge and the nature of the discipline called “theology,” a few observations about 
two later thinkers ought to be made. The first is Jean Gerson, a well studied late-medieval 
thinker, in comparison to his contemporaries, who flourished at the turn of the fifteenth 
century.6 While a reformer in many ways, Gerson was also a part of the old guard at 
Paris, generally content with the autonomy of the faculties and resistant against those 
who tried to import uncommon or “untraditional” theories into the theological 
discipline.7 A look at his views about the proper task of theology suggests why. Mark 
Burrows writes specifically about Gerson’s view of proper theological method:  
 
6 For a starting point on Gerson see: McGuire, Jean Gerson and the last Medieval Reformation; Hobbins, 
“The Schoolman as Public Intellectual.” 
7 As an example consider Daniel Hobbins description of Gerson’s criticisms: “Gerson understood the 
power of intellectual binding as one of the great purposes of the University of Paris and made no real 
distinction between internal and external correction. In 1398, he applied the principle of theological 
terminology to the teaching of the Spanish mystic Ramon Lull, which he and other masters had prevented 
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Theologiae traditio usually derives, however, directly from the literal 
sense of the revealed Scriptures themselves; these are the horizon in which 
theological discourse finds it bearings and into which it constructs its 
arguments, since the revealed text establishes both the matter and the form 
of theological argument.8 
The preceding study has shown that there is a clear Aegidian precedent for this view. The 
last line is particularly resonant of Rimini’s approach to the discipline of theology. Sacra 
Pagina or the “explicit contents of Scripture” not only contain the principles of this 
discourse, but they also definitively determine and restrict the scope of the theological 
enterprise.  
 Beyond these Aegidian echoes, we can also follow Mark Burrow’s suggestion of 
the source and inspiration behind Gerson’s position. He writes: “[Gerson] thus aligns 
theology, here following his elder colleague Henry Totting of Oyta quite closely, directly 
with exegesis: the text itself establishes the arena of theological discussion…”9 
According to William Courtenay Oyta was at Paris from 1373 to 1378, around the same 
time that Gerson would be engaged in study at Paris.10 While Oyta is not a figure we 
 
from being published (ne doctrina publicetur) because ‘it contains terms used by no doctor’; or as he says 
of Lull’s teaching in the second letter against Ruysbroeck, it ‘departs from the manner of speaking of holy 
doctors and from the doctrinal rule of its tradition as used in the schools’” (Hobbins, Authorship and 
Publicity Before Print, 47–48).  
8 Burrows, Jean Gerson and De consolatione theologiae, 108. 
9 Ibid. Burrows writes of the connection between Gerson and Oyta: “we know from citations found in 
various passages throughout his works that Gerson held Oyta in high esteem and positioned his own view 
of scripture squarely in line with his predecessor at Paris. On this point see G 10, p. 241, in which Gerson 
builds his approach to scripture on the basis of Oyta’s position as expressed in the prologue to his 
Quaestiones sententiarum. It should be noted that Oyta completed this work during the period in which 
Gerson was teaching in the arts faculty at Paris, and just before he commenced with his theological training 
(1382). Several decades later, in writing his own university lectures Contra curiositatem studentium, 
Gerson spoke of ‘venerabilis et venerandus doctor Henricus de Hoyta, qui pro suo merito veteribus aequari 
et inter eruditssimos logicos metaphysicos et theologos numerari potest, dum hanc materiam tractaret, ad 
concordiam conatus est extremia reducere.…’ G 3, pp. 241-242” (Ibid., 108, n. 16). 
10 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 147. For the standard bibliographical reference see Lang, Heinrich Totting 
von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitäten und zur 
Problemgeschichte der Spätscholastik, (Munster i. W. 1937). 
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have looked at, he is, however, a figure that scholarship links to Rimini and the Aegidian 
tradition: a connection which a reading of his own text confirms.  
Albert Lang draws the following conclusion about Oyta:  
Oyta has recognized the fundamental importance of Scripture for theology 
and faith. Present in the truths of Scripture, he saw the essential basic 
principles for theological knowledge/science (wissenshaft). In the end all 
theological statements must be tied to Scripture.11 
And Burrows goes on to summarize Lang’s historical findings: “Here Lang aligns Oyta 
within the Augustinian tradition which included Alfonso Vargas of Toledo, Gregory of 
Rimini, Hugolin of Orvieto, etc.”12 
In his own prologue, Oyta offers a familiar conclusion about the proper nature and 
method of theology that suggests a strong connection to Rimini and the Aegidian 
tradition. He writes:  
Third conclusion: neither merely probable propositions taken from other 
sciences nor propositions evident in the natural light are sufficient 
principles for our theology. This is proved: the articles of faith are like the 
principles of our theology, but they are not probable propositions taken 
from other sciences nor evident in the natural light. This is clear in the 
case of the article of the Trinity and incarnatio, therefore etc.13 
 
11 Lang, “Das Verhältnis von Schrift, Tradition und kirchlichem Lehramt nach Heinrich Totting von Oyta,” 
216–218. “Heinrich von Oyta der Heiligen Schrift die grundlegende Bedeutung für die Theologie und den 
Glauben zuerkannt hat. In den von der Schrift dargebotenen Wahrheiten sah er die unentbehrliche 
Prinzipiengrundlage für die theologische Wissenshaft. . . . Letzlich und wesentlich müssen alle 
theologischen Aussagen auf die Heilige Schrift sich stützen können.” Cited by Burrows, Jean Gerson and 
De consolatione theologiae, 108, n. 16. 
12 Ibid. 
13  Henricus de Oyta, Commentarius, I, prol. tertia conclusio, “Tertio conclusio: nec propositiones mere 
probabiles sumptae ex aliis scientiis, nec propositiones in lumine naturali evidentes sunt nostrae theologiae 
sufficientiae[?] principia. Probatur: articuli fidei sicut principia nostrae theologiae, quia nec sunt 
propositiones probabiles sumptae ex aliis scientiis, nec in naturali lumine evidentes. Hoc patet de articulo 
Trinitates et incarnationis, et igitur” (Prag Univ V.B.25, f. 5vb). 
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In taking this very Rimini-like position, Oyta is especially notable on account of the pair 
of Franciscans he singles out as the opposing authorities to this conclusion.  On the one 
hand, he identifies Peter Aureoli as standing in opposition to the first part of the above 
conclusion, and on the other hand, he identifies Francis of Marchia as the opinion he 
wants to oppose with the second part of the conclusion.14 Working in an Aegidian 
tradition, Oyta continues to oppose any attempt to provide a foundation or justification 
for theological truth that goes outside and beyond faith. The “defense” and argumentation 
of theology is confined for Oyta, as it was for Rimini, to the believing community. 
“Theological knowledge” is a category that only makes sense within the believing 
community and is meaningless and unrecognizable outside of it. 
III. A Time of Transition: Notes from Kaluza. 
From the time Oyta wrote his commentary in the late 1370’s to the turn of the 
fifteenth century we have few witnesses to the intellectual culture and climate at Paris. 
(Besides Oyta, Peter of Candia, Nicholaus of Dinkelsbühl, and Pierre D’Ailly are some of 
the latest accessible commentaries of the fourteenth century, and they were all written in 
the late 1370’s and early 1380’s.) Nevertheless, we know that things were changing. The 
easy autonomy of the arts and theology faculties was beginning to be questioned, and we 
see a revival of speculative theology (what we might call natural theology) and a renewed 
eagerness on behalf of theologians to contribute to philosophy and the natural sciences. 
 
14 For the Oyta paraphrase of Aureoli’s position see, f. 12ra, “Contra [tertiam] conclusionem quo ad 
primam eius partem arguit Aureolus sic…”; Oyta’s response comes at f. 12rb; Oyta’s list of the objections 
of Marchia are visible at f. 12vb “Contra secundum partem conclusionis tertiae est opinio Francisci de 
Marchia…”; Oyta’s response comes on f. 13ra. 
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This story of transition continues to be hard to tell because of lack of study and 
lack of accessible texts. But Zenon Kaluza has provided us with helpful details. The 
paticular movement Kaluza is interested in tracing is the emergence of late-Albertism, 
closely associated with a revival of neo-realism, later referred to as the via antiqua. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the via antiqua is not the conservative movement trying to 
protect the status quo. On the contrary, it is the avant-garde movement attempting to 
shake up the institutional practices established at Paris since the time of Buridan and 
Rimini. On the whole the movement of late-Albertism is really a story that belongs to the 
fifteenth century, with thinkers like Hemericus de Campo and the emergence of 
Dominican dominance at schools besides Paris, notably, Cologne.  
Kaluza, however, is eager to track down the early influences of this fifteenth 
century school. In his article on the beginning of late-Albertism, Kaluza identifies four 
possible causes of a backlash against the status quo at Paris. First, he mentions the 
outright attack on the “school of Buridan” by Jean Maisonneuve at the beginning of the 
century.15 Second, he notes the abandonment of an old statute, of which Rimini and 
Buridan would likely approve—namely, that no student of a higher faculty could at the 
 
15 Kaluza, “Les débuts de l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne),” 217. “La première et peut-être la plus 
difficile à éclairer, c'est l'importance et l'exclusivité accordées par l'école buridanienne de Paris et de 
Cologne aux parva logicalia, clef de leurs analyses logico-sémantiques qui remplaçaient la speculation des 
anciens. Au début du XVe siècle, Jean de Maisonneuve attaque l’école de Buridan sur ce point précis – la 
doctrine des suppositions - et lui reproche une rupture avec l'aristotélisme. Plus tard, en 1414 à Çologne, en 
1474 à Paris, les nominalistes se limiteront à défendre les parva logicalia, comme s'il s'agissait d'une 
philosophie unique, et ne se réclameront pas souvent de la tradition aristotélicienne. Les Colonais diront 
même que l'école de Buridan réduisit "l’enseignement des arts au style humble, aux termes et aux modes de 
parler" qui n'ont rien en commun avec des doctrines traditionnelles. Tel qu'il se manifeste dans les statuts, 
le programme des buridanistes semble donc fondé sur un canon des écrits‐manuels qui limite la philosophie 
à une technique de l'analyse logico-linguistique et la fige dans un minimalisme programmé et dans une 
sorte d'introduction à la lecture d'Aristote.”  
 See also Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et realistes aux confins du XIVe 
et du XVe siècles. 
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same time be a Regent Master (that is, serve in the highest teaching role) in the arts 
faculty. Kaluza documents that at the turn of this century, this rule was frequently 
ignored, which, in turn, encouraged collusion (and perhaps confusion) between 
philosophical and theological practice.16 Third, Kaluza suggests that theologians were 
uncomfortable with the restriction of “nominalist” practice, and this discomfort with 
merely arranging words inclined theologians to “reconnect with a more traditional notion 
of speculation.”17 We know that this is not true in all cases. Henry of Oyta and Pierre 
d’Ailly represent clear examples of people committed to a restricted conception of the 
theologian’s professional tasks. However, their own discussions show that this continued 
to be a hot topic, and this, in turn, suggests that the peace between the independent arts 
and theology faculties was uneasy at best. Fourth and finally, Kaluza suggests that 
rupture between the faculties in the fourteenth century was so great that the simple 
inescapable awareness of this rupture “may have stimulated reflection on the nature of 
 
16 Kaluza, “Les débuts de l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne),” 217. “La seconde raison, c'est l'abandon 
d'une vieille tradition exigeant qu'aucun étudiant des facultés supérieures ne soit régent à la faculté des arts. 
La premiere rupture de cette tradition fut faite à titre exceptionnel pour les sociétaires de la Sorbonne en 
1317. Je ne peux pas indiquer la date exacte à laquelle l'ancienne réglementation est tombée en désuétude 
j'observe seulement qu'en 1379 la règle n'est plus en vigueur, comme le montre le rôle (rotulus) de cette 
même année, où l'on voit une trentaine d'étudiants et de bacheliers en théologie, pour la plupart originaire 
de la province de Reims, exercer simultanément la régence en philosophie. Cette pratique sera plus tard 
reprise par d'autres universités, et notamment par celle de Cologne, où elle jouera un rôle important dans le 
renouveau du réalisme.” 
17 Ibid., 218. “…les théologiens de la seconde moitié du XIVe siècle ne s'accommodaient pas facilement 
du nominalisme qui remplaçait l'analyse des réalités et le discours portant sur les réalités par l'analyse des 
termes et des propositions qui parlent de ces réalités. Dans la mesure où elles désiraient conserver les liens 
avec la foi religieuse, les théologies étaient obligées à dépasser le mode nominaliste et, ce faisant, à renouer 
avec un mode traditionnel de spéculation.” 
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the two disciplines” to the point that “at the end of the fourteenth century voices arose to 
affirm the organic unity of philosophical-theological speculation.”18 
The final suggestion about the impulse to “affirm the organic unity of 
philosophical-theological speculation” is provocative, but proves frustrating when further 
inquiry is made. Kaluza mentions a couple of names, Henry of Langenstein and Giles of 
Charlier, as examples of thinkers who began to question that independence of the 
faculties.19 But in general, scholarship has access to few Sentences Commentaries 
between 1380 and 1410, especially Parisian commentaries. One exception is a 
commentary written in 1392 and 1393 at Paris by Peter Plaoul. Plaoul was a secular 
Master of Theology at Paris during the the 1390’s and was contemporary of Jean Gerson 
and Pierre D’Ailly.20 Kaluza mentions Plaoul’s commentary as having some potential 
relevance to the rise of late-Albertism, and it is a commentary that shows remarkable 
readership by neo-Albertists in the late fifteenth century.21 Kaluza, however, could not 
speculate further at the time of his writing because the text remained unedited. A critical 
edition of Plaoul’s text is now underway and, in its partial form, is already returning 
 
18 Ibid. “Finalement, il est très probable que l'expérience d'un désaccord et d'une rupture entre la 
philosophie buridanienne des artiens et leurs travail et vocation de théologien suscita et stimula une 
réflexion sur la nature de ces deux disciplines et de ces deux spéculations. Toutefois, dès la fin du XIVe 
siècle les voix se lèvent pour affirmer l'unité organique de la spéculation philosophico-théologique.” 
19 Ibid. “Telle est, par exemple, la conviction de Henri de Langenstein, pour qui la théologie s'écoule de la 
métaphysique et la prolonge. Tel est aussi le sens de l'éloge de Thomas d'Aquin et de l'unique reproche fait 
à Albert le Grand par Gilles Charlier.” Langenstein probably wrote his commentary in the 1370’s and 
Gilles of Charlier was a pupil of Jean Gerson and therefore probably wrote his commentary in after the year 
1400. 
20 Cf. Millet, “Pierre Plaoul (1353-1415): une grande figure de l'université de Paris éclipsée par Gerson” 
and Witt, “Biography of Peter Plaoul”. 
21 Ibid., 219. “Une autre trace, ce sont les manuscrits des ouvrages d'Albert le Grand copiés à Paris dès les 
premières années du XVe siècle. Ils sont assez nombreux et témoignent d'un accroissement d'intérêt pour le 
grand dominicain. Parmi les copistes et possesseurs de ces manuscrits on voit plusieurs sociétaires de la 
Sorbonne, Gérard de Perfontaines et Girard Martel, auparavant Pierre Plaoul, plus tard Henri d'Aimart et 
Alard Palenc.” 
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some interesting anecdotal evidence.22 A few select passages are sufficient to show the 
blurring of the lines that Rimini and Buridan each strove to establish.   
First, there is Plaoul’s definition of theology that would surely grate against the 
ears of Rimini. Plaoul writes:  
I call theology: knowledge of the articles of faith deduced in the natural 
light and of those things following from them either directly or indirectly, 
such that [it knows] conclusions about the matter of the Trinity or of God 
and of creatures in themselves and in comparison to God; this type of 
habit of knowing such things with the help of faith, I call theology.23 
No doubt it is strange that Plaoul talks both about knowing “in the natural light” 
and about the “help of faith” in the same breadth. It is Plaoul’s belief that faith acts as a 
restorative agent of the natural intellect, not just an additional source of knowledge.24 
Thus, infused by faith, the theologian is ready to bring “natural arguments” to bear on the 
articles of faith; arguments that are naturally available (or evident) but are still hard for 
most people to see.25 For Rimini and the Aegidian tradition, the starting point of theology 
was the revealed data of faith. Theological knowledge was defined by its opposition to 
                                                 
22 Cf.  Petrus Plaoul Editio Critica Electronica (PPECE), est. March 2011, ed. Jeffrey C. Witt 
<jeffreycwitt.com/plaoul>. 
23 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 12 (Witt, ed. 0.2 n. 15) “Ex praedictas intendo 
describere theologiam et ostendam quod theologia est communis scientia. Pro cuius evidentia, 
describendo theologiam, sciendum est quod ego voco theologiam notitiam articulorum fidei deductorum in 
lumine naturali et aliorum sequentium ex eis sive directe sive indirecte, ita quod, conclusiones circa 
materiam Trinitatis sive ipsius Dei et creaturarum inter se et in comparatione ad Deum et huiusmodi 
habitus cognoscendi talium cum adiutorio fidei, vocabo theologiam.” 
24 Cf. Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 7 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 8-21), esp. n. 8; “Consequenter viso 
qualiter fides sit elevativa et inclinativa intellectus ad summum bonum, videndum est qui sunt languores 
animae qui per fidem removentur.” 
25 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 17 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 2) “Pro cuius tamen materiae 
determinatione, ponam istam conclusionem ‘quamvis fides non intret processum theologicum tamquam 
pars antecedentis theologicam conclusionem probantis, ipsam tamen requiritur ad sic scientifice 
assentiendum’.”  
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beginning in sensible things. But Plaoul is a witness to an alternative kind of theology 
that views faith as of liberation to begin from sensible things with clear eyes. 
Even more interesting is that Plaoul follows this definition of theology with an 
explicit critique against Henry Totting of Oyta. Like Gerson, Plaoul would have been 
studying and teaching in the Arts faculty at Paris while Oyta was preparing to lecture on 
the Sentences.26 In light of his proposed definition he writes: “From this I argue against 
those who believe theology to be different, just as Oyta who says that that theology is not 
superior to faith . . .”27 In the following lecture, he proceeds with a rather clear critique of 
the idea that theology begins from the principles of faith. (Surprisingly, Plaoul, writing 70 
or so years since Aureoli wrote, also includes him in his critique: specifically targeting 
Aureoli’s unwillingness to call theology an “adhesive” habit, that is one that compels 
belief as a true science does.) 
Therefore if theology presupposes faith and takes it as its principles, it 
would then follow that what has been proposed is able to be inferred 
against Peter Aureoli (who says that theology is not an adhesive habit, and 
therefore is not a science because a science is an adhesive habit). On this 
account, theology is, as some say, nothing other than a knowledge of 
consequences and it does not deserve any description other than the 
following: [theology] speaks commonly concerning the posited articles 
and Sacred Scripture and the things contained in Scripture which are 
commonly known and infers from one what follows next. In this way 
theology is nothing other than a part of logic, namely, an obligatory art, 
which should not be said because in this mode it would have to be 
concluded that Claudianus was a theologian, as is clear from the fact that 
he wrote: ‘Christus potens verax,’ etc., which also should be not be 
                                                 
26 While Oyta was preparing his lecture and reading them in the late 70’s (see above n. 10), we know that 
Plaoul received his arts degree at Paris in 1371 and was listed as a bachelor in 1385 (CUP III: 418; cf. 
Millet, “Pierre Plaoul (1353-1415): une grande figure de l’université de Paris éclipsée par Gerson,” 181.). 
At the present we have no indication that he was away from Paris in the interim. 
27 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 12, (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 16): “Ex hoc inferam contra aliquos qui 
aliter imaginantur de theologia sicut Huta, qui dicit quod theologia non est superior fide, quia licet assensus 
theologicus sit clarior fide, non tamen est perfectior.” 
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conceded. Therefore it should be said that theology is a scientific habit and 
adhesive of the articles of the faith.”28 
This quotation reveals a lot. First, Plaoul wants to take an even more extreme 
position that is visible in either Aureoli or Ockham. Not only is theology oriented toward 
supporting and proving the articles of faith, but its discourse is said to be an “adhesive 
scientific” habit, compelling assent to the articles of faith. Likewise, we also find in 
Plaoul familiar worries against the position advanced by Oyta, which is recognizable as 
Aegidian and Ariminensian in character. The worry is that we are just playing with 
words: simply knowing what was said in Scripture and knowing its logical consequence, 
but never acquiring that knowledge which the apostles and prophets used to write the 
Scriptures. This is the familiar worry, which Henry of Ghent and Peter Aureoli were 
eager to avoid,29 and now we see the same concern emerging once more in Plaoul.  
In addition to shaping Plaoul’s conception of theology proper, the curative nature 
of faith, by extension, carries implications for theology’s relationship to philosophy and 
the natural sciences. For example in the tenth lecture of his Prologue he offers a 
provocative corollary: “From these things, I infer some corollaries. First corollary: that no 
truth of human investigation is repugnant to sacred theology or faith. This corollary is 
                                                 
28 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 13, (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 18); “Ergo si theologia praesupponit 
fidem et assumit tamquam principium, sequitur propositum posset etiam inferi contra Petrum Aureoli, qui 
dicit quod theologia non est habitus adhaesivus, et per consequens non est scientia, quia scientia est habitus 
adhaesivus, ita quod aliqui dicunt quod theologia non est nisi notitia consequentiarum, ita quod theologia 
non deservit ad aliud nisi ad hoc: quod positis articulis et Sacra Scriptura et contentis in ea quod homo sciat 
communiter loqui et ex uno inferre reliquum. Et secundum hoc theologia non est nisi una pars 
logicae, scilicet, ars obligatoria, quod non est dicendum, quia isto modo praedicto concedendum esset quod 
Claudianus fuisset theologus, ut patet per illud quod scripsit 'Christus potens verax,' etc., quod non est 
concedendum. Ideo dicendum est quod theologia est habitus scientificus et adhaesivus articulorum fidei, 
sicut dictum fuit in alia lectione.” 
29 See above, c. 6, p. 252. 
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clear because every truth is consonant with every other truth.”30 This is just the kind of 
sentiment that would infuriate Buridan who would see it as an excuse for the theologian 
to mettle in matters that that belong to the domain of the arts faculty and philosophy. 
Likewise, it is a far cry from the kind of restriction on the subject matter of theology so 
important to the Aegidian tradition.31 Plaoul continues this line as follows: “It follows 
finally that true philosophizing requires theology, indeed this is true philosophy.”32 The 
long and short of it is, Plaoul thinks philosophy left to itself is prone to excessive error. 
However, when reason is restored by faith, there is nowhere that it cannot and should not 
extend, opening up possibilities for speculation both about the natural world and about 
divine realities. 
IV. Rimini: a Prologue to the Story of the Long Middle Ages 
As part of our final assessment, I offer the following quotation from William 
Courtenay, who was attempting to assess the changing nature of theological work at Paris 
after Ockham. Speaking loosely of a kind of “Ockhamism” he notes:  
                                                 
30 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 10 (Witt, n. 4): “Ex istis, infero aliqua corollaria. Primum 
corollarium: quod nulla veritas investigationis humanae repugnat sacrae theologiae vel fidei. Patet 
corollarium quia omne verum omni vero consonat.”  
31 Recall Augustinus of Ancona’s poignant use of John the Damascene who said: “All those things which 
are handed down to us through the law in the prophets, the apostles, and the evangelists, we undertake and 
we venerate and we know, while inquiring about nothing beyond these things.” See above, c. 5, p. 232, n. 
18. 
32 Petrus Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 11 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 1): “Sequitur finaliter quod ad vere 
philosophandum requiritur theologia, immo ipsa est vera philosophia.” 
 Despite his belief in the raw power of restored natural reason, Plaoul is quite critical of the 
philosopher left to himself. In the preceding paragraph he writes: “Ex praedictis patet quod articuli 
fidei relinquendi sunt neuter apud vere philosophantes, id est, quod ex puris naturalibus philosophus vere 
philosophando non potest devenire ad notitiam articulorum, et sic non potest determinare quae pars sit vera 
vel non” (Plaoul, Commentarius, I, prol., lectio 10 (Witt, ed. 0.2, n. 18). This, it seems to me, is a rather 
large slap in the face to the kind of autonomy Buridan desired from the arts faculty, and which Rimini was 
willing to grant. 
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One aspect of this increase in Biblical theology and the Biblical 
conception of God [which he thinks is characteristic of ‘Ockhamism’] is 
that theology became less apologetic in the process. The apologetic focus 
of so much of thirteenth century theology—one thinks especially of 
Raymund Lull, Roger Bacon’s Opus Maius, Thomas’ Summa contra 
gentiles and Raymond Martin’s Pugio fidei—was designed to covert the 
Jew and the Moslem and reconvert the heretic. The emergence of a 
scientific theology that could be rationally demonstrated, a theology that 
begins with the existence and nature of god, established a common ground 
for dialogue between Christian and non-Christian. All this began to 
change in 1277. With the attack of the scientific nature of theology and the 
limitation of the amount of knowledge of God that could be gained 
through the unaided reason, theology as a tool for defending the faith and 
converting others was replaced by a more internal and internally consistent 
theological system.33 
As we end this study, I find it apt that Courtenay has zeroed in upon the “internal” nature 
of the theological enterprise in the fourteenth century. This notion of internal defense, 
self-description, and self-identification are key characteristics that have emerged 
throughout this study. But more to the point, there cannot be any doubt that Rimini had a 
great part to play in this shift in orientation and might appropriately be heralded as the 
primary champion of this approach. 
 But this study prompts another question. Should this changing orientation really 
be associated with “Ockhamism” per se? This dissertation argues that it is better to see 
this as the fruit of a recognizeable Aegidian tradition: a tradition that places special 
emphasis on the restricted interest of theology and its strict starting point in the revealed 
data of faith. It is true that in what we recognize as “Ockhamism” there is a decreasing 
confidence in our ability to demonstrate the truths of faith. But this does not 
automatically demand the kind of re-orientation we see in Rimini. We have seen, 
 
33 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 58. 
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especially in the work of Peter Aureoli, that our inability to demonstrate did not mean one 
must reject the idea that theology is the task of external contextualization and justification 
of religious truth within the pantheon of other sciences. Our inability to demonstrate the 
truths of faiths only demands that we adjust our expectations. We saw this most clearly in 
Aureoli’s interpretation of the Augustinian criterion of “defense” and the deployment of 
an arsenal of “probable reasons” drawn for the natural sciences. Ockham’s criticism of 
this method focuses solely on its categorization as a “wisdom.” But he appears to offer no 
critique of the general approach or methodology; thus, at the end of question seven of his 
prologue, he firmly states that he agrees with Aureoli that theology is indeed 
“declarative.”34 
 Rimini, therefore, draws from another source. Whether our natural arguments turn 
out to be demonstrative or probable, he refuses to acknowledge these arguments as 
properly theological. The theologian is, as Courtenay said, internally focused; concerned 
with creating a “consistent theological system”35 and defending that system only within 
the context of the community of belief. This is a unique kind of knowledge: a knowledge 
of self and a knowledge of what one believes, rather than a knowledge of causes. It is a 
view that dominated Paris for the next 50 years and remained one of the dominant 
options through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, though these are both stories that 
still need to be told. But beyond their historical influence, Rimini’s prologue and the 
Aegidio-Augustinian tradition as whole continue to represent a cogent articulation of one 
of the limited number of ways that faith can be “seeking understanding.”
 
34 See above, c. 6, p. 277, n. 54.  
35 Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” 58. 
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